Photography is valued as a medium for recording and visually reproducing features of the world. I... more Photography is valued as a medium for recording and visually reproducing features of the world. I seek to challenge the view that photography is fundamentally a recording process and that every photograph is a record—a view that I claim is based on a ‘single-stage’ misconception of the process. I propose an alternative, ‘multi-stage’ account in which I argue that causal registration of light is not equivalent to recording and reproducing an image. Intervention or non-intervention by photographers is more sophisticated than the traditional view allows. Using the multi-stage account, I describe four models for producing photographic images and pictures.
Some photographs show determinate features of a scene because the photographed scene had those fe... more Some photographs show determinate features of a scene because the photographed scene had those features. This dependency relation is, rightly, a consensus in philosophy of photography. I seek to refute many long-established theories of photography by arguing that they are incompatible with this commitment. In Section II, I classify accounts of photography as either single-stage or multi-stage. In Section III, I analyze the historical basis for single-stage accounts. In Section IV, I explain why the single-stage view led scientists to postulate “latent” photographic images as a technical phenomenon in early chemical photography. In Section V, I discredit the notion of an invisible latent image in chemical photography and, in Section VI, extend this objection to the legacy of the latent image in digital photography. In Section VII, I appeal to the dependency relation to explain why the notion of a latent image makes the single-stage account untenable. Finally, I use the multi-stage ac...
In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is ... more In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is to achieve clarity: to see clearly the logic or grammar of our language. However, his view of clarity underwent an important change, one of many changes that led Wittgenstein to write, in the preface to the Investigations, that his new ideas "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." I argue that certain "grave mistakes" of the Tractatus were due to an idealised conception of clarity, and that a revised understanding of clarity is one of the main achievements of the Investigations. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrongly assumed that when we see language clearly, what we see will be determinate, exact, and complete. In the Investigations he realised that when we see language clearly we cannot specify in advance whether what we see will be determinate or vague, exact or inexact, complete or incomplete. I characterise this insight as a truism: when we see clearly, what we see might not be clear. Wittgenstein wants the Tractatus to serve as a warning to the reader of the Investigations; his own past mistakes are instructive and this is why we should read the Investigations against the background of his old way of thinking.
Self-portrait photography presents an elucidatory range of cases for investigating the relationsh... more Self-portrait photography presents an elucidatory range of cases for investigating the relationship between automatism and artistic agency in photography— a relationship that is seen as a problem in the philosophy of art. I discuss self-portraits by photographers who examine and portray their own identities as artists working in the medium of photography. I argue that the automatism inherent in the production of a photograph has made it possible for artists to extend the tradition of self-portraiture in a way that is radically different from previous visual arts.
In Section I, I explain why self-portraiture offers a way to address the apparent conflict between automatism and agency that is debated in the philosophy of art. In Section II, I explain why mirrors play an important function in the production of a traditional self-portrait. In Sections III and IV, I discuss how photographers may create self-portraits with and without the use of mirrors to show how photography offers unique and important new forms of self-portraiture.
The puzzle that concerns me is whether it is possible to establish a substantive difference betwe... more The puzzle that concerns me is whether it is possible to establish a substantive difference between photographic images and other kinds of visual image, which can explain the special epistemic and aesthetic qualities of photographs, without giving way to scepticism about photographic art.
In this essay I offer a philosophical account of the photographic process which is able to resolve this tension. I use this account to argue that, while some photographs are mind independent, mind independence is not a defining feature of all photographs. My account is substantive because it distinctively distinguishes the photographic process from other image-making processes and is able to explain the special qualities of photographs. It is also schematic, because it covers the fullest range of photographic technologies across a comprehensive range of applications. Finally, it is clarificatory because it is able to clear up misunderstandings and resolve philosophical problems.
Beyond these theoretical aims, my broader purpose is to provide an account that has applicability for a wide range of art history cases and, furthermore, is acceptable to photographic practitioners. The paper was first presented at the Stockholm Museum of Modern Art in an interdiscipinary symposium.
