My philosophical interests are divided over two broad areas. One is in the overlap of (meta-) ethics and social/political philosophy; the other is in the intersection of philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. Much (but not all) of my work is most closely affiliated with the analytic tradition both in style and content, and much of it is heavily influenced by the philosophies of Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine, but I am also interested in (parts of) Indian, Chinese, and continental philosophy.
Before I became a "philosopher" I was an economic geographer. I gradually moved from one discipline to the other, but I remain interested in geography, heterodox economics, and in the other social sciences as well. Address: Sado, Niigata, Japan
In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Bud... more In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism asks whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it.
The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.”
Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world.
Any social and political arrangement depends on acceptance. If a substantial part of a people doe... more Any social and political arrangement depends on acceptance. If a substantial part of a people does not accept the authority of its rulers, then those can only remain in power by means of force, and even that use of force needs to be accepted to be effective. Gramsci called this acceptance of the socio-political status quo “hegemony”. Every stable state relies primarily on hegemony as a source of control. Hegemony works through the dissemination of values and beliefs that create acceptance and that serve the interests of the state and/or the ruling elite (the “hegemones”). Hegemony is most efficient if it remains invisible. A key hegemonic belief is the idea that there is no alternative to the current socio-political status quo or that the way things are is “natural”. The current hegemony – that is, the set of values and beliefs that bolster the current socio-political status quo – is a hegemony of psychopathy: it promotes “cultural psychopathy” and destroys empathy and compassion, thus threatening everything that makes us human.
The hegemony of psychopathy is responsible for massive human suffering. It must be fought and replaced with a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs that promote compassion and care. Fighting hegemony requires fighting the “pillars” that support it. Most important among these are the mass media and culture industry, and mainstream economics. The former is responsible for a continuous stream of hegemonic propaganda; the latter – among others – for providing a pseudo-scientific justification for the false belief that there is no alternative. This essay closes off with some considerations on tactics and strategy in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy, but does not – and cannot – offer any concrete advice.
Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things i... more Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction, and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction. While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be 'real', 'fundamental', or 'really existing' is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us.
In "Real Patterns" Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis... more In "Real Patterns" Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett's analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or "noisiness" of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett's analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege's puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of "deviant" implications.
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, 2019
Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphant... more Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, 2019
(First paragraphs) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, ... more (First paragraphs) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, including that of past, present, and future, and that of the passing of time. This experience and awareness of time raises a number of puzzling questions. How do we experience time? What exactly do we experience when we experience time? Do we actually experience time? Or do we infer time from something in, or some aspect of our experience? And so forth.
These and many related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open — that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers.
Bo Mou (Ed.), Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Leiden: Brill, 2018
This is the pre-publication version of my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015)* paper com... more This is the pre-publication version of my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015)* paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong 王充 as an alethic pluralist. The whole discussion (consisting of McLeod’s original paper, Bo Mou’s and my responses, McLeod’s reply to those responses, as well as two new replies to the latter by Bo Mou and me) is published in: Mou, Bo (Ed.) (2018). Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Leiden: Brill).
The first part of this reply/postscript also expands (a bit) on my paper "Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy" (2016)*. That paper, as well as my (2015)* mentioned above, are available here at Academia.edu.
The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousn... more The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion.
The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize ... more The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉, the concept of TRUTH, and the word ·truth·. The property of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉 is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉; and ·truth· is the word we use to express that understanding. Almost all human beings over the age of 2 have the concept of TRUTH, and therefore, the question whether some tradition has the concept of TRUTH is moot, but that doesn't imply that every language has a (single) word for ·truth·. Furthermore, recognizing ·truth· is complicated by the conceptual neighbors of TRUTH. What distinguishes ·truth· from its neighbors is disquotationality. Theories of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉 similarly need to be distinguished from theories about adjacent notions. If a theory is more plausibly interpreted as a theory of 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, then it is not a theory of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉.
Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward... more Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a cornerstone of both Davidson’s and Putnam’s later (but not earlier) coherentism. However, this thesis introduces a form of weak foundationalism into their theories, and consequently, those are strictly speaking not pure coherence theories, but hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism.
Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that— according to Buddhaghosa—should be evoked by... more Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that— according to Buddhaghosa—should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega—what it is and how it works—based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two "systems" : the experiential, automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation.
Philosophy once started as the critical reflection on relatively ordinary human concerns. Increas... more Philosophy once started as the critical reflection on relatively ordinary human concerns. Increasing specialization has moved the discipline farther and farther away from these concerns, however, undermining its relevance outside the academy, but has also resulting in an ever increasing fragmentation. This fragmentation has further divided the field into a large number of esoteric communities that hardly understand each other. "Further divided", because philosophy was already divided into schools and traditions that seem to speak mutually unintelligible languages. In addition to these problems for philosophy as a discipline or "cultural genre" (Rorty), this situation also creates a problem for individual philosophers who are driven primarily by the "big" and ordinary concerns that once founded the field, but that do not fit well in contemporary academic philosophy. In this essay, I suggest - but ultimately do not fully endorse - metaphilosophical anarchism as a possible solution to these problems. Metaphilosophical anarchism requires transparency and rejects opacity, but so do all other approaches to philosophy - at least officially - and if that is right, then anarchism has nothing new or different to offer.
Transcience. A Journal of Global Studies (6.1), 2015
Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-grou... more Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. The notion of othering spread from feminist theory and post-colonial studies to other areas of the humanities and social sciences, but is originally rooted in Hegel's dialectic of identification and distantiation in the encounter of the self with some other in his "Master-Slave dialectic". In this paper, after reviewing the philosophical and psychological background of othering, I distinguish two kinds of othering, "crude" and "sophisticated", that differ in the logical form of their underlying arguments. The essential difference is that the former is merely self-other distantiating, while the latter – as in Hegel's dialectic – partially depends on self-other identification. While crude othering is closer to the paradigmatic notion of othering, sophisticated othering is closer to Hegel's, but so is quasi-othering, which is nearly identical in form to sophisticated othering, but which misses the defining feature of othering – attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness. Because Hegel’s dialectic applies to any encounter of an interpreting self with some other, sophisticated or quasi-othering is at least potentially a very common occurrence in the interpretation of others, especially of those who do not belong to the in-group. However, although othering is usually undesirable, the Hegelian varieties can provide a "mirror", which can be used as a tool to improve understanding of both the other and the interpreting self, and the malignant aspects of othering can be avoided through charity.
In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been... more In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
The most common way of dealing with the fear of death is denying death. Such denial can take two ... more The most common way of dealing with the fear of death is denying death. Such denial can take two and only two forms: strategy 1 denies the finality of death; strategy 2 denies the reality of the dying subject. Most religions opt for strategy 1, but Buddhism seems to be an example of the 2nd. All variants of strategy 1 fail, however, and a closer look at the main Buddhist argument reveals that Buddhism in fact does not follow strategy 2. Moreover, there is no other theory that does, and neither can there be. This means that there is no tenable theory that denies death. There may be no universally psychologically acceptable alternative, however, which would mean that if denying death is incoherent, this is an unavoidable incoherence.
