Paul Russell is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Lund University where he also serves as Director of the Lund|Gothenburg Responsibility Project (LGRP). Supervisors: Bernard Williams
This paper examines Susan Wolf's account of "the Reason View" of moral responsibility as articula... more This paper examines Susan Wolf's account of "the Reason View" of moral responsibility as articulated and defended in Freedom Within Reason (OUP 1990). The discussion turns on two questions about the Reason View: (1) Does the Reason View aim to satisfy what Bernard Williams describes as “morality” and its (“peculiar”) conception of responsibility and blame? (2) If it does, how successful is the Reason View judged in these terms? It is argued that if the Reason View aims to satisfy “morality” in respect of its understanding of deserved blame -- as it seems to -- then it fails for reasons similar to those that apply to R. J. Wallace’s “reflective self-control” model. On the other hand, if Wolf’s Reason View does not aim to satisfy “morality” in this respect then it might well rest satisfied with the more limited conditions of Wallace’s Rational Self-Control model, which in contrast with the Reason View, does not appeal to the (problematic) apparatus of asymmetry and the principle of alternate possibilities. The paper concludes by drawing a contrast between the Reason View and a more "realistic" conception of responsibility, as suggested by the critique of “the morality system” and the more radical "recasting" of our ethical concepts that it proposes.
Hume’s ‘Dialogues concerning Natural Religion’: A Critical Guide.
This paper considers the question of “atheism” as it arises in Hume’s _Dialogues_. It argues that... more This paper considers the question of “atheism” as it arises in Hume’s _Dialogues_. It argues that the concept of “atheism” involves several signficiant ambiguities that are indicative of philosophical and interpretive disagreements of a more substantial nature. It defends the view that Philo’s general sceptical orientation accurately represents Hume’s own “irreligious” and “atheistic” commitments, both in the _Dialogues_ and in his other (“earlier”) writings. While Hume was plainly a “speculative atheist”, his “practical atheism” was targeted more narrowly against “superstition” - as opposed to deism or religion of a more “philosophical” kind.
Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams
[Revised draft June 2020]
ABSTR... more Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams [Revised draft June 2020]
ABSTRACT: The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” . It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility f(orthcoming)
Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds,
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford Univ... more Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
“Responsibility After ‘Morality’: Strawson’s Naturalism and Williams’ Genealogy” Although P.F. St... more “Responsibility After ‘Morality’: Strawson’s Naturalism and Williams’ Genealogy” Although P.F. Strawson and Bernard Williams have both made highly significant and influential contributions on the subject of moral responsibility they never directly engaged with the views of each other. On one natural reading their views are directly opposed. Strawson seeks to discredit scepticism about moral responsibility by means of naturalistic observations and arguments. Williams, by contrast, employs genealogical methods to support sceptical conclusions about moral responsibility (and blame). This way of reading their views depends, however, on the assumption that the concept of responsibility that Strawson aims to defend is the same as Williams aims to discredit. The conception of responsibility that Williams aims to discredit is one that is based around the assumptions and aspirations of “the morality system”. This paper argues that while there is a plausible way of interpreting Strawson’s naturalism that uncouples it from the assumptions of “the morality system”, there remain significant differences between Strawson and Williams. More specifically, even if Strawson’s understanding of moral responsibility abandons the (narrow) assumptions of “morality”, Strawson is still committed to “conservative” and “optimistic” conclusions about moral responsibility that cannot be sustained. [March 2022]
Few would deny that Bernard Williams has made enormously important and influential contributions ... more Few would deny that Bernard Williams has made enormously important and influential contributions to the subject of free will and moral responsibility. His views on this subject have been presented in a number of different works, including several papers published in the 1970s and 1980s, along with Shame and Necessity (1993).1 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), which is arguably Williams's most ambitious contribution to moral philosophy, has broader reach but it shares a central theme with his other writings, the critique of "the morality system".2 What Williams has to say about free will and moral responsibility is fundamental to that critique. One way to understand and assess Williams views on free will and moral responsibility is to consider them in relation to his most significant predecessors. Two figures who stand out in this regard
In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers ... more In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers that they discuss or examine. The papers that they are especially concerned with are: “The Material World and Natural Religion in Hume’s Treatise” (Ryan) [Essay 3], “Hume’s Skepticism and the Problem of Atheism” (Fosl) [Essay 12], and “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism (Gautier) [Essay 16].
Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with ... more Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought.
Precis of Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy. Book Symposium: Paul Russell, Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, 14. 26: 71-73 . With replies to critics: Peter Fosl (pp. 77-95), Claude Gautier (pp. 96-111) , and Todd Ryan (pp.112-122).
