This thesis is a collection of ve essays that encompass my actual research interests. The rst pap... more This thesis is a collection of ve essays that encompass my actual research interests. The rst paper discusses the role of regulatory competition in the provision of Corporate / Financial Law with multiple jurisdictions systems (like EU or US). The second paper analyses how the incentive to expropriate stakeholders set by Corporate and Labor Law can di er according to the speci c governance structure of the rm. The Third paper proposes a mechanism to reduce corruption in the judiciary of developing countries. The fourth paper describes the e ects on lawmaking of the interaction between strong and weak groups, in an articulated society The fth paper, nally, is a note on the rationale of assuming the existence of network e ect in group-level payo functions.
This paper aims to assess to what extent the contributions of Kindleberger to the explanation and... more This paper aims to assess to what extent the contributions of Kindleberger to the explanation and control of financial crises may still be a source of valuable insights for the present. Kindleberger had the great merit, to be shared with Minsky, of having resumed in the early 1970s, after an eclipses of more than two decades, the investigation on the intrinsic instability of credit and its impact on financial crises. Though his pure model may be considered less pregnant than that of Minsky, it extends its scope to the international and political aspects of financial crises. In addition Kindleberger provides a powerful support to the model by rooting it in the empirical evidence systematically investigated since the early 18th century. The application of Kindleberger’s model has been successfully extended, with the collaboration of Aliber, also to the financial crises occurred after the publication of his major book (Kindleberger, 1978). This paper argues that Kindleberger’s insights...
Minority-protection laws often present variations in the level of protection over time. We show h... more Minority-protection laws often present variations in the level of protection over time. We show how these changes may be the result of the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters' support. The enforcement of minority protection laws is strong when social protest is high. Interestingly, when non protesters are able to reap higher benefits from protest than protesters themselves, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when discrimination is back to high levels.
This paper analyzes how institutions evolve as a result of socioe-conomic conditions. The Constit... more This paper analyzes how institutions evolve as a result of socioe-conomic conditions. The Constitution of a country is endogenously chosen. The interests of individuals with less bargaining power at the constitutional table end up being less protected. This results in the less powerful ...
This thesis is a collection of ve essays that encompass my actual research interests. The rst pap... more This thesis is a collection of ve essays that encompass my actual research interests. The rst paper discusses the role of regulatory competition in the provision of Corporate / Financial Law with multiple jurisdictions systems (like EU or US). The second paper analyses how the incentive to expropriate stakeholders set by Corporate and Labor Law can di er according to the speci c governance structure of the rm. The Third paper proposes a mechanism to reduce corruption in the judiciary of developing countries. The fourth paper describes the e ects on lawmaking of the interaction between strong and weak groups, in an articulated society The fth paper, nally, is a note on the rationale of assuming the existence of network e ect in group-level payo functions.
This paper aims to assess to what extent the contributions of Kindleberger to the explanation and... more This paper aims to assess to what extent the contributions of Kindleberger to the explanation and control of financial crises may still be a source of valuable insights for the present. Kindleberger had the great merit, to be shared with Minsky, of having resumed in the early 1970s, after an eclipses of more than two decades, the investigation on the intrinsic instability of credit and its impact on financial crises. Though his pure model may be considered less pregnant than that of Minsky, it extends its scope to the international and political aspects of financial crises. In addition Kindleberger provides a powerful support to the model by rooting it in the empirical evidence systematically investigated since the early 18th century. The application of Kindleberger’s model has been successfully extended, with the collaboration of Aliber, also to the financial crises occurred after the publication of his major book (Kindleberger, 1978). This paper argues that Kindleberger’s insights...
Minority-protection laws often present variations in the level of protection over time. We show h... more Minority-protection laws often present variations in the level of protection over time. We show how these changes may be the result of the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters' support. The enforcement of minority protection laws is strong when social protest is high. Interestingly, when non protesters are able to reap higher benefits from protest than protesters themselves, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when discrimination is back to high levels.
This paper analyzes how institutions evolve as a result of socioe-conomic conditions. The Constit... more This paper analyzes how institutions evolve as a result of socioe-conomic conditions. The Constitution of a country is endogenously chosen. The interests of individuals with less bargaining power at the constitutional table end up being less protected. This results in the less powerful ...
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