This paper presents a simple model to estimate the number of languages that existed throughout hi... more This paper presents a simple model to estimate the number of languages that existed throughout history, and considers philosophical and linguistic implications of the findings. The estimated number is 150,000 plus or minus 50,000. Because only few of those remain, and there is no reason to believe that that remainder is a statistically representative sample, we should be very cautious about universalistic claims based on existing linguistic variation.
Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-grou... more Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. Othering can be “crude” or “sophisticated”, the defining difference being that in the latter case othering depends on the interpretation of the other/out-group in terms that are applicable only to the self/in-group but that are unconsciously assumed to be universal. The Mass Noun Thesis, the idea that all nouns in certain languages are grammatically and folk-ontologically similar to mass nouns in English, is an example of such sophisticated othering. According to this Thesis, (a) count nouns refer to discrete objects and mass nouns to stuffs; (b) the other’s language has only mass nouns and thus no count nouns; and therefore, (c) the other’s folk-ontology is an ontology of mass stuffs only. There is much evidence, however, that folk-ontology is independent from language. This paper argues that the Mass Noun Thesis is a case of sophisticated othering rooted in a conflation of grammatical and ontological conceptions of mass and count nouns that is applicable to the language of the interpreter/self but not to the languages of the relevant others, and that othering in this case is driven by a need to create some radically alien other to support a scientific or philosophical theory.
Bo Mou & R. Tieszen (eds.), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy, 2013
Introduction (not abstract):
Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the wor... more Introduction (not abstract):
Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, Dharmakīrti, and Dōgen. Prima facie, these philosophers have little in common, and indeed the differences are vast. Even in case of the two Western thinkers there is a fundamental difference between Davidson’s anti-dualist identification of phenomenal, experienced reality with the noumenal, real, external world on the one hand, and the bracketing or elimination of noumenal reality at the base of Derrida’s thought on the other, which lead to radically different ideas with regards to (the possibility and nature of) objectivity and our linguistic access to the real/external/noumenal world. Nevertheless, there are important similarities between Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories of triangulation and différance respectively, and these similarities can be exploited to bridge some of the differences and attempt a constructive engagement. After briefly introducing analytic and continental approaches to meaning and reality (and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories in particular) in section 2, and some relevant Buddhist approaches (including Dharmakīrti’s and Dōgen’s) in section 3, it will be argued in section 4 that Davidson’s theory of triangulation as a connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal needs Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha as a complement, and that apoha is best understood through Derrida’s différance in turn. A further investigation into the implications of the resulting triangulation-différance-apoha integration in section 5 (and the concluding section 6) leads to a view on meaning and reality similar to the perspectivism advocated by the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen: the phenomenal is (mostly) necessarily noumenally real, but partial, one-sided, or incomplete.
First paragraph (not abstract):
Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but... more First paragraph (not abstract):
Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but there is some disagreement among (meta-) ontologists about what “existence” means and whether there are different kinds or senses of “existence” or just one; that is, whether “existence” is equivocal or univocal. Furthermore, there is a growing number of philosophers (many of whom take inspiration from Aristotle’s metaphysical writings) who argue that ontology should not be concerned so much with what exists, but with what is fundamental or real (or something similar). Each of the positions in this debate is centered on a concept or small class of concepts that is intended to capture what ontology is about. Examples of such ontological core concepts are: existence, subsistence, Dasein, being, independent being, being real, being fundamental, being a fundamental constituent of reality, being irreducible. This paper intends to answer the twofold question of what (kind of notions) these ontological core concepts are, and how (and how much) they (can) differ. I will argue that there can be no difference between such concepts other than differing domains, and that any domain is a restriction in a maximally expanded universe, and therefore, equivalent to a (restricting) property. Furthermore, such differences between domains (or restricting properties) are intertranslatable, and consequently, there is not much room for substantial difference. Whatever difference remains is largely due to differences in focus or differences in the (phrasing of) questions ontologists try to answer.
If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(... more If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on he noumenal - phenomenal relationship turn out to complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.
In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Bud... more In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism asks whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it.
The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.”
Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world.
Any social and political arrangement depends on acceptance. If a substantial part of a people doe... more Any social and political arrangement depends on acceptance. If a substantial part of a people does not accept the authority of its rulers, then those can only remain in power by means of force, and even that use of force needs to be accepted to be effective. Gramsci called this acceptance of the socio-political status quo “hegemony”. Every stable state relies primarily on hegemony as a source of control. Hegemony works through the dissemination of values and beliefs that create acceptance and that serve the interests of the state and/or the ruling elite (the “hegemones”). Hegemony is most efficient if it remains invisible. A key hegemonic belief is the idea that there is no alternative to the current socio-political status quo or that the way things are is “natural”. The current hegemony – that is, the set of values and beliefs that bolster the current socio-political status quo – is a hegemony of psychopathy: it promotes “cultural psychopathy” and destroys empathy and compassion, thus threatening everything that makes us human.
The hegemony of psychopathy is responsible for massive human suffering. It must be fought and replaced with a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs that promote compassion and care. Fighting hegemony requires fighting the “pillars” that support it. Most important among these are the mass media and culture industry, and mainstream economics. The former is responsible for a continuous stream of hegemonic propaganda; the latter – among others – for providing a pseudo-scientific justification for the false belief that there is no alternative. This essay closes off with some considerations on tactics and strategy in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy, but does not – and cannot – offer any concrete advice.
Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things i... more Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction, and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction. While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be 'real', 'fundamental', or 'really existing' is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us.
In "Real Patterns" Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis... more In "Real Patterns" Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett's analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or "noisiness" of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett's analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege's puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of "deviant" implications.
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, 2019
Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphant... more Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, 2019
(First paragraphs) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, ... more (First paragraphs) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, including that of past, present, and future, and that of the passing of time. This experience and awareness of time raises a number of puzzling questions. How do we experience time? What exactly do we experience when we experience time? Do we actually experience time? Or do we infer time from something in, or some aspect of our experience? And so forth.
These and many related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open — that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers.
Bo Mou (Ed.), Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Leiden: Brill, 2018
This is the pre-publication version of my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015)* paper com... more This is the pre-publication version of my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015)* paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong 王充 as an alethic pluralist. The whole discussion (consisting of McLeod’s original paper, Bo Mou’s and my responses, McLeod’s reply to those responses, as well as two new replies to the latter by Bo Mou and me) is published in: Mou, Bo (Ed.) (2018). Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Leiden: Brill).
The first part of this reply/postscript also expands (a bit) on my paper "Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy" (2016)*. That paper, as well as my (2015)* mentioned above, are available here at Academia.edu.
