Poor standards among its police force and the lack of specialised units within its para-military ... more Poor standards among its police force and the lack of specialised units within its para-military is hampering India’s counter-Maoist efforts. The objective of neutralising the military might of the extremists looks, for the moment, an unrealisable goal.
Among all of New Delhi’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, the one that appears to have ... more Among all of New Delhi’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, the one that appears to have moved in the right direction without a hitch is that with Myanmar. With a transformed Myanmar, New Delhi’s steps have been bold and decisive. The four-day visit of Myanmar’s opposition leader Aung San Syu Kyi to India starting November 13, albeit a delayed one, provided another opportunity to reaffirm such assumption.
The United States has revised its Afghan strategy, opening the possibility of negotiating with th... more The United States has revised its Afghan strategy, opening the possibility of negotiating with the Haqqani Network and allowing Pakistan to play a greater role in the solution of the Afghan conflict. However this approach runs counter to an Afghan vision of an end state for the war torn country.
In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in ... more In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in the new year. The government's ability to end extremist violence and craft a counter-terror architecture continues to be hampered by bureaucratic inertia, inter-ministerial and inter-departmental rivalry and political division.
The article is an analysis of India-Myanmar foreign relations which are marked by both paranoia a... more The article is an analysis of India-Myanmar foreign relations which are marked by both paranoia and bonhomie. Myanmar is strategically important for India, especially in achieving its objective of a Look-East Policy. India has to maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmar’s non-democratic military junta to extend its influence in Southeast Asia and due to internal security concerns of its north-eastern states which are under continuous threat from various insurgent groups. This article discusses the pragmatic shift of India’s stand on Myanmar where the growing presence of China in Myanmar and India’s quest for energy are the major drivers. In economic terms, China is a major investor in Myanmar and its military relations with Myanmar are causes for concern in India. The article also discusses concerns raised about India’s Myanmar policy, keeping in view widespread scepticism about its military junta.
Poor standards among its police force and the lack of specialised units within its para-military ... more Poor standards among its police force and the lack of specialised units within its para-military is hampering India’s counter-Maoist efforts. The objective of neutralising the military might of the extremists looks, for the moment, an unrealisable goal.
Among all of New Delhi’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, the one that appears to have ... more Among all of New Delhi’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, the one that appears to have moved in the right direction without a hitch is that with Myanmar. With a transformed Myanmar, New Delhi’s steps have been bold and decisive. The four-day visit of Myanmar’s opposition leader Aung San Syu Kyi to India starting November 13, albeit a delayed one, provided another opportunity to reaffirm such assumption.
The United States has revised its Afghan strategy, opening the possibility of negotiating with th... more The United States has revised its Afghan strategy, opening the possibility of negotiating with the Haqqani Network and allowing Pakistan to play a greater role in the solution of the Afghan conflict. However this approach runs counter to an Afghan vision of an end state for the war torn country.
In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in ... more In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in the new year. The government's ability to end extremist violence and craft a counter-terror architecture continues to be hampered by bureaucratic inertia, inter-ministerial and inter-departmental rivalry and political division.
The article is an analysis of India-Myanmar foreign relations which are marked by both paranoia a... more The article is an analysis of India-Myanmar foreign relations which are marked by both paranoia and bonhomie. Myanmar is strategically important for India, especially in achieving its objective of a Look-East Policy. India has to maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmar’s non-democratic military junta to extend its influence in Southeast Asia and due to internal security concerns of its north-eastern states which are under continuous threat from various insurgent groups. This article discusses the pragmatic shift of India’s stand on Myanmar where the growing presence of China in Myanmar and India’s quest for energy are the major drivers. In economic terms, China is a major investor in Myanmar and its military relations with Myanmar are causes for concern in India. The article also discusses concerns raised about India’s Myanmar policy, keeping in view widespread scepticism about its military junta.
The government needs to get the tribals in the Maoist-dominated areas on their side, if they are ... more The government needs to get the tribals in the Maoist-dominated areas on their side, if they are going to win the battle against the Maoists. But that is easier said than done, says Bibhu Prasad Routray.
