Conference Presentations by Justin Felip Daduya
46th Annual Ugnayang Pang-Aghamtao Conference, 2024
During the advent of philosophy in the Philippines breaking away from its western philosophical r... more During the advent of philosophy in the Philippines breaking away from its western philosophical roots, the Philosophico-Anthropological method was the dominant approach towards indigenization. While groundbreaking in a time when philosophers in the Philippines were often limited to measly contributions to foreign discourse, this method, in the hands of giants like Leonardo Mercado and Florentino Timbreza, has been repeatedly criticized for its tendency towards essentialization. In its attempt to find what is “natural, unique, and pure,” critics say, the Philosophico-Anthropological method transforms into an attempt to pin down a universal Filipinoness resting on hasty generalizations, thereby silencing marginalized subnational communities and opening doors for mythologization rather than identity-building. Thus, the question for the Philosophico-Anthropological method today is clear: how do we recognize localized experiences and decolonize our categories of thought while also rejecting attempts to erase the inner diversity of Filipino thought? In this paper, I attempt to chart Filipino philosophy’s journey towards this question, moving from the essentializing discourses of Mercado to the dynamic decolonization of the present day. I analyzed 76 Filipino philosophy articles published since the year 2000 to assess how newer articles respond to the methodological critiques levied against the traditional philosophico-anthropological tradition in Filipino philosophy.
Resisting Intellectual Imperialism and Epistemic Violence: Towards Autonomous Knowledge Production, 2024
Parallel to the global economy’s core-periphery structure, the global academe is a rigid hierarch... more Parallel to the global economy’s core-periphery structure, the global academe is a rigid hierarchical structure characterized by dependency relations between marginal knowledge production zones in the Global South and hegemonic centers of epistemic power in the Global North. Surprisingly, while their explanations of dependency and the call for autonomous Global South development (both economic and academic) run parallel, there is a dearth of literature on academic reparations. In this paper, I argue that this is because The Myth of Merit is much more convincing than the Myth of Primitive Accumulation. I begin by introducing the “Myth of Merit,” an academic counterpart to the Myth of Primitive Accumulation which likewise attempts to portray the current distribution of epistemic resources as a product of scholarly excellence rather than historical injustices. Comparing the two, I point out that while it is easy to impute guilt on warmongering imperialist countries, it is harder to convince people to see funding Harvard’s medicine programs or MIT’s engineering research as unjust, because it is much easier to accept that wealth was unjustly acquired compared to epistemic resources. Much more than Global North economies, Global North academic centers have a much easier time claiming that they deserve their positions of hegemony. Ultimately, however, I argue that as long as the acquisition of these resources — whether economic or epistemic — was unjust and at the expense of another, reparations are just and necessary, which means that both Global North and Global South academics have the responsibility to fight for them.
Resisting Intellectual Imperialism and Epistemic Violence: Towards Autonomous Knowledge Production, 2024
Now that discourses about the existence of Filipino Philosophy have, in large part, waned, the bi... more Now that discourses about the existence of Filipino Philosophy have, in large part, waned, the biggest question facing philosophers is now one of details: how, exactly, is one to do Filipino philosophy? Scholars like Pada have pointed out the methodological problems that have, for so long, plagued attempts at Filipino Philosophizing, and so many new Filipino philosophers are in disarray over where the field ought to go. The problem, they point out, is in the attempt to create a unified Filipinoness that is so often associated with the philosophico-anthropological method utilized by early Filipino philosophers like Leonardo Mercado and Florentino Timbreza. But how can Filipino philosophy remain distinctly Filipino while, as Pada hopes, “preserving cultural differences” and adopting a realistic understanding of them? In this paper, I argue that this is best done by adopting a firmly historico-materialist methodology when doing Filipino philosophy, where the distinctly Filipino experiences are grounded, not in the abstract notion of “shared experiences and concerns that cover the Philippines and Filipinos in their entirety,” as Pada suggests, but a historical and economic perspective that elucidates the social mechanisms underlying these supposedly shared experiences and concerns.
Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) 2024 Conference, 2024
David Chalmers’s famous Zombie argument rests on the premise that conceivability entails metaphys... more David Chalmers’s famous Zombie argument rests on the premise that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, an assumption that remains hotly contested. One seemingly devastating objection against the premise comes from Kripke: while one could conceive a world where water is XYZ instead of H20, this is not actually possible because of a posteriori necessity. Chalmers responds by utilizing the distinction between primary and secondary intensions, arguing that while conceivability may not always entail 2-possibility, it does entail 1-possibility. In this paper, I propose a counterexample revolving around the conceivability of a Siamond world – a world where Diamonds are the exact same except for the fact that they are soft. This, I argue, creates a dilemma for the Chalmersian two-dimensionalist: if we accept the conceivability of a world where diamonds are soft, we are forced to ask: what “epistemic properties” allow for our modal talk to remain fairly stable. If hardness or any other property or set of properties whose necessity can only be known a posteriori are among of them, we are forced to accept that certain necessities are “strong,” in that they cannot be ruled out a priori, and hence are counterexamples to Chalmers’s conceivability thesis. If no such epistemic properties truly remain constant, then the consistency of modal talk is doubtful. Either way, this exposes a key methodological flaw in his methodology, undercutting the two-dimensional framework that Chalmers depends upon.
7th Human Rights, Violence, and Dictatorship International Interdisciplinary Conference, 2024
In 2016, as strongmen like Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Rodrigo Duterte managed to win their... more In 2016, as strongmen like Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Rodrigo Duterte managed to win their respective elections bolstered by online trolling and fake news, Oxford Dictionaries declared “Post-truth” the word of the year. The post-truth condition, scholars claim, is the epoch where emotion trumps evidence, and people no longer aspire towards truth and objectivity. This disregard for truth, they contend further, is intertwined with the global resurgence of the far-right and will only make things worse in the coming years, as far-right groups across the world rely on a flood of propaganda that people in the post-truth era take all too easily.
While the proliferation of fake news is undeniable and so is its connection to the resurgence of the far right, I contend that these phenomena cannot be blamed on a growing disregard for truth. In this paper, I argue that post-truth politics is better understood as a result of changing epistemic norms – we have not abandoned the search for truth, but rather have changed the regulative practices by which we select what we believe to be true. I contend that the dominant understanding of post-truth as a disregard for truth has obscured the issue, turning it into a discourse about moral and intellectual failings rather than getting to the root of the problem. I argue further that by adopting an epistemic norm-based account of post-truth politics and how it has enabled the return of fascism, we can arrive at concrete ways to respond to the fake news epidemic in light of changed epistemic norms instead of relying on appeals to “return to rationality.”
"Philosophizing About Education in the Philippines", 2024
In this paper, I highlight the problem of epistemic injustice in contested political knowledge cl... more In this paper, I highlight the problem of epistemic injustice in contested political knowledge claims and propaganda, underscoring the particular epistemic responsibility that educators have in addressing it. I argue that one solution to this problem is adopting critical pedagogy grounded in Jose Medina's epistemology of resistance. By grounding critical pedagogy in the epistemology of resistance, critical educators can truly subvert the pedagogy of oppression encouraged by the current neoliberal system of education. Once we apply these insights to how we teach our learners to study social issues and resist propaganda, we do not just address the epistemic injustices involved in those contested knowledge claims but the economic, social, and political injustices inextricably linked to them as well. By teaching anti-propaganda criticality through a critical pedagogy of epistemological resistance, students are emboldened to overcome credibility deficits and transform their resistant imaginations into reality.