The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousn... more The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion.
The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize ... more The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉, the concept of TRUTH, and the word ·truth·. The property of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉 is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉; and ·truth· is the word we use to express that understanding. Almost all human beings over the age of 2 have the concept of TRUTH, and therefore, the question whether some tradition has the concept of TRUTH is moot, but that doesn't imply that every language has a (single) word for ·truth·. Furthermore, recognizing ·truth· is complicated by the conceptual neighbors of TRUTH. What distinguishes ·truth· from its neighbors is disquotationality. Theories of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉 similarly need to be distinguished from theories about adjacent notions. If a theory is more plausibly interpreted as a theory of 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, then it is not a theory of 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒉.
Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward... more Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a cornerstone of both Davidson’s and Putnam’s later (but not earlier) coherentism. However, this thesis introduces a form of weak foundationalism into their theories, and consequently, those are strictly speaking not pure coherence theories, but hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism.
Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that— according to Buddhaghosa—should be evoked by... more Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that— according to Buddhaghosa—should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega—what it is and how it works—based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two "systems" : the experiential, automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation.
Philosophy once started as the critical reflection on relatively ordinary human concerns. Increas... more Philosophy once started as the critical reflection on relatively ordinary human concerns. Increasing specialization has moved the discipline farther and farther away from these concerns, however, undermining its relevance outside the academy, but has also resulting in an ever increasing fragmentation. This fragmentation has further divided the field into a large number of esoteric communities that hardly understand each other. "Further divided", because philosophy was already divided into schools and traditions that seem to speak mutually unintelligible languages. In addition to these problems for philosophy as a discipline or "cultural genre" (Rorty), this situation also creates a problem for individual philosophers who are driven primarily by the "big" and ordinary concerns that once founded the field, but that do not fit well in contemporary academic philosophy. In this essay, I suggest - but ultimately do not fully endorse - metaphilosophical anarchism as a possible solution to these problems. Metaphilosophical anarchism requires transparency and rejects opacity, but so do all other approaches to philosophy - at least officially - and if that is right, then anarchism has nothing new or different to offer.
Transcience. A Journal of Global Studies (6.1), 2015
Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-grou... more Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. The notion of othering spread from feminist theory and post-colonial studies to other areas of the humanities and social sciences, but is originally rooted in Hegel's dialectic of identification and distantiation in the encounter of the self with some other in his "Master-Slave dialectic". In this paper, after reviewing the philosophical and psychological background of othering, I distinguish two kinds of othering, "crude" and "sophisticated", that differ in the logical form of their underlying arguments. The essential difference is that the former is merely self-other distantiating, while the latter – as in Hegel's dialectic – partially depends on self-other identification. While crude othering is closer to the paradigmatic notion of othering, sophisticated othering is closer to Hegel's, but so is quasi-othering, which is nearly identical in form to sophisticated othering, but which misses the defining feature of othering – attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness. Because Hegel’s dialectic applies to any encounter of an interpreting self with some other, sophisticated or quasi-othering is at least potentially a very common occurrence in the interpretation of others, especially of those who do not belong to the in-group. However, although othering is usually undesirable, the Hegelian varieties can provide a "mirror", which can be used as a tool to improve understanding of both the other and the interpreting self, and the malignant aspects of othering can be avoided through charity.
In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been... more In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
The most common way of dealing with the fear of death is denying death. Such denial can take two ... more The most common way of dealing with the fear of death is denying death. Such denial can take two and only two forms: strategy 1 denies the finality of death; strategy 2 denies the reality of the dying subject. Most religions opt for strategy 1, but Buddhism seems to be an example of the 2nd. All variants of strategy 1 fail, however, and a closer look at the main Buddhist argument reveals that Buddhism in fact does not follow strategy 2. Moreover, there is no other theory that does, and neither can there be. This means that there is no tenable theory that denies death. There may be no universally psychologically acceptable alternative, however, which would mean that if denying death is incoherent, this is an unavoidable incoherence.
This paper presents a simple model to estimate the number of languages that existed throughout hi... more This paper presents a simple model to estimate the number of languages that existed throughout history, and considers philosophical and linguistic implications of the findings. The estimated number is 150,000 plus or minus 50,000. Because only few of those remain, and there is no reason to believe that that remainder is a statistically representative sample, we should be very cautious about universalistic claims based on existing linguistic variation.
Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-grou... more Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. Othering can be “crude” or “sophisticated”, the defining difference being that in the latter case othering depends on the interpretation of the other/out-group in terms that are applicable only to the self/in-group but that are unconsciously assumed to be universal. The Mass Noun Thesis, the idea that all nouns in certain languages are grammatically and folk-ontologically similar to mass nouns in English, is an example of such sophisticated othering. According to this Thesis, (a) count nouns refer to discrete objects and mass nouns to stuffs; (b) the other’s language has only mass nouns and thus no count nouns; and therefore, (c) the other’s folk-ontology is an ontology of mass stuffs only. There is much evidence, however, that folk-ontology is independent from language. This paper argues that the Mass Noun Thesis is a case of sophisticated othering rooted in a conflation of grammatical and ontological conceptions of mass and count nouns that is applicable to the language of the interpreter/self but not to the languages of the relevant others, and that othering in this case is driven by a need to create some radically alien other to support a scientific or philosophical theory.
Bo Mou & R. Tieszen (eds.), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy, 2013
Introduction (not abstract):
Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the wor... more Introduction (not abstract):
Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, Dharmakīrti, and Dōgen. Prima facie, these philosophers have little in common, and indeed the differences are vast. Even in case of the two Western thinkers there is a fundamental difference between Davidson’s anti-dualist identification of phenomenal, experienced reality with the noumenal, real, external world on the one hand, and the bracketing or elimination of noumenal reality at the base of Derrida’s thought on the other, which lead to radically different ideas with regards to (the possibility and nature of) objectivity and our linguistic access to the real/external/noumenal world. Nevertheless, there are important similarities between Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories of triangulation and différance respectively, and these similarities can be exploited to bridge some of the differences and attempt a constructive engagement. After briefly introducing analytic and continental approaches to meaning and reality (and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories in particular) in section 2, and some relevant Buddhist approaches (including Dharmakīrti’s and Dōgen’s) in section 3, it will be argued in section 4 that Davidson’s theory of triangulation as a connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal needs Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha as a complement, and that apoha is best understood through Derrida’s différance in turn. A further investigation into the implications of the resulting triangulation-différance-apoha integration in section 5 (and the concluding section 6) leads to a view on meaning and reality similar to the perspectivism advocated by the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen: the phenomenal is (mostly) necessarily noumenally real, but partial, one-sided, or incomplete.
