*This paper is still under revision and any notes would be appreciated.*
The split-brain phenome... more *This paper is still under revision and any notes would be appreciated.*
The split-brain phenomenon is often interpreted as an example of consciousness becoming divided. This raises questions about the way in which we interpret empirical findings, particularly given that certain metaphysical interpretations of consciousness prohibit the possibility that consciousness can be divided or that multiple consicousnesses can be combined.
*I am still researching this topic to improve this paper before I submit it anywhere for publicat... more *I am still researching this topic to improve this paper before I submit it anywhere for publication.*
Consciousness is often studied as though it were equivalent to a certain kind of physiological, cognitive or behavioural state, such as where coma scales are used to determine consciousness level in assessing patients with disorders of consciousness. I refer to consciousness in this sense as "symptomatic consicousness." Phenomenal consciousness, characterised by subjective experience, is often considered to be related to symptomatic consciousness and can only be studied via symptomatic consciousness. We could reasonably hypothesise that the two are closely linked. However, an opposing null hypothesis, stating that phenomenal consciousness does not correspond to the above kinds of state, cannot have empirical evidence in its favour. This shows the matter is not determined straightforwardly by empirical evidence, threatening to undermine our knowledge regarding phenomenal consciousness. The only means we have of dismissing this null hypothesis is to use theoretical justification, of which foundational claims of information integration theory are an example.
James Tartaglia makes original use of the idea of transcendence in order to answer various philos... more James Tartaglia makes original use of the idea of transcendence in order to answer various philosophical questions of contemporary and historical importance. I tackle the attempt to use his transcendent hypothesis to solve the problem of consciousness. Tartaglia describes the problem of consciousness as arising because we conceive of the objective world as composed of "centreless" objects and that any view that attempts to identify consciousness as a part of the world as presented to objective thought will fail since consciousness is inherently centred. His proposed solution is to suggest that a transcendent reality must be able to account for consciousness, but I argue that his characterisation of this reality entails that it too must be composed of centreless parts and thus the transcendent hypothesis fails to solve the consciousness problem. Positing that we can best describe reality as something about which our knowledge is unavoidably impaired has been a recurring the...
*This paper is still under revision and any notes would be appreciated.*
The split-brain phenome... more *This paper is still under revision and any notes would be appreciated.*
The split-brain phenomenon is often interpreted as an example of consciousness becoming divided. This raises questions about the way in which we interpret empirical findings, particularly given that certain metaphysical interpretations of consciousness prohibit the possibility that consciousness can be divided or that multiple consicousnesses can be combined.
*I am still researching this topic to improve this paper before I submit it anywhere for publicat... more *I am still researching this topic to improve this paper before I submit it anywhere for publication.*
Consciousness is often studied as though it were equivalent to a certain kind of physiological, cognitive or behavioural state, such as where coma scales are used to determine consciousness level in assessing patients with disorders of consciousness. I refer to consciousness in this sense as "symptomatic consicousness." Phenomenal consciousness, characterised by subjective experience, is often considered to be related to symptomatic consciousness and can only be studied via symptomatic consciousness. We could reasonably hypothesise that the two are closely linked. However, an opposing null hypothesis, stating that phenomenal consciousness does not correspond to the above kinds of state, cannot have empirical evidence in its favour. This shows the matter is not determined straightforwardly by empirical evidence, threatening to undermine our knowledge regarding phenomenal consciousness. The only means we have of dismissing this null hypothesis is to use theoretical justification, of which foundational claims of information integration theory are an example.
James Tartaglia makes original use of the idea of transcendence in order to answer various philos... more James Tartaglia makes original use of the idea of transcendence in order to answer various philosophical questions of contemporary and historical importance. I tackle the attempt to use his transcendent hypothesis to solve the problem of consciousness. Tartaglia describes the problem of consciousness as arising because we conceive of the objective world as composed of "centreless" objects and that any view that attempts to identify consciousness as a part of the world as presented to objective thought will fail since consciousness is inherently centred. His proposed solution is to suggest that a transcendent reality must be able to account for consciousness, but I argue that his characterisation of this reality entails that it too must be composed of centreless parts and thus the transcendent hypothesis fails to solve the consciousness problem. Positing that we can best describe reality as something about which our knowledge is unavoidably impaired has been a recurring the...
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The split-brain phenomenon is often interpreted as an example of consciousness becoming divided. This raises questions about the way in which we interpret empirical findings, particularly given that certain metaphysical interpretations of consciousness prohibit the possibility that consciousness can be divided or that multiple consicousnesses can be combined.
Consciousness is often studied as though it were equivalent to a certain kind of physiological, cognitive or behavioural state, such as where coma scales are used to determine consciousness level in assessing patients with disorders of consciousness. I refer to consciousness in this sense as "symptomatic consicousness." Phenomenal consciousness, characterised by subjective experience, is often considered to be related to symptomatic consciousness and can only be studied via symptomatic consciousness. We could reasonably hypothesise that the two are closely linked. However, an opposing null hypothesis, stating that phenomenal consciousness does not correspond to the above kinds of state, cannot have empirical evidence in its favour. This shows the matter is not determined straightforwardly by empirical evidence, threatening to undermine our knowledge regarding phenomenal consciousness. The only means we have of dismissing this null hypothesis is to use theoretical justification, of which foundational claims of information integration theory are an example.
Papers by Adam Balmer
The split-brain phenomenon is often interpreted as an example of consciousness becoming divided. This raises questions about the way in which we interpret empirical findings, particularly given that certain metaphysical interpretations of consciousness prohibit the possibility that consciousness can be divided or that multiple consicousnesses can be combined.
Consciousness is often studied as though it were equivalent to a certain kind of physiological, cognitive or behavioural state, such as where coma scales are used to determine consciousness level in assessing patients with disorders of consciousness. I refer to consciousness in this sense as "symptomatic consicousness." Phenomenal consciousness, characterised by subjective experience, is often considered to be related to symptomatic consciousness and can only be studied via symptomatic consciousness. We could reasonably hypothesise that the two are closely linked. However, an opposing null hypothesis, stating that phenomenal consciousness does not correspond to the above kinds of state, cannot have empirical evidence in its favour. This shows the matter is not determined straightforwardly by empirical evidence, threatening to undermine our knowledge regarding phenomenal consciousness. The only means we have of dismissing this null hypothesis is to use theoretical justification, of which foundational claims of information integration theory are an example.