HOW CAN PRAXIS INFORM THEORY? HOW CAN THEORY ADVANCE PRAXIS? ON APPLIED ETHICS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 2024
Scholars of Artificial Intelligence remain split on their assessment of how AI’s rapid growth wil... more Scholars of Artificial Intelligence remain split on their assessment of how AI’s rapid growth will impact society. For some, AI will revolutionize knowledge work for the better with the speed and efficiency with which they can gather and process information. For others, meanwhile, its ability to write paragraphs upon paragraphs of convincing text despite a complete disregard for truth make them “automatic bullshit generators that pose an immediate epistemic threat to society. The capacity of AI to produce copious amounts of text, often convincingly, has sparked discussions regarding its relationship with truth and the implications for knowledge acquisition. In the “Age of Bullshit” as Harry Frankfurt has called it, they say that AI is bound to make an epidemic of truth-disregarding speech even worse. In this lecture, I attempt to bring nuance to the issue and propose a way to evaluate trustworthiness without resorting to blanket approbations or condemnations of technology, whilst remaining critical of the veracity of its products. The central contention of this lecture is twofold: first, AI's capacity to produce bullshit does not render all AI-generated content inherently untrustworthy, and second, a careful evaluation of the trustworthiness of AI is still possible, and it requires a context-specific and dyadic model for appraising AI trustworthiness.
"Aquinas and Foucault: At the Crossroads of Medieval and Contemporary Philosophy", 2024
In 1972, Michel Foucault famously argued against the French Maoist Pierre Victor on the concept o... more In 1972, Michel Foucault famously argued against the French Maoist Pierre Victor on the concept of the People’s Court. While for Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theoreticians the people’s court is a weapon for the delivery of popular justice, Foucault thinks that the model of a court can do nothing but constrain justice, leaving buds of the state apparatus preparing to sprout at a later time.
In this paper, I appeal to an unlikely interlocutor – Thomist political and legal philosopher John Finnis and his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas – to argue against Foucault’s position and explain the role of the people’s court in Maoist praxis. I begin by expounding upon the concept of a “people’s court” – particularly in the context of French revolutionary praxis – before I sketch Foucault’s argument against the court form. Then, after pointing out certain congruences in their conceptualizations of justice, I use Finnis’s notion of the law as coordination to debunk Foucault’s main claim. I end by arguing that Foucault’s objections to the court form speak to a bigger problem: a mode of theorizing that ends at the deconstructive project of the revolution, and fails to seriously offer an alternative.
Alinsunod kuno sa ika-16 na Sustainable Development Goal ng United Nations, ipinagpapatuloy ng re... more Alinsunod kuno sa ika-16 na Sustainable Development Goal ng United Nations, ipinagpapatuloy ng rehimeng Marcos ang madugong kontra-insurhensiya kasabay ng Whole-of-Nation Approach sa ngalan ng “kapayapaan, katarungan, at matatag na institusyon.” Sa papel na ito, nais kong ilantad ang pilosopikal na kabuktutan ng mga konsepto ng “kapayapaan” at “katarungan” na tinatangkang iangkop ng rehimen upang ipagtanggol ang kanilang karahasan. Sa pamamagitan ng paglapat ng mga batayang tunguhin at prinsipyo ng Pilipinong konsepto ng Katarungan ni Jose W. Diokno, ipakikita ko kung paanong ang huwad na mga “inisyatibang pangkapayapaan” ng rehimeng Marcos ang mismong sagka sa pagkamit ng katarungan, kapayapaan, at sustenibleng pag-unlad. Una, mula sa pagsuri sa mga talumpati at polisiya ng rehimeng Marcos, ipakikita kong hindi tunay na katarungang panlipunan ang batayan ng kapayapaan at katarungan ni Marcos, kundi nakasalalay ang kaniyang kapayapaan at katarungan sa normalisasyon at panaka-nakang panlipunang serbisyo. Ilalapat ko dito ang Pilipinong konsepto ng katarungan ni Jose W. Diokno, at ipakikita kung paanong hindi nito matutugunan ang mga batayang tunguhin at prinsipyo ng balangkas ng katarungan ni Diokno. Mula dito, susuriin ko ang alternatibong inihahapag ng mga rebolusyonaryo sa estado: ang usaping pangkapayapaan, partikular na ang Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms na dapat maging susunod na yugto ng usaping ito. Sa kabuuan, nais kong ipakitang hangga’t kumakapit ang estado sa huwad na pagpapakahulugan ng kapayapaan at katarungan, hindi matutugunan ang ugat ng armadong pakikibaka, kung kaya’t hindi rin mapapatahimik ang nagngangalit na sambayanan.
