The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–87, 1989
The withdrawal of Soviet demands on forward-based systems at Vladivostok seemed to indicate that ... more The withdrawal of Soviet demands on forward-based systems at Vladivostok seemed to indicate that the Pentagon and NATO Europe had won the argument: the principle of extended deterrence had been preserved. But this illusion did not last long. Brezhnev could not afford to drop forward-based systems—a subject of great concern to the Soviet military—without also seeking compensation elsewhere. He had little choice now but to proceed with weapons programmes hitherto delayed, including the testing of the SS-20.
By flooding a depressed world market with raw materials and agricultural produce in order to supp... more By flooding a depressed world market with raw materials and agricultural produce in order to support the foreign exchange burden of the five-year plan, the Russians came into direct collision with powerful industrial and agrarian lobbies, West and East. For although France took the lead in combatting Soviet dumping, it was also an issue which complicated Moscow’s relations with almost every Power and fast became the main element in destabilising the USSR’s hard-won peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world.
The events of 1938 reinforced Moscow’s reservations about the practicability of collective securi... more The events of 1938 reinforced Moscow’s reservations about the practicability of collective security. The year began badly. After Zhdanov’s attack on the Narkomindel for not asserting Soviet interests vis-a-vis the capitalist world in general, came the publication of Stalin’s written reply to comrades Ivanov and Filippovich on the 14 February 1938. He spoke of the need to combine “the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people”. Stalin continued: “We need to strengthen and reinforce the international proletarian links of the working-class of the USSR. with the working-class of the bourgeois countries; we need to organise political aid from the working-class of the bourgeois countries to the working-class of our own country in the event of an armed attack on our own country, equally we need to organise all possible aid from the working-class of our own country to the working-class of the bourgeois countries.”1...
The sudden and unexpected emergence of an immediate threat to Russian frontiers in the Far East s... more The sudden and unexpected emergence of an immediate threat to Russian frontiers in the Far East seemed to presage important and long-term consequences for Soviet policy with respect to both the SALT negotiations and detente in Europe. On 2 March 1969 Soviet and Chinese forces collided in a dispute over the possession of an island (Damansky/Chenpao) on the Sino-Soviet border. A minor border incident soon flared into open warfare and by 18 August the Russians were contemplating drastic action. On that day, former National Security adviser Henry Kissinger recalls, ‘a middle-level State Department specialist in Soviet affairs … was having lunch with a Soviet Embassy official [who worked for the KGB] when, out of the blue, the Russian asked what the US reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities’.1
Extremely uncertain of its position in Europe and before long gravely weakened economically and m... more Extremely uncertain of its position in Europe and before long gravely weakened economically and militarily by Stalin’s terror, the Soviet Union was not about to take any uncalculated risks in relation to Japan in 1937. Yet the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East — with Manchuria securely in the hands of the Japanese and with the Western Powers loath to intervene — was not to Soviet advantage either. Moscow therefore did its best to revive Chinese resistance to Japanese occupation, and in the spring of 1937 renewed its offer of arms to the KMT as a means to that end.1 For Chiang Kai-shek, however, there was little to be gained by accepting such an offer if it provoked the Japanese into further aggression. Nothing therefore came of the proposal. Furthermore the prospects for involving the Western Powers in a collective security system to contain Japan appeared as bleak as ever in Soviet eyes. Britain, under its new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, used the growing crisis...
The archives that can give us the definitive answer as to the war-aims of the Soviet regime are s... more The archives that can give us the definitive answer as to the war-aims of the Soviet regime are still closed: that is to say, all the Politburo papers relating to foreign, defence and intelligence matters and the greater part of the relevant files in the Foreign Ministry.1
Hitler’s unexpected accession to power in Germany at the beginning of 1933 had by the end of that... more Hitler’s unexpected accession to power in Germany at the beginning of 1933 had by the end of that eventful year brought about a dramatic volte-face in the direction of Soviet foreign policy, ushering in the most pro-Western period Moscow has ever seen; this was the Litvinov era of Soviet diplomacy.