Its time yet again for an over hyped anti-militant operation in Pakistan. On 3 July, the Pakistan... more Its time yet again for an over hyped anti-militant operation in Pakistan. On 3 July, the Pakistani army and the para-military forces launched full-scale operations in the Kurram Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) area, along the Afghanistan border. Named after the famous mountain range Spin Ghar, Operation Koh-i-Sofaid (White Mountain), intends getting rid of this tribal Agency of the presence of militants affiliated with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban. However, by all means, the operation is doomed to fail in its key objectives.
The 12 July 2011 unilateral ceasefire declaration by the ULFA’s pro-talk faction and the clarific... more The 12 July 2011 unilateral ceasefire declaration by the ULFA’s pro-talk faction and the clarification issued by the outfit on 23 July that sovereignty for Assam is not in their charter of demands, are welcome developments for the state, which has struggled to break free from the cycle of violence for many years. Although an immediate halt to violence is certainly not on the cards, the consolidation of peace would certainly depend on the direction of negotiations between New Delhi and the ULFA leaders, due to begin in August.
The Raman Singh government has taken a decision to lower the recruitment benchmark so that the Sp... more The Raman Singh government has taken a decision to lower the recruitment benchmark so that the Special Police Officers (SPOs), facing a purge, can be recruited into the regular police force. Neither was the Salwa Judum movement the brightest of counter-insurgency ideas, nor will the sly attempt to circumvent the apex court’s decision add to the state’s capacity to deal with the extremists.
The Ministry of Home Affairs might have given itself a pat on the back after flaunting a reductio... more The Ministry of Home Affairs might have given itself a pat on the back after flaunting a reduction in Left wing extremism-related fatalities across the country. The reality, however, is that the military capacities among the Naxals remain undiminished. The dip in fatalities is merely a result of tactical and political compromises, which makes the so-called gains tenuous and consequently, reversible.
LACK of action by an opponent can easily be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness. No big Al Qaeda... more LACK of action by an opponent can easily be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness. No big Al Qaeda attack has taken place since the May 2 killing of Osama Bin Laden. The organization has lost quite a few biggies. Its operations are in shambles. It is merely attempting to survive rather than expand or even strike back to vindicate its leader’s death.
Till the time there is an efficient leadership in place, it would be difficult to elicit popular... more Till the time there is an efficient leadership in place, it would be difficult to elicit popular support for the government's moves in fighting terror. However, I am still convinced that P Chidambaram is our best bet as home minister, says Bibhu Prasad Routray.
A relatively stabilised Jammu and Kashmir can free up substantial numbers of security forces that... more A relatively stabilised Jammu and Kashmir can free up substantial numbers of security forces that can then be deployed against left-wing insurgents
The pattern of India’s internal security challenges has undergone a significant makeover in recen... more The pattern of India’s internal security challenges has undergone a significant makeover in recent years. Chronic conflicts have either subsided or have hit a low patch and new conflict areas have emerged, necessitating a rationalisation in the way the Government deploys its security forces. But it would appear that our security policy-makers are stuck in time, steadfastly refusing to respond to the unfolding conflict dynamics. This explains, in a way, why the country, with a bourgeoning security force establishment, still struggles to find adequate forces to fight its internal wars.
CERTAIN things are doomed to fail since the time of their conception. The National Counter Terror... more CERTAIN things are doomed to fail since the time of their conception. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) too appears to be going in the direction of a dustbin. The current state of affairs is invariably a result of partisan politics and departmental turf war, rather than rational considerations.
As the home ministry’s decades-long modernisation programme for the CAPFs focuses on augmenting t... more As the home ministry’s decades-long modernisation programme for the CAPFs focuses on augmenting the capacity of the forces, won’t it be a better idea to simply merge the CAPF organisations under one head? If we accept that the Indian Army is doing well under just one supreme command, why not bring the CAPFs under a similar arrangement?
It now appears that the task of defeating Left-Wing extremism in the country has moved from the M... more It now appears that the task of defeating Left-Wing extremism in the country has moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to the Ministry of Rural Development. An array of proposed developmental initiatives on behalf of the ministry now hog the limelight. Since his July 2011 elevation to the rank of a Cabinet minister in charge of the ministry, Jairam Ramesh has toured the Maoist-affected states, spoken to innumerable officials and people, held press briefings, addressed seminars and provided a ‘road map’ for defeating the Maoists. The home ministry, it appears, is only too happy to let the rural development minister have his fill. The country, however, is nowhere close to securing a victory over the extremists.