In the autumn of 1913 Ludwig Wittgenstein fled Cambridge for Skjolden in central Norway, in searc... more In the autumn of 1913 Ludwig Wittgenstein fled Cambridge for Skjolden in central Norway, in search of solitude to work without distraction on the problems of logic he had inherited from Bertrand Russell. The eventual product of this work would be the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, completed during Wittgenstein’s active service in the First World War. In Skjolden Wittgenstein designed a small wooden house, intended to be his permanent workplace.
The site chosen was deliberately remote, perched on a cliff ledge facing Skjolden and reached by boat across Lake Eidsvatnet. The building, completed in 1915, was later given to Skjoldener Arne Bolstad, but continued to be used by Wittgenstein as the most significant of his working retreats, notably during 1936-7 whilst writing the manuscripts of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein finally attempted to return there in 1950 shortly before his death.
This article examines the history of the house at Skjolden and discusses its current condition and future legacy.
In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is ... more In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is to achieve clarity: to see clearly the logic or grammar of our language. However, his view of clarity underwent an important change, one of many changes that led Wittgenstein to write, in the preface to the Investigations, that his new ideas “could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.”
I argue that certain “grave mistakes” of the Tractatus were due to an idealised conception of clarity, and that a revised understanding of clarity is one of the main achievements of the Investigations. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrongly assumed that when we see language clearly, what we see will be determinate, exact, and complete. In the Investigations he realised that when we see language clearly we cannot specify in advance whether what we see will be determinate or vague, exact or inexact, complete or incomplete. I characterise this insight as a truism: when we see clearly, what we see might not be clear.
Wittgenstein wants the Tractatus to serve as a warning to the reader of the Investigations; his own past mistakes are instructive and this is why we should read the Investigations against the background of his old way of thinking
I examine the relationship between complete analysis and clarificatory analysis and explain why W... more I examine the relationship between complete analysis and clarificatory analysis and explain why Wittgenstein thought he required both in his account of how to solve the problems of philosophy.
I first describe Wittgenstein’s view of how philosophical confusions arise, by explaining how it is possible to misunderstand the logic of everyday language. I argue that any method of logical analysis in the Tractatus will inevitably be circular, but explain why this does not threaten the prospect of solving philosophical problems. I distinguish between complete and clarificatory analysis and argue that Wittgenstein’s ‘strictly correct’ philosophical method is clarificatory analysis.
Finally I discuss the relationship between the two forms of analysis and claim that, although, at the time of writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed that the possibility of complete analysis underpins clarificatory analysis, in fact this was a mistake. In the Philosophical Investigations complete analysis is rejected and clarificatory analysis is retained
We are told by philosophers that photographs are ‘mind-independent’. In epistemic debates, mind-i... more We are told by philosophers that photographs are ‘mind-independent’. In epistemic debates, mind-independence is viewed as essential for explaining why photographs occupy a distinct category among images. It also justifies a variety of claims about their privileged epistemic and affective status in science, forensics, popular culture and journalism. But, in the philosophy of art, this position has fuelled scepticism: if photographs are mind-independent they are not intimately bound to the intentional states of an artist.
In this article I argue that we can address scepticism in the philosophy of art by overcoming dogmatism in the epistemology of photography. I offer a substantive account of the photographic process and clarify the difference between photographs as images and photographs as pictures. Using this account, I show that it is unnecessary to treat mind-independence as a defining feature of photographs. This opens space to understand that a skilled photographer can create pictures, not just images, by using objects and light sources analogous to a painter using brushes and paint.
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the a... more In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the aim, task and results of philosophy. In this essay I suggest that his ‘picture theory’ of language implies that clarity has aesthetic significance in philosophical work.
Wittgenstein claims that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. In the ‘picture theory’ of thought and language, a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and a proposition is a picture of reality. The question I pose is: how should we construe clarity, if making a thought clear is making clear a picture of reality?
