I consider a generalizarion of Vanderschraaf's correlated conventions to Quasi-Conventions, u... more I consider a generalizarion of Vanderschraaf's correlated conventions to Quasi-Conventions, using the concept of coarse correlated equilibria. I discuss the possibility of improved payoffs and the question of learnability by simple uncoupled learning dynamics. Laboratory experiments are surveyed. The generalization introduces strains of commitment, which can be see from different points of view. I conclude that the strains of commitment preclude using the generalization as a stand-alone definition of convention, but that in certain settings Quasi-Conventions can be important modules within larger true conventions.
Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998) treatment of his Game of Life as a bargaining game and his treatment o... more Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998) treatment of his Game of Life as a bargaining game and his treatment of morality as an equilibrium selection device for that game, are examined in the context of repeated games with both infinite and finite horizon. With a finite horizon, there are three different viable approaches. They differ in the way they impact his treatment of morality.
We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ... more We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular composition where simpler games evolve to form more complex chains. We also consider how the evolution of new capacities by modular composition may be more efficient than evolving those capacities from basic decisions.
We present here a hierarchical model for the evolution of compositional language. The model has t... more We present here a hierarchical model for the evolution of compositional language. The model has the structure of a two-sender/one-receiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who may learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. The model shows how functional agents might coevolve representational roles even as they evolve a reliable compositional language in the context of costly signaling. When successful, the evolved language captures both the compositional structure of properties in the world and the compositional structure of successful actions involving those properties.
We present three hierarchical models for the evolution of compositional language. Each has the ba... more We present three hierarchical models for the evolution of compositional language. Each has the basic structure of a two-sender/one receiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who can learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. With each game, we move from stronger to weaker modeling assumptions. The first game shows how the basic senders and receiver might evolve a compositional language when the two senders have pre-established representational roles. The second shows how the two senders might coevolve representational roles as they evolve a reliable compositional language. Both of these games impose an efficiency demand on the agents. The third game shows how costly signaling alone might lead role-free agents to evolve a compositional language.
We show how Richard Jeffrey's The Logic of Decision provides the proper formalism for calcula... more We show how Richard Jeffrey's The Logic of Decision provides the proper formalism for calculating expected fitness for correlated encounters in general. As an illustration, some puzzles about kin selection are resolved.
Author(s): Hu, Yilei; Skyrms, Brian; Tarres, Pierre | Abstract: We consider a signaling game orig... more Author(s): Hu, Yilei; Skyrms, Brian; Tarres, Pierre | Abstract: We consider a signaling game originally introduced by Skyrms, which models how two interacting players learn to signal each other and thus create a common language. The first rigorous analysis was done by Argiento, Pemantle, Skyrms and Volkov (2009) with 2 states, 2 signals and 2 acts. We study the case of M_1 states, M_2 signals and M_1 acts for general M_1, M_2. We prove that the expected payoff increases in average and thus converges a.s., and that a limit bipartite graph emerges, such that no signal-state correspondence is associated to both a synonym and an informational bottleneck. Finally, we show that any graph correspondence with the above property is a limit configuration with positive probability.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
It is shown how martingale convergence theorems apply to coherent belief change in radical probab... more It is shown how martingale convergence theorems apply to coherent belief change in radical probabilist epistemology.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
By "Propensities" I mean the kind of probabilities that figure in laws of nature. Prope... more By "Propensities" I mean the kind of probabilities that figure in laws of nature. Propensities might be (i) relative frequencies, finite or long run, de facto or modalized, or (ii) reflections of our epistemic probabilities or (iii) sui generus theoretical notions. I believe that the whole family of relative frequency proposals (i) are inadequate. As an alternative I wish to suggest (ii) an epistemic account of propensities and of nomic force in general, in the spirit of Hume, Mill, DeFinetti, Ayer, Suppes and Jeffrey. Whether accounts of the third kind differ in substance or in name only from the sort of account that I am proposing is a nice question, to which I will devote some brief closing remarks.