Given that the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act [AFSPA] has been in vogue for more than two deca... more Given that the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act [AFSPA] has been in vogue for more than two decades in 20 of 22 districts of Jammu and Kashmir, it is almost a given that the debate over its withdrawal would be prolonged. Stakeholders would make their case, arguing for and against the proposed repeal, sometimes resorting to alarming scenario building exercises. That is precisely what has happened. However, under the circumstances, the stage by stage withdrawal of the controversial Act appears to be the only sober option for the Government of India.
By all means, the November 24 killing of Kishenji, the third-ranking leader of the Communist Part... more By all means, the November 24 killing of Kishenji, the third-ranking leader of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in West Bengal’s Jangalmahal area, is an achievement for the security forces. The usual allegations of the encounter being ‘fake’ by the Maoist bandwagon notwithstanding, the fact remains that in the war between the state and the extremists, the former’s policy of targeting the top leaders has met with a significant success.
India’s Afghan policy has invited more critiques than appreciation over the years. It is criticis... more India’s Afghan policy has invited more critiques than appreciation over the years. It is criticised of being far too dependent on the military effort of the US-led ISAF forces. Predictions have been repeatedly made that once the Taliban-led insurgency makes a comeback to that country, either subsequent to the US downsizing its presence by 2014 or through a reconciliation process, India will have little leverage left in Afghanistan. However, as 2011 ends, the future of India’s presence in Afghanistan appears a little more stronger than before, for the US option of abandoning Afghanistan to its fate in near future looks highly improbable.
2011 was the year of consolidation of the "absence of violence-phenomenon" that has dawned in Ind... more 2011 was the year of consolidation of the "absence of violence-phenomenon" that has dawned in India's Northeast for the past few years. Most parts of this rebellious region have reported declining trends in armed violence. Many of the mature insurgency movements, which appeared to be intractable for a long time, have run out of steam. Cooperation from neighbouring Bangladesh has managed to achieve what the decades-long military, development and political initiatives by the Indian government could not. And yet, the goal of establishing durable peace in the region, looks some distance away. This year end assessment is an attempt to survey the ongoing peace processes in the region in terms of their proximity to final solutions.
In the past few months, the government has asserted in unambiguous terms that the security situat... more In the past few months, the government has asserted in unambiguous terms that the security situation in the country has undergone serious positive transformations. The last one in the series of its publications is the December 24 Report Card of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), titled, ‘Capacity to meet threat to internal security improved—Overall security situation remains under control’. The MHA insists that with a plethora of measures initiated by it during the past year, the country’s capacity to meet terror threats, arising internally as well as from across the border, has grown manifold. At the dawn of 2012, unless one is a serving government official or a loyalist of the ruling party, it is difficult to go along with such assessments.
The moot question, thus, is not whether conflict-ridden areas should be developed or not, but whe... more The moot question, thus, is not whether conflict-ridden areas should be developed or not, but whether they can be developed, as long as they remain under the influence of the extremists? Will development initiatives, with potentially damaging impact on the Maoist influence, be allowed to take off by the extremists? Won’t a single attack, if not a series, prove to be a decisive setback for the entire development project, thereby deepening the suspicion of the population in the capacity of the government? And thus, won’t it be rational for the government to secure a semblance of order before pouring money into such areas?
On the surface, it appears that the Odisha government came out relatively unscathed from the mont... more On the surface, it appears that the Odisha government came out relatively unscathed from the month-long abduction episodes involving two Italians and an MLA. Only a handful of the prisoners were released in exchange. In Chhattisgarh too, with pressure on the Maoists increasing even from their known apologists, it is quite possible that the abducted collector too would be released without the state having to concede too much. Just like the tunes of Ram Dhun marked the release of the MLA in Odisha attempting to depict a peaceful resolution of the episode, Chhattisgarh too would find reason to boast about its methods of negotiating differently. So does it mean that it’s back to normal till one more high-profile abduction takes place? Or do the states have to introspect what these episodes have cost them?
