Papers by Julia Mosquera
The International Journal of Philosophical Studies , 2022
Climate change evokes different emotions in people. Recently, climate emotions have become a matt... more Climate change evokes different emotions in people. Recently, climate emotions have become a matter of normative scrutiny in the public debate. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the normativization of climate emotions, manifests at two levels. At the individual level, people are faced with affective dilemmas, situations where they are genuinely uncertain about what is the right way to feel in the face of climate change. At the collective level, the public debate reflects disagreement about which emotions are appropriate to feel in the climate context. The aim of this paper is to examine the normative reasons in favour of different climate emotions by combining normative criteria from philosophy and psychology, such as rationality-based and consequentialist ones. We conclude that these criteria provide partial reasons for or against different climate emotions and that the suitability of each criterion will depend on various considerations, including the specific object that the emotion is directed to. We suggest that emotional disagreement in climate contexts may generate distrust, potentially hindering cooperation for climate action. We propose that we can ease challenges like this if we come to terms with the complex nature of climate emotions and their normative justification.
Theoria, 2022
Definitions of disability are useful for different purposes and carry normative significance. How... more Definitions of disability are useful for different purposes and carry normative significance. However, defining disability has proven a difficult task. Communities with different theoretical backgrounds and practical aims disagree about how to define disability. Recently, Chong-Ming Lim (2018) has attempted to define disability in a manner accommodating of the different interests and theoretical commitments of the disability and the medical communities. His account aims at broadening Elizabeth Barnes' (2016) definition of disability, which is not sufficiently inclusive of the interests of the medical community and leaves out cases other than physical disabilities. Under the most plausible interpretation of his account, however, the account becomes more restrictive than that of Barnes. In this paper, I propose instead two kinds of accounts: a disjunctive one based on a reinterpretation of Lim's, and a cluster concept account of disability. Both accounts can avoid the restrictiveness problem faced by Lim's and Barnes' original accounts.
Utilitas, 2022
According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as... more According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as negative egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The egalitarian value of a population is a function of both pairwise relations of inequality (negative) and pairwise relations of equality (positive). Positive and negative egalitarianism diverge, especially in different-number cases. Hence, an investigation of positive egalitarianism might shed new light on the vexed topic of population ethics and our duties to future generations. We shall here, in light of some recent criticism, further develop the idea of giving positive value to equal relations.
The Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 2021
In her widely known paper “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” Elizabeth Barnes defends the v... more In her widely known paper “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” Elizabeth Barnes defends the view that disability is a mere difference (Mere-Difference View, or MDV). Her paper is a response to critics who argue that the MDV implies the permissibility of inflicting disability. Barnes defends the view that inflicting disability is nevertheless morally wrong because of (1) the transition costs of becoming disabled, and (2) the Principle of Non-Interference (PNI). This chapter argues that although Barnes is right in affirming that inflicting disability is morally wrong, the arguments she provides in support of this conclusion are unsuccessful in a number of cases. Absent better defense, the MDV remains susceptible to permitting the infliction of disability.
Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem, 2020
In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two... more In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes (e.g. being a parent and being a non-parent) unless one can grasp what these outcomes are like; and (2) one can evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.
Deprivations normally give rise to undeserved inequality. It is commonly thought that one way of ... more Deprivations normally give rise to undeserved inequality. It is commonly thought that one way of improving a situation with respect to equality is by reducing the incidence of deprivations. In this paper I argue that there is at least one respect in which reducing the incidence of deprivations can make things worse from the point of view of equality. While eliminating deprivations leads to the elimination of inequalities, reducing the incidence of deprivations leads to an uneven distribution of the pairwise relations of inequality of a population, which leads to the concentration of pairwise relations of inequality in the worse off. If my argument is correct, egalitarians have reasons to broaden their dimensions of concern: egalitarians should not only be concerned about the unequal distribution of goods, but also about the unequal distribution of pairwise relations of inequality of a population.
Review of Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability (Oxford: Oxford University ... more Review of Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 224, £25. Ratio. doi:10.1111/rati.12151
Blog Posts, Interviews, etc. by Julia Mosquera
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Papers by Julia Mosquera
Blog Posts, Interviews, etc. by Julia Mosquera