Following a close analysis of the picture theory, paying particular attention to the notions of depicting, presenting and mirroring, I conclude that the result of philosophical work – the clarification of propositions – will be pleasurable, inexpressible and intrinsically valuable. For these reasons I suggest that the attainment of a clear thought is an aesthetic experience.
This article contains a survey of recent debates in the philosophy of photography, focusing on ae... more This article contains a survey of recent debates in the philosophy of photography, focusing on aesthetic and epistemic issues in particular.
Starting from widespread notions about automatism, causality and realism in the theory of photography, the authors ask whether the prima facie tension between the epistemic and aesthetic embodied in oppositions such as automaticism and agency, causality and intentionality, realism and fictional competence is more than apparent.
In this context, the article discusses recent work by Roger Scruton, Dominic Lopes, Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, Noël Carroll, and Patrick Maynard in some detail. Specific topics addressed include: aesthetic scepticism, transparency, imagination, perception, information, representation and depiction.
Arguing about art: contemporary philosophical …, Jan 1, 2007
In his 1983 article, ‘Photography and Representation’, Roger Scruton presented a powerful and pro... more In his 1983 article, ‘Photography and Representation’, Roger Scruton presented a powerful and provocative sceptical position. For most people interested in the aesthetics of photography, this paper represents an important challenge and, over the last twenty years, the many responses have created a rich body of literature. I shall not attempt to survey this literature here, but will focus on the best available response: Dominic Lopes’ 2003 article, ‘The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency’. Lopes provides a particularly clear formulation of Scruton’s original argument and sets out a strengthened version of the sceptical position, in order to argue that even the strengthened position can be defeated. I find Lopes’ argument convincing, as far as it goes; but I shall argue that he does not go far enough. Lopes successfully meets the sceptical challenge he sets up, but does not appreciate that a deeper challenge deserves to be addressed.
According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be representational art. Most r... more According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be representational art. Most responses to Scruton’s Scepticism are versions of the claim that Scruton disregards the extent to which intentionality features in photography. Even if these responses offer appealing or compelling reasons to consider photography an art form, they do not shake Scruton’s position because they cannot force him to give up his notion of the ideal photograph.
My approach is to argue that Scruton has misconstrued the role of causation in his discussion of photography. This exposes a flaw in his account of the ideal photograph and, moreover, a serious flaw in his account of how it is possible to take interest in an ideal photograph. I can highlight what is radical in my approach by the following suggestion: although Scruton insists that the ideal photograph is defined by its ‘merely causal’ provenance, in fact he fails to take the causal provenance of photographs seriously enough.
To replace Scruton's notion of the ideal photograph, I offer a substantive account of the causal provenance of photographs, centred on the distinctive role of ‘the photographic event’. I conclude that, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, we have good reason to re-open the question of photography as a representational art.
Podcast of a philosophy seminar: a paper titled 'Emotion, Imagination and Education' presented by... more Podcast of a philosophy seminar: a paper titled 'Emotion, Imagination and Education' presented by Kathleen Lennon and responses from Constantine Sandis and Dawn Wilson.
Photography is valued as a medium for recording and visually reproducing features of the world. I... more Photography is valued as a medium for recording and visually reproducing features of the world. I seek to challenge the view that photography is fundamentally a recording process and that every photograph is a record—a view that I claim is based on a ‘single-stage’ misconception of the process. I propose an alternative, ‘multi-stage’ account in which I argue that causal registration of light is not equivalent to recording and reproducing an image. Intervention or non-intervention by photographers is more sophisticated than the traditional view allows. Using the multi-stage account, I describe four models for producing photographic images and pictures.
