Clinton entered office as the first post-Cold War president. “No other modern American president ... more Clinton entered office as the first post-Cold War president. “No other modern American president inherited a stronger, safer international position than Bill Clinton,” states Hyland (1999, p. 1). The nation was at peace; the United States was now the world’s sole superpower. Major threats posed by the delicate balance of hostile bipolar relations with the former Soviet Union—an arms race in nuclear missiles and the spread of communist regimes in third world states that had shaped American foreign policy for nearly half a century of the Cold War era—had virtually disappeared. The Cold War had ended with American victory. The Gulf War in 1991 also brought American victory—Kuwait was freed and Saudi Arabia protected from Iraqi aggression. The United States felt at liberty to act on the international stage without fearing confrontation from any formidable adversary. The new president, like his predecessor, George H. W. Bush, was an internationalist; he resisted the temptations of isolationism. Unlike his predecessor, he was a moralist and took a liberal stand on global politics arguing that noble humanitarian goals, enlarging the realm of democracies, and advancing the protection of human rights should be pursued around the world, stating in his inaugural address that “Our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s cause.”
Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction: Intervention Centrality: An Argument Global Structure... more Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction: Intervention Centrality: An Argument Global Structure and American Intervention World Perspectives and American Intervention Policy Perspectives on American Intervention Foreign Policy Doctrines on American Intervention American Intervention: Post-Cold War Cases American Intervention: Evolving Opportunities American Intervention: Evolving Trends Intervention Impact: An Assessment Bibliography Index
Based on the conference proceedings of a meeting held in April 1988, subjects covered in this tit... more Based on the conference proceedings of a meeting held in April 1988, subjects covered in this title include US intervention in Central America, USSR intervention in Europe, and intervention by the superpowers in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait. The United States react... more On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait. The United States reacted immediately, sending Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia on August 5 to brief King Fahd on the threat and to secure his majesty’s immediate agreement to dispatching U.S. military forces to the kingdom. The Bush administration was increasingly concerned about the unwillingness of the House of Saud and other leading Arab countries to stand up to Saddam’s threat (Friedman, 1990). The United States decided it was necessary to defend Saudi oil fields and do so quickly, hence four days after the Iraqi intervention, the American delegation was pressuring its rich Middle East ally to allow American use of airstrips and naval installations. In order to respond to Iraqi moves, Cheney demanded several conditions for U.S. troop deployment: first, the United States would not accept any limits on the number of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, and second, the United States would not accept a fixed date for troop withdrawal, although the military forces would leave if King Fahd requested they do so.
Bush assumed the presidency after one of the closest national election contests in U.S. history. ... more Bush assumed the presidency after one of the closest national election contests in U.S. history. From November 7 until December 12, 2000, the outcome was in abeyance. In December, after he was declared the winner, Bush met with Clinton in a two-hour private discussion on national security and foreign policy issues. According to the testimony given to the National Commission investigating the 9/11 attacks, Clinton recalled telling the president-elect that bin Laden and al Qaeda formed a major threat to U.S. Security (9/11 Report, 2004, p. 287); members of Bush’s administration did not understand the obsession with al Qaeda, indeed thought it rather odd (Clarke, 2004, p. 225). At the time, few Americans had died in the attacks executed by al Qaeda terrorists, unlike the Beirut Marine Barracks suicide bombing of 1983, or the Pan Am Flight 103, which was full of Americans traveling home for Christmas holidays, midair explosion over Scotland in December 1988. In each of these events, well over 200 people had lost their lives, yet the tragedies had not provoked any U.S. retaliation.
The debate over appropriate ways to cope with terrorism varies in intensity as spectacular incide... more The debate over appropriate ways to cope with terrorism varies in intensity as spectacular incidents explode and recede from popular memory, declared Rubin (1990, pp. xi–xii) in a prophetic remark befitting the situation the United States has faced since the Clinton administration took office in January 1993. Leaders must decide among a repertoire of policy responses taking into account both effective tactics and overall foreign policy interests. To compound the problem, measuring counterterrorism effectiveness is not easy— failure, though it may be rare, is starkly evident whenever violent attacks occur; rates of success, noted by the frequency of foiled terrorist plots, may be significant but unknown to the general public due to intelligence sensitivities. Logically, a trajectory of counterterrorism policies over time should lead to increased effectiveness as a product of decision makers’ learning curve and as better security mechanisms are implemented. A pattern of decreased effectiveness might emerge however, if a copycat process is expanding (more and more individuals and groups applying terrorist tactics in many, often vulnerable, environments in order to achieve their goals), and the sheer volume of attack attempts grows exponentially. In another scenario, when enhancing security factors (improved safety levels) intertwine with inhibiting security factors (terrorism diffusion) it may seem that changes in counterterrorism effectiveness are negligible.
