The campaign in East Africa is one of the lesser-known and understood theatres of the First World... more The campaign in East Africa is one of the lesser-known and understood theatres of the First World War. Strategically unimportant to the main war effort, East Africa has remained in the shadows of the much better known Western, Mesopotamian and Palestine Fronts. Despite this, the campaign lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 and covered a large portion of East Africa as well as drawing in the majority of its population. Scholarly works have been greatly outnumbered by popular accounts and the final two years, 1916 to 1918, remain vague and contradictory. Nevertheless, a great deal of valuable primary material exists in various archives and it is the aim of this dissertation to describe and analyse the military operations of this period. At the outbreak of war, the imperial powers in East Africa were unprepared for a major campaign. Although the colonies possessed little strategic value in themselves, the dynamics of imperial rivalry quickly generated armed conflict. The East African campaign evolved haphazardly from neutralising German wireless communications and naval facilities to a wildly over-ambitious plan to conquer the whole of the colony with scant forces. The British wanted to keep any potential spoils for themselves, but were also strongly influenced by the expansionist policies of South Africa, largely propounded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. By September 1916, the British forces, commanded by Smuts, had occupied the bulk of German East Africa with all the railways, towns and ports in their possession. However, he had failed to bring the German Schutztruppe to battle and it remained a powerful and well-motivated force. Furthermore, his reliance to manoeuvre and reluctance to fight battles led his troops ever-deeper into enemy territory and dependent on inadequate lines of communication. Smuts continued his advance until January 1917 when he left for the Imperial War Conference. His forces were in terrible condition and unfit for further offensive operations. He was succeeded by the British General Hoskins for a bare three months, but, who nevertheless instigated badly needed reforms and reorganisation. In May 1917, the South African, General van Deventer assumed command, an appointment that he would hold until the end of the war. Van Deventer continued to build on Hoskins's work while instigating an aggressive policy of fighting hard battles whenever possible, while concurrently trying to destroy German food supplies. These methods were continued throughout the remainder of 1917 and until November 1918 when the war ended with the Schutztruppe being pursued from Portuguese East Africa into Northern Rhodesia. For both sides, the campaign was dominated not by heavy fighting, but by the questions of health and supply. The levels of sickness, particularly malaria, were many times worse than other theatres and constantly hindered military operations. The provision and distribution of food and other supplies was an enormous problem that was only partially solved by the widespread use of motor vehicles and road construction.F or the British, relations with their Belgian and Portuguese allies were never smooth as imperial rivalries often created friction and misunderstanding. In the end, the East African campaign was one of mobility and evasion and quite unlike campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East.
The First World War began in East Africa in August 1914 and did not end until 13 November 1918. I... more The First World War began in East Africa in August 1914 and did not end until 13 November 1918. In its scale and impact, it was the largest conflict yet to take place on African soil. Four empires and their subject peoples were engaged in a conflict that ranged from modern Kenya in the north to Mozambique in the south. The campaign combined heroic human endeavour and terrible suffering, set in some of the most difficult terrain in the world. The troops had to cope with extremes that ranged from arid deserts to tropical jungles and formidable mountains, and almost always on inadequate rations. Yet the East African campaign has languished in undeserved obscurity over the years, with many people only vaguely aware of its course of events. Indeed, Humphrey Bogart’s famous film, The African Queen, inspired by an episode of the campaign, often provides its only lasting image. The Forgotten Front is the first full-scale history of this neglected campaign. Ross Anderson details the fighting and the strategic and political background to the war and the differing viewpoints of the principal protagonists.
On 6 November 1914, the landing of the Indian Army's 16th Infantry Brigade at Fao, in the Vilayet... more On 6 November 1914, the landing of the Indian Army's 16th Infantry Brigade at Fao, in the Vilayet of Basra in Mesopotamia initiated land hostilities between the British and the Ottoman empires. Part of the IEFD, these 4,700 soldiers, succeeded in their task of subduing the shore battery and garrison before moving up the Shatt-al-Arab riverway and latter occupying Basra. The Indian Army's performance in the Mesopotamian Campaign was heavily influenced by its recent past, notably the Kitchener reforms of 1904-1909, and official unwillingness to reconcile India's military means with Britain's strategic interests. One of the biggest impediments to the efficiency of the Indian Army in Mesopotamia was the shortage of British officers throughout the war. The IEFD started the campaign ill-prepared for modern warfare against a first-class enemy. It was fortunate in that the Ottoman troops opposing it until the Battle of Ctesiphon were second grade and poorly equipped.