I consider a generalizarion of Vanderschraaf's correlated conventions to Quasi-Conventions, u... more I consider a generalizarion of Vanderschraaf's correlated conventions to Quasi-Conventions, using the concept of coarse correlated equilibria. I discuss the possibility of improved payoffs and the question of learnability by simple uncoupled learning dynamics. Laboratory experiments are surveyed. The generalization introduces strains of commitment, which can be see from different points of view. I conclude that the strains of commitment preclude using the generalization as a stand-alone definition of convention, but that in certain settings Quasi-Conventions can be important modules within larger true conventions.
Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998) treatment of his Game of Life as a bargaining game and his treatment o... more Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998) treatment of his Game of Life as a bargaining game and his treatment of morality as an equilibrium selection device for that game, are examined in the context of repeated games with both infinite and finite horizon. With a finite horizon, there are three different viable approaches. They differ in the way they impact his treatment of morality.
We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ... more We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular composition where simpler games evolve to form more complex chains. We also consider how the evolution of new capacities by modular composition may be more efficient than evolving those capacities from basic decisions.
We present here a hierarchical model for the evolution of compositional language. The model has t... more We present here a hierarchical model for the evolution of compositional language. The model has the structure of a two-sender/one-receiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who may learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. The model shows how functional agents might coevolve representational roles even as they evolve a reliable compositional language in the context of costly signaling. When successful, the evolved language captures both the compositional structure of properties in the world and the compositional structure of successful actions involving those properties.
We present three hierarchical models for the evolution of compositional language. Each has the ba... more We present three hierarchical models for the evolution of compositional language. Each has the basic structure of a two-sender/one receiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who can learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. With each game, we move from stronger to weaker modeling assumptions. The first game shows how the basic senders and receiver might evolve a compositional language when the two senders have pre-established representational roles. The second shows how the two senders might coevolve representational roles as they evolve a reliable compositional language. Both of these games impose an efficiency demand on the agents. The third game shows how costly signaling alone might lead role-free agents to evolve a compositional language.
We show how Richard Jeffrey's The Logic of Decision provides the proper formalism for calcula... more We show how Richard Jeffrey's The Logic of Decision provides the proper formalism for calculating expected fitness for correlated encounters in general. As an illustration, some puzzles about kin selection are resolved.
Author(s): Hu, Yilei; Skyrms, Brian; Tarres, Pierre | Abstract: We consider a signaling game orig... more Author(s): Hu, Yilei; Skyrms, Brian; Tarres, Pierre | Abstract: We consider a signaling game originally introduced by Skyrms, which models how two interacting players learn to signal each other and thus create a common language. The first rigorous analysis was done by Argiento, Pemantle, Skyrms and Volkov (2009) with 2 states, 2 signals and 2 acts. We study the case of M_1 states, M_2 signals and M_1 acts for general M_1, M_2. We prove that the expected payoff increases in average and thus converges a.s., and that a limit bipartite graph emerges, such that no signal-state correspondence is associated to both a synonym and an informational bottleneck. Finally, we show that any graph correspondence with the above property is a limit configuration with positive probability.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
It is shown how martingale convergence theorems apply to coherent belief change in radical probab... more It is shown how martingale convergence theorems apply to coherent belief change in radical probabilist epistemology.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
By "Propensities" I mean the kind of probabilities that figure in laws of nature. Prope... more By "Propensities" I mean the kind of probabilities that figure in laws of nature. Propensities might be (i) relative frequencies, finite or long run, de facto or modalized, or (ii) reflections of our epistemic probabilities or (iii) sui generus theoretical notions. I believe that the whole family of relative frequency proposals (i) are inadequate. As an alternative I wish to suggest (ii) an epistemic account of propensities and of nomic force in general, in the spirit of Hume, Mill, DeFinetti, Ayer, Suppes and Jeffrey. Whether accounts of the third kind differ in substance or in name only from the sort of account that I am proposing is a nice question, to which I will devote some brief closing remarks.
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Papers by Brian Skyrms