I'm a professor in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University where I also direct the Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop. My primary area of research lies at the intersection of early modern philosophy, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion.
This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern s... more This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, demurred, arguing for a return once again of causal powers. Having explored the decline, fall, and rise of causal powers in the ontologies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz, the essay closes by asking if early modern debates over causal powers might have anything to teach us about the study of ontology itself.
Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is th... more Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is the belief that, for example, eyes are for seeing and gills are for breathing. It is the belief that people go to the cinema in order to see films and that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. The core idea of teleology is thus intuitive enough. Nonetheless, difficult questions arise as we dig deeper into the concept. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic—that is, is teleology inherent in its subjects or is it imposed on them from the outside? Does teleology necessarily involve intentionality—that is, does teleology necessarily involve a subject’s cognizing some end, goal, or purpose? What is the scope of teleology—is the concept of teleology, for example, applicable to elements and animals, or only to rational beings? Finally, is teleology explanatory? When we say that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn, have we explained why they swim upstream? When we say that eyes are for seeing, have we explained why we have eyes? This volume explores the development of the concept of teleology from ancient times to the present. It begins in the golden age of ancient Greece with Plato and Aristotle, winds its way through Islamic, Latin, and Jewish medieval traditions, passes into treatments by leading figures of the scientific revolution, and European Enlightenment, and finishes with current debates in contemporary philosophy of biology. Chapter discussions of key figures, traditions, and contexts are enlivened and contextualized by a series of intermittent reflections on the implications of teleology in medicine, art, poetry and music.
In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep thr... more In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz’s views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their systematic compatibility with Leibniz’s theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous creation, and argues that they can be allayed once two readings of the principle are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation.
It is a quirk of philosophy that the study of philosophy belongs to philosophy itself. As philoso... more It is a quirk of philosophy that the study of philosophy belongs to philosophy itself. As philosophers, we can ask not only "What is the fundamental nature of the world?" but also "What is the study of the fundamental nature of the world?" We can ask not only "Are there causal powers in the world?" but also "How should we understand debates about causal powers in the world?" The focus of this essay is an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology-that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes (1596-1650) helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), however, demurred. Returning full circle, he insisted that any satisfactory account of the created world must appeal to causal powers reminiscent of scholastic...
Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. That, fo... more Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. That, for example, people have eyes for seeing. That they read for pleasure. This volume explores the intuitive yet contested concept of teleology as it has been treated by philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the modern day. Philosophical discussions are enlivened and contextualized by reflections on the implications of teleology in medicine, art, poetry and music.
This essay argues that, with his much-maligned “infinite analysis” theory of contingency, Leibniz... more This essay argues that, with his much-maligned “infinite analysis” theory of contingency, Leibniz is onto something deep and important – a tangle of issues that wouldn’t be sorted out properly for centuries to come, and then only by some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. The first two sections place Leibniz’s theory in its proper historical context and draw a distinction between Leibniz’s logical and meta-logical discoveries. The third section argues that Leibniz’s logical insights initially make his “infinite analysis” theory of contingency more rather than less perplexing. The last two sections argue that Leibniz’s meta-logical insights, however, point the way towards a better appreciation of (what we should regard as) his formal theory of contingency, and its correlative, his formal theory of necessity.
This paper argues that Śrīgupta and Leibniz accept similar metaphysical principles concerning uni... more This paper argues that Śrīgupta and Leibniz accept similar metaphysical principles concerning unity, aggregates, and being. It then shows how from those shared principles, Śrīgupta and Leibniz arrive at similar conclusions concerning the reality of ordinary bodies and radically different conclusions about fundamental ontology.
This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern s... more This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, demurred, arguing for a return once again of causal powers. Having explored the decline, fall, and rise of causal powers in the ontologies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz, the essay closes by asking if early modern debates over causal powers might have anything to teach us about the study of ontology itself.
Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is th... more Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is the belief that, for example, eyes are for seeing and gills are for breathing. It is the belief that people go to the cinema in order to see films and that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. The core idea of teleology is thus intuitive enough. Nonetheless, difficult questions arise as we dig deeper into the concept. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic—that is, is teleology inherent in its subjects or is it imposed on them from the outside? Does teleology necessarily involve intentionality—that is, does teleology necessarily involve a subject’s cognizing some end, goal, or purpose? What is the scope of teleology—is the concept of teleology, for example, applicable to elements and animals, or only to rational beings? Finally, is teleology explanatory? When we say that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn, have we explained why they swim upstream? When we say that eyes are for seeing, have we explained why we have eyes? This volume explores the development of the concept of teleology from ancient times to the present. It begins in the golden age of ancient Greece with Plato and Aristotle, winds its way through Islamic, Latin, and Jewish medieval traditions, passes into treatments by leading figures of the scientific revolution, and European Enlightenment, and finishes with current debates in contemporary philosophy of biology. Chapter discussions of key figures, traditions, and contexts are enlivened and contextualized by a series of intermittent reflections on the implications of teleology in medicine, art, poetry and music.
In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep thr... more In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz’s views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their systematic compatibility with Leibniz’s theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous creation, and argues that they can be allayed once two readings of the principle are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation.
It is a quirk of philosophy that the study of philosophy belongs to philosophy itself. As philoso... more It is a quirk of philosophy that the study of philosophy belongs to philosophy itself. As philosophers, we can ask not only "What is the fundamental nature of the world?" but also "What is the study of the fundamental nature of the world?" We can ask not only "Are there causal powers in the world?" but also "How should we understand debates about causal powers in the world?" The focus of this essay is an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology-that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes (1596-1650) helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), however, demurred. Returning full circle, he insisted that any satisfactory account of the created world must appeal to causal powers reminiscent of scholastic...
Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. That, fo... more Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. That, for example, people have eyes for seeing. That they read for pleasure. This volume explores the intuitive yet contested concept of teleology as it has been treated by philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the modern day. Philosophical discussions are enlivened and contextualized by reflections on the implications of teleology in medicine, art, poetry and music.
This essay argues that, with his much-maligned “infinite analysis” theory of contingency, Leibniz... more This essay argues that, with his much-maligned “infinite analysis” theory of contingency, Leibniz is onto something deep and important – a tangle of issues that wouldn’t be sorted out properly for centuries to come, and then only by some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. The first two sections place Leibniz’s theory in its proper historical context and draw a distinction between Leibniz’s logical and meta-logical discoveries. The third section argues that Leibniz’s logical insights initially make his “infinite analysis” theory of contingency more rather than less perplexing. The last two sections argue that Leibniz’s meta-logical insights, however, point the way towards a better appreciation of (what we should regard as) his formal theory of contingency, and its correlative, his formal theory of necessity.
This paper argues that Śrīgupta and Leibniz accept similar metaphysical principles concerning uni... more This paper argues that Śrīgupta and Leibniz accept similar metaphysical principles concerning unity, aggregates, and being. It then shows how from those shared principles, Śrīgupta and Leibniz arrive at similar conclusions concerning the reality of ordinary bodies and radically different conclusions about fundamental ontology.
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