The battle of Tanga, fought between 2 and 5 November 1914, has become one of the best-known event... more The battle of Tanga, fought between 2 and 5 November 1914, has become one of the best-known events of one of the more obscure campaigns of the First World War. Although dwarfed in scale by the huge battles being waged in Europe, Tanga was important as it marked the beginning of a colonial adventure that would ultimately last over four years and would involve much of East Africa. It was also an early example of the lack of consistency and thoroughness in British strategic planning that was to carry on through the failures at the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia. The battle also exposed major limitations in the existing cabinet system and in the machinery of providing military advice to the Government, including the need for the unified direction of operations world-wide. Finally, it underlined the lack of joint planning between the military services and weaknesses in the Indian Army’s operational readiness. All in all, Tanga was an unmitigated fiasco.
A synopsis of Professor George Shepperson's military career (1939-1945) that focusses on his war... more A synopsis of Professor George Shepperson's military career (1939-1945) that focusses on his wartime experiences in the 13th (Nyasaland) Battalion of the King's African Rifles (1943-1945) serving in East Africa, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India and Burma. It also covers his love of literature and African songs.
The entire special supplementary edition of the Society of Malawi (Vol 74, No3, 2021) as a tribute to Professor George (Sam) Shepperson CBE was published electronically as a Flip-Book at the following hyperlink: https://online.flipbuilder.com/spmg/fgbz/
A study of the challenges facing the Indian Army and its Expeditionary Force D (IEF D) during the... more A study of the challenges facing the Indian Army and its Expeditionary Force D (IEF D) during the course of the Mesopotamian Campaign, 1914-1918. Topics include pre-war readiness, logistics (transport, supply and medical), manpower including the supply of officers and the staff, with an assessment of the overall effectiveness of IEF D.
This is a preliminary paper to the published version which appeared as 'Logistics of the Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia: 1914-1918' in Kaushik Roy (ed) "The Indian Army in the Two World Wars" Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp 105-143.
The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little... more The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little attention despite the remarkable exploits of Major General Edward Northey and Norforce. In field command for two and a half years, he successfully led a multi-ethnic and polyglot force across some of the most difficult terrain of the war. Exerting strong leadership and overseeing detailed logistical planning, Northey was able to maintain an effective force that was consistently able to march and fight the German Schutztruppe under von Lettow-Vorbeck. In contrast to the main body of the British East African Force, Norforce maintained its combat effectiveness despite high levels of sickness and highly trying climatic conditions. Overall, Northey must be considered the outstanding British general of the East African Campaign while Norforce deserves full credit for its singular achievements.
The campaign in East Africa that lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 was quite unlike those ... more The campaign in East Africa that lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 was quite unlike those fought in Europe or the Middle East. Apart from the significant physical differences and the fact that British troops were usually in the minority, the East African Expeditionary Force had two South African officers as commanders-in-chief during the bulk of the active offensive operations. The first was Lieutenant General Jan Christiaan Smuts (February 1916 – January 1917), the noted politician, lawyer and thinker, while the second was Lieutenant General Sir Jacob (Jaap) Louis van Deventer (May 1917 - November 1918), an undeservedly forgotten. Although the two men had a long association in peace and war, their personalities, command style and ultimate achievements were very different. It is the aim of this article to examine the background to the war in East Africa, their tenure in the chief command, including the constraints under which they operated, and to assess their performance. http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/31-2-156
The campaign in East Africa is one of the lesser-known and understood theatres of the First World... more The campaign in East Africa is one of the lesser-known and understood theatres of the First World War. Strategically unimportant to the main war effort, East Africa has remained in the shadows of the much better known Western, Mesopotamian and Palestine Fronts. Despite this, the campaign lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 and covered a large portion of East Africa as well as drawing in the majority of its population. Scholarly works have been greatly outnumbered by popular accounts and the final two years, 1916 to 1918, remain vague and contradictory. Nevertheless, a great deal of valuable primary material exists in various archives and it is the aim of this dissertation to describe and analyse the military operations of this period. At the outbreak of war, the imperial powers in East Africa were unprepared for a major campaign. Although the colonies possessed little strategic value in themselves, the dynamics of imperial rivalry quickly generated armed conflict. The East African campaign evolved