Accounts of moral responsibility can be divided into those that claim that attributability of an ... more Accounts of moral responsibility can be divided into those that claim that attributability of an act, omission, or attitude to an agent is sufficient for responsibility for it, and those which hold that responsibility depends crucially on choice. I argue that accounts of the first, attributionist, kind fail to make room for the relatively stringent epistemic conditions upon moral responsibility, and that therefore an account of the second, volitionist, kind ought to be preferred. I examine the various arguments advanced on behalf of attributionist accounts, and argue that for each of them volitionism has a reply that is in every case at least as, and often more, persuasive. Most significantly, only volitionism can accommodate the intuitively important distinction between the bad and the blameworthy.
In a recent paper in this journal, Joshua Blanchard has identified a novel problem: the problem o... more In a recent paper in this journal, Joshua Blanchard has identified a novel problem: the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. We find ourselves in unwelcome epistemic company when we hold a belief that is also held mainly or most prominently by those we regard as morally or epistemically bad. Blanchard argues that some, but not all, unwelcome epistemic company provides higher-order evidence against our belief. But he doesn't provide a test for when company is unwelcome or a diagnosis of why it is unwelcome. I provide both. On my disjunctive test, unwelcome epistemic company provides us with a defeater when either there is a match between the content of the belief and the properties that make our company unwelcome, or there is reason to suspect that the belief arose via a shared, unreliable, causal process.
Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These a... more Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have expectable consequences. I will argue that these consequences are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments.
Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsi... more Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.
Neuroethics – as a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary endeavor – examines the implications... more Neuroethics – as a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary endeavor – examines the implications of the neurosciences on human beings in general and on their self-understanding and their social interactions in particular. The range of approaches adopted in neuroethics includes but is not limited to historical, anthropological, ethical, philosophical, theological, sociological and legal approaches. Based on the study of neuroscientific developments and innovations, examined from different angles, this Handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the international neuroethical debate, and offers unprecedented insights into the impact of neuroscientific research, diagnosis, and therapy. This Handbook deals with a plethora of topics divided into in three parts: the first part contains discussions of theories of neuroethics, identity, free will, as well as other philosophical considerations. The second part is dedicated to issues involved in current and future clinical applications of ...
Journal of consciousness studies : controversies in science & the humanities, 2014
It is widely assumed that consciousness matters. It matters in a way, and to a degree, that many ... more It is widely assumed that consciousness matters. It matters in a way, and to a degree, that many of the other topics on which philosophers outside the explicitly normative areas of the discipline spend their time and energy do not. It matters in the kind of way that central topics in ethics and political philosophy matter. Indeed, it is, or should, be a central topic in ethics, since it is intrinsically valuable and/or confers value on those who possess it. Accordingly, consciousness, or its lack, is often invoked in discussions in applied and normative ethics. Ethical issues that arise at the beginning and the end of life are often held to turn, in part at any rate, on whether the organism is conscious. If the fetus is conscious, it is widely held, its moral value is greater than if it is not yet conscious, and this extra value must be taken into account in discussions of the permissibility of abortion. The presence or absence of consciousness is held to make a difference in a parallel way when the question concerns the permissibility of switching off life support, or the pursuit of further treatments for those near the end of life.
Abstract The use of interventions into the mind and body to treat a diagnosed disorder or disease... more Abstract The use of interventions into the mind and body to treat a diagnosed disorder or disease is uncontroversial, but it is very controversial whether interventions aimed at enhancing function in the absence of disease or disorder are acceptable or not. In this chapter we focus on transcranial electrical stimulation used as a cognitive enhancer, and aim to assess the case for and against its use. We first show that the treatment/enhancement distinction cannot be invoked to draw a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable uses of interventions. We then proceed to assess transcranial electrical stimulation against five common objections to the use of cognitive enhancements, which we call the safety, authenticity, cheating, social justice, and positional goods objections. Though we think that some of these objections provide reasons for caution with regard to the use of some cognitive enhancements, we argue that transcranial electrical stimulation is not seriously troubled by any of them.
Etude de la critique de la modernite et du mythe de la rationalite developpee par A. MacIntyre da... more Etude de la critique de la modernite et du mythe de la rationalite developpee par A. MacIntyre dans le sens d'un retour a la tradition. Alors que MacIntyre veut substituer au relativisme et au pluralisme modernes l'unite morale de l'aristotelisme (in «After virtue», 1985), l'A. montre que le philosophe reintroduit le pluralisme dans sa conception des traditions rationnelles, et sape la distinction meme entre l'unite des traditions de recherche et la pluralite moderne des structures morales.
Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existen... more Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to ...
ABSTRACT In A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford ... more ABSTRACT In A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and related papers, Helen Steward advances a new argument for incompatibilism. Though she concedes that the luck objection is persuasive with regard to existing versions of libertarianism, she claims that agency itself is incompatible with determinism: we are only agents at all if we are able to settle matters concerning our movements, where settling something requires that prior to our settling it lacked sufficient conditions. She argues that genuine agents settle very fine-grained aspects of their movements: when and how they move, even when and how their neurons fire. In this paper, I advance two linked arguments against agency incompatibilism. I argue, first, that we do not exercise direct control over the fine-grained aspects of our movements. Rather, we control these movements indirectly, by intentionally engaging in broadly individuated action types (regarding which Steward concedes that the compatibilist has a plausible story to tell). Second, I argue that these aspects of our movements are lucky for us and, since this is true, they cannot play the role of grounding our agency.
