The inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine promises to transform the art of th... more The inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine promises to transform the art of the possible in Europe and Eurasia. But it remains to be seen whether the new president will hold power or simply hold office. The most dangerous period in any revolution usually arises just after it takes place. At home and in the former Soviet Union, Yushchenko confronts a nexus of power that is ingrown, opaque and still highly resourceful. There are grounds for hope: a political culture which, by post-Soviet standards, is democratic and pluralistic; the Euro-Atlantic orientation of many who work inside State structures; a considerable degree of ethnic and linguistic tolerance; and (despite recent appearances) the lack of strong separatist sentiment. There are also grounds for prudence: the scale of public expectations; the tenacity of criminal structures; strong regional divisions and a complex international environment. Until Russia changes its paradigm of geopolitics and “good neighborliness,” it will pose serious problems for Ukraine. Until the West reinforces Ukraine’s advance by changes in policy, its transformation will be precarious and its prospects uncertain.
This chapter assesses the cumulative impact of the geopolitical changes on the European continent... more This chapter assesses the cumulative impact of the geopolitical changes on the European continent since the 1994 cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and considers the dangers they pose. The West’s relations with Russia began with illusory geopolitics of partnership, which around 1999 transformed into increasing tension. From the war in Georgia in 2008, however, a new form of confrontational geopolitics descended over Europe. The latest geopolitical changes set in motion by the Ukraine conflict threaten to tip the awkward balances that have prevailed for over two decades over fault lines and even precipices. More than at any time in the recent past, the South Caucasus finds itself becoming a rear staging area for conflict elsewhere. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are being dragged into problems not of their own making, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can no longer be treated as a faraway local difficulty of little import to the world around it.
The Soviet Union will survive its economic difficulties, but it is unlikely to surmount them. Twe... more The Soviet Union will survive its economic difficulties, but it is unlikely to surmount them. Twenty-five years ago, such a prognosis would have astounded many. In the wake of Sputnik a large number of observers, sympathetic and hostile, were convinced that the USSR’s technical and scientific prowess, and the planning system which underpinned it, posed a profound challenge to the West’s values, institutions and international standing. A fresh listening to the 1960 Kennedy—Nixon debates is enough to rekindle the exaggerated sense of urgency then felt that Communism represented the wave of the future, as its adherents had prophesied. l Today it is commonly held that the Soviet economy is an albatross — an albatross in the form of heavy military outlays, hard currency imports, and a lengthening backlog of consumer demands. It is widely accepted that this system ‘has nothing to teach us’. Indeed, the fashion in many quarters is to ponder whether the West possesses the discipline and finesse to ‘manage’ the USSR’s decline — or perhaps accelerate it. Several questions motivate this discussion. Is Western conventional wisdom a better guide to reality today than it was twenty-five years ago? What precisely is at fault with the Soviet economy, and to what extent is improvement possible? What are the implications of economic strain for Soviet power, internally and externally? Can outside pressure play a role in influencing the course of events?
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Jun 1, 2008
Not for the first time, the Black Sea region finds itself between zones of geopolitics and compet... more Not for the first time, the Black Sea region finds itself between zones of geopolitics and competing geopolitical dogmas. Yet within only a few years, the framework has appreciably changed. The impact of 9/11 and, still more recently, the recovery of Russia’s confidence make it essential for the states of the region to recalculate the art of the possible and the methods of realizing it. This is also true for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). These entities still have a largely post‐Cold War and post‐modern approach to a region that is, once again, becoming a zone of Realpolitik. It is essential that this challenge be understood with perspective and adapted to in a way that does not jettison the achievements of the 1990s and the thinking that underpinned them.
Even before Ukraine’s President, Leonid Kuchma, issued his 15 December 1999 decree launching the ... more Even before Ukraine’s President, Leonid Kuchma, issued his 15 December 1999 decree launching the country’s latest and most serious programme of defence reform, few were prepared to argue that Ukraine’s armed forces could respond to the country’s novel and complex security challenges ‘in an effective and efficient way’. Almost three years previously, the National Security and Defence Concept of Ukraine (14 January 1997) defined a set of security problems fundamentally different from those which the Soviet armed forces were designed to address. In setting out their vision of a volunteer force by 2015, the authors of Ukraine’s State Programme of Armed Forces Development and Reform 2001–5 (May 2000) recognise that a conscript-based force will not be able to address these challenges effectively, whatever other reforms take place. They also recognise that these other reforms — in operational concepts, force structure, command and control, training and education — must take place. Critically, they also recognise that without the establishment of a coherent and professional defence and security system, these reforms will not achieve their potential. Nevertheless, the fact remains that beyond ‘leading’ and expert circles, most of Ukraine’s military and political establishment underestimate the incongruity that exists between state policy and the unofficial norms, attitudes and working cultures which define ‘life itself’ in the armed forces.
The inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine promises to transform the art of th... more The inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine promises to transform the art of the possible in Europe and Eurasia. But it remains to be seen whether the new president will hold power or simply hold office. The most dangerous period in any revolution usually arises just after it takes place. At home and in the former Soviet Union, Yushchenko confronts a nexus of power that is ingrown, opaque and still highly resourceful. There are grounds for hope: a political culture which, by post-Soviet standards, is democratic and pluralistic; the Euro-Atlantic orientation of many who work inside State structures; a considerable degree of ethnic and linguistic tolerance; and (despite recent appearances) the lack of strong separatist sentiment. There are also grounds for prudence: the scale of public expectations; the tenacity of criminal structures; strong regional divisions and a complex international environment. Until Russia changes its paradigm of geopolitics and “good neighborliness,” it will pose serious problems for Ukraine. Until the West reinforces Ukraine’s advance by changes in policy, its transformation will be precarious and its prospects uncertain.
This chapter assesses the cumulative impact of the geopolitical changes on the European continent... more This chapter assesses the cumulative impact of the geopolitical changes on the European continent since the 1994 cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and considers the dangers they pose. The West’s relations with Russia began with illusory geopolitics of partnership, which around 1999 transformed into increasing tension. From the war in Georgia in 2008, however, a new form of confrontational geopolitics descended over Europe. The latest geopolitical changes set in motion by the Ukraine conflict threaten to tip the awkward balances that have prevailed for over two decades over fault lines and even precipices. More than at any time in the recent past, the South Caucasus finds itself becoming a rear staging area for conflict elsewhere. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are being dragged into problems not of their own making, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can no longer be treated as a faraway local difficulty of little import to the world around it.
The Soviet Union will survive its economic difficulties, but it is unlikely to surmount them. Twe... more The Soviet Union will survive its economic difficulties, but it is unlikely to surmount them. Twenty-five years ago, such a prognosis would have astounded many. In the wake of Sputnik a large number of observers, sympathetic and hostile, were convinced that the USSR’s technical and scientific prowess, and the planning system which underpinned it, posed a profound challenge to the West’s values, institutions and international standing. A fresh listening to the 1960 Kennedy—Nixon debates is enough to rekindle the exaggerated sense of urgency then felt that Communism represented the wave of the future, as its adherents had prophesied. l Today it is commonly held that the Soviet economy is an albatross — an albatross in the form of heavy military outlays, hard currency imports, and a lengthening backlog of consumer demands. It is widely accepted that this system ‘has nothing to teach us’. Indeed, the fashion in many quarters is to ponder whether the West possesses the discipline and finesse to ‘manage’ the USSR’s decline — or perhaps accelerate it. Several questions motivate this discussion. Is Western conventional wisdom a better guide to reality today than it was twenty-five years ago? What precisely is at fault with the Soviet economy, and to what extent is improvement possible? What are the implications of economic strain for Soviet power, internally and externally? Can outside pressure play a role in influencing the course of events?
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Jun 1, 2008
Not for the first time, the Black Sea region finds itself between zones of geopolitics and compet... more Not for the first time, the Black Sea region finds itself between zones of geopolitics and competing geopolitical dogmas. Yet within only a few years, the framework has appreciably changed. The impact of 9/11 and, still more recently, the recovery of Russia’s confidence make it essential for the states of the region to recalculate the art of the possible and the methods of realizing it. This is also true for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). These entities still have a largely post‐Cold War and post‐modern approach to a region that is, once again, becoming a zone of Realpolitik. It is essential that this challenge be understood with perspective and adapted to in a way that does not jettison the achievements of the 1990s and the thinking that underpinned them.
Even before Ukraine’s President, Leonid Kuchma, issued his 15 December 1999 decree launching the ... more Even before Ukraine’s President, Leonid Kuchma, issued his 15 December 1999 decree launching the country’s latest and most serious programme of defence reform, few were prepared to argue that Ukraine’s armed forces could respond to the country’s novel and complex security challenges ‘in an effective and efficient way’. Almost three years previously, the National Security and Defence Concept of Ukraine (14 January 1997) defined a set of security problems fundamentally different from those which the Soviet armed forces were designed to address. In setting out their vision of a volunteer force by 2015, the authors of Ukraine’s State Programme of Armed Forces Development and Reform 2001–5 (May 2000) recognise that a conscript-based force will not be able to address these challenges effectively, whatever other reforms take place. They also recognise that these other reforms — in operational concepts, force structure, command and control, training and education — must take place. Critically, they also recognise that without the establishment of a coherent and professional defence and security system, these reforms will not achieve their potential. Nevertheless, the fact remains that beyond ‘leading’ and expert circles, most of Ukraine’s military and political establishment underestimate the incongruity that exists between state policy and the unofficial norms, attitudes and working cultures which define ‘life itself’ in the armed forces.
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