Scholars of civil war and insurgency have long posited that insurgent organizations and their sta... more Scholars of civil war and insurgency have long posited that insurgent organizations and their state enemies incur costs for the collateral damage they cause. We provide the first direct quantitative evidence that wartime informing is affected by civilian casualties. Using newly declassified data on tip flow to Coalition forces in Iraq we find that information flow goes down after government forces inadvertently kill civilians and it goes up when insurgents do so. These results confirm a relationship long posited in the theoretical literature on insurgency but never directly observed, have strong policy implications, and are consistent with a broad range of circumstantial evidence on the topic.
Can foreign aid help countries emerge from civil war? This paper presents new research that sugge... more Can foreign aid help countries emerge from civil war? This paper presents new research that suggests that injecting lots of money into conflict zones may in fact encourage corruption and violence. The aid community should focus on what it can do well: working closely with communities to target small-scale, modest improvements that can be implemented in conflict zones. If accompanied by a gradual improvement in the quality of governance, current aid recipients can aspire to a long-run improvement in both security and prosperity. Can foreign aid and development assistance help countries emerge from civil war and unrest? Or does injecting money into conflict zones simply encourage corruption and fuel conflict? Recent research studying the relationship between food aid and conflict is not encouraging. It shows that increases in US food aid driven by spurts of agricultural productivity in the US lead to increased conflict risk in aid recipient countries (Nunn and Qian 2012). This result ...
A systematic analysis of formerly classified Soviet Politburo documents challenges popular miscon... more A systematic analysis of formerly classified Soviet Politburo documents challenges popular misconceptions about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The archival evidence indicates that, far from being a near-complete and chaotic failure, the withdrawal was based on a coherent exit strategy that initially achieved its limited objectives. Moscow's strategy enabled Soviet-trained Afghan forces to withstand the insurgent offensive and allowed the Afghan government to remain in power nearly three years after the Soviet combat forces departed. The Soviet-installed Afghan government ultimately collapsed not from military defeat or bankruptcy but from internal political strife and betrayals. Even though Soviet leaders failed to secure long-term gains as their strategy ran out of time, their experience provides relevant lessons for U.S. strategy formulation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and is an instructive case that can inform theories of great-power...
Many experts see a move toward high-value export crops, such as fruits and vegetables, as an impo... more Many experts see a move toward high-value export crops, such as fruits and vegetables, as an important opportunity for economic growth and poverty reduction, but little is known about the effects of export crops in fragile and conflict-affected countries. We exploit movements in world market prices combined with geographic variation in crop production to show that increases in the value of bananas, the country’s biggest export crop, caused an increase in conflict violence and insurgent-controlled territory in the Philippines. This effect was concentrated in provinces where bananas are produced in large plantations with areas greater than 25 hectares. Our results are consistent with a mechanism in which insurgents fund their operations by extorting large agricultural export firms.
Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanit... more Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws governing their treatment of noncombatants. How much risk to their own forces they must take to limit harm to civilians in the course of military operations, however, is unclear. The principle of proportionality in the law of armed conflict all but necessitates that they make a utilitarian calculation: potential harm to civilians must always be balanced against military value when considering actions that could hurt innocents. In asymmetric conflicts, such as most counterinsurgencies, information flows, collaboration, and ultimately the support of the local population can be key to achieving strategic objectives. Thus, limiting casualties to noncombatants and other actions that alienate the population in these types of conflicts is a key part of a winning strategy. The concept of “courageous restraint” was created to express this principle to NATO and U.S. forces fighting in A...
Page 1. Page 2. Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden... more Page 1. Page 2. Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions ...
Page 1. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series Iranian Strategy in Iraq... more Page 1. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series Iranian Strategy in Iraq Politics and Other Means Joseph Felter Brian Fishman October 13, 2008 1 Page 2. Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 ...
... The Sentinel's editorial board includes CTC Director... more ... The Sentinel's editorial board includes CTC Director of Research Dr. Jarret Brachman, Senior Research Fellow Dr. Assaf Moghadam and Senior Associate Brian Fishman. The CTC Sentinel is one of several new initiatives that we are pleased to announce. ...
... He also cites Imam Qassani al-Hanafi who said that it is permissible to attack non-Muslim ene... more ... He also cites Imam Qassani al-Hanafi who said that it is permissible to attack non-Muslim enemies 6 Page 8. ... It is a Long Trip for Dr. Fadl from Beni Suwaif to Peshawar to Sudan to Yemen and the end in Turah. Al-Masry al-Yawm. ... Excerpts from Ayman Al-Zawahiri as I Knew ...