haphazardly from neutralising German wireless communications and naval facilities to a wildly over-ambitious plan to conquer the whole of the colony with scant forces. The British wanted to keep any potential spoils for themselves, but were also strongly influenced by the expansionist policies of South Africa, largely propounded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. By September 1916, the British forces, commanded by Smuts, had occupied the bulk of German East Africa with all the railways, towns and ports in their possession. However, he had failed to bring the German Schutztruppe to battle and it remained a powerful and well-motivated force. Furthermore, his reliance to manoeuvre and reluctance to fight battles led his troops ever-deeper into enemy territory and dependent on inadequate lines of communication. Smuts continued his advance until January 1917 when he left for the Imperial War Conference. His forces were in terrible condition and unfit for further offensive operations. He was succeeded by the British General Hoskins for a bare three months, but, who nevertheless instigated badly needed reforms and reorganisation. In May 1917, the South African, General van Deventer assumed command, an appointment that he would hold until the end of the war. Van Deventer continued to build on Hoskins's work while instigating an aggressive policy of fighting hard battles whenever possible, while concurrently trying to destroy German food supplies. These methods were continued throughout the remainder of 1917 and until November 1918 when the war ended with the Schutztruppe being pursued from Portuguese East Africa into Northern Rhodesia. For both sides, the campaign was dominated not by heavy fighting, but by the questions of health and supply. The levels of sickness, particularly malaria, were many times worse than other theatres and constantly hindered military operations. The provision and distribution of food and other supplies was an enormous problem that was only partially solved by the widespread use of motor vehicles and road construction.F or the British, relations with their Belgian and Portuguese allies were never smooth as imperial rivalries often created friction and misunderstanding. In the end, the East African campaign was one of mobility and evasion and quite unlike campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East.
The First World War began in East Africa in August 1914 and did not end until 13 November 1918. I... more The First World War began in East Africa in August 1914 and did not end until 13 November 1918. In its scale and impact, it was the largest conflict yet to take place on African soil. Four empires and their subject peoples were engaged in a conflict that ranged from modern Kenya in the north to Mozambique in the south. The campaign combined heroic human endeavour and terrible suffering, set in some of the most difficult terrain in the world. The troops had to cope with extremes that ranged from arid deserts to tropical jungles and formidable mountains, and almost always on inadequate rations. Yet the East African campaign has languished in undeserved obscurity over the years, with many people only vaguely aware of its course of events. Indeed, Humphrey Bogart’s famous film, The African Queen, inspired by an episode of the campaign, often provides its only lasting image. The Forgotten Front is the first full-scale history of this neglected campaign. Ross Anderson details the fighting and the strategic and political background to the war and the differing viewpoints of the principal protagonists.
On 6 November 1914, the landing of the Indian Army's 16th Infantry Brigade at Fao, in the Vilayet... more On 6 November 1914, the landing of the Indian Army's 16th Infantry Brigade at Fao, in the Vilayet of Basra in Mesopotamia initiated land hostilities between the British and the Ottoman empires. Part of the IEFD, these 4,700 soldiers, succeeded in their task of subduing the shore battery and garrison before moving up the Shatt-al-Arab riverway and latter occupying Basra. The Indian Army's performance in the Mesopotamian Campaign was heavily influenced by its recent past, notably the Kitchener reforms of 1904-1909, and official unwillingness to reconcile India's military means with Britain's strategic interests. One of the biggest impediments to the efficiency of the Indian Army in Mesopotamia was the shortage of British officers throughout the war. The IEFD started the campaign ill-prepared for modern warfare against a first-class enemy. It was fortunate in that the Ottoman troops opposing it until the Battle of Ctesiphon were second grade and poorly equipped.
The battle of Tanga, fought between 2 and 5 November 1914, has become one of the best-known event... more The battle of Tanga, fought between 2 and 5 November 1914, has become one of the best-known events of one of the more obscure campaigns of the First World War. Although dwarfed in scale by the huge battles being waged in Europe, Tanga was important as it marked the beginning of a colonial adventure that would ultimately last over four years and would involve much of East Africa. It was also an early example of the lack of consistency and thoroughness in British strategic planning that was to carry on through the failures at the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia. The battle also exposed major limitations in the existing cabinet system and in the machinery of providing military advice to the Government, including the need for the unified direction of operations world-wide. Finally, it underlined the lack of joint planning between the military services and weaknesses in the Indian Army’s operational readiness. All in all, Tanga was an unmitigated fiasco.