The new two volume edition of Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, edited by Tom Beaucha... more The new two volume edition of Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, edited by Tom Beauchamp and Mark Box, is the first critical edition.[3] What primarily distinguishes a critical edition is that it collates the copy-text with all other editions and provides a complete record of variations in the texts. Beauchamp and Box provide readers with detailed, informative notes and annotations that describe the variations and revisions that have been made to the Essays published within Hume’s lifetime. They also provide a table that catalogues the contents of the various editions from 1741 to 1771 and several helpful appendixes relating to their publication. The final text of the essays has been carefully edited and annotated. The second volume contains the editors’ extensive annotations, which are both informed and illuminating. All the editorial work has been done with enormous attention to detail and precision....
My discussion in this paper proceeds in four stages. First, Iprovide a brief
description of Nozic... more My discussion in this paper proceeds in four stages. First, Iprovide a brief description of Nozick’s entitlement theory and I raise some general questions about it. Secondly, I argue, contrary to Nozick, that we are justified in distributing some goods on the basis of need. More specifically, I argue that we must distinguish between the claim that goods ought to be distributed on the basis of need and the claim that goods which are essential needs ought to be distributed on the basis of need. In the third section I consider the objection that such dism’butions will inevitably lead to the violation of individuals’ property rights. I argue that individuals are obliged to be charitable and that this obligation places limits on what they are entitled to. What charity requires of us, I maintain, we have no rights over and we must relinquish. In the fourth and final section I point out the general significance of these arguments.
There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among th... more There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among the most significant contributions to modern moral philosophy. Although any number of essays have been devoted to it, Pamela Hieronymi’s 'Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals' is the first book-length study. The aim of Hieronymi’s study is to show that Strawson’s “central argument” has been “underestimated and misunderstood.” Hieronymi interprets this argument in terms of what she describes as Strawson’s “social naturalism”. Understood this way, Hieronymi maintains, “the argument is powerful”. In what follows I argue that while Hieronymi’s discussion is stimulating and provides valuable insights into “Freedom and Resentment,” neither the interpretation advanced nor the social naturalist position that it describes is convincing.
This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Ru... more This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Russell. I provide replies to three critics of The Limits of Free Will. The first reply is to Robert Wallace and focuses on the question of whether there is a conflict between the core compatibilist and pessimist components of the "critical compatibilist" position that I have advanced. The second reply is to Angela Smith's discussion of the "narrow" interpretation of moral responsibility responsibility (as defended by R. Jay Wallace). and how best to respond to it. The third and last reply is concerned with Christopher Bennett's criticism of my views concerning "motivational scepticism" and the possibility of pure practice reasons.
Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Williams. A. Szigeti & M. Talbert, eds. New York: Oxford University Press., 2021
Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams
Forthcoming in Agency, Fate and... more Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams
Forthcoming in Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Williams. A. Szigeti & M. Talbert, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Revised draft June 2020
ABSTRACT: The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” . It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
RECASTING HUME AND EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY: Selected Essays [New York: Oxford University Press], 2021
David Hume is one of the most influential and penetrating critics of religion. There is, neverthe... more David Hume is one of the most influential and penetrating critics of religion. There is, nevertheless, considerable debate about where he stands on the fundamental question concerning the existence of God. Some argue that Hume is a theist, others that he is an atheist and, in the middle, some claim that he is a skeptic who neither affirms nor denies God’s existence. The central concern of this paper is to advance a set of distinctions and arguments in support of the atheistic interpretation. More specifically, it is argued that: (1) according to Hume the argument from design is not just logically weak, it is psychologically incapable of generating belief; (2) Hume advances a set of arguments that provide grounds for denying the existence of God, even on a weak or more minimal interpretation.; and (3) Hume’s (mitigated) skeptical principles are not, in practice, inconsistent with his atheism. In an Appendix it is also argued that (4) Hume’s arguments can be easily reconfigured into the framework of the (current) abductive debate in a way that provides independent support for the hard sceptical atheistic interpretation.
Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought: V. Rosaleny & P. Smith, eds. /Springer: Dordrecht., 2020
Atheists may well agree that the religious hypothesis is false but still disagree about the pract... more Atheists may well agree that the religious hypothesis is false but still disagree about the practical significance of this conclusion. Some (e.g. Spinoza and Philip Kitcher) claim, for example, that for the good of society, we need to retain and accommodate religion in some preferred or more benign form (e.g. “true religion” of some kind). Others philosophers (e.g. D'Holbach and the New Atheists) have argued that the atheist should aim to eradicate all traces of religion. The brand of atheism that Hume recommends rejects both these proposals. The first proposal, he maintains, mistakenly supposes that there is some benign and constructive form of religion available to the masses that will effectively support and sustain ethical life. The second proposal fails to acknowledge the extent to which religious propensities are, in various ways, an inescapable feature of human life and society. In the final analysis, both these proposals rest on optimistic assumptions that Hume rejects. The form of practical atheism that Hume defends is founded on a more pessimistic understanding of the human predicament.
Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia for Philosophy of Religion , Eds. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro
David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the... more David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the heart of what most concerned him. Although the exact nature of Hume’s attitude to religion is a matter of some controversy, there is general agreement that his basic stance was critical, if not hostile, to the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief and practice. There remains, however, considerable disagreement about whether or not Hume believed that there is any truth or value in religion. According to some, Hume was a sceptic who regarded all conjectures relating to religious hypotheses to be beyond the scope of human understanding – he neither affirmed nor denied these conjectures. Others read Hume as embracing a highly refined form of “true religion”. On the other side of this spectrum, it is claimed that Hume was committed to atheism, although due to social conditions at the time, this had to be (thinly) concealed or masked. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Hume’s core concerns and arguments on this subject and to provide the reader with a framework for interpreting and assessing his various contributions.
Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds,
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford Univ... more Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity, they address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. Skepticism threatens a wide range of interests and concerns that themselves rest on the foundation of our self-conception as responsible moral agents. From this perspective, whereas skepticism licences a degree of pessimism about our human predicament, the defeat of skepticism serves to vindicate optimism. In recent years this orthodox view of the relationship between skepticism and pessimism has been challenged. It has been argued, for example, that skepticism may be defended in much more optimistic terms. While we have reason to accept skepticism, we have no reason to draw any bleak or depressing consequences from this. Another way of severing the orthodox connection between skepticism and pessimism is to reject skepticism but deny that this will serve to secure or salvage any unqualified form of optimism. This article reviews and contrast these various positions and approaches, beginning with an account of P.F. Strawson’s particularly influential statement of the relationship between the skeptical challenge and pessimism.
The philosophy of Samuel Clarke is of central importance for an adequate understanding of Hume’s ... more The philosophy of Samuel Clarke is of central importance for an adequate understanding of Hume’s Treatise. Despite this, most Hume scholars have either entirely overlooked Clarke’s work, or referred to it in a casual manner that fails to do justice to the significance of the Clarke-Hume relationship. This tendency is particularly apparent in accounts of Hume’s views on space in Treatise I.ii. In this paper, I argue that one of Hume’s principal objectives in his discussion of space is to discredit Clarke’s Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and, more deeply, the ‘argument a priori’ that Clarke constructs around it. On the basis of this interpretation, I argue that Hume’s ‘system’ of space constitutes an important part of his more fundamental ‘atheistic’ or anti- Christian objectives in the Treatise.
This paper examines Susan Wolf's account of "the Reason View" of moral responsibility as articula... more This paper examines Susan Wolf's account of "the Reason View" of moral responsibility as articulated and defended in Freedom Within Reason (OUP 1990). The discussion turns on two questions about the Reason View: (1) Does the Reason View aim to satisfy what Bernard Williams describes as “morality” and its (“peculiar”) conception of responsibility and blame? (2) If it does, how successful is the Reason View judged in these terms? It is argued that if the Reason View aims to satisfy “morality” in respect of its understanding of deserved blame -- as it seems to -- then it fails for reasons similar to those that apply to R. J. Wallace’s “reflective self-control” model. On the other hand, if Wolf’s Reason View does not aim to satisfy “morality” in this respect then it might well rest satisfied with the more limited conditions of Wallace’s Rational Self-Control model, which in contrast with the Reason View, does not appeal to the (problematic) apparatus of asymmetry and the principle of alternate possibilities. The paper concludes by drawing a contrast between the Reason View and a more "realistic" conception of responsibility, as suggested by the critique of “the morality system” and the more radical "recasting" of our ethical concepts that it proposes.
Hume’s ‘Dialogues concerning Natural Religion’: A Critical Guide.
This paper considers the question of “atheism” as it arises in Hume’s _Dialogues_. It argues that... more This paper considers the question of “atheism” as it arises in Hume’s _Dialogues_. It argues that the concept of “atheism” involves several signficiant ambiguities that are indicative of philosophical and interpretive disagreements of a more substantial nature. It defends the view that Philo’s general sceptical orientation accurately represents Hume’s own “irreligious” and “atheistic” commitments, both in the _Dialogues_ and in his other (“earlier”) writings. While Hume was plainly a “speculative atheist”, his “practical atheism” was targeted more narrowly against “superstition” - as opposed to deism or religion of a more “philosophical” kind.
Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams
[Revised draft June 2020]
ABSTR... more Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams [Revised draft June 2020]
ABSTRACT: The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” . It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility f(orthcoming)
Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds,
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford Univ... more Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
“Responsibility After ‘Morality’: Strawson’s Naturalism and Williams’ Genealogy” Although P.F. St... more “Responsibility After ‘Morality’: Strawson’s Naturalism and Williams’ Genealogy” Although P.F. Strawson and Bernard Williams have both made highly significant and influential contributions on the subject of moral responsibility they never directly engaged with the views of each other. On one natural reading their views are directly opposed. Strawson seeks to discredit scepticism about moral responsibility by means of naturalistic observations and arguments. Williams, by contrast, employs genealogical methods to support sceptical conclusions about moral responsibility (and blame). This way of reading their views depends, however, on the assumption that the concept of responsibility that Strawson aims to defend is the same as Williams aims to discredit. The conception of responsibility that Williams aims to discredit is one that is based around the assumptions and aspirations of “the morality system”. This paper argues that while there is a plausible way of interpreting Strawson’s naturalism that uncouples it from the assumptions of “the morality system”, there remain significant differences between Strawson and Williams. More specifically, even if Strawson’s understanding of moral responsibility abandons the (narrow) assumptions of “morality”, Strawson is still committed to “conservative” and “optimistic” conclusions about moral responsibility that cannot be sustained. [March 2022]
Few would deny that Bernard Williams has made enormously important and influential contributions ... more Few would deny that Bernard Williams has made enormously important and influential contributions to the subject of free will and moral responsibility. His views on this subject have been presented in a number of different works, including several papers published in the 1970s and 1980s, along with Shame and Necessity (1993).1 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), which is arguably Williams's most ambitious contribution to moral philosophy, has broader reach but it shares a central theme with his other writings, the critique of "the morality system".2 What Williams has to say about free will and moral responsibility is fundamental to that critique. One way to understand and assess Williams views on free will and moral responsibility is to consider them in relation to his most significant predecessors. Two figures who stand out in this regard
In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers ... more In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers that they discuss or examine. The papers that they are especially concerned with are: “The Material World and Natural Religion in Hume’s Treatise” (Ryan) [Essay 3], “Hume’s Skepticism and the Problem of Atheism” (Fosl) [Essay 12], and “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism (Gautier) [Essay 16].
Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with ... more Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought.
Precis of Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy. Book Symposium: Paul Russell, Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, 14. 26: 71-73 . With replies to critics: Peter Fosl (pp. 77-95), Claude Gautier (pp. 96-111) , and Todd Ryan (pp.112-122).
The new two volume edition of Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, edited by Tom Beaucha... more The new two volume edition of Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, edited by Tom Beauchamp and Mark Box, is the first critical edition.[3] What primarily distinguishes a critical edition is that it collates the copy-text with all other editions and provides a complete record of variations in the texts. Beauchamp and Box provide readers with detailed, informative notes and annotations that describe the variations and revisions that have been made to the Essays published within Hume’s lifetime. They also provide a table that catalogues the contents of the various editions from 1741 to 1771 and several helpful appendixes relating to their publication. The final text of the essays has been carefully edited and annotated. The second volume contains the editors’ extensive annotations, which are both informed and illuminating. All the editorial work has been done with enormous attention to detail and precision....
My discussion in this paper proceeds in four stages. First, Iprovide a brief
description of Nozic... more My discussion in this paper proceeds in four stages. First, Iprovide a brief description of Nozick’s entitlement theory and I raise some general questions about it. Secondly, I argue, contrary to Nozick, that we are justified in distributing some goods on the basis of need. More specifically, I argue that we must distinguish between the claim that goods ought to be distributed on the basis of need and the claim that goods which are essential needs ought to be distributed on the basis of need. In the third section I consider the objection that such dism’butions will inevitably lead to the violation of individuals’ property rights. I argue that individuals are obliged to be charitable and that this obligation places limits on what they are entitled to. What charity requires of us, I maintain, we have no rights over and we must relinquish. In the fourth and final section I point out the general significance of these arguments.
There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among th... more There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among the most significant contributions to modern moral philosophy. Although any number of essays have been devoted to it, Pamela Hieronymi’s 'Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals' is the first book-length study. The aim of Hieronymi’s study is to show that Strawson’s “central argument” has been “underestimated and misunderstood.” Hieronymi interprets this argument in terms of what she describes as Strawson’s “social naturalism”. Understood this way, Hieronymi maintains, “the argument is powerful”. In what follows I argue that while Hieronymi’s discussion is stimulating and provides valuable insights into “Freedom and Resentment,” neither the interpretation advanced nor the social naturalist position that it describes is convincing.