Neither the 25th May attack in Chhattisgarh’s Darbha nor the 2nd July killing of the Superintende... more Neither the 25th May attack in Chhattisgarh’s Darbha nor the 2nd July killing of the Superintendent of Police of Pakur district in Jharkhand by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres constituted momentous military victories for the outfit. None of these attacks furthered the outfit’s purported objective of capturing state power in any manner. Yet the 35 dead bodies of politicians, activists and security forces, left behind by these attacks, significantly deepened the myth of an invincible adversary. There are doubts whether the Indian state would be able to neutralise the threat.
Several divergent descriptions have emerged explaining the circumstances leading to the arrest of... more Several divergent descriptions have emerged explaining the circumstances leading to the arrest of Yasin Bhatkal, one of the founders of the Indian Mujahideen (IM), along with one of his close associate, Asadullah Akhtar. Given that media personnel scurrying for information during such ‘big time’ events are generally expected and encouraged to be quite imaginative in their descriptions, such wide variations in the details are not entirely unexpected. They provide interesting pointers to what the researchers on terrorism must navigate through while piecing together the narrative and trying to link the dots.
In August 2013, Jharkhand police announced the plan to set up an exclusive cell to deal with Maoi... more In August 2013, Jharkhand police announced the plan to set up an exclusive cell to deal with Maoist activities. The state's Director General of Police, Rajiv Kumar, told the media, “We have already drafted a proposal for the creation of an anti-Maoist cell.” Expected to be in operation in the coming months, the cell will gather intelligence inputs and execute anti-Maoist operations. With units in all districts, the cell will also coordinate with the central paramilitary and state police forces. According to the plan, the existing Special (intelligence) branch of the police department would staff the new cell and no fresh recruitment and additional resources would be necessary.
The United States has revised its Afghan strategy, opening the possibility of negotiating with th... more The United States has revised its Afghan strategy, opening the possibility of negotiating with the Haqqani Network and allowing Pakistan to play a greater role in the solution of the Afghan conflict. However this approach runs counter to an Afghan vision of an end state for the war torn country.
Myanmar’s recent policy to politically reform itself might have excited many analysts outside the... more Myanmar’s recent policy to politically reform itself might have excited many analysts outside the country, but its objective of achieving peace with the ethnic rebels is progressing slower than expected. Suspicion regarding the government’s real intentions remains the key factor
Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) Commentary No. 4052, Jul 24, 2013
Its appellation bears close resemblance to a pre-existing evangelical video. On July 23, Al Qaeda... more Its appellation bears close resemblance to a pre-existing evangelical video. On July 23, Al Qaeda's media arm, As-Sahab, released the English translation of a video statement it had posted in June 2013 calling upon the Indian Muslims to join the jihad in Syria. Titled, "Why is There No Storm in Your Ocean?", the video features Maulana Aasim Umar, an Al Qaeda ideologue believed to be based in northwest Pakistan.
Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, New Delhi, Jul 10, 2013
Is it an economic nationalist movement, an awakening of sorts, a rabid anti-Muslim movement, or a... more Is it an economic nationalist movement, an awakening of sorts, a rabid anti-Muslim movement, or a hate revolution that would eventually consume its own children?
The ongoing war of words between the United States and Pakistan is a clash of diverse end goals o... more The ongoing war of words between the United States and Pakistan is a clash of diverse end goals of these countries in Afghanistan. It also represents a contest between a declining superpower and a country that believes it simply cannot lose.
The Indo-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on 4 October, unveils the congruence ... more The Indo-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on 4 October, unveils the congruence of US, Afghan and Indian end goals in the war torn country. It also has implications for Pakistani-Afghan relations
In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in ... more In spite of some improvements, internal security remains a critical area of concern for India in the new year. The government's ability to end extremist violence and craft a counter-terror architecture continues to be hampered by bureaucratic inertia, inter-ministerial and inter-departmental rivalry and political division.
This special report sums up the left-wing extremism situation in India in 2014 and looks at the p... more This special report sums up the left-wing extremism situation in India in 2014 and looks at the prospect of its resolution in 2015.
It is necessary to make incremental progress, state by state, rather than aiming for an illusory ... more It is necessary to make incremental progress, state by state, rather than aiming for an illusory knock-out punch against the Maoists in India.