Robert Nozick argues for the minimal state — a state limited to law enforcement and defense— beca... more Robert Nozick argues for the minimal state — a state limited to law enforcement and defense— because he says any more than this would require the state to violate property rights based on his Entitlement Theory of Justice. But this is undermined by the faulty premise upon which it rests: that the current distribution of holdings is a product of a long series of mostly just acquisitions and transfers, with aberrations that need to be corrected here and there. I will show this to be an unfair premise using the paradigm case of imperialist plunder, showing the extent to which injustices are ingrained in the backbone of the current distribution, and how, at least prima facie, it is reasonable to doubt that justice is the norm. Because Nozick never really argues for this premise nor does he provide a mechanism to calculate the extent to which these injustices need to be rectified, Nozick’s theory cannot support the libertarianism often attributed to him. All of this, I argue, shows that Nozick is left with two options: to flip his philosophy on its head and advocate for a large redistributive state until we arrive at a just distribution of holdings, or to abandon the practical utility of his theory entirely and limit its use to a world where the distribution is already largely just. Thus, I show that Nozick fails to justify the minimal state.
“We all know what in ordinary life would be called a miracle,” says Wittgenstein, but philosopher... more “We all know what in ordinary life would be called a miracle,” says Wittgenstein, but philosophers of religion remain split on what exactly constitutes the miraculous, and how we are to recognize them.This is difficult, especially when trying to answer the most common questions about them such as the reasonability of belief in miracles and their evidentiary capability. In the literature, there are two main accounts: the Humean tradition, which talks about miraculosity as a fact to be discovered in the event, and the Wittgenstinian tradition, which is more concerned with how the subject perceives the miracles. In this paper, I argue that both accounts are reductionist, forward an alternative account of miracles as explanations and of recognizing miraculosity as inferences to the best explanation, and attempt to answer the questions of reasonability and evidential capability. First, I argue against both of the views currently dominant among philosophers of religion, showing that while the first unattainable requirements for recognizing the “objective” miraculously it desires, the second renders miraculously purely subjective, setting aside the “miracle” itself. Then, I forward my alternative account, arguing that the central characteristic of a miracle is that the observer considers divine intervention to be the best explanation for its occurrence. This account, like the first view of miracles, captures the treatment of the event itself as an object of consideration, while also allowing the recognition to be context-dependent. It also allows us to affirmatively answer the questions of reasonability and evidential capability, with the qualification that these, too, are matters that are context-dependent.
Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment may be summarized as follows: Suppose that there ex... more Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment may be summarized as follows: Suppose that there exists an almost exact replica of earth with the sole difference that the substance which we call water (made up of H2O) is replaced with a substance of chemical composition XYZ but which also has the exact same properties as the substance we refer to as water. Since everything else is an exact copy, then there exists an individual in this world (I1) that is exactly the same as an individual in that world (I2) both of whom are unaware of the chemical composition of what they call water and therefore in the exact same psychological states when they use the word water (W1 and W2 respectively) to refer to the substances in their respective worlds commonly called water (watere and waterTE respectively). He argues: P1) If W1 and W2 have different extensions, then I1 and I2 mean different things despite being in the same psychological state P2) W1 and W2 have different extensions C) I1 and I2 mean different things despite being in the same psychological state If this holds to be true, then this means that the speaker’s psychological state is not enough to determine meaning, or as Putnam puts it: “meaning ain’t in the head.” In this paper, I challenge the second premise, showing that W1 and W2 have the same extension and therefore I1 and I2 do not mean different things despite being in the same psychological state. I first show that Putnam’s Twin Earth example fails to establish that W1 and W2 must refer to different substances, then I show how W1 and W2 can still have the same extension. Thus, I show that Putnam’s Twin Earth example is insufficient to establish the externality of meaning.