This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Ru... more This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Russell. I provide replies to three critics of The Limits of Free Will. The first reply is to Robert Wallace and focuses on the question of whether there is a conflict between the core compatibilist and pessimist components of the "critical compatibilist" position that I have advanced. The second reply is to Angela Smith's discussion of the "narrow" interpretation of moral responsibility responsibility (as defended by R. Jay Wallace). and how best to respond to it. The third and last reply is concerned with Christopher Bennett's criticism of my views concerning "motivational scepticism" and the possibility of pure practice reasons.
Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Williams. A. Szigeti & M. Talbert, eds. New York: Oxford University Press., 2021
Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams
Forthcoming in Agency, Fate and... more Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams
Forthcoming in Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Williams. A. Szigeti & M. Talbert, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Revised draft June 2020
ABSTRACT: The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” . It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
RECASTING HUME AND EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY: Selected Essays [New York: Oxford University Press], 2021
David Hume is one of the most influential and penetrating critics of religion. There is, neverthe... more David Hume is one of the most influential and penetrating critics of religion. There is, nevertheless, considerable debate about where he stands on the fundamental question concerning the existence of God. Some argue that Hume is a theist, others that he is an atheist and, in the middle, some claim that he is a skeptic who neither affirms nor denies God’s existence. The central concern of this paper is to advance a set of distinctions and arguments in support of the atheistic interpretation. More specifically, it is argued that: (1) according to Hume the argument from design is not just logically weak, it is psychologically incapable of generating belief; (2) Hume advances a set of arguments that provide grounds for denying the existence of God, even on a weak or more minimal interpretation.; and (3) Hume’s (mitigated) skeptical principles are not, in practice, inconsistent with his atheism. In an Appendix it is also argued that (4) Hume’s arguments can be easily reconfigured into the framework of the (current) abductive debate in a way that provides independent support for the hard sceptical atheistic interpretation.
Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought: V. Rosaleny & P. Smith, eds. /Springer: Dordrecht., 2020
Atheists may well agree that the religious hypothesis is false but still disagree about the pract... more Atheists may well agree that the religious hypothesis is false but still disagree about the practical significance of this conclusion. Some (e.g. Spinoza and Philip Kitcher) claim, for example, that for the good of society, we need to retain and accommodate religion in some preferred or more benign form (e.g. “true religion” of some kind). Others philosophers (e.g. D'Holbach and the New Atheists) have argued that the atheist should aim to eradicate all traces of religion. The brand of atheism that Hume recommends rejects both these proposals. The first proposal, he maintains, mistakenly supposes that there is some benign and constructive form of religion available to the masses that will effectively support and sustain ethical life. The second proposal fails to acknowledge the extent to which religious propensities are, in various ways, an inescapable feature of human life and society. In the final analysis, both these proposals rest on optimistic assumptions that Hume rejects. The form of practical atheism that Hume defends is founded on a more pessimistic understanding of the human predicament.
Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia for Philosophy of Religion , Eds. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro
David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the... more David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the heart of what most concerned him. Although the exact nature of Hume’s attitude to religion is a matter of some controversy, there is general agreement that his basic stance was critical, if not hostile, to the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief and practice. There remains, however, considerable disagreement about whether or not Hume believed that there is any truth or value in religion. According to some, Hume was a sceptic who regarded all conjectures relating to religious hypotheses to be beyond the scope of human understanding – he neither affirmed nor denied these conjectures. Others read Hume as embracing a highly refined form of “true religion”. On the other side of this spectrum, it is claimed that Hume was committed to atheism, although due to social conditions at the time, this had to be (thinly) concealed or masked. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Hume’s core concerns and arguments on this subject and to provide the reader with a framework for interpreting and assessing his various contributions.
Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds,
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford Univ... more Forthcoming in D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom, eds, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity, they address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. Skepticism threatens a wide range of interests and concerns that themselves rest on the foundation of our self-conception as responsible moral agents. From this perspective, whereas skepticism licences a degree of pessimism about our human predicament, the defeat of skepticism serves to vindicate optimism. In recent years this orthodox view of the relationship between skepticism and pessimism has been challenged. It has been argued, for example, that skepticism may be defended in much more optimistic terms. While we have reason to accept skepticism, we have no reason to draw any bleak or depressing consequences from this. Another way of severing the orthodox connection between skepticism and pessimism is to reject skepticism but deny that this will serve to secure or salvage any unqualified form of optimism. This article reviews and contrast these various positions and approaches, beginning with an account of P.F. Strawson’s particularly influential statement of the relationship between the skeptical challenge and pessimism.