First paragraph (not abstract):
Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but... more First paragraph (not abstract):
Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but there is some disagreement among (meta-) ontologists about what “existence” means and whether there are different kinds or senses of “existence” or just one; that is, whether “existence” is equivocal or univocal. Furthermore, there is a growing number of philosophers (many of whom take inspiration from Aristotle’s metaphysical writings) who argue that ontology should not be concerned so much with what exists, but with what is fundamental or real (or something similar). Each of the positions in this debate is centered on a concept or small class of concepts that is intended to capture what ontology is about. Examples of such ontological core concepts are: existence, subsistence, Dasein, being, independent being, being real, being fundamental, being a fundamental constituent of reality, being irreducible. This paper intends to answer the twofold question of what (kind of notions) these ontological core concepts are, and how (and how much) they (can) differ. I will argue that there can be no difference between such concepts other than differing domains, and that any domain is a restriction in a maximally expanded universe, and therefore, equivalent to a (restricting) property. Furthermore, such differences between domains (or restricting properties) are intertranslatable, and consequently, there is not much room for substantial difference. Whatever difference remains is largely due to differences in focus or differences in the (phrasing of) questions ontologists try to answer.
If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(... more If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on he noumenal - phenomenal relationship turn out to complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.
This paper argues that Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes fail against so-called "App... more This paper argues that Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes fail against so-called "Applied Relativisms", i.e. theories of conceptual relativism found outside philosophy such as Whorf's. These theories make no metaphysical claims, which Davidson seems to assume. Ultimately, the misunderstanding (and resulting strawman argument) illustrates (the effect of) differences in conceptual scheme more than that it undermines it.
One of the effects of climate change is an increase in extreme weather and natural disasters. Unl... more One of the effects of climate change is an increase in extreme weather and natural disasters. Unless CO₂ emissions are significantly reduced very soon, it is inevitable that the effects of disaster will exceed many (and ultimately all) societies' mitigation capacity. Compounding unmitigated disaster effects will slowly but surely push a society towards collapse. Because no part of the planet is safe from the increase in natural disaster intensity and because some of the effects of disasters — such as refugees and economic decline — spill over boundaries, this will eventually lead to global societal collapse. Furthermore, just reducing CO₂ emissions is insufficient to prevent this, as disaster intensity is expected to exceed mitigation capacity in some global regions within one or two decades from now. To avoid a cascade of collapse it is necessary to reverse economic globalization and decrease long-distance trade, as well as to implement a global resettlement program for the increasing number of climate refugees.
This is a formatted version (for e-book readers or printing) of a very long blog post about secul... more This is a formatted version (for e-book readers or printing) of a very long blog post about secular and radical Buddhism. It discusses Stephen Batchelor's secular Buddhism, Seno'o Giro's radical Buddhism (as well as its roots in Mahayana philosophy; Nichiren and the Lotus Sutra in particular), and several related topics.
Within (and outside) philosophy, the notions of truth and justification are commonly confused, an... more Within (and outside) philosophy, the notions of truth and justification are commonly confused, and consequently, much (pseudo-) philosophical talk that appears to be about truth is really about justification. The confusion is understandable, as truth cannot be a norm and the notion thus has little practical value, contrary to justification. Nevertheless, the two notions can and should be kept apart.
The primary concern of Classical Chinese philosophy was dao 道, the social conventions that guide ... more The primary concern of Classical Chinese philosophy was dao 道, the social conventions that guide people to lead virtues lives. Two kinds of arguments were particularly common to argue for a particular theory about the right dao. One is an appeal to natural or heavenly preferences. The other, and more important argument is an appeal to consequences: the right dao is the dao that is expected to lead to harmonious order (or something similar). This is “second-order consequentialism”. Contrary to first-order consequentialism, second-order consequentialism is not a moral theory, but a way of or method for doing moral philosophy. It is a method that avoids some problematic assumptions that are common in Western philosophy, but that also changes the question: a second-order consequentialist is not really interested in moral truth, but in what works. Hence, second-order consequentialism is Pragmatist.
In the short essay "The Symbolic Order of Life and Manhood" Strik (2018) argues that most people’... more In the short essay "The Symbolic Order of Life and Manhood" Strik (2018) argues that most people’s understanding of reality is guided by a “symbolic order” that connects masculinity to (the fear of) death. This (long) response to Strik’s essay analyzes its main themes. Towards that end it starts with an overview of key theories and concepts: varieties of “masculinity” (including toxic masculinity and masculinity as a cultural dimension), terror management and the denial of death, masculine/feminine opposition and concept dichotomization, and so forth. After recruiting these concepts and theories in a commentary on Strik’s essay, this response concludes with the introduction of the notion of “hypermasculinity”, a cultural phenomenon that developed in response to perceived threats to stereotypical masculinity.
This article reviews and rejects three different arguments for skepticism. The first argument inv... more This article reviews and rejects three different arguments for skepticism. The first argument invalidly infers “possibly all” from “some”. The second skeptical argument is based on the closure principle of justification and fails because it misunderstands the grammar of “justification” and mistakenly omits that what justifies. The third argument for skepticism is grounded in a religious (rather than scientific) desire for absolute certainty and is countered by an appeal to Bayes’ theorem and a plea for a more pragmatist or naturalist attitude towards knowledge.
The supposed right to an opinion is either the right to free speech, or the right to have an opin... more The supposed right to an opinion is either the right to free speech, or the right to have an opinion. In the first case it is superfluous, however, and there cannot be a right to have an opinion. Therefore, there is no such thing as a right to your opinion.
Male chauvinism is the belief that men are morally superior to women. Female chauvinism is the b... more Male chauvinism is the belief that men are morally superior to women. Female chauvinism is the belief that women are morally superior to men. Both depend on the assumption of essential or natural gender differences between men and women with regards to thinking styles, most easily summarized as male principle-based thinking and female empathic thinking. There is no evidence for such a gender difference, however, but there is evidence that differences in experience and circumstances can lead to relevant differences. People who care (often women) become more caring, for example. By implication, gender chauvinism is based on false premises, and therefore, its superiority claims are false as well. Moreover, because both male and female chauvinism imply that it is socially preferable if women focus on caring tasks and occupation before taking on other jobs, both promote the same social inequality, and consequently, female chauvinism is anti-feminist.
Assuming that there are different conceptual schemes, the differences between those can be concei... more Assuming that there are different conceptual schemes, the differences between those can be conceived in a number of ways. Davidson, for example, understood difference between schemes as radical non-inter-translatability, which is impossible, but his interpretation seems far removed from the intentions of (most of) the scheme theorists. In this paper, I suggest an alternative conceptualization of radical difference in terms of prototypes and boundaries of concepts, and explore differences between prototypes and boundaries within the domains of color terms and number marking. However, no evidence for ‘radical’ difference thus understood is found. Because there does not seem to be another obvious option for a formal criterion of ‘radical’ difference between schemes, we may have to give up that idea, and focus on ‘subtle’ differences instead.