Some photographs show determinate features of a scene because the photographed scene had those fe... more Some photographs show determinate features of a scene because the photographed scene had those features. This dependency relation is, rightly, a consensus in philosophy of photography. I seek to refute many long-established theories of photography by arguing that they are incompatible with this commitment. In Section II, I classify accounts of photography as either single-stage or multi-stage. In Section III, I analyze the historical basis for single-stage accounts. In Section IV, I explain why the single-stage view led scientists to postulate “latent” photographic images as a technical phenomenon in early chemical photography. In Section V, I discredit the notion of an invisible latent image in chemical photography and, in Section VI, extend this objection to the legacy of the latent image in digital photography. In Section VII, I appeal to the dependency relation to explain why the notion of a latent image makes the single-stage account untenable. Finally, I use the multi-stage ac...
In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is ... more In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is to achieve clarity: to see clearly the logic or grammar of our language. However, his view of clarity underwent an important change, one of many changes that led Wittgenstein to write, in the preface to the Investigations, that his new ideas "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." I argue that certain "grave mistakes" of the Tractatus were due to an idealised conception of clarity, and that a revised understanding of clarity is one of the main achievements of the Investigations. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrongly assumed that when we see language clearly, what we see will be determinate, exact, and complete. In the Investigations he realised that when we see language clearly we cannot specify in advance whether what we see will be determinate or vague, exact or inexact, complete or incomplete. I characterise this insight as a truism: when we see clearly, what we see might not be clear. Wittgenstein wants the Tractatus to serve as a warning to the reader of the Investigations; his own past mistakes are instructive and this is why we should read the Investigations against the background of his old way of thinking.
Self-portrait photography presents an elucidatory range of cases for investigating the relationsh... more Self-portrait photography presents an elucidatory range of cases for investigating the relationship between automatism and artistic agency in photography— a relationship that is seen as a problem in the philosophy of art. I discuss self-portraits by photographers who examine and portray their own identities as artists working in the medium of photography. I argue that the automatism inherent in the production of a photograph has made it possible for artists to extend the tradition of self-portraiture in a way that is radically different from previous visual arts.
In Section I, I explain why self-portraiture offers a way to address the apparent conflict between automatism and agency that is debated in the philosophy of art. In Section II, I explain why mirrors play an important function in the production of a traditional self-portrait. In Sections III and IV, I discuss how photographers may create self-portraits with and without the use of mirrors to show how photography offers unique and important new forms of self-portraiture.
The puzzle that concerns me is whether it is possible to establish a substantive difference betwe... more The puzzle that concerns me is whether it is possible to establish a substantive difference between photographic images and other kinds of visual image, which can explain the special epistemic and aesthetic qualities of photographs, without giving way to scepticism about photographic art.
In this essay I offer a philosophical account of the photographic process which is able to resolve this tension. I use this account to argue that, while some photographs are mind independent, mind independence is not a defining feature of all photographs. My account is substantive because it distinctively distinguishes the photographic process from other image-making processes and is able to explain the special qualities of photographs. It is also schematic, because it covers the fullest range of photographic technologies across a comprehensive range of applications. Finally, it is clarificatory because it is able to clear up misunderstandings and resolve philosophical problems.
Beyond these theoretical aims, my broader purpose is to provide an account that has applicability for a wide range of art history cases and, furthermore, is acceptable to photographic practitioners. The paper was first presented at the Stockholm Museum of Modern Art in an interdiscipinary symposium.
In the autumn of 1913 Ludwig Wittgenstein fled Cambridge for Skjolden in central Norway, in searc... more In the autumn of 1913 Ludwig Wittgenstein fled Cambridge for Skjolden in central Norway, in search of solitude to work without distraction on the problems of logic he had inherited from Bertrand Russell. The eventual product of this work would be the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, completed during Wittgenstein’s active service in the First World War. In Skjolden Wittgenstein designed a small wooden house, intended to be his permanent workplace.
The site chosen was deliberately remote, perched on a cliff ledge facing Skjolden and reached by boat across Lake Eidsvatnet. The building, completed in 1915, was later given to Skjoldener Arne Bolstad, but continued to be used by Wittgenstein as the most significant of his working retreats, notably during 1936-7 whilst writing the manuscripts of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein finally attempted to return there in 1950 shortly before his death.