The philosophy of Samuel Clarke is of central importance for an adequate understanding of Hume’s ... more The philosophy of Samuel Clarke is of central importance for an adequate understanding of Hume’s Treatise. Despite this, most Hume scholars have either entirely overlooked Clarke’s work, or referred to it in a casual manner that fails to do justice to the significance of the Clarke-Hume relationship. This tendency is particularly apparent in accounts of Hume’s views on space in Treatise I.ii. In this paper, I argue that one of Hume’s principal objectives in his discussion of space is to discredit Clarke’s Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and, more deeply, the ‘argument a priori’ that Clarke constructs around it. On the basis of this interpretation, I argue that Hume’s ‘system’ of space constitutes an important part of his more fundamental ‘atheistic’ or anti- Christian objectives in the Treatise.
In November 2017 the University of British Columbia presented a draft document concerning freedo... more In November 2017 the University of British Columbia presented a draft document concerning freedom of expression for discussion and comment. The document was written and prepared by a committee appointed and selected by the university administration. The document can found here:
After the document appeared I was contacted by Margaret Wente of the GLOBE & MAIL and asked to comment on it. My comments are contained in what follows....
Eugenio LeCaldano & Paul Russell review of Dennis Rasmussen, The Infidel and the Professor - with... more Eugenio LeCaldano & Paul Russell review of Dennis Rasmussen, The Infidel and the Professor - with replies from Dennis Rasmussen
__________
In this brief review it is not possible to do full justice to this lively and lucidly presented study. It is fair to say, I think, that the considerable merits of this work rest primarily with its intelligent and reliable selection of material, most of which is already available and familiar. This study does not aim to challenge any orthodoxies or present new material of some significant kind. Rasmussen does not need to do this since his real concern is to tell a story about two great thinkers in an engaging manner – a task which he achieves with great success. This is a book that scholars will thoroughly enjoy and appreciate and which will also find many appreciative readers well beyond these boundaries.
Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility is an ambitious and impressive statement of a n... more Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility is an ambitious and impressive statement of a new theory of moral responsibility. McKenna’s approach builds upon the strategy advanced in P.F. Strawson’s enormously influential “Freedom and Resentment” (which was published in 1962). The account advanced aims to provide Strawson’s theory with the sort of detail that is required to fill significant gaps and respond to a wide range of criticisms and objections that have been directed against it. ....Conversation and Responsibility belongs on the top shelf of any set of readings devoted to the contemporary discussion of moral responsibility. All readers, whatever their philosophical orientation may be, will find it both challenging and rewarding. Whether in the end one endorses the conversational model or not, there can be no doubt that this is a contribution that significantly advances our overall understanding of these important and complex matters.
No one debates that Hume’s views about causation are of central importance to his philosophy and ... more No one debates that Hume’s views about causation are of central importance to his philosophy and that, historically speaking, what he said on this subject has been enormously influential. Nor is there much doubt that according to the “standard” interpretation Hume holds that causation must be understood in terms of the constant conjunction of objects and does not involve any “metaphysical” powers or forces in the objects themselves. On this reading Hume is a proponent of the “regularity” theory of causation, and it is this view that has done much to shape empiricist and “positivist” philosophy over the past two centuries.
Despite these points of agreement, recent work in Hume scholarship has challenged
the accuracy of the standard interpretation. This work includes, most notably, John Wright’s The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (1983) and Galen Strawson’s The Secret Connexion (1989). One particular merit of The New Hume Debate is that it gives both Wright and Strawson an opportunity to present their case for the “causal realist” interpretation in relatively concise and brief papers that will be more accessible to a wider audience. The most important and influential response to the realist interpretation, as defended by Wright and Strawson, is Kenneth Winkler’s paper “The New Hume” (1991), which is reprinted in this volumealong with a new “Postscript.” The other contributors to this collection, beside the editors, are Barry Stroud, Simon Blackburn, Edward Craig, Martin Bell, Daniel Flage, and Anne Jaap Jacobson. All the contributions are of interest and merit comment. However, for the purpose of this review I will focus my attention on the debate between Strawson and Winkler, which involves most of the central issues.