Growing Soviet self-confidence in the Far East could be seen not only in Moscow’s belligerent att... more Growing Soviet self-confidence in the Far East could be seen not only in Moscow’s belligerent attitude towards Japan, but also in its treatment of the United States. Having secured diplomatic recognition from Washington, but certain the United States was uninterested in an entangling alliance, the Russians turned their backs on US demands that they repay pre-revolutionary debts. Even the Commissariat of Foreign Trade had no vested interest in appeasing the Americans: the Johnson Act had effectively prevented the US Government underwriting loans to the Russians as a quid pro quo for debt repayment. The American diplomats who arrived in Moscow early in 1934, expecting to find their new partners pliant, instead found them polite but coolly indifferent.
The shift in Western policy towards the Soviet Union represented by the dual-track decision found... more The shift in Western policy towards the Soviet Union represented by the dual-track decision found the Russians completely unprepared. They failed to see the significance of what was happening. Under the ageing Brezhnev, backed by the equally ageing Gromyko, the Soviet Government lost all diplomatic initiative. It was easier to assume that the correlation of forces was still to Soviet advantage, that detente was irreversible because the economic crisis in the West had undermined NATO’s resolve to confront the Russians in Europe, and that the resurgence in Western determination to bolster NATO’s defences was ultimately unsustainable, than to reconsider long-held assumptions and re-orchestrate policy along entirely new lines. For this reason it took a considerable period of time for the Russians to adjust to the new reality.
The conclusion of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact augured well for Moscow’s future. The Sov... more The conclusion of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact augured well for Moscow’s future. The Soviet Union at last appeared to be harvesting international rewards for the desperate sacrifices of the previous three years. A series of further successes, both real and apparent, in the autumn and winter of 1932 — both within Germany and elsewhere — appeared firm confirmation that the USSR had finally established itself as a Power to be reckoned with. The only setback occurred in relations with Britain, yet even this proved shortlived and seemed only to underline the progress Moscow had made.
The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39, 1984
There was never a clear and complete concord in outlook or tactics between the Narkomindel and th... more There was never a clear and complete concord in outlook or tactics between the Narkomindel and the Comintern despite the self-evident fact that both institutions were ultimately answerable to the Politburo under Stalin. Foreign policy was not his metier. He had never lived abroad. He knew no foreign languages. He cared little for the world outside. It was merely an ever-present menace to the revolution he had appropriated and sought to transform. Not until 1939, with the centralisation of Party and state as complete as it would ever become, did Stalin consider himself sufficiently confident to jettison the pilot, Litvinov.
Annual Review of Political Science - ANNU REV POLIT SCI, 2003
▪ The fall of Soviet Communism led to the release of top secret documents vital to our understa... more ▪ The fall of Soviet Communism led to the release of top secret documents vital to our understanding of the Cold War. This material is, however, available to research only to a limited extent. The best access is to be obtained in the archives of the Warsaw Pact countries, including those in Berlin. In Moscow itself, secrecy still forestalls access to the most important documents, above all those relating to the origins of the Cold War under Stalin. It is therefore not surprising that the debate about Cold War origins is still with us, and without any notable improvement in the quality of evidence adduced in the debate. It is by no means clear, as historians such as Gaddis have asserted, that the origins can be laid merely at the door of one unreasonable and unreasoning man: Stalin. It is, however, equally unconvincing to hear from Trachtenberg that Stalin was merely doing what all statesmen do and did so entirely rationally. The complementary argument from Leffler that, given the rational nature of Russian decisions, the answer lies more with U.S. than with Russian policy makers begs as many questions as it seeks to answer. The wary reader is well advised that the jury is still out until both the prosecution and the defense actually have adequate access to the evidence.
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 1976
Page 1. http://mil.sagepub.com International Studies Millennium - Journal of DOI: 10.1177/0305829... more Page 1. http://mil.sagepub.com International Studies Millennium - Journal of DOI: 10.1177/03058298760050030401 1976; 5; 282 Millennium - Journal of International Studies Jonathan Haslam Analysis ...