This article examines the history of the house at Skjolden and discusses its current condition and future legacy.
In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is ... more In both the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein claimed that the aim of philosophy is to achieve clarity: to see clearly the logic or grammar of our language. However, his view of clarity underwent an important change, one of many changes that led Wittgenstein to write, in the preface to the Investigations, that his new ideas “could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.”
I argue that certain “grave mistakes” of the Tractatus were due to an idealised conception of clarity, and that a revised understanding of clarity is one of the main achievements of the Investigations. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrongly assumed that when we see language clearly, what we see will be determinate, exact, and complete. In the Investigations he realised that when we see language clearly we cannot specify in advance whether what we see will be determinate or vague, exact or inexact, complete or incomplete. I characterise this insight as a truism: when we see clearly, what we see might not be clear.
Wittgenstein wants the Tractatus to serve as a warning to the reader of the Investigations; his own past mistakes are instructive and this is why we should read the Investigations against the background of his old way of thinking
I examine the relationship between complete analysis and clarificatory analysis and explain why W... more I examine the relationship between complete analysis and clarificatory analysis and explain why Wittgenstein thought he required both in his account of how to solve the problems of philosophy.
I first describe Wittgenstein’s view of how philosophical confusions arise, by explaining how it is possible to misunderstand the logic of everyday language. I argue that any method of logical analysis in the Tractatus will inevitably be circular, but explain why this does not threaten the prospect of solving philosophical problems. I distinguish between complete and clarificatory analysis and argue that Wittgenstein’s ‘strictly correct’ philosophical method is clarificatory analysis.
Finally I discuss the relationship between the two forms of analysis and claim that, although, at the time of writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed that the possibility of complete analysis underpins clarificatory analysis, in fact this was a mistake. In the Philosophical Investigations complete analysis is rejected and clarificatory analysis is retained
We are told by philosophers that photographs are ‘mind-independent’. In epistemic debates, mind-i... more We are told by philosophers that photographs are ‘mind-independent’. In epistemic debates, mind-independence is viewed as essential for explaining why photographs occupy a distinct category among images. It also justifies a variety of claims about their privileged epistemic and affective status in science, forensics, popular culture and journalism. But, in the philosophy of art, this position has fuelled scepticism: if photographs are mind-independent they are not intimately bound to the intentional states of an artist.
In this article I argue that we can address scepticism in the philosophy of art by overcoming dogmatism in the epistemology of photography. I offer a substantive account of the photographic process and clarify the difference between photographs as images and photographs as pictures. Using this account, I show that it is unnecessary to treat mind-independence as a defining feature of photographs. This opens space to understand that a skilled photographer can create pictures, not just images, by using objects and light sources analogous to a painter using brushes and paint.
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the a... more In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the aim, task and results of philosophy. In this essay I suggest that his ‘picture theory’ of language implies that clarity has aesthetic significance in philosophical work.
Wittgenstein claims that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. In the ‘picture theory’ of thought and language, a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and a proposition is a picture of reality. The question I pose is: how should we construe clarity, if making a thought clear is making clear a picture of reality?
Following a close analysis of the picture theory, paying particular attention to the notions of depicting, presenting and mirroring, I conclude that the result of philosophical work – the clarification of propositions – will be pleasurable, inexpressible and intrinsically valuable. For these reasons I suggest that the attainment of a clear thought is an aesthetic experience.
This article contains a survey of recent debates in the philosophy of photography, focusing on ae... more This article contains a survey of recent debates in the philosophy of photography, focusing on aesthetic and epistemic issues in particular.
Starting from widespread notions about automatism, causality and realism in the theory of photography, the authors ask whether the prima facie tension between the epistemic and aesthetic embodied in oppositions such as automaticism and agency, causality and intentionality, realism and fictional competence is more than apparent.
