This article looks at the development of civil society in Malaysia under competitive authoritaria... more This article looks at the development of civil society in Malaysia under competitive authoritarian rule. It focuses on three main questions: What role does civil society play under competitive authoritarian rule? Can it successfully challenge authoritarianism? Or does the existence of a civil society actually strengthen the stability of the authoritarian order? In order to provide answers to these questions,
Vietnam is a communist one-party regime in transition. With the implementation of doi moi, the Co... more Vietnam is a communist one-party regime in transition. With the implementation of doi moi, the Communist Party of Vietnam replaced a centrally planned economy with a “socialist-oriented market economy.” The transition from a fully planned economy to a mixed economy generated dynamic economic growth and socioeconomic modernization that puts the Communist Party in a potentially vulnerable position. The Party has reacted resolutely against any demands for political liberalization or a more open political process. Overall, it appears that the communist rulers have successfully adapted the pillars of regime stability to changing international and domestic contexts. The strategy of economic transformation and institutional innovation has enabled the CPV to keep its regime coalition together and to reconcile increasingly diverse sectoral and regional interests. Today, the CPV is no longer a revolutionary party striving for a utopian socialist ideal, but a bureaucratic party seeking to preserve the political status quo. Three decades of reform have generated conflict between the government and society in general, within the Party, and within different social groups in various forms, indicated by a steadily growing number of protests since the late 1990s. But even with these challenges, communist party rule in Vietnam appears resilient and adaptive. This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of Vietnam’s political system and summarizes its history and recent developments.
German scholars have long neglected the analysis of political transformation pro-cesses in South,... more German scholars have long neglected the analysis of political transformation pro-cesses in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. Only since the end of the 1990s have researchers in Germany developed an interest in this international, mostly English-language, literature. In contrast, German-language political science democ-ratization research on Asia has long been well established. As in North America, the boundaries between democratization and autocracy research have become blurred in recent years — while the close link between democracy and dictatorship research is a welcome development. Theoretically and methodologically, the German-language transformation research on Asia has made only a comparatively small contribution to international political science research. Its main advance has been in its in-depth analysis of individual or select cases. In order to remain internationally pertinent and to become more widely accepted, German-language research hence-forth needs to be more me...
The parliamentary election held in Thailand on February 6, 2005, was a critical conjuncture in th... more The parliamentary election held in Thailand on February 6, 2005, was a critical conjuncture in that country's political evolution. The election marked the decisive entrenchment of the political hegemony of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party that emerged after he was elected Prime Minister in a landslide vote in January 2001. While TRT gained seventy-five percent of the seats in the House of Representatives, the main opposition force, the Democratic Party (DP), suffered a crushing defeat. Though it is evident that Thaksin and TRT won a convincing victory, it is not clear what will follow. Although TRT formed the first single party government in the history of Thailand's democracy in March 2005, it remains uncertain whether the reelected government can deal effectively with the country's urgent problems.
On 19 September 2006, units of the Royal Thai Army successfully staged a coup d’?tat against the ... more On 19 September 2006, units of the Royal Thai Army successfully staged a coup d’?tat against the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This article sets out to examine the recent events within the broader context of social and political developments in Thailand since 1932. Its main argument is that due to the complex configuration of societal conflicts within Thai society, the 2006 coup cannot be explained simply as a result of a lack of military professionalism. The failure of democracy is rather a consequence of the incapacity of the political system to accommodate these social and political tensions. The main shortcomings have been the weakly organized social bases for mass parties and, especially, the lack of adequate representation of the interests of the urban working class and rural voters. Simultaneously, the legitimacy of the political aspirations and preferences of those segments of Thai society has not been fully accepted by the political elites. Thaksin and hi...
In Hongkong droht die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee den Demonstrierenden mit „Konsequenzen“; i... more In Hongkong droht die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee den Demonstrierenden mit „Konsequenzen“; in Venezuela unterstützt die Armee die Repression der Proteste gegen Präsident Maduro; in Algerien schlagen sich die Streitkräfte des Landes auf die Seite der protestierenden Massen gegen Präsident Bouteflika und im Sudan stürzt das Militär den langjährigen Machthaber al-Bashir nach Massenprotesten. Diese Fälle spiegeln historische Erfahrungen: Das Militär entscheidet in vielen Fällen über den Ausgang von Massenprotesten und handelt vor allem im eigenen Interesse.
