Full Professor of Philosophy at CUNY/Kingsborough, Fellow of the Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, APPA certified Philosophical Counselor, certified Cognitive Behavioral Therapist, certified Life Coach, and certified Mindfulness Instructor, trained in Gestalt Psychotherapy, author of several peer-reviewed articles, chapters, and books on meditation, mental freedom, and free will, practitioner and instructor in meditation and yoga since 1976, and 4th degree blackball in Shotokan karate. www.rickrepetti.com
Interdisciplinary Research in Counseling, Ethics and Philosophy - IRCEP
In this paper I first argue for a somewhat paradoxically ‘methodless method’ of philosophical pra... more In this paper I first argue for a somewhat paradoxically ‘methodless method’ of philosophical practice that includes as many methods as a practitioner can learn and include in their toolkit, as well as no method. Then I overview over a dozen major things, and some minor ones, that philosophical counselors and other philosophical practitioners might benefit from adding to their philosophical practice toolkits. These include: The DIME framework, 4e Cognitive Science, the 4Ps of knowing, the Gestalt change process model, Philosophical Fellowship (aka Philosophical Companionship), Dialectic to Dialogos, Nelsonian Socratic Dialogue, Self-Determination Theory, the Ikigai Framework, Philosophical Midwifery, the Eightfold Path, the Four Agreements, and Meditation. Where appropriate, I offer what I take to be basic elements of rationale for viewing certain of these items, particularly some that might not appear philosophical from an analytic perspective, as philosophical practice tools as we...
Did the Buddha Teach Free Will? Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explain... more Did the Buddha Teach Free Will? Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred. (6) The title of Federman's article raises the question, "What Kind of Free Will Did the Buddha Teach?" This question suggests that the Buddha taught a certain kind of "free will." Federman's article attempts to substantiate that suggestion. The Tathagata (the Buddha) never discussed "free will," but he did discuss fate, chance, karma, "dependent origination" or "conditioned arising" (the thesis that all conditioned phenomena originate or arise in dependence upon previous conditions), (7) the efficacy of volition, effort, choice, and action, and a host of things that presuppose a kind of free will. But as the...
In “Confessions of a Deluded Westerner,” Michael Brent insists no contributions to Buddhist Persp... more In “Confessions of a Deluded Westerner,” Michael Brent insists no contributions to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti) even address free will because none deploy the criteria for free will that Western (incompatibilist) philosophers identify: the ability to do otherwise under identical conditions, and the ability to have one’s choices be up to oneself. Brent claims the criteria and abilities in that anthology are criteria for intentional action, but not all intentional actions are free. He also insists that Buddhism, ironically, cannot even accept intentional action, because, on his analysis, intentionality requires an agent, which Buddhism rejects. I have four responses: (i) Brent ignores the other half of the debate, compatibilism, in both Western and Buddhist philosophy, represented in the anthology by several contributors; (ii) the autonomy of Buddhist meditation virtuosos is titanic compared to Brent’s autonomy criteria, which latter are relatively mundane and facile, ...
This is my reply to Karin Meyers, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of An... more This is my reply to Karin Meyers, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," in this Symposium. Meyers generally focuses on exegesis of what Early Buddhists said, which reasonably constrains what we may think about them if we are Buddhists. I agree with and find much value in most of her astute analyses, here and elsewhere, so I restrict my reply here to where we disagree, or otherwise seem to be speaking past, or misunderstanding, each other. In this regard, I focus on three of her claims. Meyers argues that (1) Buddhist dependent origination is not determinism; (2) attempts at naturalizing Buddhism threaten to run afoul of her hermeneutics; and (3) I seem to err on both fronts. However, I have emphasized that I am not a determinist, and I am not as concerned with what Buddhists did say about causation and agency. As a philosopher, I am mainly concerned with what philosophers can say about them. 1 Philosophy Department, ...
Conclusions of the Early-Period Scholarship (2) In the first article in this series ("Earlie... more Conclusions of the Early-Period Scholarship (2) In the first article in this series ("Earlier") I examined the writings of early-period Buddhist scholars Story, Rahula, Gomez, and Kalupahana regarding the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with "determinism," the doctrine of universal lawful causation. These "early-period" scholars resist a straightforward equation of the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratTtya samutpada), which asserts the dependence of all conditioned/composite phenomena on previous or simultaneous impartite micro-phenomena, with either a "rigid" determinism or a "chaotic" indeterminism, opting for a "middle way" between both. Some hold that Hume's model of causation, as mere constant conjunction obtaining among pairs of contingent event types, provides a "middle way" for Buddhist compatibilism. (3) But Humean causation involves generalizations abou...