A synopsis of Professor George Shepperson's military career (1939-1945) that focusses on his war... more A synopsis of Professor George Shepperson's military career (1939-1945) that focusses on his wartime experiences in the 13th (Nyasaland) Battalion of the King's African Rifles (1943-1945) serving in East Africa, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India and Burma. It also covers his love of literature and African songs.
The entire special supplementary edition of the Society of Malawi (Vol 74, No3, 2021) as a tribute to Professor George (Sam) Shepperson CBE was published electronically as a Flip-Book at the following hyperlink: https://online.flipbuilder.com/spmg/fgbz/
A study of the challenges facing the Indian Army and its Expeditionary Force D (IEF D) during the... more A study of the challenges facing the Indian Army and its Expeditionary Force D (IEF D) during the course of the Mesopotamian Campaign, 1914-1918. Topics include pre-war readiness, logistics (transport, supply and medical), manpower including the supply of officers and the staff, with an assessment of the overall effectiveness of IEF D.
This is a preliminary paper to the published version which appeared as 'Logistics of the Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia: 1914-1918' in Kaushik Roy (ed) "The Indian Army in the Two World Wars" Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp 105-143.
The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little... more The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little attention despite the remarkable exploits of Major General Edward Northey and Norforce. In field command for two and a half years, he successfully led a multi-ethnic and polyglot force across some of the most difficult terrain of the war. Exerting strong leadership and overseeing detailed logistical planning, Northey was able to maintain an effective force that was consistently able to march and fight the German Schutztruppe under von Lettow-Vorbeck. In contrast to the main body of the British East African Force, Norforce maintained its combat effectiveness despite high levels of sickness and highly trying climatic conditions. Overall, Northey must be considered the outstanding British general of the East African Campaign while Norforce deserves full credit for its singular achievements.
The campaign in East Africa that lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 was quite unlike those ... more The campaign in East Africa that lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 was quite unlike those fought in Europe or the Middle East. Apart from the significant physical differences and the fact that British troops were usually in the minority, the East African Expeditionary Force had two South African officers as commanders-in-chief during the bulk of the active offensive operations. The first was Lieutenant General Jan Christiaan Smuts (February 1916 – January 1917), the noted politician, lawyer and thinker, while the second was Lieutenant General Sir Jacob (Jaap) Louis van Deventer (May 1917 - November 1918), an undeservedly forgotten. Although the two men had a long association in peace and war, their personalities, command style and ultimate achievements were very different. It is the aim of this article to examine the background to the war in East Africa, their tenure in the chief command, including the constraints under which they operated, and to assess their performance. http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/31-2-156
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its population. Scholarly works have been greatly outnumbered by popular accounts and the final two years, 1916 to 1918, remain vague and contradictory. Nevertheless, a great deal of valuable primary material exists in various archives and it is the aim of this dissertation to describe and analyse the military operations of this period. At the outbreak of war, the imperial powers in East Africa were unprepared for a major campaign. Although the colonies possessed little strategic value in themselves, the dynamics of imperial rivalry quickly generated armed conflict. The East African campaign evolved haphazardly from neutralising German wireless communications and naval facilities to a wildly over-ambitious plan to conquer the whole of the colony with scant forces. The British wanted to keep any potential spoils for themselves, but were also strongly influenced by the expansionist policies of South Africa, largely
propounded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. By September 1916, the British forces, commanded by Smuts, had occupied the bulk of German East Africa with all the railways, towns and ports in their possession. However, he had failed to bring the German Schutztruppe to battle and it remained a powerful and well-motivated force. Furthermore, his reliance to manoeuvre and reluctance to fight battles led his troops ever-deeper into enemy territory and dependent on inadequate lines of communication. Smuts continued his advance until January 1917 when he left for the Imperial War Conference. His forces were in terrible condition and unfit for further offensive operations. He was succeeded by the British General Hoskins for a bare three months, but, who nevertheless instigated badly needed reforms and reorganisation. In May 1917, the South African, General van Deventer assumed command, an appointment that he would hold until the end of the war. Van Deventer continued to build on Hoskins's work while instigating an aggressive policy of fighting hard battles whenever possible, while concurrently trying to destroy German food supplies. These methods were continued throughout the remainder of 1917 and until November 1918 when the war ended with the Schutztruppe being pursued from Portuguese East Africa into Northern Rhodesia. For both sides, the campaign was dominated not by heavy fighting, but by the questions of health and supply. The levels of sickness, particularly malaria, were many times worse than other theatres and constantly hindered military operations. The provision and distribution of food and other supplies was an enormous problem that was only partially solved by the widespread use of motor vehicles and road construction.F or the British, relations with their Belgian and Portuguese allies were never smooth as imperial rivalries often created friction and misunderstanding. In the end, the East African campaign was one of mobility and evasion and quite unlike campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East.