Demographies of organizations apply demographic methods to study change in populations of organiz... more Demographies of organizations apply demographic methods to study change in populations of organizations. There are (at least) five relatively independent demographies of organizations. All of these have to deal with the same conceptual and theoretical problems that are mainly the result of the biological analogies on which they are based. All of these demographies lack a clear and consistent conceptual framework. Such a framework could not only help solve these conceptual problems, but would also improve the possibility of knowledge exchange between the different fields. Ontology is – among others – the scientific field that specifies such conceptual frameworks. Besides introducing and explaining this type of ontology, this paper proposes an ontology of events in the demographies of organizations. Eight basic types of vital events can be distinguished and are defined by means of symbolic logic and set theory: founding, termination, split-off, take-over, split-up, merger, essential change, and population transfer. All other types of events are either supertypes or are non-vital events. Non-vital events can be transformed into population transfer events. All demographies of organizations share these events, this ontology.
This is an extended version of my "book note" of Garfield's book for the Australasian Journal of ... more This is an extended version of my "book note" of Garfield's book for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy including both the pre-publication version of that book note and some additional comments.
The "book note" focuses on the ambiguous purpose of the book in relation with its envisaged project of engagement between mainstream Western philosophy and Buddhist philosophy. Additional comments in the extended review concern terminological problems (such as "dukkha"/"suffering" and metaphysical "dependence"), obscurity, and conflicting dogmas, and further explore the aforementioned ambiguous aim and purpose of the book.
Episodic memory (EM) involves reliving or re-experiencing past experiences, which suggests that E... more Episodic memory (EM) involves reliving or re-experiencing past experiences, which suggests that EM depends on mental imagery. Aphantasics lack mental imagery, however, which would imply that they don't have EM, and people with "severely deficient autobiographical memory" (SDAM) also lack the ability to relive or re-experience. Both aphantasics and people with SDAM are otherwise normally functioning people, however, and do have personal memories, which is an other defining aspect of EM. By implication, episodic memory is not a natural kind but a loose collection of independent mental faculties. Aphantasics indeed lack episodic memory, because there is no such thing as episodic memory.
An updated version of this talk was published as “Aphantasia, SDAM, and Episodic Memory” in the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, vol. 28 (2019), pp. 9-32.
There is considerable difference between languages in how they deal with the expression of the te... more There is considerable difference between languages in how they deal with the expression of the temporal situation of events. Tense and aspect are the most common ways of marking when an event took or takes place and how it extended or extends over time. However, different languages have different tenses and aspects, mix them with modality to greater or lesser extent, or even lack grammatical tense and/or aspect. This variation might raise a number of questions. (1) What is the extent of actual and possible variation? (2) Do these differences lead to (interesting) differences in ways of thinking between speakers of (relevantly) different languages? And (3) Does this linguistic variation have any (other) effects or implications that are philosophically interesting and/or important? This short talk addresses all three questions, but will only offer some skeptical remarks and no (real) answers.
This text was prepared for the introductory talk in a workshop intended to promote communication ... more This text was prepared for the introductory talk in a workshop intended to promote communication and cooperation between philosophers and experimental scientists on topics related to the experience and awareness of time. The workshop's two themes were: (1) the "specious present" and related ideas and research findings, and (2) mental time travel in animals (and humans).
This talk/paper consists of four parts that are only loosely connected. The first (section 2) discusses the nature of philosophy and its relation to science and proposes that philosophy is a part of science characterized by a primarily deductive approach, and that philosophy's roles within science are critical and exploratory. The next three parts are more directly related to the workshop's themes but are also intended to illustrate those two roles. The second part (section 3) presents a brief grammatical analysis of the verb "to be conscious (of)" and applies that analysis to the "problem of the rock" (or the "generality problem") for Higher Order theories of consciousness to conclude that that " problem " makes no sense. The third part (section 4) summarizes theories of temporal consciousness and points out a number of fundamental problems that most (if not all) of these theories share. The last part (section 5) is intended more to illustrate the exploratory role of philosophy in science (than its critical role) and draws together several lines of thought and research to show why a certain aspect of animal consciousness matters.
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A heavily revised version of section 3 of this talk was published as "The Problem of the Rock and the grammar of consciousness" in 2017.
Based on a brief exploration of the education as business analogy, I distinguish five different k... more Based on a brief exploration of the education as business analogy, I distinguish five different kinds of stakeholders in customer-like roles and discuss their interests in and perspectives on global higher education (GHE). The three main perspectives are individual (students and their parents), corporate (corporations and states), and social (society or societies). Answers to questions about what GHE is or should be and what (or who) it is good for depend very much on the stakeholder perspective chosen and are incompatible, but these answers co-determine curricular decisions. From the corporate perspective, the purpose of GHE is to produce "global human resources", but this purpose clashes with views on GHE from the other two perspectives. Lacking perspective-independent answers, GHE institutes need to choose (implicitly or explicitly) which stakeholder to prioritize.
In metaphysics, quantifiers are assumed to be either binary or unary. Binary quantifiers take the... more In metaphysics, quantifiers are assumed to be either binary or unary. Binary quantifiers take the concept(s) "all of" and/or "some of" as primitive(s); unary quantifiers take the concept(s) "everything" and/or "something" as primitive(s). Binary quantifiers (explicitly) range over domains. However, "everything" and "something" are reducible to the binary quantifiers "all of" and "some of": "everything" is all of some implied domain, and there is no natural, default, or inherent domain U such that everything is all of U. Therefore, any quantifier ranges over a domain, and is thus binary, and there are no unary quantifiers.
This implies that if two theories assign different truth values to "Fs exist", while they agree about the relevant properties of Fs, then the two theories quantify over different domains, and a choice between these two theories is, therefore, a choice between domains. However, none of the common arguments for or against particular domains is up to the task, and therefore, there are at least some cases in which there is no single right domain. The choice for a particular domain is a pragmatic choice.
In addition to substantiating the above arguments, this paper discusses its implications for the metaphysical debate between Carnap and Quine and the contemporary controversies in meta-ontology.
Despite the extraordinary amount of attention critical thinking has received in the last few deca... more Despite the extraordinary amount of attention critical thinking has received in the last few decades, the teaching and fostering of critical thinking in higher education is largely failing, and critical thinking has become an empty buzzword. However, given its importance as an aim of education, it needs to be “refilled”, but that is possible only after identifying the causes of the current failure, i.e. the obstacles to fostering critical thinking. Three such obstacles are identified in this paper, two actual and one hypothetical: (1) the lack of clarity and agreement about what critical thinking is, (2) current teaching practice, and (3) social resistance to (fostering) critical thinking. Based on a critical analysis of these obstacles, this paper suggests to remove or avoid them by refocusing critical thinking “instruction” in higher education on the idea that critical thinking is aiming for truth.