Interdisciplinary Research in Counseling, Ethics and Philosophy - IRCEP
In this paper I first argue for a somewhat paradoxically ‘methodless method’ of philosophical pra... more In this paper I first argue for a somewhat paradoxically ‘methodless method’ of philosophical practice that includes as many methods as a practitioner can learn and include in their toolkit, as well as no method. Then I overview over a dozen major things, and some minor ones, that philosophical counselors and other philosophical practitioners might benefit from adding to their philosophical practice toolkits. These include: The DIME framework, 4e Cognitive Science, the 4Ps of knowing, the Gestalt change process model, Philosophical Fellowship (aka Philosophical Companionship), Dialectic to Dialogos, Nelsonian Socratic Dialogue, Self-Determination Theory, the Ikigai Framework, Philosophical Midwifery, the Eightfold Path, the Four Agreements, and Meditation. Where appropriate, I offer what I take to be basic elements of rationale for viewing certain of these items, particularly some that might not appear philosophical from an analytic perspective, as philosophical practice tools as we...
Did the Buddha Teach Free Will? Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explain... more Did the Buddha Teach Free Will? Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred. (6) The title of Federman's article raises the question, "What Kind of Free Will Did the Buddha Teach?" This question suggests that the Buddha taught a certain kind of "free will." Federman's article attempts to substantiate that suggestion. The Tathagata (the Buddha) never discussed "free will," but he did discuss fate, chance, karma, "dependent origination" or "conditioned arising" (the thesis that all conditioned phenomena originate or arise in dependence upon previous conditions), (7) the efficacy of volition, effort, choice, and action, and a host of things that presuppose a kind of free will. But as the...
In “Confessions of a Deluded Westerner,” Michael Brent insists no contributions to Buddhist Persp... more In “Confessions of a Deluded Westerner,” Michael Brent insists no contributions to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti) even address free will because none deploy the criteria for free will that Western (incompatibilist) philosophers identify: the ability to do otherwise under identical conditions, and the ability to have one’s choices be up to oneself. Brent claims the criteria and abilities in that anthology are criteria for intentional action, but not all intentional actions are free. He also insists that Buddhism, ironically, cannot even accept intentional action, because, on his analysis, intentionality requires an agent, which Buddhism rejects. I have four responses: (i) Brent ignores the other half of the debate, compatibilism, in both Western and Buddhist philosophy, represented in the anthology by several contributors; (ii) the autonomy of Buddhist meditation virtuosos is titanic compared to Brent’s autonomy criteria, which latter are relatively mundane and facile, ...
This is my reply to Karin Meyers, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of An... more This is my reply to Karin Meyers, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," in this Symposium. Meyers generally focuses on exegesis of what Early Buddhists said, which reasonably constrains what we may think about them if we are Buddhists. I agree with and find much value in most of her astute analyses, here and elsewhere, so I restrict my reply here to where we disagree, or otherwise seem to be speaking past, or misunderstanding, each other. In this regard, I focus on three of her claims. Meyers argues that (1) Buddhist dependent origination is not determinism; (2) attempts at naturalizing Buddhism threaten to run afoul of her hermeneutics; and (3) I seem to err on both fronts. However, I have emphasized that I am not a determinist, and I am not as concerned with what Buddhists did say about causation and agency. As a philosopher, I am mainly concerned with what philosophers can say about them. 1 Philosophy Department, ...
Conclusions of the Early-Period Scholarship (2) In the first article in this series ("Earlie... more Conclusions of the Early-Period Scholarship (2) In the first article in this series ("Earlier") I examined the writings of early-period Buddhist scholars Story, Rahula, Gomez, and Kalupahana regarding the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with "determinism," the doctrine of universal lawful causation. These "early-period" scholars resist a straightforward equation of the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratTtya samutpada), which asserts the dependence of all conditioned/composite phenomena on previous or simultaneous impartite micro-phenomena, with either a "rigid" determinism or a "chaotic" indeterminism, opting for a "middle way" between both. Some hold that Hume's model of causation, as mere constant conjunction obtaining among pairs of contingent event types, provides a "middle way" for Buddhist compatibilism. (3) But Humean causation involves generalizations abou...
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