In this context, the article discusses recent work by Roger Scruton, Dominic Lopes, Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, Noël Carroll, and Patrick Maynard in some detail. Specific topics addressed include: aesthetic scepticism, transparency, imagination, perception, information, representation and depiction.
Arguing about art: contemporary philosophical …, Jan 1, 2007
In his 1983 article, ‘Photography and Representation’, Roger Scruton presented a powerful and pro... more In his 1983 article, ‘Photography and Representation’, Roger Scruton presented a powerful and provocative sceptical position. For most people interested in the aesthetics of photography, this paper represents an important challenge and, over the last twenty years, the many responses have created a rich body of literature. I shall not attempt to survey this literature here, but will focus on the best available response: Dominic Lopes’ 2003 article, ‘The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency’. Lopes provides a particularly clear formulation of Scruton’s original argument and sets out a strengthened version of the sceptical position, in order to argue that even the strengthened position can be defeated. I find Lopes’ argument convincing, as far as it goes; but I shall argue that he does not go far enough. Lopes successfully meets the sceptical challenge he sets up, but does not appreciate that a deeper challenge deserves to be addressed.
According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be representational art. Most r... more According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be representational art. Most responses to Scruton’s Scepticism are versions of the claim that Scruton disregards the extent to which intentionality features in photography. Even if these responses offer appealing or compelling reasons to consider photography an art form, they do not shake Scruton’s position because they cannot force him to give up his notion of the ideal photograph.
My approach is to argue that Scruton has misconstrued the role of causation in his discussion of photography. This exposes a flaw in his account of the ideal photograph and, moreover, a serious flaw in his account of how it is possible to take interest in an ideal photograph. I can highlight what is radical in my approach by the following suggestion: although Scruton insists that the ideal photograph is defined by its ‘merely causal’ provenance, in fact he fails to take the causal provenance of photographs seriously enough.
To replace Scruton's notion of the ideal photograph, I offer a substantive account of the causal provenance of photographs, centred on the distinctive role of ‘the photographic event’. I conclude that, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, we have good reason to re-open the question of photography as a representational art.
Podcast of a philosophy seminar: a paper titled 'Emotion, Imagination and Education' presented by... more Podcast of a philosophy seminar: a paper titled 'Emotion, Imagination and Education' presented by Kathleen Lennon and responses from Constantine Sandis and Dawn Wilson.
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In Section I, I explain why self-portraiture offers a way to address the apparent conflict between automatism and agency that is debated in the philosophy of art. In Section II, I explain why mirrors play an important function in the production of a traditional self-portrait. In Sections III and IV, I discuss how photographers may create self-portraits with and without the use of mirrors to show how photography offers unique and important new forms of self-portraiture.
In this essay I offer a philosophical account of the photographic process which is able to resolve this tension. I use this account to argue that, while some photographs are mind independent, mind independence is not a defining feature of all photographs. My account is substantive because it distinctively distinguishes the photographic process from other image-making processes and is able to explain the special qualities of photographs. It is also schematic, because it covers the fullest range of photographic technologies across a comprehensive range of applications. Finally, it is clarificatory because it is able to clear up misunderstandings and resolve philosophical problems.
Beyond these theoretical aims, my broader purpose is to provide an account that has applicability for a wide range of art history cases and, furthermore, is acceptable to photographic practitioners. The paper was first presented at the Stockholm Museum of Modern Art in an interdiscipinary symposium.
The site chosen was deliberately remote, perched on a cliff ledge facing Skjolden and reached by boat across Lake Eidsvatnet. The building, completed in 1915, was later given to Skjoldener Arne Bolstad, but continued to be used by Wittgenstein as the most significant of his working retreats, notably during 1936-7 whilst writing the manuscripts of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein finally attempted to return there in 1950 shortly before his death.
This article examines the history of the house at Skjolden and discusses its current condition and future legacy.