Envisioning the Philippine Socio-Political Landscape in the Post-Pandemic World, 2022
Alongside its devastating medical and economic impact, the COVID-19 pandemic wrought an ideologic... more Alongside its devastating medical and economic impact, the COVID-19 pandemic wrought an ideological tension, particularly in the struggle between individualism and collectivism. On one hand, social distancing measures and the need for self-preservation promoted individualism. On the other hand, the social dimension of the pandemic response required collectivist values. This tension is best exemplified by the Filipino pandemic response, where traditional collectivist Filipino values such as kagandahang-loob and pagkakaisa contradicted society’s growing individualism and the need for self-preservation. In light of several studies showing how collectivism helped the pandemic response and how it will help post-pandemic recovery, it is ideal to promote a collectivist Filipino ethics. For this effort, the German Phenomenologist Max Scheler’s ethical system and his views on solidarity present an appealing foundation. In this paper, I seek to prove two things: Schelerian ethics naturally fits in with Filipino ethics, and promoting a Schelerian Filipino ethical framework would help the country recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and prepare for the next. First, I argue that Scheler is a natural dialogue partner for the development of such an ethical framework because his philosophy is axiological, personalistic, and collectivistic. The axiological nature of Schelerian morality makes it naturally fit in well with the non-formal and value-centered Filipino ethical decision making. Scheler’s personalism corresponds with the Loob’s central role in Filipino Philosophy. Finally, Scheler’s love community as the peak of solidarity mirrors the final goal of Filipino value ethics: Pagkakaisa. Second, I argue that a Schelerian Filipino ethical framework would be beneficial for the same reasons: its axiological nature, its personalist orientation, and its collectivist goal. Its axiological nature — from Scheler’s ordo amoris and the Filipino kagandahang-loob — leads to the prioritization of the greater good instead of individual pleasure. Its personalist orientation — from Scheler’s view of human dignity and the Filipino recognition of loob — ensures that notions of the greater good do not sacrifice people on the altar of utilitarianism. Finally, its collectivistic goal — from Scheler’s Liebesgemeinschaft and the Filipino pagkakaisa — creates the solidarity and subsidiarity essential for growing together as a society. This goes to show that a Schelerian-Filipino ethical framework can help repair social bonds torn apart by COVID-19.
Drafts by Justin Felip Daduya
Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davisdson seem to be on the opposite sides of the search for m... more Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davisdson seem to be on the opposite sides of the search for meaning. While Quine’s most famous insight is his arguments against the determinacy of meaning, Davidson is mostly remembered for making the connection between Tarski’s theory of truth and the age-old problem of meaning. But this characterization does not bring either justice. The two are inextricably linked, not only because Davidson considered himself a faithful student of his mentor Quine until his death, but because they are grappling with the same fundamental problem: given the indeterminacy of meaning, how are we able to talk and, more importantly, how can we be understood? In this paper, I argue that Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation does not contradict Quinean meaning skepticism, nor does it try to. I start by reconstructing Quine’s arguments to draw a distinction between between the Standard Picture (SP) of meaning (which Quine rejects) and the Radical Picture (RP) of meaning (which Quine accepts). I then argue for Davidson’s fundamental continuity with this project. I do this by first showing that his theory radical interpretation presupposes a rejection of SP meaning. Then, I show that Davidson’s radical interpretation is only an account of RP meaning and not SP meaning.
Analytical jurists often criticize social scientific theories of law, saying empirical data canno... more Analytical jurists often criticize social scientific theories of law, saying empirical data cannot teach us about “what the law is,” instead only providing information about particular manifestations of the law in particular societies. But these criticisms painting social science theories of law as devoid of conceptual analysis are rooted in a narrow conception of what constitutes genuine inquiry into the nature of law, boxing us into two sides of a doctrinal divide that hampers the growth of the discipline. In this essay, I will challenge the presupposed polarization between analytical and social scientific theories of law, arguing that social science theories can contribute to conceptual questions about the law. In doing so, I first sketch the analytic jurisprudent’s position, explaining why they think that social scientific theories cannot inquire into what the law is. Then I show that this comes from an unrealistically restrictive understanding of what constitutes an inquiry into the nature of law, and that once jurists let go of the search for supposedly universal and necessary truths, both methods are able to elucidate the concept of law. I go on to pinpoint several social science theorists that used their empirical studies to ground a conceptual inquiry into the law, proving that empirical studies are not incompatible with conceptual questions.