James A. Harris's biography of David Hume is the first such study to appear since Ernest Mossner'... more James A. Harris's biography of David Hume is the first such study to appear since Ernest Mossner's The Life of David Hume (1954). Unlike Mossner, Harris aims to write a specifically "intellectual biography", one that gives "a complete picture of Hume's ideas" and "relates Hume's works to the circumstances in which they were conceived and written" (vii). Harris's study turns on four central theses or claims about the character of Hume's thought and how it is structured and developed. The claims are:
Hume's Treatise has no claim to any sort of "privileged" status in relation to Hume's other major works -- which include his Essays and his History of England. There is no system, doctrine, or fundamental aims or ambitions that serve to unify Hume's thought. Irreligious aims and interests are not of any particular or unique importance for Hume's thought. Moreover, whatever irreligious aims and objectives Hume may have had, they reflect his moderate, neutral and detached attitude to this and all other subjects -- there is no underlying animus or hostility against religion that motivates his contributions to this subject. Hume's thought should be understood and explained not in terms of his concern with some specific subject matter or body of doctrine but rather in terms of his style and his identity as a "philosophical man of letters".
The general picture of Hume that emerges from this study, as constructed around these four core theses, is, as I explain, incomplete, unconvincing and, in important respects, seriously flawed and misleading.
There are two basic questions to ask about this book, questions that reflect two distinct audienc... more There are two basic questions to ask about this book, questions that reflect two distinct audiences. Those involved in contemporary Hume studies will want to ask (i) whether Willis’s interpretation can stand up to close textual and contextual analysis. Those involved in contemporary religious studies will want to ask (ii) whether (Humean) “true religion” is recognizably religious and serves as a plausible and convincing “generative resource.” With regard to (i), Willis’s interpretation is strained and stretched and not recognizably Hume’s. Although Willis is well-informed about much of the secondary literature, and conveys an admirable sense of purpose throughout, his account of the positive side of Hume’s attitude to religion depends, not only on reading Hume through the lens of other philosophers and theologians whose aims and concerns are alien to Hume’s, but also on ignoring many of Hume’s doubts about the value and significance of true religion itself. Finally, it is puzzling that Willis has turned to Hume as a “resource” for rethinking contemporary religion when the views that he develops are much closer to the views that Spinoza articulates and defends in his Theological-Political Treatise—a work that Willis neglects and overlooks.
Forthcoming in Rivista di Filosofia [with a second review by Eugenio Lecaldano and replies from D... more Forthcoming in Rivista di Filosofia [with a second review by Eugenio Lecaldano and replies from Dennis Rasmussen].
Uploads
Papers by Paul Russell
[Revised draft June 2020]
ABSTRACT:
The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” .
It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
Paul Russell
(June 2019 / June 2020)
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
Precis of Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy. Book Symposium: Paul Russell, Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, 14. 26: 71-73 . With replies to critics: Peter Fosl (pp. 77-95), Claude Gautier (pp. 96-111) , and Todd Ryan (pp.112-122).
THE GREAT GUIDE
What David Hume can teach us about being human and living well
328pp. Princeton University Press. £20 (US $24.95).
Julian Baggini
description of Nozick’s entitlement theory and I raise some general questions about it.
Secondly, I argue, contrary to Nozick, that we are justified in distributing some goods on
the basis of need. More specifically, I argue that we must distinguish between the claim
that goods ought to be distributed on the basis of need and the claim that goods which are
essential needs ought to be distributed on the basis of need. In the third section I consider
the objection that such dism’butions will inevitably lead to the violation of individuals’
property rights. I argue that individuals are obliged to be charitable and that this
obligation places limits on what they are entitled to. What charity requires of us, I
maintain, we have no rights over and we must relinquish. In the fourth and final section
I point out the general significance of these arguments.
Forthcoming in Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Williams. A. Szigeti & M. Talbert, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Revised draft June 2020
ABSTRACT:
The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” .
It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
Paul Russell
(June 2019 / June 2020)
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity, they address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. Skepticism threatens a wide range of interests and concerns that themselves rest on the foundation of our self-conception as responsible moral agents. From this perspective, whereas skepticism licences a degree of pessimism about our human predicament, the defeat of skepticism serves to vindicate optimism. In recent years this orthodox view of the relationship between skepticism and pessimism has been challenged. It has been argued, for example, that skepticism may be defended in much more optimistic terms. While we have reason to accept skepticism, we have no reason to draw any bleak or depressing consequences from this. Another way of severing the orthodox connection between skepticism and pessimism is to reject skepticism but deny that this will serve to secure or salvage any unqualified form of optimism. This article reviews and contrast these various positions and approaches, beginning with an account of P.F. Strawson’s particularly influential statement of the relationship between the skeptical challenge and pessimism.