According to Donald Davidson, verbs should be understood as n-place predicates. It is, however, n... more According to Donald Davidson, verbs should be understood as n-place predicates. It is, however, not the case that for any given verb, there is a single collection of arguments filling those n places. Rather, collections of syntactic core arguments and semantic core arguments – although necessarily largely overlapping – do not necessarily coincide. Furthermore, there is some evidence for a more subtle kind of difference between semantic and syntactic arguments: indirectly referring verb arguments. A verb argument is ‘indirectly referring’ if it is a syntactic core argument, but (strictly speaking) not a semantic core argument itself, but merely an identifier or marker of the semantic core argument. Some evidence for this is presented here – “meaning” in English and “being” in Japanese – but this is evidence is interpretation-dependent and there are competing interpretations. Therefore, the ‘evidence’ does not seem strong enough to make the case for indirect reference. A preliminary analysis of “believing” in English suggests stronger evidence, but further research is necessary.
This is a guide to help (my) students to write better papers (as well as better research plans an... more This is a guide to help (my) students to write better papers (as well as better research plans and outlines).
If you are a teacher, feel free to use it in any way you like (including "stealing" from it). Feedback would be highly appreciated.
If you are a student and you found this guide helpful, feel free to share it with others.
This guide is formatted to be printed as an A5 booklet.
This is a 6-page handout (preceded by a 1-page preface) that I use to explain natural deduction t... more This is a 6-page handout (preceded by a 1-page preface) that I use to explain natural deduction to students who struggle to grasp the rules of inference and how to use them to prove arguments. The explanation is based on a - less than perfect - analogy with an assembly plant.
This is the handout for a one-day (six-hour) workshop intended to introduce aspects of language a... more This is the handout for a one-day (six-hour) workshop intended to introduce aspects of language and linguistics in an informal, playful way. Topics discussed include sounds (phonology), writing systems, grammar (syntax and morphology), language change (historical linguistics), and relations between language and thought (psycholinguistics). To explore these and other aspects of language, participants are asked to "construct" a fictional language. Because this workshop is given in English in Japan, it is assumed that most attendees speak those two languages (or are somewhat familiar with both at least), and for that reason, most examples are from English and Japanese.
The culture - economy dialectic (CED) -- the opposition of the concepts and phenomena of culture ... more The culture - economy dialectic (CED) -- the opposition of the concepts and phenomena of culture and economy -- is one of the most important ideas in the modern history of ideas. Both disciplinary boundaries and much theoretical thought in social science are strongly influenced or even determined by the CED. For that reason, a thorough analysis and evaluation of the CED is needed to improve understanding of the history of ideas in social science and the currently fashionable research on the cultural influences on economic differences between countries and regions. This thesis is an attempts to do just that. The concepts of "culture" and "economy" (and related concepts) and the (assumed) relations therebetween are compared and analyzed. Empirical results from earlier studies are summarized and some new test are presented. These new tests are partly based on a measurement of Dutch regional culture. However, most theories of the CED are (nearly) impossible to verify (empirically). There appears to be some influence of wealth on specific cultural phenomena (such as individualism and post-materialism), but the often assumed influence of culture on entrepreneurship and economic growth remains unconfirmed. Moreover, from an analysis of the theories themselves, it appears that most of these cannot be falsified and are, therefore, hardly 'scientific'. Many of the theories of the CED and, in fact, many theories of social science in general are of a conceptual rather than a causal nature. These theories cannot be falsified (or verified) by empirical means alone, but must be studied by means of conceptual analysis. In the final conclusions, this thesis, therefore, argues for conceptual analysis in -- and a more anarchist approach to -- social science.
The culture - economy dialectic (CED) -- the opposition of the concepts and phenomena of culture ... more The culture - economy dialectic (CED) -- the opposition of the concepts and phenomena of culture and economy -- is one of the most important ideas in the modern history of ideas. Both disciplinary boundaries and much theoretical thought in social science are strongly influenced or even determined by the CED. For that reason, a thorough analysis and evaluation of the CED is needed to improve understanding of the history of ideas in social science and the currently fashionable research on the cultural influences on economic differences between countries and regions. This thesis is an attempts to do just that. The concepts of "culture" and "economy" (and related concepts) and the (assumed) relations therebetween are compared and analyzed. Empirical results from earlier studies are summarized and some new test are presented. These new tests are partly based on a measurement of Dutch regional culture. However, most theories of the CED are (nearly) impossible to verify (empirically). There appears to be some influence of wealth on specific cultural phenomena (such as individualism and post-materialism), but the often assumed influence of culture on entrepreneurship and economic growth remains unconfirmed. Moreover, from an analysis of the theories themselves, it appears that most of these cannot be falsified and are, therefore, hardly 'scientific'. Many of the theories of the CED and, in fact, many theories of social science in general are of a conceptual rather than a causal nature. These theories cannot be falsified (or verified) by empirical means alone, but must be studied by means of conceptual analysis. In the final conclusions, this thesis, therefore, argues for conceptual analysis in -- and a more anarchist approach to -- social science.
From: Brons, L.L. (2002). Ondernemersgedrag en de dialectiek van cultuur en economie. Netherlands Geographical Studies (NGS) vol. 296, Utrecht: KNAG., 2002
This is the English summary of a book in Dutch titled "Ondernemersgedrag en de dialectiek van cul... more This is the English summary of a book in Dutch titled "Ondernemersgedrag en de dialectiek van cultuur en economie" (Entrepreneurial behaviour and the dialectic of culture and economy).
(First paragraph) - In “Needing the Other” (2014a), I argued that the Mass Noun Thesis is an exam... more (First paragraph) - In “Needing the Other” (2014a), I argued that the Mass Noun Thesis is an example of “sophisticated othering” (see also my 2014b). Part of that argument is based on an analysis of the grammar of numeral classifiers in Japanese. There is, however, an alternative analysis thereof – as mentioned in footnote 8 on page 114 – leading to the same conclusions about the Mass Noun Thesis, but differing in other respects. Because of limitations of space, this alternative analysis was ignored in the published paper. This “postscript” is intended to remedy that omission.
Supplement to the paper "Bare and indexical existence".
See also "What does it mean for someth... more Supplement to the paper "Bare and indexical existence".
See also "What does it mean for something to exist?" in the Published Papers section, and "Quantifiers, domains, and (meta-) ontology" in the Working Papers section.