As the only ruling monarchy in Southeast Asia, the Sultanate of Brunei seems a political anachron... more As the only ruling monarchy in Southeast Asia, the Sultanate of Brunei seems a political anachronism in the region. Yet it is also a beacon of political stability in Southeast Asia. Following recent studies on the stability of authoritarian regimes, which emphasize the importance of legitimation, co-optation, and repression for the reproduction of authoritarian rule, the royalist regime seems to have struck a balance between legitimation, cooptation, and repression as the three pillars of authoritarian rule. Rent income from petroleum and natural gas allowed the regime to finance a well-developed security apparatus to defend against internal and external challengers but also provide its citizens with a generous welfare state and employment opportunities in the public sector. An expanding state administration provides patronage to members of the political elite. To corroborate his normative claim to power, the Sultan has emphasized the idea of the Malay Islamic Monarchy in recent years and portrays himself as a proponent and guarantor of morally superior Islamic rule. So far, demands for political liberalization are few and far between. Neither civil society nor political opposition parties are able or willing to challenge the ruling system. This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of Brunei’s political system and summarizes recent developments.
In 2018, ever-incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen scored a landslide victory in the Cambodian genera... more In 2018, ever-incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen scored a landslide victory in the Cambodian general elections. Three factors in particular explain this outcome. First, the elimination of the main opposition party, whose strategy of a peaceful election boycott failed. Second, favorable economic conditions and government handouts of spoils to constituencies that traditionally supported the opposition. Third, the weak leverage of the United States and the EU, and the Hun Sen regime’s strong links with China.
In democracies throughout the world, intra-party factions manifest themselves in parties and gove... more In democracies throughout the world, intra-party factions manifest themselves in parties and governments. Formal and informal institutions have, however, proved crucial in managing factionalism. This is especially true in Thailand's emerging parliamentary democracy where the management of factionalism has become a major objective for Thai parties. This study explores factions and factionalism as well as how different types of parties try to manage intra-party dissension especially in the case of Thailand. The findings suggest that management style tends to be a function of a party's organization, with parties which practice a collegial style tending to be the more successful in controlling intra-party cliques over time. At the same time, the most important tools which party leaderships can use to control factions are the careful use of constitutional provisions and manipulation of party finance.
After local elections in 2017, the Cambodian People’s Party intensified its attacks on free media... more After local elections in 2017, the Cambodian People’s Party intensified its attacks on free media, NGOs, and the Cambodian National Rescue Party. Meanwhile, stronger links to China and waning Western leverage are enabling Prime Minister Hun Sen to transform the post-1993 multiparty system into a patrimonial dictatorship. Cambodia enjoyed strong economic growth but saw little improvement in its weak institutional framework, in social justice, or in economic competitiveness.
This article looks at the development of civil society in Malaysia under competitive authoritaria... more This article looks at the development of civil society in Malaysia under competitive authoritarian rule. It focuses on three main questions: What role does civil society play under competitive authoritarian rule? Can it successfully challenge authoritarianism? Or does the existence of a civil society actually strengthen the stability of the authoritarian order? In order to provide answers to these questions,
Vietnam is a communist one-party regime in transition. With the implementation of doi moi, the Co... more Vietnam is a communist one-party regime in transition. With the implementation of doi moi, the Communist Party of Vietnam replaced a centrally planned economy with a “socialist-oriented market economy.” The transition from a fully planned economy to a mixed economy generated dynamic economic growth and socioeconomic modernization that puts the Communist Party in a potentially vulnerable position. The Party has reacted resolutely against any demands for political liberalization or a more open political process. Overall, it appears that the communist rulers have successfully adapted the pillars of regime stability to changing international and domestic contexts. The strategy of economic transformation and institutional innovation has enabled the CPV to keep its regime coalition together and to reconcile increasingly diverse sectoral and regional interests. Today, the CPV is no longer a revolutionary party striving for a utopian socialist ideal, but a bureaucratic party seeking to preserve the political status quo. Three decades of reform have generated conflict between the government and society in general, within the Party, and within different social groups in various forms, indicated by a steadily growing number of protests since the late 1990s. But even with these challenges, communist party rule in Vietnam appears resilient and adaptive. This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of Vietnam’s political system and summarizes its history and recent developments.
German scholars have long neglected the analysis of political transformation pro-cesses in South,... more German scholars have long neglected the analysis of political transformation pro-cesses in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. Only since the end of the 1990s have researchers in Germany developed an interest in this international, mostly English-language, literature. In contrast, German-language political science democ-ratization research on Asia has long been well established. As in North America, the boundaries between democratization and autocracy research have become blurred in recent years — while the close link between democracy and dictatorship research is a welcome development. Theoretically and methodologically, the German-language transformation research on Asia has made only a comparatively small contribution to international political science research. Its main advance has been in its in-depth analysis of individual or select cases. In order to remain internationally pertinent and to become more widely accepted, German-language research hence-forth needs to be more me...