[Revised draft June 2020]
ABSTRACT:
The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” .
It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
Paul Russell
(June 2019 / June 2020)
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
Precis of Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy. Book Symposium: Paul Russell, Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, 14. 26: 71-73 . With replies to critics: Peter Fosl (pp. 77-95), Claude Gautier (pp. 96-111) , and Todd Ryan (pp.112-122).
THE GREAT GUIDE
What David Hume can teach us about being human and living well
328pp. Princeton University Press. £20 (US $24.95).
Julian Baggini
description of Nozick’s entitlement theory and I raise some general questions about it.
Secondly, I argue, contrary to Nozick, that we are justified in distributing some goods on
the basis of need. More specifically, I argue that we must distinguish between the claim
that goods ought to be distributed on the basis of need and the claim that goods which are
essential needs ought to be distributed on the basis of need. In the third section I consider
the objection that such dism’butions will inevitably lead to the violation of individuals’
property rights. I argue that individuals are obliged to be charitable and that this
obligation places limits on what they are entitled to. What charity requires of us, I
maintain, we have no rights over and we must relinquish. In the fourth and final section
I point out the general significance of these arguments.
Forthcoming in Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Williams. A. Szigeti & M. Talbert, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Revised draft June 2020
ABSTRACT:
The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” .
It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us.
Paul Russell
(June 2019 / June 2020)
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press
We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity, they address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. Skepticism threatens a wide range of interests and concerns that themselves rest on the foundation of our self-conception as responsible moral agents. From this perspective, whereas skepticism licences a degree of pessimism about our human predicament, the defeat of skepticism serves to vindicate optimism. In recent years this orthodox view of the relationship between skepticism and pessimism has been challenged. It has been argued, for example, that skepticism may be defended in much more optimistic terms. While we have reason to accept skepticism, we have no reason to draw any bleak or depressing consequences from this. Another way of severing the orthodox connection between skepticism and pessimism is to reject skepticism but deny that this will serve to secure or salvage any unqualified form of optimism. This article reviews and contrast these various positions and approaches, beginning with an account of P.F. Strawson’s particularly influential statement of the relationship between the skeptical challenge and pessimism.
http://faculty-staff.ubc.ca/2017/11/08/freedom-of-expression-draft-statement/
After the document appeared I was contacted by Margaret Wente of the GLOBE & MAIL and asked to comment on it. My comments are contained in what follows....
__________
In this brief review it is not possible to do full justice to this lively and lucidly presented study. It is fair to say, I think, that the considerable merits of this work rest primarily with its intelligent and reliable selection of material, most of which is already available and familiar. This study does not aim to challenge any orthodoxies or present new material of some significant kind. Rasmussen does not need to do this since his real concern is to tell a story about two great thinkers in an engaging manner – a task which he achieves with great success. This is a book that scholars will thoroughly enjoy and appreciate and which will also find many appreciative readers well beyond these boundaries.
Despite these points of agreement, recent work in Hume scholarship has challenged
the accuracy of the standard interpretation. This work includes, most notably, John Wright’s The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (1983) and Galen Strawson’s The Secret Connexion (1989). One particular merit of The New Hume Debate is that it gives both Wright and Strawson an opportunity to present their case for the “causal realist” interpretation in relatively concise and brief papers that will be more accessible to a wider audience. The most important and influential response to the realist interpretation, as defended by Wright and Strawson, is Kenneth Winkler’s paper “The New Hume” (1991), which is reprinted in this volumealong with a new “Postscript.” The other contributors to this collection, beside the editors, are Barry Stroud, Simon Blackburn, Edward Craig, Martin Bell, Daniel Flage, and Anne Jaap Jacobson. All the contributions are of interest and merit comment. However, for the purpose of this review I will focus my attention on the debate between Strawson and Winkler, which involves most of the central issues.
Hume's Treatise has no claim to any sort of "privileged" status in relation to Hume's other major works -- which include his Essays and his History of England.
There is no system, doctrine, or fundamental aims or ambitions that serve to unify Hume's thought.
Irreligious aims and interests are not of any particular or unique importance for Hume's thought. Moreover, whatever irreligious aims and objectives Hume may have had, they reflect his moderate, neutral and detached attitude to this and all other subjects -- there is no underlying animus or hostility against religion that motivates his contributions to this subject.
Hume's thought should be understood and explained not in terms of his concern with some specific subject matter or body of doctrine but rather in terms of his style and his identity as a "philosophical man of letters".
The general picture of Hume that emerges from this study, as constructed around these four core theses, is, as I explain, incomplete, unconvincing and, in important respects, seriously flawed and misleading.