As a form of violence that seeks to influence, coerce, threaten, and weaken a government and its ... more As a form of violence that seeks to influence, coerce, threaten, and weaken a government and its citizens, terrorism has left many people “bewildered by its nature, its capacity to control minds, and its ability to survive across time and place.” Terrorists target innocent victims “who are unknowingly caught in the inner turmoil of minds that nurture and proclaim hate, anger, and violence and that claim injustice, indignity, and abuse,” says Marsella (2004, p. 14). Terrorists’ acts, committed in the passion of the moment, are carried out for reasons of just cause and retribution based on an interpretation of the past. They are calculated events, precisely planned; the violence is aimed at destroying carefully chosen physical targets: a nationally symbolic building, a government structure, an aircraft, a ship, although the particular affected occupants (workers or passengers) are usually a random compilation of individuals rather than a specific marked group. Over the past century terrorism has killed, injured, and brutalized thousands of unsuspecting human beings.
Obama entered the presidency in January, 2009 facing two unpopular American-generated wars in the... more Obama entered the presidency in January, 2009 facing two unpopular American-generated wars in the Islamic world begun under the Bush administration: the war in Afghanistan that started with the October, 2001 U.S. intervention in response to the 9/11 attacks—a determination to wipe out al Qaeda training camps and seize its primary leaders, and to eliminate the repressive, fundamentalist Taliban regime; and the war in Iraq, a preemptive invasion in March, 2003 designed to oust its leader, Saddam Hussein, capture and destroy the presumed, but later discovered to be a nonexistent, cache of weapons of mass destruction, and to “drain the swamp” of terrorists expected to flock to the region. Both of these wars were unpopular in that their rationale and support within the United States was waning, and anti-Americanism abroad, particularly in Muslim majority nations, was growing as a result of the massive U.S. military presence. Neither conflict showed sure signs of U.S. victory. The Taliban were regaining strength in Afghanistan and post-Saddam regime conditions in Iraq pointed to serious, continuing hostile rift between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The terrorism threat was alive despite the expansive, expensive Global War on Terrorism policy built by the Bush administration to defeat it.
A common pattern in thinking about counterterrorism is a tendency toward absolute solutions and a... more A common pattern in thinking about counterterrorism is a tendency toward absolute solutions and a rejection of accommodation and finesse, states Paul Pillar (2001), a former U.S. government analyst who served at the CIA and National Intelligence Council. If the task of countering terrorism is viewed through the lens of warfare, it is easy to conclude that there is no substitute for victory and no room for compromise; the nature of terrorism is to think of it simply as an evil to be eradicated, rather than a complex phenomenon with political viewpoints that may need to be considered. Pillar (2001) recommends the problem of terrorism be addressed in a wider scope of concerns when formulating appropriate policies to deal with it, including an assessment of root conditions and issues that give rise to terrorist groups and motivate individuals to join them; the capability and intentions of such groups to conduct terrorist attacks; and the defenses erected against such attacks. Effective counterterrorism requires attention to all areas, that is, responding to terrorism goes beyond law enforcement and military solutions. The advice seems reasonable and well-intentioned although its implementation has been fraught with challenges.1
ABSTRACT Government officials are never eager to negotiate with terrorist groups. In practice, th... more ABSTRACT Government officials are never eager to negotiate with terrorist groups. In practice, though, they often decide to do so after a long terrorist campaign threatens their national security. Sometimes negotiated agreement is the result. What causes this development? Conflict ripeness, turning points and negotiation readiness explain conceptually how parties come to the table for talks. These ideas are represented respectively in frequency and severity of terrorist attacks and leadership change in affected governments and examined in four cases of long wars of terrorism conflict: Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Israel-Palestine, to discover whether escalation or de-escalation processes-examined in a simple form - signal convergence toward negotiation, and if new leaders in office make a difference.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United... more The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United Nations as reflected in journal articles published during the period 1950-1969.Scope and Method of This StudyIn recent years students of politics have become increasingly self-conscious about the spread of behavioral methods and viewpoints within the discipline. A great deal of energy has been expended in explaining what behavioralism is, defending it, attacking it, or trying to reconcile it with more traditional approaches.