Scholars of civil war and insurgency have long posited that insurgent organizations and their sta... more Scholars of civil war and insurgency have long posited that insurgent organizations and their state enemies incur costs for the collateral damage they cause. We provide the first direct quantitative evidence that wartime informing is affected by civilian casualties. Using newly declassified data on tip flow to Coalition forces in Iraq we find that information flow goes down after government forces inadvertently kill civilians and it goes up when insurgents do so. These results confirm a relationship long posited in the theoretical literature on insurgency but never directly observed, have strong policy implications, and are consistent with a broad range of circumstantial evidence on the topic.
Can foreign aid help countries emerge from civil war? This paper presents new research that sugge... more Can foreign aid help countries emerge from civil war? This paper presents new research that suggests that injecting lots of money into conflict zones may in fact encourage corruption and violence. The aid community should focus on what it can do well: working closely with communities to target small-scale, modest improvements that can be implemented in conflict zones. If accompanied by a gradual improvement in the quality of governance, current aid recipients can aspire to a long-run improvement in both security and prosperity. Can foreign aid and development assistance help countries emerge from civil war and unrest? Or does injecting money into conflict zones simply encourage corruption and fuel conflict? Recent research studying the relationship between food aid and conflict is not encouraging. It shows that increases in US food aid driven by spurts of agricultural productivity in the US lead to increased conflict risk in aid recipient countries (Nunn and Qian 2012). This result ...
A systematic analysis of formerly classified Soviet Politburo documents challenges popular miscon... more A systematic analysis of formerly classified Soviet Politburo documents challenges popular misconceptions about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The archival evidence indicates that, far from being a near-complete and chaotic failure, the withdrawal was based on a coherent exit strategy that initially achieved its limited objectives. Moscow's strategy enabled Soviet-trained Afghan forces to withstand the insurgent offensive and allowed the Afghan government to remain in power nearly three years after the Soviet combat forces departed. The Soviet-installed Afghan government ultimately collapsed not from military defeat or bankruptcy but from internal political strife and betrayals. Even though Soviet leaders failed to secure long-term gains as their strategy ran out of time, their experience provides relevant lessons for U.S. strategy formulation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and is an instructive case that can inform theories of great-power...
Many experts see a move toward high-value export crops, such as fruits and vegetables, as an impo... more Many experts see a move toward high-value export crops, such as fruits and vegetables, as an important opportunity for economic growth and poverty reduction, but little is known about the effects of export crops in fragile and conflict-affected countries. We exploit movements in world market prices combined with geographic variation in crop production to show that increases in the value of bananas, the country’s biggest export crop, caused an increase in conflict violence and insurgent-controlled territory in the Philippines. This effect was concentrated in provinces where bananas are produced in large plantations with areas greater than 25 hectares. Our results are consistent with a mechanism in which insurgents fund their operations by extorting large agricultural export firms.
Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanit... more Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws governing their treatment of noncombatants. How much risk to their own forces they must take to limit harm to civilians in the course of military operations, however, is unclear. The principle of proportionality in the law of armed conflict all but necessitates that they make a utilitarian calculation: potential harm to civilians must always be balanced against military value when considering actions that could hurt innocents. In asymmetric conflicts, such as most counterinsurgencies, information flows, collaboration, and ultimately the support of the local population can be key to achieving strategic objectives. Thus, limiting casualties to noncombatants and other actions that alienate the population in these types of conflicts is a key part of a winning strategy. The concept of “courageous restraint” was created to express this principle to NATO and U.S. forces fighting in A...
Page 1. Page 2. Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden... more Page 1. Page 2. Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions ...
Page 1. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series Iranian Strategy in Iraq... more Page 1. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series Iranian Strategy in Iraq Politics and Other Means Joseph Felter Brian Fishman October 13, 2008 1 Page 2. Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 ...
... The Sentinel's editorial board includes CTC Director... more ... The Sentinel's editorial board includes CTC Director of Research Dr. Jarret Brachman, Senior Research Fellow Dr. Assaf Moghadam and Senior Associate Brian Fishman. The CTC Sentinel is one of several new initiatives that we are pleased to announce. ...
... He also cites Imam Qassani al-Hanafi who said that it is permissible to attack non-Muslim ene... more ... He also cites Imam Qassani al-Hanafi who said that it is permissible to attack non-Muslim enemies 6 Page 8. ... It is a Long Trip for Dr. Fadl from Beni Suwaif to Peshawar to Sudan to Yemen and the end in Turah. Al-Masry al-Yawm. ... Excerpts from Ayman Al-Zawahiri as I Knew ...
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