Dan López de Sa

ICREA, Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, Universitat de Barcelona, Faculty Member

University of Aberdeen, Department of Philosophy and Northern Institute of Philosophy, NIP Associate Fellow

Universitat de Barcelona, Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència, Faculty Member

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I am ICREA Research Professor at the Departament de Lògica, Història, i Filosofia de la Ciència of the Universitat de Barcelona, adjunct coordinator of LOGOS, and honorary associate fellow at NIP (Aberdeen).

I did my PhD in Barcelona (visiting ANU for a short while). I was Arché Postdoc in St Andrews (2004-06), Fullbright-GenCat Postdoc at NYU (2006-07), and I rejoined LOGOS as an ICREA Researcher (2007-12) and then RyC (2012-13).

I work on matters issuing from words –vagueness, contextualism/relativism, rigidity– and issues where words don't really matter (much) –truthmaking, grounding, time, disagreement, values–. In between, I have an increasing interest in topics around gender, race, and sexuality.

I have published papers in Analysis, Mind, Noûs, Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Studies, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, and Synthèse, among others.

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Papers by Dan López de Sa

Rigid vs. Flexible Response-Dependent Properties

Varieties of Dependence

The Non-circularity Constraint : Peacocke vs

According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be in... more According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be individuated by providing the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that concept. Hence possessions conditions for concepts should be specifiable in a way that respects a non-circularity constraint. In a more recent paper “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality” (1998a) Peacocke argues against his former view, in the light of the phenomenon of rationally accepting principles which do not follow from what the thinker antecedently accepts. In this paper I defend the view of the book from his more recent criticisms, claiming that the noncircularity constraint should be respected, and that Peacocke's more recent insights could be accommodated in the framework of his former theory of concepts. One of the main tenets of A Study of Concepts (1992) was what Christopher Peacocke labeled “Principle of Dependence:” There can be nothing more to the nature of a concept ...

El presidente del Tribunal Supremo: ¿Un problema metafísico?

Disagreements and Disputes About Matters of Taste

Perspectives on Taste, 2022

Who Reclaims Slurs?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2022

The Non-circularity Constraint: Peacocke vs. Peacocke*

para poseerlo. De ahí que las condiciones de posesión deban ser especificables de un modo que res... more para poseerlo. De ahí que las condiciones de posesión deban ser especificables de un modo que respeten un requisito de no-circularidad. En un artículo más reciente “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality”, (1998a) Peacocke argumenta en contra de su anterior teoría, a la luz del fenómeno que consiste en aceptar racionalmente principios que no se siguen de cosas que el pensador aceptaba previamente. En este artículo defiendo la teoría del libro, manteniendo que el requisito de no-circularidad debe ser respetado, y que las ideas más recientes de Peacocke se pueden acomodar en el marco de su anterior teoría acerca de los conceptos. According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be individuated by providing the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that concept. Hence possessions conditions for concepts should be specifiable in a way that respects a non-circularity constraint. In a more recent paper “Implicit Conce...

Response-dependencies: colors and values

La nocion de dependencia de respuesta se introdujo con el objetivo de generalizar la nocion de cu... more La nocion de dependencia de respuesta se introdujo con el objetivo de generalizar la nocion de cualidad secundaria, de un modo que cubriera a los valores tambien, reivindicando asi el realismos evaluativo, La tesis distingue dos tipos de dependencia de respuesta: rigida y flexible, y defiende que solo el primero y no el segundo es capaz de reivindicar el realismo, mientras que los valores, en contra de lo que presumiblemente pasa con los colores, son propiedades dependientes de respuesta en el sentido flexible. Es asi un trabajo en Metafisica contemporanea, pero tambien en meta-etica y filosofia del lenguaje.

The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the Colors

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2013

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Williamson on unclarity "De Re

Flexible Property Designators

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2006

What is said:" indexical vs non-indexical contextualisms: abstract

Actas Del V Congreso De La Sociedad De Logica Metodologia Y Filosofia De La Ciencia En Espana 2006 Isbn 978 84 9349419 3 Pags 170 171, 2006

Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist Relativist Account

Erkenntnis, 2014

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of a... more Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of (existent) disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis (Proc Aristot Soc 63(Suppl):113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa (Relative truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of (existent) disagreement.

Audience in Context

Erkenntnis, 2014

In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitiv... more In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine the appropriate truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of this note is to explore how this may not be so.