This paper looks at the events leading up to the Labor Government's decision in 1947 to nationali... more This paper looks at the events leading up to the Labor Government's decision in 1947 to nationalise the private banks; details the research undertaken in an unsuccessful attempt to find out what happened behind the scenes; and concludes by making a number of inferences about the causes of various events at that time.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 1994
Abstract As against views recently put forward by Dr Corns, the article argues that inter-discipl... more Abstract As against views recently put forward by Dr Corns, the article argues that inter-disciplinary difficulties between police and lawyers in the National Crime Authority have been largely due to personal differences rather than the 'competing ideologies'; of the two ...
The previous paper on this subject, also on academia.edu, discussed in item 6 a claim in 1954 by ... more The previous paper on this subject, also on academia.edu, discussed in item 6 a claim in 1954 by the Russian defector Vladimir Petrov that he had been told by an NKVD colleague V F Razin that they had a man in British Counter-Intelligence; and that he 'passed on valuable information to the NKVD relating to British counter-measures'. Petrov and Razin had been at the USSR Embassy in Stockholm together in 1944-46. The paper went on to suggest that the most likely candidate for this source was Roger Hollis, as against the claim by Christopher Andrew that it was Anthony Blunt. Petrov made this disclosure in July 1954. Further research has shown that he was questioned again on the matter on 6 and 8 August 1954, following receipt of a brief received from London, and that he added some valuable further detail. While Petrov understood from Razin that the London source was 'controlled by the State Security Organization' [the NKVD], Razin had not specifically mentioned which organisation was controlling him. Further, Petrov stated that …if the G.R.U. had obtained such a source, they would have continued to run it, but if any information yielded by the source had an important bearing on State Security interests, then the G.R.U. would in all probability have passed such information on to the State Security Organisation and would perhaps even have apprised that organisation, both at Headquarters and its Resident in London, of the nature of the source. It seems likely that MI5 prompted Petrov on the point because of the claim made by the GRU defector, Igor Gouzenko, that that organisation had a spy inside MI5 with the code name Elli. During his questioning in August, Petrov was shown a number of notional code words, one of which was Elli. He did not select it. Petrov provided a further detail which bears more directly on the identity of the London source. The Security Liaison Officer (SLO) in Australia reported thus (NAUK file KV2/3458): According to Petrov, Razin related that the source in the UK handed over to the RIS [Russian Intelligence Service] for photography British dossiers on members of the Soviet Embassy in London who were under security investigation. Razin did not mention the source's code-name or any further details about the source. The SLO cautioned that 'it is difficult to say at this remove of time whether his memory has not perhaps played tricks with him over this embellishment'. Accepting it at face value, however, enables us to take the matter further. It is only fair to note that Andrew's account of what the London source did-reproduced in the original paper-makes more sense in the light of this additional information. As noted in the previous paper, at the relevant time-at the end of the war-Hollis was in charge of F Division of MI5, entitled Subversive Activities, which included Russian Intelligence (F.2.C.) (see The Security Service 1908-1945: The Official History, Appendix II) That volume also recorded at 364 the difficulties MI5 faced during the war in attempting to detect 'the secret agents of the Soviet', which was compounded by the rigid restrictions placed on it by the Foreign Office as to what actions it could take. The only action allowed seems to have been
This paper looks at the events leading up to the Labor Government's decision in 1947 to nationali... more This paper looks at the events leading up to the Labor Government's decision in 1947 to nationalise the private banks; details the research undertaken in an unsuccessful attempt to find out what happened behind the scenes; and concludes by making a number of inferences about the causes of various events at that time.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 1994
Abstract As against views recently put forward by Dr Corns, the article argues that inter-discipl... more Abstract As against views recently put forward by Dr Corns, the article argues that inter-disciplinary difficulties between police and lawyers in the National Crime Authority have been largely due to personal differences rather than the 'competing ideologies'; of the two ...
The previous paper on this subject, also on academia.edu, discussed in item 6 a claim in 1954 by ... more The previous paper on this subject, also on academia.edu, discussed in item 6 a claim in 1954 by the Russian defector Vladimir Petrov that he had been told by an NKVD colleague V F Razin that they had a man in British Counter-Intelligence; and that he 'passed on valuable information to the NKVD relating to British counter-measures'. Petrov and Razin had been at the USSR Embassy in Stockholm together in 1944-46. The paper went on to suggest that the most likely candidate for this source was Roger Hollis, as against the claim by Christopher Andrew that it was Anthony Blunt. Petrov made this disclosure in July 1954. Further research has shown that he was questioned again on the matter on 6 and 8 August 1954, following receipt of a brief received from London, and that he added some valuable further detail. While Petrov understood from Razin that the London source was 'controlled by the State Security Organization' [the NKVD], Razin had not specifically mentioned which organisation was controlling him. Further, Petrov stated that …if the G.R.U. had obtained such a source, they would have continued to run it, but if any information yielded by the source had an important bearing on State Security interests, then the G.R.U. would in all probability have passed such information on to the State Security Organisation and would perhaps even have apprised that organisation, both at Headquarters and its Resident in London, of the nature of the source. It seems likely that MI5 prompted Petrov on the point because of the claim made by the GRU defector, Igor Gouzenko, that that organisation had a spy inside MI5 with the code name Elli. During his questioning in August, Petrov was shown a number of notional code words, one of which was Elli. He did not select it. Petrov provided a further detail which bears more directly on the identity of the London source. The Security Liaison Officer (SLO) in Australia reported thus (NAUK file KV2/3458): According to Petrov, Razin related that the source in the UK handed over to the RIS [Russian Intelligence Service] for photography British dossiers on members of the Soviet Embassy in London who were under security investigation. Razin did not mention the source's code-name or any further details about the source. The SLO cautioned that 'it is difficult to say at this remove of time whether his memory has not perhaps played tricks with him over this embellishment'. Accepting it at face value, however, enables us to take the matter further. It is only fair to note that Andrew's account of what the London source did-reproduced in the original paper-makes more sense in the light of this additional information. As noted in the previous paper, at the relevant time-at the end of the war-Hollis was in charge of F Division of MI5, entitled Subversive Activities, which included Russian Intelligence (F.2.C.) (see The Security Service 1908-1945: The Official History, Appendix II) That volume also recorded at 364 the difficulties MI5 faced during the war in attempting to detect 'the secret agents of the Soviet', which was compounded by the rigid restrictions placed on it by the Foreign Office as to what actions it could take. The only action allowed seems to have been
Based on an analysis of the Ultra material sent to Crete in April and May 1941, the paper conclud... more Based on an analysis of the Ultra material sent to Crete in April and May 1941, the paper concludes that its role before and during the battle has been greatly exaggerated; and that the preparation for the battle and its outcome would have been the same in the absence of the material.
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