The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–87, 1989
The withdrawal of Soviet demands on forward-based systems at Vladivostok seemed to indicate that ... more The withdrawal of Soviet demands on forward-based systems at Vladivostok seemed to indicate that the Pentagon and NATO Europe had won the argument: the principle of extended deterrence had been preserved. But this illusion did not last long. Brezhnev could not afford to drop forward-based systems—a subject of great concern to the Soviet military—without also seeking compensation elsewhere. He had little choice now but to proceed with weapons programmes hitherto delayed, including the testing of the SS-20.
By flooding a depressed world market with raw materials and agricultural produce in order to supp... more By flooding a depressed world market with raw materials and agricultural produce in order to support the foreign exchange burden of the five-year plan, the Russians came into direct collision with powerful industrial and agrarian lobbies, West and East. For although France took the lead in combatting Soviet dumping, it was also an issue which complicated Moscow’s relations with almost every Power and fast became the main element in destabilising the USSR’s hard-won peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world.
The events of 1938 reinforced Moscow’s reservations about the practicability of collective securi... more The events of 1938 reinforced Moscow’s reservations about the practicability of collective security. The year began badly. After Zhdanov’s attack on the Narkomindel for not asserting Soviet interests vis-a-vis the capitalist world in general, came the publication of Stalin’s written reply to comrades Ivanov and Filippovich on the 14 February 1938. He spoke of the need to combine “the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people”. Stalin continued: “We need to strengthen and reinforce the international proletarian links of the working-class of the USSR. with the working-class of the bourgeois countries; we need to organise political aid from the working-class of the bourgeois countries to the working-class of our own country in the event of an armed attack on our own country, equally we need to organise all possible aid from the working-class of our own country to the working-class of the bourgeois countries.”1...
The sudden and unexpected emergence of an immediate threat to Russian frontiers in the Far East s... more The sudden and unexpected emergence of an immediate threat to Russian frontiers in the Far East seemed to presage important and long-term consequences for Soviet policy with respect to both the SALT negotiations and detente in Europe. On 2 March 1969 Soviet and Chinese forces collided in a dispute over the possession of an island (Damansky/Chenpao) on the Sino-Soviet border. A minor border incident soon flared into open warfare and by 18 August the Russians were contemplating drastic action. On that day, former National Security adviser Henry Kissinger recalls, ‘a middle-level State Department specialist in Soviet affairs … was having lunch with a Soviet Embassy official [who worked for the KGB] when, out of the blue, the Russian asked what the US reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities’.1
Extremely uncertain of its position in Europe and before long gravely weakened economically and m... more Extremely uncertain of its position in Europe and before long gravely weakened economically and militarily by Stalin’s terror, the Soviet Union was not about to take any uncalculated risks in relation to Japan in 1937. Yet the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East — with Manchuria securely in the hands of the Japanese and with the Western Powers loath to intervene — was not to Soviet advantage either. Moscow therefore did its best to revive Chinese resistance to Japanese occupation, and in the spring of 1937 renewed its offer of arms to the KMT as a means to that end.1 For Chiang Kai-shek, however, there was little to be gained by accepting such an offer if it provoked the Japanese into further aggression. Nothing therefore came of the proposal. Furthermore the prospects for involving the Western Powers in a collective security system to contain Japan appeared as bleak as ever in Soviet eyes. Britain, under its new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, used the growing crisis...
The archives that can give us the definitive answer as to the war-aims of the Soviet regime are s... more The archives that can give us the definitive answer as to the war-aims of the Soviet regime are still closed: that is to say, all the Politburo papers relating to foreign, defence and intelligence matters and the greater part of the relevant files in the Foreign Ministry.1
Hitler’s unexpected accession to power in Germany at the beginning of 1933 had by the end of that... more Hitler’s unexpected accession to power in Germany at the beginning of 1933 had by the end of that eventful year brought about a dramatic volte-face in the direction of Soviet foreign policy, ushering in the most pro-Western period Moscow has ever seen; this was the Litvinov era of Soviet diplomacy.