I argue that certain “grave mistakes” of the Tractatus were due to an idealised conception of clarity, and that a revised understanding of clarity is one of the main achievements of the Investigations. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrongly assumed that when we see language clearly, what we see will be determinate, exact, and complete. In the Investigations he realised that when we see language clearly we cannot specify in advance whether what we see will be determinate or vague, exact or inexact, complete or incomplete. I characterise this insight as a truism: when we see clearly, what we see might not be clear.
Wittgenstein wants the Tractatus to serve as a warning to the reader of the Investigations; his own past mistakes are instructive and this is why we should read the Investigations against the background of his old way of thinking
I first describe Wittgenstein’s view of how philosophical confusions arise, by explaining how it is possible to misunderstand the logic of everyday language. I argue that any method of logical analysis in the Tractatus will inevitably be circular, but explain why this does not threaten the prospect of solving philosophical problems. I distinguish between complete and clarificatory analysis and argue that Wittgenstein’s ‘strictly correct’ philosophical method is clarificatory analysis.
Finally I discuss the relationship between the two forms of analysis and claim that, although, at the time of writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed that the possibility of complete analysis underpins clarificatory analysis, in fact this was a mistake. In the Philosophical Investigations complete analysis is rejected and clarificatory analysis is retained
In this article I argue that we can address scepticism in the philosophy of art by overcoming dogmatism in the epistemology of photography. I offer a substantive account of the photographic process and clarify the difference between photographs as images and photographs as pictures. Using this account, I show that it is unnecessary to treat mind-independence as a defining feature of photographs. This opens space to understand that a skilled photographer can create pictures, not just images, by using objects and light sources analogous to a painter using brushes and paint.
Wittgenstein claims that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. In the ‘picture theory’ of thought and language, a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and a proposition is a picture of reality. The question I pose is: how should we construe clarity, if making a thought clear is making clear a picture of reality?
Following a close analysis of the picture theory, paying particular attention to the notions of depicting, presenting and mirroring, I conclude that the result of philosophical work – the clarification of propositions – will be pleasurable, inexpressible and intrinsically valuable. For these reasons I suggest that the attainment of a clear thought is an aesthetic experience.
Starting from widespread notions about automatism, causality and realism in the theory of photography, the authors ask whether the prima facie tension between the epistemic and aesthetic embodied in oppositions such as automaticism and agency, causality and intentionality, realism and fictional competence is more than apparent.
In this context, the article discusses recent work by Roger Scruton, Dominic Lopes, Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, Noël Carroll, and Patrick Maynard in some detail. Specific topics addressed include: aesthetic scepticism, transparency, imagination, perception, information, representation and depiction.
My approach is to argue that Scruton has misconstrued the role of causation in his discussion of photography. This exposes a flaw in his account of the ideal photograph and, moreover, a serious flaw in his account of how it is possible to take interest in an ideal photograph. I can highlight what is radical in my approach by the following suggestion: although Scruton insists that the ideal photograph is defined by its ‘merely causal’ provenance, in fact he fails to take the causal provenance of photographs seriously enough.
To replace Scruton's notion of the ideal photograph, I offer a substantive account of the causal provenance of photographs, centred on the distinctive role of ‘the photographic event’. I conclude that, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, we have good reason to re-open the question of photography as a representational art.
In Section I, I explain why self-portraiture offers a way to address the apparent conflict between automatism and agency that is debated in the philosophy of art. In Section II, I explain why mirrors play an important function in the production of a traditional self-portrait. In Sections III and IV, I discuss how photographers may create self-portraits with and without the use of mirrors to show how photography offers unique and important new forms of self-portraiture.
In this essay I offer a philosophical account of the photographic process which is able to resolve this tension. I use this account to argue that, while some photographs are mind independent, mind independence is not a defining feature of all photographs. My account is substantive because it distinctively distinguishes the photographic process from other image-making processes and is able to explain the special qualities of photographs. It is also schematic, because it covers the fullest range of photographic technologies across a comprehensive range of applications. Finally, it is clarificatory because it is able to clear up misunderstandings and resolve philosophical problems.
