The Vienna Circle was an influential group of philosophers in the early 20 th century. Its member... more The Vienna Circle was an influential group of philosophers in the early 20 th century. Its members were dedicated to do philosophy and to conduct research in accordance with the guidelines of the scientific world-conception. For some of them, Oswald Spengler was a dangerous antagonist due to the success and influence of his metaphysical philosophy of history in Der Untergang des Abendlandes and other works. In this paper, I will explore systematically the Circle's critical reception of Spengler regarding his methodological approaches, ontological positions, and political philosophy. I will, thereby, also evaluate the criticism brought forth against Spengler.
In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of experiments to test whether the w... more In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of experiments to test whether the will is free. Whilst he originally assumed that the will functions like an immaterial initiator of cerebral processes culminating in actions, he later began to think that it rather works like an immaterial veto inhibiting unwanted actions by preventing unconsciously initiated cerebral processes from unfolding. Libet's veto was widely criticized for its Cartesian dualist and interactionist implications. However, in 2016, Schultze-Kraft et al. adopted Libet's idea of an action-inhibiting veto and conducted a new experiment. Its goal was to test until which moment agents can inhibit an action that they already intended to do. Despite insisting on the material nature of the veto, the researchers also described the function of the veto in interactionist terms, namely as an act of the agent performed against her own cerebral processes. The purpose of this paper is to explain in which sense the veto in Libet's and in Schultze-Kraft's study is interactionist, and to provide a non-interactionist reinterpretation of the test subjects' action inhibition in Schultze-Kraft's experiment.
Against the Illusory Will Hypothesis - A Reinterpretation of the Test Results from Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley's I Spy Experiment, 2021
Since Benjamin Libet's famous experiments in 1979, the study
of the will has become a focal poin... more Since Benjamin Libet's famous experiments in 1979, the study
of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like
Libet the scientists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt
that the will is causally efficacious. In their inuential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experimental setup to show that agents erroneously
experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions
are caused by unconscious neural processes; the agent's `causal
experience of will' is just an illusion. Both the scienti c method and the
conclusion drawn from the empirical results have already been criticized
by philosophers. In this paper, I will analyze the action performed in
the I Spy experiment and criticize more fundamentally the assumption
of a `causal experience of will'. I will argue that the experiment does
not show that the agent's causal experience of will is illusory, because it
does not show that there is a causal experience of will. Against Wegner
& Wheatley's assumption, I will show that it is unlikely that the participants
in the I Spy experiment experienced their conscious thoughts
as causally ecacious for an action, that they did not perform at all.
It is more likely, that they experienced their own bodily movement as
causally ecacious for a cooperative action, that they did not perform
solely by themselves
Am Ende einer Reihe von wegweisenden Experimenten resümierte der Kognitionswissenschaftler Benjam... more Am Ende einer Reihe von wegweisenden Experimenten resümierte der Kognitionswissenschaftler Benjamin Libet enttäuscht, dass der freie Wille eine Illusion sein müsse. Aufgefordert eine bestimmte Körperbewegung zu vollziehen, konnten in den Gehirnen seiner Proband*innen schon kurz vor dem Bewusstwerden der Handlungsabsicht neuronale Aktivitäten nachgewiesen werden konnten, die typisch für die entsprechende Bewegung sind. Doch das implizite Verständnis der Natur des freien Willens, das diesen Versuchen zugrunde liegt, ist problematisch und hat seine Wurzeln in der philosophischen Idee des interaktionistischen Substanzdualismus von René Descartes. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich dieses Verständnis offenlegen und historisch verorten. Zum Schluss werde ich noch eine plausiblere Alternative anbieten.
David Hume and other philosophers doubt that causality can be perceived directly. Instead, observ... more David Hume and other philosophers doubt that causality can be perceived directly. Instead, observers become aware of it through inference based on the perception of the two events constituting cause and effect of the causal relation. However, Hume and the other philosophers primarily consider causal relations in which one object triggers a motion or change in another. In this paper, I will argue against Hume's assumption by distinguishing a kind of causal relations in which an agent is controlling the motion or change of an object. I will call this kind of causal relations 'causation-as-control'. In instances of causation-as-control, the observer does not become aware of the causality through inference based on the perception of two events (cause and effect). Rather, she perceives the two events directly and without further inference as cause and effect of a causal relation, and, therefore, the causality at work.
Philosophers pursued different strategies to determine the nature of explanatory reasons for acti... more Philosophers pursued different strategies to determine the nature of explanatory reasons for actions. Explanatory reasons were analyzed as obtaining or non-obtaining states of affairs, or as the agent’s beliefs. In this paper, I will show that neither of these strategies works properly; a new approach is needed. I will argue that all explanatory reasons have an essentially hybrid nature. They are entities that both involve explanatory-relevant objects in the world that the agent represented, as well as the agent’s representation of them.
The Vienna Circle was an influential group of philosophers in the early 20 th century. Its member... more The Vienna Circle was an influential group of philosophers in the early 20 th century. Its members were dedicated to do philosophy and to conduct research in accordance with the guidelines of the scientific world-conception. For some of them, Oswald Spengler was a dangerous antagonist due to the success and influence of his metaphysical philosophy of history in Der Untergang des Abendlandes and other works. In this paper, I will explore systematically the Circle's critical reception of Spengler regarding his methodological approaches, ontological positions, and political philosophy. I will, thereby, also evaluate the criticism brought forth against Spengler.