Accounts of moral responsibility can be divided into those that claim that attributability of an ... more Accounts of moral responsibility can be divided into those that claim that attributability of an act, omission, or attitude to an agent is sufficient for responsibility for it, and those which hold that responsibility depends crucially on choice. I argue that accounts of the first, attributionist, kind fail to make room for the relatively stringent epistemic conditions upon moral responsibility, and that therefore an account of the second, volitionist, kind ought to be preferred. I examine the various arguments advanced on behalf of attributionist accounts, and argue that for each of them volitionism has a reply that is in every case at least as, and often more, persuasive. Most significantly, only volitionism can accommodate the intuitively important distinction between the bad and the blameworthy.
In a recent paper in this journal, Joshua Blanchard has identified a novel problem: the problem o... more In a recent paper in this journal, Joshua Blanchard has identified a novel problem: the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. We find ourselves in unwelcome epistemic company when we hold a belief that is also held mainly or most prominently by those we regard as morally or epistemically bad. Blanchard argues that some, but not all, unwelcome epistemic company provides higher-order evidence against our belief. But he doesn't provide a test for when company is unwelcome or a diagnosis of why it is unwelcome. I provide both. On my disjunctive test, unwelcome epistemic company provides us with a defeater when either there is a match between the content of the belief and the properties that make our company unwelcome, or there is reason to suspect that the belief arose via a shared, unreliable, causal process.
Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These a... more Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have expectable consequences. I will argue that these consequences are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments.
Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsi... more Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.
Neuroethics – as a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary endeavor – examines the implications... more Neuroethics – as a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary endeavor – examines the implications of the neurosciences on human beings in general and on their self-understanding and their social interactions in particular. The range of approaches adopted in neuroethics includes but is not limited to historical, anthropological, ethical, philosophical, theological, sociological and legal approaches. Based on the study of neuroscientific developments and innovations, examined from different angles, this Handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the international neuroethical debate, and offers unprecedented insights into the impact of neuroscientific research, diagnosis, and therapy. This Handbook deals with a plethora of topics divided into in three parts: the first part contains discussions of theories of neuroethics, identity, free will, as well as other philosophical considerations. The second part is dedicated to issues involved in current and future clinical applications of ...
Journal of consciousness studies : controversies in science & the humanities, 2014
It is widely assumed that consciousness matters. It matters in a way, and to a degree, that many ... more It is widely assumed that consciousness matters. It matters in a way, and to a degree, that many of the other topics on which philosophers outside the explicitly normative areas of the discipline spend their time and energy do not. It matters in the kind of way that central topics in ethics and political philosophy matter. Indeed, it is, or should, be a central topic in ethics, since it is intrinsically valuable and/or confers value on those who possess it. Accordingly, consciousness, or its lack, is often invoked in discussions in applied and normative ethics. Ethical issues that arise at the beginning and the end of life are often held to turn, in part at any rate, on whether the organism is conscious. If the fetus is conscious, it is widely held, its moral value is greater than if it is not yet conscious, and this extra value must be taken into account in discussions of the permissibility of abortion. The presence or absence of consciousness is held to make a difference in a parallel way when the question concerns the permissibility of switching off life support, or the pursuit of further treatments for those near the end of life.
Abstract The use of interventions into the mind and body to treat a diagnosed disorder or disease... more Abstract The use of interventions into the mind and body to treat a diagnosed disorder or disease is uncontroversial, but it is very controversial whether interventions aimed at enhancing function in the absence of disease or disorder are acceptable or not. In this chapter we focus on transcranial electrical stimulation used as a cognitive enhancer, and aim to assess the case for and against its use. We first show that the treatment/enhancement distinction cannot be invoked to draw a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable uses of interventions. We then proceed to assess transcranial electrical stimulation against five common objections to the use of cognitive enhancements, which we call the safety, authenticity, cheating, social justice, and positional goods objections. Though we think that some of these objections provide reasons for caution with regard to the use of some cognitive enhancements, we argue that transcranial electrical stimulation is not seriously troubled by any of them.
Etude de la critique de la modernite et du mythe de la rationalite developpee par A. MacIntyre da... more Etude de la critique de la modernite et du mythe de la rationalite developpee par A. MacIntyre dans le sens d'un retour a la tradition. Alors que MacIntyre veut substituer au relativisme et au pluralisme modernes l'unite morale de l'aristotelisme (in «After virtue», 1985), l'A. montre que le philosophe reintroduit le pluralisme dans sa conception des traditions rationnelles, et sape la distinction meme entre l'unite des traditions de recherche et la pluralite moderne des structures morales.
Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existen... more Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to ...
ABSTRACT In A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford ... more ABSTRACT In A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and related papers, Helen Steward advances a new argument for incompatibilism. Though she concedes that the luck objection is persuasive with regard to existing versions of libertarianism, she claims that agency itself is incompatible with determinism: we are only agents at all if we are able to settle matters concerning our movements, where settling something requires that prior to our settling it lacked sufficient conditions. She argues that genuine agents settle very fine-grained aspects of their movements: when and how they move, even when and how their neurons fire. In this paper, I advance two linked arguments against agency incompatibilism. I argue, first, that we do not exercise direct control over the fine-grained aspects of our movements. Rather, we control these movements indirectly, by intentionally engaging in broadly individuated action types (regarding which Steward concedes that the compatibilist has a plausible story to tell). Second, I argue that these aspects of our movements are lucky for us and, since this is true, they cannot play the role of grounding our agency.
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Papers by Neil Levy