Clinton entered office as the first post-Cold War president. “No other modern American president ... more Clinton entered office as the first post-Cold War president. “No other modern American president inherited a stronger, safer international position than Bill Clinton,” states Hyland (1999, p. 1). The nation was at peace; the United States was now the world’s sole superpower. Major threats posed by the delicate balance of hostile bipolar relations with the former Soviet Union—an arms race in nuclear missiles and the spread of communist regimes in third world states that had shaped American foreign policy for nearly half a century of the Cold War era—had virtually disappeared. The Cold War had ended with American victory. The Gulf War in 1991 also brought American victory—Kuwait was freed and Saudi Arabia protected from Iraqi aggression. The United States felt at liberty to act on the international stage without fearing confrontation from any formidable adversary. The new president, like his predecessor, George H. W. Bush, was an internationalist; he resisted the temptations of isolationism. Unlike his predecessor, he was a moralist and took a liberal stand on global politics arguing that noble humanitarian goals, enlarging the realm of democracies, and advancing the protection of human rights should be pursued around the world, stating in his inaugural address that “Our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s cause.”
Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction: Intervention Centrality: An Argument Global Structure... more Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction: Intervention Centrality: An Argument Global Structure and American Intervention World Perspectives and American Intervention Policy Perspectives on American Intervention Foreign Policy Doctrines on American Intervention American Intervention: Post-Cold War Cases American Intervention: Evolving Opportunities American Intervention: Evolving Trends Intervention Impact: An Assessment Bibliography Index
Based on the conference proceedings of a meeting held in April 1988, subjects covered in this tit... more Based on the conference proceedings of a meeting held in April 1988, subjects covered in this title include US intervention in Central America, USSR intervention in Europe, and intervention by the superpowers in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait. The United States react... more On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait. The United States reacted immediately, sending Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia on August 5 to brief King Fahd on the threat and to secure his majesty’s immediate agreement to dispatching U.S. military forces to the kingdom. The Bush administration was increasingly concerned about the unwillingness of the House of Saud and other leading Arab countries to stand up to Saddam’s threat (Friedman, 1990). The United States decided it was necessary to defend Saudi oil fields and do so quickly, hence four days after the Iraqi intervention, the American delegation was pressuring its rich Middle East ally to allow American use of airstrips and naval installations. In order to respond to Iraqi moves, Cheney demanded several conditions for U.S. troop deployment: first, the United States would not accept any limits on the number of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, and second, the United States would not accept a fixed date for troop withdrawal, although the military forces would leave if King Fahd requested they do so.
Bush assumed the presidency after one of the closest national election contests in U.S. history. ... more Bush assumed the presidency after one of the closest national election contests in U.S. history. From November 7 until December 12, 2000, the outcome was in abeyance. In December, after he was declared the winner, Bush met with Clinton in a two-hour private discussion on national security and foreign policy issues. According to the testimony given to the National Commission investigating the 9/11 attacks, Clinton recalled telling the president-elect that bin Laden and al Qaeda formed a major threat to U.S. Security (9/11 Report, 2004, p. 287); members of Bush’s administration did not understand the obsession with al Qaeda, indeed thought it rather odd (Clarke, 2004, p. 225). At the time, few Americans had died in the attacks executed by al Qaeda terrorists, unlike the Beirut Marine Barracks suicide bombing of 1983, or the Pan Am Flight 103, which was full of Americans traveling home for Christmas holidays, midair explosion over Scotland in December 1988. In each of these events, well over 200 people had lost their lives, yet the tragedies had not provoked any U.S. retaliation.
The debate over appropriate ways to cope with terrorism varies in intensity as spectacular incide... more The debate over appropriate ways to cope with terrorism varies in intensity as spectacular incidents explode and recede from popular memory, declared Rubin (1990, pp. xi–xii) in a prophetic remark befitting the situation the United States has faced since the Clinton administration took office in January 1993. Leaders must decide among a repertoire of policy responses taking into account both effective tactics and overall foreign policy interests. To compound the problem, measuring counterterrorism effectiveness is not easy— failure, though it may be rare, is starkly evident whenever violent attacks occur; rates of success, noted by the frequency of foiled terrorist plots, may be significant but unknown to the general public due to intelligence sensitivities. Logically, a trajectory of counterterrorism policies over time should lead to increased effectiveness as a product of decision makers’ learning curve and as better security mechanisms are implemented. A pattern of decreased effectiveness might emerge however, if a copycat process is expanding (more and more individuals and groups applying terrorist tactics in many, often vulnerable, environments in order to achieve their goals), and the sheer volume of attack attempts grows exponentially. In another scenario, when enhancing security factors (improved safety levels) intertwine with inhibiting security factors (terrorism diffusion) it may seem that changes in counterterrorism effectiveness are negligible.