Beyond these theoretical aims, my broader purpose is to provide an account that has applicability for a wide range of art history cases and, furthermore, is acceptable to photographic practitioners. The paper was first presented at the Stockholm Museum of Modern Art in an interdiscipinary symposium.
The site chosen was deliberately remote, perched on a cliff ledge facing Skjolden and reached by boat across Lake Eidsvatnet. The building, completed in 1915, was later given to Skjoldener Arne Bolstad, but continued to be used by Wittgenstein as the most significant of his working retreats, notably during 1936-7 whilst writing the manuscripts of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein finally attempted to return there in 1950 shortly before his death.
This article examines the history of the house at Skjolden and discusses its current condition and future legacy.
I argue that certain “grave mistakes” of the Tractatus were due to an idealised conception of clarity, and that a revised understanding of clarity is one of the main achievements of the Investigations. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrongly assumed that when we see language clearly, what we see will be determinate, exact, and complete. In the Investigations he realised that when we see language clearly we cannot specify in advance whether what we see will be determinate or vague, exact or inexact, complete or incomplete. I characterise this insight as a truism: when we see clearly, what we see might not be clear.
Wittgenstein wants the Tractatus to serve as a warning to the reader of the Investigations; his own past mistakes are instructive and this is why we should read the Investigations against the background of his old way of thinking
I first describe Wittgenstein’s view of how philosophical confusions arise, by explaining how it is possible to misunderstand the logic of everyday language. I argue that any method of logical analysis in the Tractatus will inevitably be circular, but explain why this does not threaten the prospect of solving philosophical problems. I distinguish between complete and clarificatory analysis and argue that Wittgenstein’s ‘strictly correct’ philosophical method is clarificatory analysis.
Finally I discuss the relationship between the two forms of analysis and claim that, although, at the time of writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed that the possibility of complete analysis underpins clarificatory analysis, in fact this was a mistake. In the Philosophical Investigations complete analysis is rejected and clarificatory analysis is retained
In this article I argue that we can address scepticism in the philosophy of art by overcoming dogmatism in the epistemology of photography. I offer a substantive account of the photographic process and clarify the difference between photographs as images and photographs as pictures. Using this account, I show that it is unnecessary to treat mind-independence as a defining feature of photographs. This opens space to understand that a skilled photographer can create pictures, not just images, by using objects and light sources analogous to a painter using brushes and paint.
Wittgenstein claims that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. In the ‘picture theory’ of thought and language, a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and a proposition is a picture of reality. The question I pose is: how should we construe clarity, if making a thought clear is making clear a picture of reality?
Following a close analysis of the picture theory, paying particular attention to the notions of depicting, presenting and mirroring, I conclude that the result of philosophical work – the clarification of propositions – will be pleasurable, inexpressible and intrinsically valuable. For these reasons I suggest that the attainment of a clear thought is an aesthetic experience.
Starting from widespread notions about automatism, causality and realism in the theory of photography, the authors ask whether the prima facie tension between the epistemic and aesthetic embodied in oppositions such as automaticism and agency, causality and intentionality, realism and fictional competence is more than apparent.
In this context, the article discusses recent work by Roger Scruton, Dominic Lopes, Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, Noël Carroll, and Patrick Maynard in some detail. Specific topics addressed include: aesthetic scepticism, transparency, imagination, perception, information, representation and depiction.
My approach is to argue that Scruton has misconstrued the role of causation in his discussion of photography. This exposes a flaw in his account of the ideal photograph and, moreover, a serious flaw in his account of how it is possible to take interest in an ideal photograph. I can highlight what is radical in my approach by the following suggestion: although Scruton insists that the ideal photograph is defined by its ‘merely causal’ provenance, in fact he fails to take the causal provenance of photographs seriously enough.
To replace Scruton's notion of the ideal photograph, I offer a substantive account of the causal provenance of photographs, centred on the distinctive role of ‘the photographic event’. I conclude that, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, we have good reason to re-open the question of photography as a representational art.