In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ectiv... more In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ective organization of a ruling party. Today, China stands out as a successful party-based authoritarian regime. In contrast to conventional approaches, which emphasize the role of authoritarian parties in controlling elite conflict and electoral-legislative processes, this dissertation demonstrates that the party makes the regime strong at the local level. Thanks to the party, the Chinese government has a strong grip of local societies across its large realm. Since China has “crimson areas”, where the party is more present, and “pink areas”, where the party is less present, the Chinese case is ideally suited for a subnational comparative analysis of party-based authoritarianism. Subnational analysis, with its strong focus on geography, demonstrates that the party is doing much more than distributing patronage, and that as a result the state is most resilient, best at extracting taxes, and mo...
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2016
This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive po... more This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive power. To exercise power over the expanse of their realm, governments need an infrastructure to access even more peripheral communities. But as rulers overcome the problems of distance, they discover the challenges of proximity, because locals influence state agents and undermine state autonomy. Studying the uneven reach of Chinese local governments within their jurisdictions, we demonstrate that micro-variation of extraction in rural China, including monetary and non-monetary levies, provides a rare window onto the micro-geography of power. Physical distance still obstructs extractive power projection into extremely remote places, but physical proximity has become a greater constraint for the exercise of power. Local governments are pressured by their immediate neighborhood, at the expense of less fortunate citizens, who live at intermediate distances: still within the reach of the state, but already too far away to turn the state to their favor. The effect of organizational distance, which in China is mediated primarily through the Communist Party, is similarly dualistic: Party networks alleviate asymmetric information problems, which hamper rural taxation around the world, but party networks are sustained by patronage and therefore jeopardize state autonomy.
In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ectiv... more In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ective organization of a ruling party. Today, China stands out as a successful party-based authoritarian regime. In contrast to conventional approaches, which emphasize the role of authoritarian parties in controlling elite conflict and electoral-legislative processes, this dissertation demonstrates that the party makes the regime strong at the local level. Thanks to the party, the Chinese government has a strong grip of local societies across its large realm. Since China has “crimson areas”, where the party is more present, and “pink areas”, where the party is less present, the Chinese case is ideally suited for a subnational comparative analysis of party-based authoritarianism. Subnational analysis, with its strong focus on geography, demonstrates that the party is doing much more than distributing patronage, and that as a result the state is most resilient, best at extracting taxes, and mo...
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2016
This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive po... more This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive power. To exercise power over the expanse of their realm, governments need an infrastructure to access even more peripheral communities. But as rulers overcome the problems of distance, they discover the challenges of proximity, because locals influence state agents and undermine state autonomy. Studying the uneven reach of Chinese local governments within their jurisdictions, we demonstrate that micro-variation of extraction in rural China, including monetary and non-monetary levies, provides a rare window onto the micro-geography of power. Physical distance still obstructs extractive power projection into extremely remote places, but physical proximity has become a greater constraint for the exercise of power. Local governments are pressured by their immediate neighborhood, at the expense of less fortunate citizens, who live at intermediate distances: still within the reach of the state, but already too far away to turn the state to their favor. The effect of organizational distance, which in China is mediated primarily through the Communist Party, is similarly dualistic: Party networks alleviate asymmetric information problems, which hamper rural taxation around the world, but party networks are sustained by patronage and therefore jeopardize state autonomy.
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Papers by Daniel Koss