A short-sighted counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, an apathetic political class, an unresponsive... more A short-sighted counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, an apathetic political class, an unresponsive state machinery, bureaucratic inertia, and the growing disconnect between a prospering and an impoverished India, have been flagged as some of the factors that contribute to the lack of an effective strategy and the near unassailability of the extremists. At the heart of such inadequacies, however, is the persistent conceptual ambiguity regarding the nature of the movement and the threat it poses to the Indian state. Authorities have been periodically compelled to revisit their strategies after each successful extremist attack. And yet, a comprehensive national strategy providing a long term solution to LWE remains a far fetched goal. The 25 May 2013 extremist attack in the state of Chhattisgarh provided yet another opportunity to rethink and reset the official strategy. Whether the new strategy would end the ambiguity and explore alternate mechanisms for conflict resolution, however, remains to be seen.
The naxal war economy goes much beyond the extortion regime of the extremists. It includes a host... more The naxal war economy goes much beyond the extortion regime of the extremists. It includes a host of players including the bureaucrats, contractors, politicians besides the extremists.
In Asia's war on terror, India's Maoists and Afghanistan's Taliban fighters have proved some of t... more In Asia's war on terror, India's Maoists and Afghanistan's Taliban fighters have proved some of the toughest and most tenacious enemies. Indian and U.S.-led forces in both conflict zones could learn greatly from each other's shortcomings.
Abstract
Away from the guns, the smoke and the dense forest battle lines drawn between the securi... more Abstract Away from the guns, the smoke and the dense forest battle lines drawn between the security forces and armed cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), a different war is being waged between the Government and a section of the society who profess a pro-Maoist view point. As casualties mount among the security forces, the Government is finding it difficult to swallow the argument of these groups who paint the State as a plunderer and a mere representative of the multinational companies waiting to exploit the rich resources lying in the tribal belts of the country. This section of the society also argues that the Maoists, consisting mostly of the marginalised tribals are only fighting for protection of their inalienable rights. As a result, these armed uprisings have assumed the characteristic of an inescapable war to prevent the march of the State into the tribal heartland. Clearly, there is no escape from the fact that in addition to meeting the military challenge posed by the armed Maoists, this war of words too must be won by the State, if it seeks to secure a comprehensive victory against armed extremism.
The loss of a number of Central Committee leaders weakens the CPI-Maoist politically, but it allo... more The loss of a number of Central Committee leaders weakens the CPI-Maoist politically, but it allows the Military Commission of the outfit to dominate over the political wing.
Security forces in India, in spite of several organiszational and logistical problems, are making... more Security forces in India, in spite of several organiszational and logistical problems, are making progress against the left-wing extremists. Ultimate success would, however, depend on sustaining the present momentum and sincere implementation of the developmental measures.
No one expects the war against the Maoists to be won in a hurry. But with its haphazard and ad ho... more No one expects the war against the Maoists to be won in a hurry. But with its haphazard and ad hoc policies, New Delhi appears to be making a difficult task harder than it needs to be.
The government needs to take a leaf from the manual of the Maoists, to be slow and calculated in ... more The government needs to take a leaf from the manual of the Maoists, to be slow and calculated in the way it builds up its response. It is clear that in the hurry to mitigate the menace, some serious compromises have been made. The necessity to put boots on the ground can not be at the cost of quality of personnel deployed.
Poor standards among its police force and the lack of specialised units within its para-military ... more Poor standards among its police force and the lack of specialised units within its para-military is hampering India’s counter-Maoist efforts. The objective of neutralising the military might of the extremists looks, for the moment, an unrealisable goal.
The crumbling of the Left Front edifice in the recently concluded West Bengal elections has been ... more The crumbling of the Left Front edifice in the recently concluded West Bengal elections has been interpreted as a watershed in Indian politics. However, whether the new beginning under the aegis of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) proves to be a game changer as far as West Bengal’s experience with left-wing extremism (LWE) is concerned remains a crucial question.
For some time, Mamata Banerjee might succeed in reducing the scale of Maoist violence in the state. However, that will be at the cost of turning West Bengal into a safe haven for the CPI-Maoist, with larger implications on the security of the neighbouring states – Orissa and Jharkhand. And by the time reality strikes and the Chief Minister realises her folly of pursuing a policy of peaceful co-existence with the extremists, it might be wee bit too late for dealing with the problem.