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 1 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It explains the books aim: de... more This is chapter 1 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It explains the books aim: developing a philosophy that (1) is radically naturalist, (in a roughly Quinean or pragmatist sense); (2) is politically radical in the sense that it rejects neoliberal capitalism and the hegemony of psychopathy; (3) is recognizably and defensibly Buddhist; and (4) is radical in the sense of being uncompromising, rigorous, and consistent. Additionally, this chapter discusses variants of naturalism and explains the (more or less Quinean) metholodological naturalism that serves as the book’s backbone.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 2 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It gives a brief and selectiv... more This is chapter 2 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It gives a brief and selective overview of some aspects of the history of Buddhist philosophy, focusing on realism, rationalism, and precursors of social egagement.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 3 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses Western secular ... more This is chapter 3 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses Western secular Buddhism and a list of Asian engaged and radical Buddhists including: Anagarika Dharmapāla, A.T. Ariyaratne, Inoue Enryō, Takagi Kenmyō, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Taixu, Lin Qiuwu, Han Yongun, Thích Nhất Hạnh, Buddhadāsa, Sulak Sivaraksa, U Nu, Gendun Chopel, Tenzin Gyatso (the 14th Dalai Lama), and B.R. Ambedkar.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 4 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses some common patt... more This is chapter 4 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses some common patterns in the thought of prominent engaged and radical Buddhists, focusing on their rejection of materialism (or physicalism) and Marxism. The chapter argues that some form of physicalism should be accepted, and that Marxism is less alien to Buddhism than sometimes assumed and may offer some valuable insights for radical Buddhists.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 5 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It presents an attempt to com... more This is chapter 5 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It presents an attempt to come up with a definition of “Buddhism” and a definition of “Buddhist” to distinguish Buddhist from non-Buddhist theories. Essentialist definitions are rejected as there doesn’t appear to be a clear “essence” that all varieties of Buddhism share. Instead, the chapter argues for a historical or genetic approach.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 6 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It wraps up the first, introd... more This is chapter 6 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It wraps up the first, introductory part of the book, and discusses the common claim that Buddhism is a philosophy rather than a religion (mainly by trying to clarify the differences between science, philosophy, and religion).
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is the introduction to part II of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). Part II of ... more This is the introduction to part II of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). Part II of the book deals with metaphysics and epistemology. This introduction discusses “truth” and the difference between truth and justification.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 7 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses a number of conc... more This is chapter 7 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses a number of concepts in philosophy that are often confused or misunderstood including “realism”, “idealism”, and “relativism”.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 8 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues for a realist (rath... more This is chapter 8 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues for a realist (rather than idealist) interpretation of Yogācāra, and discusses relativism/perspectivism in Yogācāra and Tiantai/Tendai. Based mostly on ideas by the Yogācāra philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but with some help from Donald Davidson, this chapter develops a perspectival realist metaphysics that in important respects agrees with Zhiyi’s Tiantai.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 9 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It defends a coherentist theo... more This is chapter 9 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It defends a coherentist theory of justification based on Buddhist (Dharmakīrti) an Western Pragmatist sources (Lewis, Quine, and others). Additionally it discusses the implication of the metaphysical and epistemological view developed in this and the preceding chapter from some traditional Buddhist doctrines such as karma and rebirth.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 10 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It asses to what extent the ... more This is chapter 10 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It asses to what extent the metaphysical and epistemological view developed in the preceding two chapters can be considered “Buddhist”, and it briefly discusses some theories of perspectival realism from Eastern and Western philosophy.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is the introduction to part III of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). Part III o... more This is the introduction to part III of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). Part III of the book deals with ethics and moral philosophy.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 11 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It proposes a coherentist ap... more This is chapter 11 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It proposes a coherentist approach to epistemic justification applied to ethics. In other words, it argues that we are justified to accept moral beliefs (as true) if those beliefs are shared by virtually everyone. It is argued that nearly everyone agrees that the right (or wrong) X are the X that have the right (or wrong) kind of expected consequences, which raises three questions: (1) What kinds of things are X? (2) What exactly are expected consequences? (3) What are the right or wrong expected consequences. (Answering these questions is the aim of chapters 14, 12, and 13, respectively.)
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 12 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues that expected cons... more This is chapter 12 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues that expected consequences are not a kind of consequences, but a kind of beliefs (i.e. expectations) about the future, and that virtually all varieties of consequentalism (and not just “subjective consequentialism”) appeal to such expectations rather than to actual consequences. Additionally the chapter discusses the interpretation of Buddhist ethics (Śāntideva and Asaṅga, specifically) as consequentialism.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 13 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues that there is no u... more This is chapter 13 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues that there is no universal, intrinsic good, but that there are two universal, intrinsic evils: death and suffering.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 14 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses the metaphysics... more This is chapter 14 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses the metaphysics of acts and rules in the context of consequentialism and argues that even though rules (and virtues) do not “really” exist (because they can be reduced to acts), but that this doesn’t really matter for purposes of evaluation. Rather, because they can be reduced to acts, a consequentialist or expectivist can evaluate acts, rules, and virtues for their expected consequences.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 15 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses the case agains... more This is chapter 15 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses the case against capitalism from the perspective of the moral framework developed in chapters 12 to 14 (i.e. a kind of negative expectivism). It argues that capitalism should be abolished because it has causes unimaginable death and suffering and is expected to continue to do so.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is chapter 16 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses some constraint... more This is chapter 16 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It discusses some constraints on the search for a better society from a radical Buddhist perspective. Most importantly it rejects ideal theory and utopianism. Additionally this chapter discusses the relevance of climate change for social thought and radical Buddhism in particular.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism, 2022
This is the final, concluding chapter 17 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It wra... more This is the final, concluding chapter 17 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It wraps up the book’s project and discusses the prospects for the re-emergence of a radical Buddhism.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
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The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.”
Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world.
The hegemony of psychopathy is responsible for massive human suffering. It must be fought and replaced with a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs that promote compassion and care. Fighting hegemony requires fighting the “pillars” that support it. Most important among these are the mass media and culture industry, and mainstream economics. The former is responsible for a continuous stream of hegemonic propaganda; the latter – among others – for providing a pseudo-scientific justification for the false belief that there is no alternative. This essay closes off with some considerations on tactics and strategy in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy, but does not – and cannot – offer any concrete advice.
These and many related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open — that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers.
The first part of this reply/postscript also expands (a bit) on my paper "Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy" (2016)*. That paper, as well as my (2015)* mentioned above, are available here at Academia.edu.
Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, Dharmakīrti, and Dōgen. Prima facie, these philosophers have little in common, and indeed the differences are vast. Even in case of the two Western thinkers there is a fundamental difference between Davidson’s anti-dualist identification of phenomenal, experienced reality with the noumenal, real, external world on the one hand, and the bracketing or elimination of noumenal reality at the base of Derrida’s thought on the other, which lead to radically different ideas with regards to (the possibility and nature of) objectivity and our linguistic access to the real/external/noumenal world. Nevertheless, there are important similarities between Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories of triangulation and différance respectively, and these similarities can be exploited to bridge some of the differences and attempt a constructive engagement. After briefly introducing analytic and continental approaches to meaning and reality (and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories in particular) in section 2, and some relevant Buddhist approaches (including Dharmakīrti’s and Dōgen’s) in section 3, it will be argued in section 4 that Davidson’s theory of triangulation as a connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal needs Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha as a complement, and that apoha is best understood through Derrida’s différance in turn. A further investigation into the implications of the resulting triangulation-différance-apoha integration in section 5 (and the concluding section 6) leads to a view on meaning and reality similar to the perspectivism advocated by the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen: the phenomenal is (mostly) necessarily noumenally real, but partial, one-sided, or incomplete.
Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but there is some disagreement among (meta-) ontologists about what “existence” means and whether there are different kinds or senses of “existence” or just one; that is, whether “existence” is equivocal or univocal. Furthermore, there is a growing number of philosophers (many of whom take inspiration from Aristotle’s metaphysical writings) who argue that ontology should not be concerned so much with what exists, but with what is fundamental or real (or something similar). Each of the positions in this debate is centered on a concept or small class of concepts that is intended to capture what ontology is about. Examples of such ontological core concepts are: existence, subsistence, Dasein, being, independent being, being real, being fundamental, being a fundamental constituent of reality, being irreducible. This paper intends to answer the twofold question of what (kind of notions) these ontological core concepts are, and how (and how much) they (can) differ. I will argue that there can be no difference between such concepts other than differing domains, and that any domain is a restriction in a maximally expanded universe, and therefore, equivalent to a (restricting) property. Furthermore, such differences between domains (or restricting properties) are intertranslatable, and consequently, there is not much room for substantial difference. Whatever difference remains is largely due to differences in focus or differences in the (phrasing of) questions ontologists try to answer.
The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.”
Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world.
The hegemony of psychopathy is responsible for massive human suffering. It must be fought and replaced with a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs that promote compassion and care. Fighting hegemony requires fighting the “pillars” that support it. Most important among these are the mass media and culture industry, and mainstream economics. The former is responsible for a continuous stream of hegemonic propaganda; the latter – among others – for providing a pseudo-scientific justification for the false belief that there is no alternative. This essay closes off with some considerations on tactics and strategy in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy, but does not – and cannot – offer any concrete advice.
These and many related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open — that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers.
The first part of this reply/postscript also expands (a bit) on my paper "Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy" (2016)*. That paper, as well as my (2015)* mentioned above, are available here at Academia.edu.
Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, Dharmakīrti, and Dōgen. Prima facie, these philosophers have little in common, and indeed the differences are vast. Even in case of the two Western thinkers there is a fundamental difference between Davidson’s anti-dualist identification of phenomenal, experienced reality with the noumenal, real, external world on the one hand, and the bracketing or elimination of noumenal reality at the base of Derrida’s thought on the other, which lead to radically different ideas with regards to (the possibility and nature of) objectivity and our linguistic access to the real/external/noumenal world. Nevertheless, there are important similarities between Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories of triangulation and différance respectively, and these similarities can be exploited to bridge some of the differences and attempt a constructive engagement. After briefly introducing analytic and continental approaches to meaning and reality (and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories in particular) in section 2, and some relevant Buddhist approaches (including Dharmakīrti’s and Dōgen’s) in section 3, it will be argued in section 4 that Davidson’s theory of triangulation as a connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal needs Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha as a complement, and that apoha is best understood through Derrida’s différance in turn. A further investigation into the implications of the resulting triangulation-différance-apoha integration in section 5 (and the concluding section 6) leads to a view on meaning and reality similar to the perspectivism advocated by the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen: the phenomenal is (mostly) necessarily noumenally real, but partial, one-sided, or incomplete.
Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but there is some disagreement among (meta-) ontologists about what “existence” means and whether there are different kinds or senses of “existence” or just one; that is, whether “existence” is equivocal or univocal. Furthermore, there is a growing number of philosophers (many of whom take inspiration from Aristotle’s metaphysical writings) who argue that ontology should not be concerned so much with what exists, but with what is fundamental or real (or something similar). Each of the positions in this debate is centered on a concept or small class of concepts that is intended to capture what ontology is about. Examples of such ontological core concepts are: existence, subsistence, Dasein, being, independent being, being real, being fundamental, being a fundamental constituent of reality, being irreducible. This paper intends to answer the twofold question of what (kind of notions) these ontological core concepts are, and how (and how much) they (can) differ. I will argue that there can be no difference between such concepts other than differing domains, and that any domain is a restriction in a maximally expanded universe, and therefore, equivalent to a (restricting) property. Furthermore, such differences between domains (or restricting properties) are intertranslatable, and consequently, there is not much room for substantial difference. Whatever difference remains is largely due to differences in focus or differences in the (phrasing of) questions ontologists try to answer.
The "book note" focuses on the ambiguous purpose of the book in relation with its envisaged project of engagement between mainstream Western philosophy and Buddhist philosophy. Additional comments in the extended review concern terminological problems (such as "dukkha"/"suffering" and metaphysical "dependence"), obscurity, and conflicting dogmas, and further explore the aforementioned ambiguous aim and purpose of the book.
An updated version of this talk was published as “Aphantasia, SDAM, and Episodic Memory” in the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, vol. 28 (2019), pp. 9-32.
This talk/paper consists of four parts that are only loosely connected. The first (section 2) discusses the nature of philosophy and its relation to science and proposes that philosophy is a part of science characterized by a primarily deductive approach, and that philosophy's roles within science are critical and exploratory. The next three parts are more directly related to the workshop's themes but are also intended to illustrate those two roles. The second part (section 3) presents a brief grammatical analysis of the verb "to be conscious (of)" and applies that analysis to the "problem of the rock" (or the "generality problem") for Higher Order theories of consciousness to conclude that that " problem " makes no sense. The third part (section 4) summarizes theories of temporal consciousness and points out a number of fundamental problems that most (if not all) of these theories share. The last part (section 5) is intended more to illustrate the exploratory role of philosophy in science (than its critical role) and draws together several lines of thought and research to show why a certain aspect of animal consciousness matters.
---
A heavily revised version of section 3 of this talk was published as "The Problem of the Rock and the grammar of consciousness" in 2017.
This implies that if two theories assign different truth values to "Fs exist", while they agree about the relevant properties of Fs, then the two theories quantify over different domains, and a choice between these two theories is, therefore, a choice between domains. However, none of the common arguments for or against particular domains is up to the task, and therefore, there are at least some cases in which there is no single right domain. The choice for a particular domain is a pragmatic choice.
In addition to substantiating the above arguments, this paper discusses its implications for the metaphysical debate between Carnap and Quine and the contemporary controversies in meta-ontology.
If you are a teacher, feel free to use it in any way you like (including "stealing" from it). Feedback would be highly appreciated.
If you are a student and you found this guide helpful, feel free to share it with others.
This guide is formatted to be printed as an A5 booklet.
Because this workshop is given in English in Japan, it is assumed that most attendees speak those two languages (or are somewhat familiar with both at least), and for that reason, most examples are from English and Japanese.
See also "What does it mean for something to exist?" in the Published Papers section, and "Quantifiers, domains, and (meta-) ontology" in the Working Papers section.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949