We use a contest framework to investigate the nature of organizational culture. Organization memb... more We use a contest framework to investigate the nature of organizational culture. Organization members decide whether to participate in the contest and if they do participate they have two possible modi operandi: be helpful or not. We state sufficient conditions, in terms of contest design, for the existence of various types of organizational culture and we show the possibility (at equilibrium) of a mixed organizational culture, i.e. the coexistence of two subcultures: a helping one and an individualistic one. We find that cooperation emerges only when prize density is sufficiently high. However, in a mixed culture the degree of cooperation decreases in the number of prizes.
We introduce the notion of a "crowding game", w... more We introduce the notion of a "crowding game", where individuals choose to locate themselves among finitely many compartments, each with a capacity (size) and a cost (price). Individuals have a common notion of physical comfort (freedom from crowding), which is increasing in the size of their compartment, decreasing in the number (or mass) of other individuals choosing it. Where individuals differ is in their sensitivity to the cost of the compartment. Under these assumptions, we find unique equilibria in which no individual wishes to change compartments. After dealing with these notions of equilibrium play in games of crowding, we discuss the optimal design of such games by a supplier who can choose the capacities and costs of the compartments. The supplier's objective might be profit or welfare maximisation, or perhaps the maximisation of the number of individuals who enter some compartment.
We develop a game theoretic model of joint quality control in a single sourcing environment which... more We develop a game theoretic model of joint quality control in a single sourcing environment which integrates supplier and customer decisions. In this model, both parties behave strategically and take each other's incentives into account when deciding on their respective sampling plans. The specific sampling plans considered are of the “single sample fraction defective with rectifying inspection” type. A method
European Journal of Operational Research, Apr 1, 2001
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a mono... more ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a monopolist manufacturer and his retailer, when inventory costs are taken into consideration. We find that the traditional result (lower prices) remains true only when inventory costs are sufficiently small. The direction of the price change also depends on the market size.
Journal of the Operational Research Society, Nov 1, 1995
ABSTRACT Two unit-speed searchers starting at 0 seek a stationary target hidden according to a kn... more ABSTRACT Two unit-speed searchers starting at 0 seek a stationary target hidden according to a known bounded symmetric distribution. The objective is to minimize the expected time for the searchers to return to 0 after one of them has found the target. We find a general optimality condition and use it to solve the problem when the target has a uniform, triangular, or truncated, exponential distribution. The problem has applications to parallel processing and to the optimal choice of drilling depths in the search for an underground mineral.
We model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers (tra... more We model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers (trade-ins) or new buyers (introductory offers) of a quasi-durable good. We analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third-degree price discrimination. In our two-period model, the monopolist sets a first-period price that segments the second-period market optimally into holders and nonholders of
We use a contest framework to investigate the nature of organizational culture. Organization memb... more We use a contest framework to investigate the nature of organizational culture. Organization members decide whether to participate in the contest and if they do participate they have two possible modi operandi: be helpful or not. We state sufficient conditions, in terms of contest design, for the existence of various types of organizational culture and we show the possibility (at equilibrium) of a mixed organizational culture, i.e. the coexistence of two subcultures: a helping one and an individualistic one. We find that cooperation emerges only when prize density is sufficiently high. However, in a mixed culture the degree of cooperation decreases in the number of prizes.
We introduce the notion of a "crowding game", w... more We introduce the notion of a "crowding game", where individuals choose to locate themselves among finitely many compartments, each with a capacity (size) and a cost (price). Individuals have a common notion of physical comfort (freedom from crowding), which is increasing in the size of their compartment, decreasing in the number (or mass) of other individuals choosing it. Where individuals differ is in their sensitivity to the cost of the compartment. Under these assumptions, we find unique equilibria in which no individual wishes to change compartments. After dealing with these notions of equilibrium play in games of crowding, we discuss the optimal design of such games by a supplier who can choose the capacities and costs of the compartments. The supplier's objective might be profit or welfare maximisation, or perhaps the maximisation of the number of individuals who enter some compartment.
We develop a game theoretic model of joint quality control in a single sourcing environment which... more We develop a game theoretic model of joint quality control in a single sourcing environment which integrates supplier and customer decisions. In this model, both parties behave strategically and take each other's incentives into account when deciding on their respective sampling plans. The specific sampling plans considered are of the “single sample fraction defective with rectifying inspection” type. A method
European Journal of Operational Research, Apr 1, 2001
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a mono... more ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a monopolist manufacturer and his retailer, when inventory costs are taken into consideration. We find that the traditional result (lower prices) remains true only when inventory costs are sufficiently small. The direction of the price change also depends on the market size.
Journal of the Operational Research Society, Nov 1, 1995
ABSTRACT Two unit-speed searchers starting at 0 seek a stationary target hidden according to a kn... more ABSTRACT Two unit-speed searchers starting at 0 seek a stationary target hidden according to a known bounded symmetric distribution. The objective is to minimize the expected time for the searchers to return to 0 after one of them has found the target. We find a general optimality condition and use it to solve the problem when the target has a uniform, triangular, or truncated, exponential distribution. The problem has applications to parallel processing and to the optimal choice of drilling depths in the search for an underground mineral.
We model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers (tra... more We model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers (trade-ins) or new buyers (introductory offers) of a quasi-durable good. We analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third-degree price discrimination. In our two-period model, the monopolist sets a first-period price that segments the second-period market optimally into holders and nonholders of
Uploads