A Few days ago, some newspapers in India ran two separate reports. One hogging the front page was... more A Few days ago, some newspapers in India ran two separate reports. One hogging the front page was a stub on India’s flourishing economy and the other relegated to the inside pages underlined the challenges faced by the security forces battling the Left-wing extremists (Naxalites) in the remotest corners of the country. The first item pointed to the soaring number of choppers and private jets jostling for space in Indian skies and the demands they make on the Air Traffic Controllers. The second report, on the other hand, quoted the Border Security Force (BSF) authorities asking the ministry of home affairs (MHA) to replace the Dhruv helicopters since these do not meet the force’s operational requirements. This report went on to detail the drastic shortage of choppers for the security forces deployed on anti-Naxal duty and its impact on the morale of the forces. These two narratives posed a familiar paradox, from Coleridge’s “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, when there are “choppers choppers everywhere, but not many for the security forces”.
On August 15, 2011, the day India celebrated its 65th Independence Day, the left-wing extremists,... more On August 15, 2011, the day India celebrated its 65th Independence Day, the left-wing extremists, purportedly fighting for the cause of the tribals, did attempt to indulge in some acts of sabotage and violence, although the activity reported on the day did not match the anticipations of the government. The Home Ministry had earlier alerted the governments of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh about possible attempts by the Maoists to trigger violence.
India is currently grappling with an effective response to left-wing extremism. Even though in th... more India is currently grappling with an effective response to left-wing extremism. Even though in the last two years, extremist violence as well as areas under extremist influence has somewhat diminished, the problem remains serious.While India's military approach has failed to make much headway owing to a range of weaknesses among the forces, the development approach too has been critiqued for being too romanticised and unreal for implementation.
Aurelie Campana & Gerard Hervouet (ed.), Terrorisme et insurrection. Evolution des dynamiques conflictuelles et reponses des Etats., Presses de l'Universite du Quebec (PUQ) Montreal/Quebec, Dec 2012
Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore Insight No. 213, Jul 8, 2013
The inability to craft an effective national policy to deal with the surge of left-wing extremism... more The inability to craft an effective national policy to deal with the surge of left-wing extremism (LWE) is a subject of intense policy debate and mounting public concern in India. A shortsighted ounter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, an apathetic political class, an unresponsive state machinery, bureaucratic inertia, problems of coordination (between the centre and state governments)and the growing disconnect between a prospering and an impoverished India, have been flagged as some of the factors that contribute to the lack of an effective strategy and the near-unassailability of the extremists. At the heart of such inadequacies, however, is the persistent conceptual ambiguity regarding the nature of the ovement and the threat it poses to the Indian state. Authorities have been periodically compelled to revisit their strategies after each successful extremist attack. And yet, a comprehensive and unified national strategy providing a long-term solution to LWE remains a far-fetched goal. The 25 May 2013 extremist attack in the state of Chhattisgarh provided yet another opportunity torethink and reset the COIN strategy. Whether the new strategy would end the ambiguity and explore alternate mechanisms for conflict resolution, however, remains to be seen.
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Papers by Bibhu Prasad Routray
Away from the guns, the smoke and the dense forest battle lines drawn between the security forces and armed cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), a different war is being waged between the Government and a section of the society who profess a pro-Maoist view point. As casualties mount among the security forces, the Government is finding it difficult to swallow the argument of these groups who paint the State as a plunderer and a mere representative of the multinational companies waiting to exploit the rich resources lying in the tribal belts of the country. This section of the society also argues that the Maoists, consisting mostly of the marginalised tribals are only fighting for protection of their inalienable rights. As a result, these armed uprisings have assumed the characteristic of an inescapable war to prevent the march of the State into the tribal heartland. Clearly, there is no escape from the fact that in addition to meeting the military challenge posed by the armed Maoists, this war of words too must be won by the State, if it seeks to secure a comprehensive victory against armed extremism.
For some time, Mamata Banerjee might succeed in reducing the scale of Maoist violence in the state. However, that will be at the cost of turning West Bengal into a safe haven for the CPI-Maoist, with larger implications on the security of the neighbouring states – Orissa and Jharkhand. And by the time reality strikes and the Chief Minister realises her folly of pursuing a policy of peaceful co-existence with the extremists, it might be wee bit too late for dealing with the problem.