Aristotle's theory of a virtuous Mean, or mesotēs, has a range of application that is widely unde... more Aristotle's theory of a virtuous Mean, or mesotēs, has a range of application that is widely underestimated. A Mean, stripped of extraneous properties, is best thought of as a case of goaloriented goodness. Contrary to what many commentators assume, it need not be objectionably quantitative. The theory of the Mean applies to both acts and dispositions. It is not restricted to intermediate states of feeling or emotion, and it can cover many cases of obligation. It deserves to be rehabilitated, since the failure to grasp its structure leads to frequent confusions in everyday criticism.
Explores the Euthyphro dilemma and its broader significance. The dilemma which Socrates poses to ... more Explores the Euthyphro dilemma and its broader significance. The dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.
It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s theory of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues... more It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s theory of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues are not typically flanked by two opposing vices as he claimed. However, a restatement of Aristotle’s view in terms of sufficiency for an objective reveals that the Mean is more widely applicable than has sometimes been alleged. Understood as a special case of sufficiency, the Mean is implicit in many judgments of right and wrong. I defend Aristotle against some objections, but acknowledge that a certain tension exists in Aristotle's theory of the good.
Abstract: Aesthetic and Some Other Forms of Value
A single thread runs through superficially div... more Abstract: Aesthetic and Some Other Forms of Value
A single thread runs through superficially diverse appraisals of monetary, historic, personal and aesthetic value; namely the ability of a thing being evaluated to realize respective ends in view. Various considerations point to the need to distinguish between an evaluated thing, the ends for which it is judged, and the value itself. Bearing this threefold distinction in mind while resisting a common confusion between semantic and pragmatic aspects of evaluative utterances can help forestall exaggerated skepticism about aesthetic value.
Aristotle's theory of a virtuous Mean, or mesotēs, has a range of application that is widely unde... more Aristotle's theory of a virtuous Mean, or mesotēs, has a range of application that is widely underestimated. A Mean, stripped of extraneous properties, is best thought of as a case of goaloriented goodness. Contrary to what many commentators assume, it need not be objectionably quantitative. The theory of the Mean applies to both acts and dispositions. It is not restricted to intermediate states of feeling or emotion, and it can cover many cases of obligation. It deserves to be rehabilitated, since the failure to grasp its structure leads to frequent confusions in everyday criticism.
Explores the Euthyphro dilemma and its broader significance. The dilemma which Socrates poses to ... more Explores the Euthyphro dilemma and its broader significance. The dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.
It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s theory of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues... more It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s theory of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues are not typically flanked by two opposing vices as he claimed. However, a restatement of Aristotle’s view in terms of sufficiency for an objective reveals that the Mean is more widely applicable than has sometimes been alleged. Understood as a special case of sufficiency, the Mean is implicit in many judgments of right and wrong. I defend Aristotle against some objections, but acknowledge that a certain tension exists in Aristotle's theory of the good.
Abstract: Aesthetic and Some Other Forms of Value
A single thread runs through superficially div... more Abstract: Aesthetic and Some Other Forms of Value
A single thread runs through superficially diverse appraisals of monetary, historic, personal and aesthetic value; namely the ability of a thing being evaluated to realize respective ends in view. Various considerations point to the need to distinguish between an evaluated thing, the ends for which it is judged, and the value itself. Bearing this threefold distinction in mind while resisting a common confusion between semantic and pragmatic aspects of evaluative utterances can help forestall exaggerated skepticism about aesthetic value.
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A single thread runs through superficially diverse appraisals of monetary, historic, personal and aesthetic value; namely the ability of a thing being evaluated to realize respective ends in view. Various considerations point to the need to distinguish between an evaluated thing, the ends for which it is judged, and the value itself. Bearing this threefold distinction in mind while resisting a common confusion between semantic and pragmatic aspects of evaluative utterances can help forestall exaggerated skepticism about aesthetic value.
A single thread runs through superficially diverse appraisals of monetary, historic, personal and aesthetic value; namely the ability of a thing being evaluated to realize respective ends in view. Various considerations point to the need to distinguish between an evaluated thing, the ends for which it is judged, and the value itself. Bearing this threefold distinction in mind while resisting a common confusion between semantic and pragmatic aspects of evaluative utterances can help forestall exaggerated skepticism about aesthetic value.