Natural Law Theory holds that Law draws its force from objective morality – that laws are good la... more Natural Law Theory holds that Law draws its force from objective morality – that laws are good laws when they correspond to objective ought statements that are beyond the people who follow them, and not just social facts. The Classical Natural Law tradition further says that we can derive these objective moral claims by asking whether they conform to particular conceptions of “naturalness.” But David Hume, in what is now called the naturalistic fallacy, contends that the philosophers of the Classical Natural Law tradition fail to explain the leap from nature’s state of affairs – all of which are Is statements – towards the Ought statements that are required by Natural Law. In this paper, I argue that Finnis’s “New” Natural Law Theory, while far from being a perfect account of how we can derive objective moral oughts, is successful in avoiding the naturalistic fallacy. First, I sketch a general outline of how Classical Natural Law theorists tried to derive ought statements from what they saw as “natural,” and show why they fail to justify the leap from descriptive to normative statements. Then, I show how Finnis deals with the problem, and that by accepting the direct apprehension of goodness and the First Principle of Practical Reason, he manages to evade the naturalistic fallacy, shifting the question entirely towards their acceptance or non-acceptance.
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Conference Presentations by Justin Felip Daduya
While the proliferation of fake news is undeniable and so is its connection to the resurgence of the far right, I contend that these phenomena cannot be blamed on a growing disregard for truth. In this paper, I argue that post-truth politics is better understood as a result of changing epistemic norms – we have not abandoned the search for truth, but rather have changed the regulative practices by which we select what we believe to be true. I contend that the dominant understanding of post-truth as a disregard for truth has obscured the issue, turning it into a discourse about moral and intellectual failings rather than getting to the root of the problem. I argue further that by adopting an epistemic norm-based account of post-truth politics and how it has enabled the return of fascism, we can arrive at concrete ways to respond to the fake news epidemic in light of changed epistemic norms instead of relying on appeals to “return to rationality.”
In this paper, I appeal to an unlikely interlocutor – Thomist political and legal philosopher John Finnis and his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas – to argue against Foucault’s position and explain the role of the people’s court in Maoist praxis. I begin by expounding upon the concept of a “people’s court” – particularly in the context of French revolutionary praxis – before I sketch Foucault’s argument against the court form. Then, after pointing out certain congruences in their conceptualizations of justice, I use Finnis’s notion of the law as coordination to debunk Foucault’s main claim. I end by arguing that Foucault’s objections to the court form speak to a bigger problem: a mode of theorizing that ends at the deconstructive project of the revolution, and fails to seriously offer an alternative.
Drafts by Justin Felip Daduya
While the proliferation of fake news is undeniable and so is its connection to the resurgence of the far right, I contend that these phenomena cannot be blamed on a growing disregard for truth. In this paper, I argue that post-truth politics is better understood as a result of changing epistemic norms – we have not abandoned the search for truth, but rather have changed the regulative practices by which we select what we believe to be true. I contend that the dominant understanding of post-truth as a disregard for truth has obscured the issue, turning it into a discourse about moral and intellectual failings rather than getting to the root of the problem. I argue further that by adopting an epistemic norm-based account of post-truth politics and how it has enabled the return of fascism, we can arrive at concrete ways to respond to the fake news epidemic in light of changed epistemic norms instead of relying on appeals to “return to rationality.”
In this paper, I appeal to an unlikely interlocutor – Thomist political and legal philosopher John Finnis and his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas – to argue against Foucault’s position and explain the role of the people’s court in Maoist praxis. I begin by expounding upon the concept of a “people’s court” – particularly in the context of French revolutionary praxis – before I sketch Foucault’s argument against the court form. Then, after pointing out certain congruences in their conceptualizations of justice, I use Finnis’s notion of the law as coordination to debunk Foucault’s main claim. I end by arguing that Foucault’s objections to the court form speak to a bigger problem: a mode of theorizing that ends at the deconstructive project of the revolution, and fails to seriously offer an alternative.