Growing Soviet self-confidence in the Far East could be seen not only in Moscow’s belligerent att... more Growing Soviet self-confidence in the Far East could be seen not only in Moscow’s belligerent attitude towards Japan, but also in its treatment of the United States. Having secured diplomatic recognition from Washington, but certain the United States was uninterested in an entangling alliance, the Russians turned their backs on US demands that they repay pre-revolutionary debts. Even the Commissariat of Foreign Trade had no vested interest in appeasing the Americans: the Johnson Act had effectively prevented the US Government underwriting loans to the Russians as a quid pro quo for debt repayment. The American diplomats who arrived in Moscow early in 1934, expecting to find their new partners pliant, instead found them polite but coolly indifferent.
The shift in Western policy towards the Soviet Union represented by the dual-track decision found... more The shift in Western policy towards the Soviet Union represented by the dual-track decision found the Russians completely unprepared. They failed to see the significance of what was happening. Under the ageing Brezhnev, backed by the equally ageing Gromyko, the Soviet Government lost all diplomatic initiative. It was easier to assume that the correlation of forces was still to Soviet advantage, that detente was irreversible because the economic crisis in the West had undermined NATO’s resolve to confront the Russians in Europe, and that the resurgence in Western determination to bolster NATO’s defences was ultimately unsustainable, than to reconsider long-held assumptions and re-orchestrate policy along entirely new lines. For this reason it took a considerable period of time for the Russians to adjust to the new reality.
The conclusion of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact augured well for Moscow’s future. The Sov... more The conclusion of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact augured well for Moscow’s future. The Soviet Union at last appeared to be harvesting international rewards for the desperate sacrifices of the previous three years. A series of further successes, both real and apparent, in the autumn and winter of 1932 — both within Germany and elsewhere — appeared firm confirmation that the USSR had finally established itself as a Power to be reckoned with. The only setback occurred in relations with Britain, yet even this proved shortlived and seemed only to underline the progress Moscow had made.
The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39, 1984
There was never a clear and complete concord in outlook or tactics between the Narkomindel and th... more There was never a clear and complete concord in outlook or tactics between the Narkomindel and the Comintern despite the self-evident fact that both institutions were ultimately answerable to the Politburo under Stalin. Foreign policy was not his metier. He had never lived abroad. He knew no foreign languages. He cared little for the world outside. It was merely an ever-present menace to the revolution he had appropriated and sought to transform. Not until 1939, with the centralisation of Party and state as complete as it would ever become, did Stalin consider himself sufficiently confident to jettison the pilot, Litvinov.
Annual Review of Political Science - ANNU REV POLIT SCI, 2003
▪ The fall of Soviet Communism led to the release of top secret documents vital to our understa... more ▪ The fall of Soviet Communism led to the release of top secret documents vital to our understanding of the Cold War. This material is, however, available to research only to a limited extent. The best access is to be obtained in the archives of the Warsaw Pact countries, including those in Berlin. In Moscow itself, secrecy still forestalls access to the most important documents, above all those relating to the origins of the Cold War under Stalin. It is therefore not surprising that the debate about Cold War origins is still with us, and without any notable improvement in the quality of evidence adduced in the debate. It is by no means clear, as historians such as Gaddis have asserted, that the origins can be laid merely at the door of one unreasonable and unreasoning man: Stalin. It is, however, equally unconvincing to hear from Trachtenberg that Stalin was merely doing what all statesmen do and did so entirely rationally. The complementary argument from Leffler that, given the rational nature of Russian decisions, the answer lies more with U.S. than with Russian policy makers begs as many questions as it seeks to answer. The wary reader is well advised that the jury is still out until both the prosecution and the defense actually have adequate access to the evidence.
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 1976
Page 1. http://mil.sagepub.com International Studies Millennium - Journal of DOI: 10.1177/0305829... more Page 1. http://mil.sagepub.com International Studies Millennium - Journal of DOI: 10.1177/03058298760050030401 1976; 5; 282 Millennium - Journal of International Studies Jonathan Haslam Analysis ...
Uploads