The parliamentary election held in Thailand on February 6, 2005, was a critical conjuncture in th... more The parliamentary election held in Thailand on February 6, 2005, was a critical conjuncture in that country's political evolution. The election marked the decisive entrenchment of the political hegemony of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party that emerged after he was elected Prime Minister in a landslide vote in January 2001. While TRT gained seventy-five percent of the seats in the House of Representatives, the main opposition force, the Democratic Party (DP), suffered a crushing defeat. Though it is evident that Thaksin and TRT won a convincing victory, it is not clear what will follow. Although TRT formed the first single party government in the history of Thailand's democracy in March 2005, it remains uncertain whether the reelected government can deal effectively with the country's urgent problems.
On 19 September 2006, units of the Royal Thai Army successfully staged a coup d’?tat against the ... more On 19 September 2006, units of the Royal Thai Army successfully staged a coup d’?tat against the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This article sets out to examine the recent events within the broader context of social and political developments in Thailand since 1932. Its main argument is that due to the complex configuration of societal conflicts within Thai society, the 2006 coup cannot be explained simply as a result of a lack of military professionalism. The failure of democracy is rather a consequence of the incapacity of the political system to accommodate these social and political tensions. The main shortcomings have been the weakly organized social bases for mass parties and, especially, the lack of adequate representation of the interests of the urban working class and rural voters. Simultaneously, the legitimacy of the political aspirations and preferences of those segments of Thai society has not been fully accepted by the political elites. Thaksin and hi...
In Hongkong droht die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee den Demonstrierenden mit „Konsequenzen“; i... more In Hongkong droht die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee den Demonstrierenden mit „Konsequenzen“; in Venezuela unterstützt die Armee die Repression der Proteste gegen Präsident Maduro; in Algerien schlagen sich die Streitkräfte des Landes auf die Seite der protestierenden Massen gegen Präsident Bouteflika und im Sudan stürzt das Militär den langjährigen Machthaber al-Bashir nach Massenprotesten. Diese Fälle spiegeln historische Erfahrungen: Das Militär entscheidet in vielen Fällen über den Ausgang von Massenprotesten und handelt vor allem im eigenen Interesse.
As the only ruling monarchy in Southeast Asia, the Sultanate of Brunei seems a political anachron... more As the only ruling monarchy in Southeast Asia, the Sultanate of Brunei seems a political anachronism in the region. Yet it is also a beacon of political stability in Southeast Asia. Following recent studies on the stability of authoritarian regimes, which emphasize the importance of legitimation, co-optation, and repression for the reproduction of authoritarian rule, the royalist regime seems to have struck a balance between legitimation, cooptation, and repression as the three pillars of authoritarian rule. Rent income from petroleum and natural gas allowed the regime to finance a well-developed security apparatus to defend against internal and external challengers but also provide its citizens with a generous welfare state and employment opportunities in the public sector. An expanding state administration provides patronage to members of the political elite. To corroborate his normative claim to power, the Sultan has emphasized the idea of the Malay Islamic Monarchy in recent years and portrays himself as a proponent and guarantor of morally superior Islamic rule. So far, demands for political liberalization are few and far between. Neither civil society nor political opposition parties are able or willing to challenge the ruling system. This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of Brunei’s political system and summarizes recent developments.
In 2018, ever-incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen scored a landslide victory in the Cambodian genera... more In 2018, ever-incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen scored a landslide victory in the Cambodian general elections. Three factors in particular explain this outcome. First, the elimination of the main opposition party, whose strategy of a peaceful election boycott failed. Second, favorable economic conditions and government handouts of spoils to constituencies that traditionally supported the opposition. Third, the weak leverage of the United States and the EU, and the Hun Sen regime’s strong links with China.
In democracies throughout the world, intra-party factions manifest themselves in parties and gove... more In democracies throughout the world, intra-party factions manifest themselves in parties and governments. Formal and informal institutions have, however, proved crucial in managing factionalism. This is especially true in Thailand's emerging parliamentary democracy where the management of factionalism has become a major objective for Thai parties. This study explores factions and factionalism as well as how different types of parties try to manage intra-party dissension especially in the case of Thailand. The findings suggest that management style tends to be a function of a party's organization, with parties which practice a collegial style tending to be the more successful in controlling intra-party cliques over time. At the same time, the most important tools which party leaderships can use to control factions are the careful use of constitutional provisions and manipulation of party finance.
After local elections in 2017, the Cambodian People’s Party intensified its attacks on free media... more After local elections in 2017, the Cambodian People’s Party intensified its attacks on free media, NGOs, and the Cambodian National Rescue Party. Meanwhile, stronger links to China and waning Western leverage are enabling Prime Minister Hun Sen to transform the post-1993 multiparty system into a patrimonial dictatorship. Cambodia enjoyed strong economic growth but saw little improvement in its weak institutional framework, in social justice, or in economic competitiveness.
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Papers by Aurel Croissant