that would ultimately last over four years and would involve much of East Africa. It was also an early example of the lack of consistency and thoroughness in British strategic planning that was to carry on through the failures at the Dardanelles and
Mesopotamia. The battle also exposed major limitations in the existing cabinet system and in the machinery of providing military advice to the Government, including the need for the unified direction of operations world-wide. Finally, it
underlined the lack of joint planning between the military services and weaknesses in the Indian Army’s operational readiness. All in all, Tanga was an unmitigated fiasco.
The entire special supplementary edition of the Society of Malawi (Vol 74, No3, 2021) as a tribute to Professor George (Sam) Shepperson CBE was published electronically as a Flip-Book at the following hyperlink:
https://online.flipbuilder.com/spmg/fgbz/
Details are on JSTOR at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26978896
This is a preliminary paper to the published version which appeared as 'Logistics of the Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia: 1914-1918' in Kaushik Roy (ed) "The Indian Army in the Two World Wars" Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp 105-143.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/31-2-156
its population. Scholarly works have been greatly outnumbered by popular accounts and the final two years, 1916 to 1918, remain vague and contradictory. Nevertheless, a great deal of valuable primary material exists in various archives and it is the aim of this dissertation to describe and analyse the military operations of this period. At the outbreak of war, the imperial powers in East Africa were unprepared for a major campaign. Although the colonies possessed little strategic value in themselves, the dynamics of imperial rivalry quickly generated armed conflict. The East African campaign evolved haphazardly from neutralising German wireless communications and naval facilities to a wildly over-ambitious plan to conquer the whole of the colony with scant forces. The British wanted to keep any potential spoils for themselves, but were also strongly influenced by the expansionist policies of South Africa, largely
propounded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. By September 1916, the British forces, commanded by Smuts, had occupied the bulk of German East Africa with all the railways, towns and ports in their possession. However, he had failed to bring the German Schutztruppe to battle and it remained a powerful and well-motivated force. Furthermore, his reliance to manoeuvre and reluctance to fight battles led his troops ever-deeper into enemy territory and dependent on inadequate lines of communication. Smuts continued his advance until January 1917 when he left for the Imperial War Conference. His forces were in terrible condition and unfit for further offensive operations. He was succeeded by the British General Hoskins for a bare three months, but, who nevertheless instigated badly needed reforms and reorganisation. In May 1917, the South African, General van Deventer assumed command, an appointment that he would hold until the end of the war. Van Deventer continued to build on Hoskins's work while instigating an aggressive policy of fighting hard battles whenever possible, while concurrently trying to destroy German food supplies. These methods were continued throughout the remainder of 1917 and until November 1918 when the war ended with the Schutztruppe being pursued from Portuguese East Africa into Northern Rhodesia. For both sides, the campaign was dominated not by heavy fighting, but by the questions of health and supply. The levels of sickness, particularly malaria, were many times worse than other theatres and constantly hindered military operations. The provision and distribution of food and other supplies was an enormous problem that was only partially solved by the widespread use of motor vehicles and road construction.F or the British, relations with their Belgian and Portuguese allies were never smooth as imperial rivalries often created friction and misunderstanding. In the end, the East African campaign was one of mobility and evasion and quite unlike campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East.
that would ultimately last over four years and would involve much of East Africa. It was also an early example of the lack of consistency and thoroughness in British strategic planning that was to carry on through the failures at the Dardanelles and
Mesopotamia. The battle also exposed major limitations in the existing cabinet system and in the machinery of providing military advice to the Government, including the need for the unified direction of operations world-wide. Finally, it
underlined the lack of joint planning between the military services and weaknesses in the Indian Army’s operational readiness. All in all, Tanga was an unmitigated fiasco.
The entire special supplementary edition of the Society of Malawi (Vol 74, No3, 2021) as a tribute to Professor George (Sam) Shepperson CBE was published electronically as a Flip-Book at the following hyperlink:
https://online.flipbuilder.com/spmg/fgbz/
Details are on JSTOR at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26978896
This is a preliminary paper to the published version which appeared as 'Logistics of the Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia: 1914-1918' in Kaushik Roy (ed) "The Indian Army in the Two World Wars" Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp 105-143.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/31-2-156