As a form of violence that seeks to influence, coerce, threaten, and weaken a government and its ... more As a form of violence that seeks to influence, coerce, threaten, and weaken a government and its citizens, terrorism has left many people “bewildered by its nature, its capacity to control minds, and its ability to survive across time and place.” Terrorists target innocent victims “who are unknowingly caught in the inner turmoil of minds that nurture and proclaim hate, anger, and violence and that claim injustice, indignity, and abuse,” says Marsella (2004, p. 14). Terrorists’ acts, committed in the passion of the moment, are carried out for reasons of just cause and retribution based on an interpretation of the past. They are calculated events, precisely planned; the violence is aimed at destroying carefully chosen physical targets: a nationally symbolic building, a government structure, an aircraft, a ship, although the particular affected occupants (workers or passengers) are usually a random compilation of individuals rather than a specific marked group. Over the past century terrorism has killed, injured, and brutalized thousands of unsuspecting human beings.
Obama entered the presidency in January, 2009 facing two unpopular American-generated wars in the... more Obama entered the presidency in January, 2009 facing two unpopular American-generated wars in the Islamic world begun under the Bush administration: the war in Afghanistan that started with the October, 2001 U.S. intervention in response to the 9/11 attacks—a determination to wipe out al Qaeda training camps and seize its primary leaders, and to eliminate the repressive, fundamentalist Taliban regime; and the war in Iraq, a preemptive invasion in March, 2003 designed to oust its leader, Saddam Hussein, capture and destroy the presumed, but later discovered to be a nonexistent, cache of weapons of mass destruction, and to “drain the swamp” of terrorists expected to flock to the region. Both of these wars were unpopular in that their rationale and support within the United States was waning, and anti-Americanism abroad, particularly in Muslim majority nations, was growing as a result of the massive U.S. military presence. Neither conflict showed sure signs of U.S. victory. The Taliban were regaining strength in Afghanistan and post-Saddam regime conditions in Iraq pointed to serious, continuing hostile rift between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The terrorism threat was alive despite the expansive, expensive Global War on Terrorism policy built by the Bush administration to defeat it.
A common pattern in thinking about counterterrorism is a tendency toward absolute solutions and a... more A common pattern in thinking about counterterrorism is a tendency toward absolute solutions and a rejection of accommodation and finesse, states Paul Pillar (2001), a former U.S. government analyst who served at the CIA and National Intelligence Council. If the task of countering terrorism is viewed through the lens of warfare, it is easy to conclude that there is no substitute for victory and no room for compromise; the nature of terrorism is to think of it simply as an evil to be eradicated, rather than a complex phenomenon with political viewpoints that may need to be considered. Pillar (2001) recommends the problem of terrorism be addressed in a wider scope of concerns when formulating appropriate policies to deal with it, including an assessment of root conditions and issues that give rise to terrorist groups and motivate individuals to join them; the capability and intentions of such groups to conduct terrorist attacks; and the defenses erected against such attacks. Effective counterterrorism requires attention to all areas, that is, responding to terrorism goes beyond law enforcement and military solutions. The advice seems reasonable and well-intentioned although its implementation has been fraught with challenges.1
ABSTRACT Government officials are never eager to negotiate with terrorist groups. In practice, th... more ABSTRACT Government officials are never eager to negotiate with terrorist groups. In practice, though, they often decide to do so after a long terrorist campaign threatens their national security. Sometimes negotiated agreement is the result. What causes this development? Conflict ripeness, turning points and negotiation readiness explain conceptually how parties come to the table for talks. These ideas are represented respectively in frequency and severity of terrorist attacks and leadership change in affected governments and examined in four cases of long wars of terrorism conflict: Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Israel-Palestine, to discover whether escalation or de-escalation processes-examined in a simple form - signal convergence toward negotiation, and if new leaders in office make a difference.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United... more The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United Nations as reflected in journal articles published during the period 1950-1969.Scope and Method of This StudyIn recent years students of politics have become increasingly self-conscious about the spread of behavioral methods and viewpoints within the discipline. A great deal of energy has been expended in explaining what behavioralism is, defending it, attacking it, or trying to reconcile it with more traditional approaches.
Uploads
Papers by Karen Feste