Santiago Legarre
Santiago Legarre (born May 24, 1968 in Buenos Aires, Argentina) is an Argentine intellectual and a professor of law at Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA).
Legarre received his law degree from (UCA) in 1992 and subsequently earned a Master of Studies in Legal Research from Oxford University and a PhD from Universidad de Buenos Aires. While at Oxford he wrote a dissertation titled "The Historical Background of the Police Power", published in 2007 by the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law.
After Law School he clerked for the Argentine Supreme Court. He then started his career in law teaching at Universidad Austral in 1995. Legarre moved to UCA in 2007. Since 2012 he is also a visiting professor at the University of Notre Dame Law School (Indiana) and at Strathmore Law School (Kenya), where he developed a teaching system of expressing knowledge through art. In 2016 he lectured at Harvard Law School, invited by the American Constitution Society; and at Cornell Law School, where he was part of the Berger International Speakers Series. In 2017 he presented on natural law and constitutional law for the Eric Voegelin Institute at Louisiana State University.
Legarre's academic interests include constitutional law and jurisprudence. He also teaches a workshop on creative writing for law students. Together with a group of students he founded in 2006 the online magazine Sed Contra and was the first editor-in-chief. The magazine is now in its 22nd issue and has published articles by more than 200 law students.
Legarre is an independent researcher at CONICET, the Argentine National Council for Research. He writes free lance for La Nación, a leading Argentine newspaper.
Legarre received his law degree from (UCA) in 1992 and subsequently earned a Master of Studies in Legal Research from Oxford University and a PhD from Universidad de Buenos Aires. While at Oxford he wrote a dissertation titled "The Historical Background of the Police Power", published in 2007 by the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law.
After Law School he clerked for the Argentine Supreme Court. He then started his career in law teaching at Universidad Austral in 1995. Legarre moved to UCA in 2007. Since 2012 he is also a visiting professor at the University of Notre Dame Law School (Indiana) and at Strathmore Law School (Kenya), where he developed a teaching system of expressing knowledge through art. In 2016 he lectured at Harvard Law School, invited by the American Constitution Society; and at Cornell Law School, where he was part of the Berger International Speakers Series. In 2017 he presented on natural law and constitutional law for the Eric Voegelin Institute at Louisiana State University.
Legarre's academic interests include constitutional law and jurisprudence. He also teaches a workshop on creative writing for law students. Together with a group of students he founded in 2006 the online magazine Sed Contra and was the first editor-in-chief. The magazine is now in its 22nd issue and has published articles by more than 200 law students.
Legarre is an independent researcher at CONICET, the Argentine National Council for Research. He writes free lance for La Nación, a leading Argentine newspaper.
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In this Article, we examine a peculiar line of Supreme Court cases in the free speech context that bring the problem into focus. In the so-called secondary effects cases, the Justices gradually moved away from accepting public morality arguments in support of state restrictions on adult businesses. In place of public morality, the Court began to retrain its focus on the social ills attendant to the activity in question, or what it termed the “secondary effects” of such conduct. Rather than decide whether the regulated activity is immoral, and thus within the legitimate regulatory sweep of the police power as traditionally conceived, the Court instead looked to whether the state could show that its restriction reduced deleterious secondary effects associated with the activity.
This development might have appeared desirable insofar as it would permit courts to rest their rulings on objective facts rather than wrestle with matters of opinion and moral sentiment. To the contrary, we argue, secondary effects arguments rely on moral reasoning — whether articulated or not — to the same extent as public morality arguments. The Court’s attempt in the secondary effects cases to avoid engaging in moral reasoning in reality demonstrates its indispensability.
In this Article, we examine a peculiar line of Supreme Court cases in the free speech context that bring the problem into focus. In the so-called secondary effects cases, the Justices gradually moved away from accepting public morality arguments in support of state restrictions on adult businesses. In place of public morality, the Court began to retrain its focus on the social ills attendant to the activity in question, or what it termed the “secondary effects” of such conduct. Rather than decide whether the regulated activity is immoral, and thus within the legitimate regulatory sweep of the police power as traditionally conceived, the Court instead looked to whether the state could show that its restriction reduced deleterious secondary effects associated with the activity.
This development might have appeared desirable insofar as it would permit courts to rest their rulings on objective facts rather than wrestle with matters of opinion and moral sentiment. To the contrary, we argue, secondary effects arguments rely on moral reasoning — whether articulated or not — to the same extent as public morality arguments. The Court’s attempt in the secondary effects cases to avoid engaging in moral reasoning in reality demonstrates its indispensability.