In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of experiments to test whether the w... more In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of experiments to test whether the will is free. Whilst he originally assumed that the will functions like an immaterial initiator of cerebral processes culminating in actions, he later began to think that it rather works like an immaterial veto inhibiting unwanted actions by preventing unconsciously initiated cerebral processes from unfolding. Libet's veto was widely criticized for its Cartesian dualist and interactionist implications. However, in 2016, Schultze-Kraft et al. adopted Libet's idea of an action-inhibiting veto and conducted a new experiment. Its goal was to test until which moment agents can inhibit an action that they already intended to do. Despite insisting on the material nature of the veto, the researchers also described the function of the veto in interactionist terms, namely as an act of the agent performed against her own cerebral processes. The purpose of this paper is to explain in which sense the veto in Libet's and in Schultze-Kraft's study is interactionist, and to provide a non-interactionist reinterpretation of the test subjects' action inhibition in Schultze-Kraft's experiment.
Against the Illusory Will Hypothesis - A Reinterpretation of the Test Results from Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley's I Spy Experiment, 2021
Since Benjamin Libet's famous experiments in 1979, the study
of the will has become a focal poin... more Since Benjamin Libet's famous experiments in 1979, the study
of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like
Libet the scientists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt
that the will is causally efficacious. In their inuential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experimental setup to show that agents erroneously
experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions
are caused by unconscious neural processes; the agent's `causal
experience of will' is just an illusion. Both the scienti c method and the
conclusion drawn from the empirical results have already been criticized
by philosophers. In this paper, I will analyze the action performed in
the I Spy experiment and criticize more fundamentally the assumption
of a `causal experience of will'. I will argue that the experiment does
not show that the agent's causal experience of will is illusory, because it
does not show that there is a causal experience of will. Against Wegner
& Wheatley's assumption, I will show that it is unlikely that the participants
in the I Spy experiment experienced their conscious thoughts
as causally ecacious for an action, that they did not perform at all.
It is more likely, that they experienced their own bodily movement as
causally ecacious for a cooperative action, that they did not perform
solely by themselves
Am Ende einer Reihe von wegweisenden Experimenten resümierte der Kognitionswissenschaftler Benjam... more Am Ende einer Reihe von wegweisenden Experimenten resümierte der Kognitionswissenschaftler Benjamin Libet enttäuscht, dass der freie Wille eine Illusion sein müsse. Aufgefordert eine bestimmte Körperbewegung zu vollziehen, konnten in den Gehirnen seiner Proband*innen schon kurz vor dem Bewusstwerden der Handlungsabsicht neuronale Aktivitäten nachgewiesen werden konnten, die typisch für die entsprechende Bewegung sind. Doch das implizite Verständnis der Natur des freien Willens, das diesen Versuchen zugrunde liegt, ist problematisch und hat seine Wurzeln in der philosophischen Idee des interaktionistischen Substanzdualismus von René Descartes. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich dieses Verständnis offenlegen und historisch verorten. Zum Schluss werde ich noch eine plausiblere Alternative anbieten.
David Hume and other philosophers doubt that causality can be perceived directly. Instead, observ... more David Hume and other philosophers doubt that causality can be perceived directly. Instead, observers become aware of it through inference based on the perception of the two events constituting cause and effect of the causal relation. However, Hume and the other philosophers primarily consider causal relations in which one object triggers a motion or change in another. In this paper, I will argue against Hume's assumption by distinguishing a kind of causal relations in which an agent is controlling the motion or change of an object. I will call this kind of causal relations 'causation-as-control'. In instances of causation-as-control, the observer does not become aware of the causality through inference based on the perception of two events (cause and effect). Rather, she perceives the two events directly and without further inference as cause and effect of a causal relation, and, therefore, the causality at work.
Philosophers pursued different strategies to determine the nature of explanatory reasons for acti... more Philosophers pursued different strategies to determine the nature of explanatory reasons for actions. Explanatory reasons were analyzed as obtaining or non-obtaining states of affairs, or as the agent’s beliefs. In this paper, I will show that neither of these strategies works properly; a new approach is needed. I will argue that all explanatory reasons have an essentially hybrid nature. They are entities that both involve explanatory-relevant objects in the world that the agent represented, as well as the agent’s representation of them.
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of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like
Libet the scientists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt
that the will is causally efficacious. In their inuential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experimental setup to show that agents erroneously
experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions
are caused by unconscious neural processes; the agent's `causal
experience of will' is just an illusion. Both the scienti c method and the
conclusion drawn from the empirical results have already been criticized
by philosophers. In this paper, I will analyze the action performed in
the I Spy experiment and criticize more fundamentally the assumption
of a `causal experience of will'. I will argue that the experiment does
not show that the agent's causal experience of will is illusory, because it
does not show that there is a causal experience of will. Against Wegner
& Wheatley's assumption, I will show that it is unlikely that the participants
in the I Spy experiment experienced their conscious thoughts
as causally ecacious for an action, that they did not perform at all.
It is more likely, that they experienced their own bodily movement as
causally ecacious for a cooperative action, that they did not perform
solely by themselves
Drafts by Robert Reimer
Talks by Robert Reimer
of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like
Libet the scientists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt
that the will is causally efficacious. In their inuential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experimental setup to show that agents erroneously
experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions
are caused by unconscious neural processes; the agent's `causal
experience of will' is just an illusion. Both the scienti c method and the
conclusion drawn from the empirical results have already been criticized
by philosophers. In this paper, I will analyze the action performed in
the I Spy experiment and criticize more fundamentally the assumption
of a `causal experience of will'. I will argue that the experiment does
not show that the agent's causal experience of will is illusory, because it
does not show that there is a causal experience of will. Against Wegner
& Wheatley's assumption, I will show that it is unlikely that the participants
in the I Spy experiment experienced their conscious thoughts
as causally ecacious for an action, that they did not perform at all.
It is more likely, that they experienced their own bodily movement as
causally ecacious for a cooperative action, that they did not perform
solely by themselves