Ukraine has been an active participant in NATO partnership activities almost since the country be... more Ukraine has been an active participant in NATO partnership activities almost since the country became independent in 1991. The intensity of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO increased markedly throughout the 1990s, and even more after Ukraine’s announcement in June 2003 of its ambition for NATO membership. While the motives behind both the partnership and membership policies are numerous and complex, the main argument of this chapter is that Ukraine’s desire to build a strong European identity is the most important. Thus, in terms of the scholarly debate on the sources of states’ foreign policies, this study provides empirical evidence in support of the constructivist claim that states’ identities have significant explanatory power (on this claim, see for example Wendt, 1999, especially pp. 231–3; Katzenstein, 1996, chapters 2, 8, 9, 10 and 11; Ashizawa, 2008, pp. 571–98; Checkel, 1993, pp. 271–300).
ABSTRACT In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add ... more ABSTRACT In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add up, this article discusses whether Russian private military companies have become low-cost tools to restore Russian great power status. Our findings suggest that whenever these companies are used in a ‘power as outcome’ way, they appear less successful at adding great power status on the cheap and less useful at elite enrichment. In contrast, PMCs seem well suited to make power contributions, and for a low cost, in a ‘power as prestige’ way. In these settings they are also more suitable instruments for informal elite earnings.
... Therefore, the CES may not make any fundamental changes in this respect. Although big busines... more ... Therefore, the CES may not make any fundamental changes in this respect. Although big business in Ukraine was built on close relations with Moscow, some of Ukraine's established business magnates envision a different future. Accord-ing to Julia Mostovaia, ...
ABSTRACT Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country’s prominent role in instigating and ... more ABSTRACT Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country’s prominent role in instigating and supporting an anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, surprised the world. This study seeks to explain Russian behaviour in these two cases. Because of the recent nature of events, there is so far not an abundance of reliable sources. Thus, some of the findings in this study should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. It is argued that dominating Russian axioms about Russians and Ukrainian being one people; the West using popular uprisings as a means of war against unwanted regimes; and Western exploitation of Russian weakness for 20 years; all constitute necessary preconditions for the Russian behaviour. However, the explanation is not complete without considerations on the dominant position of people with background from the Federalnaia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti in the inner decision-making circle, and on Putin’s risk-taking, improvisation and emotions.
IN AUGUST 2009, Russia celebrated the one-year anniversary of its military campaign in Georgia. I... more IN AUGUST 2009, Russia celebrated the one-year anniversary of its military campaign in Georgia. In the Kremlin's view, the war was a demonstration ofthe Russian armed forces' renewed ability to fight conventional wars. Independent observers have also partly shared that point of view. The Russian president has promised that the lessons drawn from the conflict will lead to changed priorities in arms purchases. Inspired by the lessons ofthe war, the Defense Ministry promised additional funds for the Russian armed forces and proposed changing its structure from division- to brigade-sized units to improve the armed forces' ability to fight small wars, such as the one with Georgia.1 This article summarizes the domestic Russian debate and draws some preliminary conclusions about the Russian armed forces. The Ground Offensive in South Ossetia From the Russian military's point of view, the most successful part ofthe campaign in South Ossetia was the performance ofthe Russian ground forces in expelling Georgians from the area. The degree of success, however, is relative. How impressive the performance ofthe Russian ground troops looks depends on the size of Russian numerical superiority in the conflict. Early estimates suggest there were between 15,000 and 25,000 on the Georgian side and between 20,000 and 30,000 on the Russian side. About 3,000 South Ossetian troops and 9,000 Abkhazian troops are included in the Russian figures.2 If those figures are true, one could argue that the Russian numerical advantage was significant but not decisive. However, some claim that the number of troops on the Russian side has been severely underestimated. Andrei Illarionov, former economic adviser to Vladimir Putin and now a Russian opposition figure, claims that Russia might have had up to three times the number of troops Georgia had. According to Illarionov, most independent Russian experts now think there were at least 40,000 Russian, Abkhazian, and North Ossetian troops in theater, and that an additional 40,000 Russian troops were mobilized across the border in Russia.' If these higher estimates are true, the accomplishments of the Russian ground offensive look less impressive than they initially did. Russian equipment was either similar or inferior to Georgian equipment; Russia had the most equipment plus reserve stocks. In addition, the Russian forces' fighting ability was a decisive element. In particular, the coordination between artillery and infantry worked well.4 This must be an encouraging sign for Russian political and military leaders, and goes some way toward justifying Russian president Dmitry Medvedev's claim that the operations in Georgia demonstrated the renewed quality of the Russian military. Clearly, Russia's ability to conduct and execute large and complicated military operations has survived the difficult 1 990s. According to U.S. military personnel who trained the Georgians, one of the major reasons for the Russian victory was that the Georgian forces trained at the tactical level, but underwent only limited reorganization and training at the operational and strategic levels. The Georgian forces had few well-educated, trained officers at higher levels. ^ Accounts of Georgia's performance in the conflict describe declining professionalism in higher echelons. Reports from the battlefield tell of Georgian soldiers who fought well, but within an increasingly chaotic organization.6 The same was not the case for the Russian forces. However, one should not rush to conclude that the ongoing professionalization ofthe Russian army has become a success. Several sources claim that detachments from the airborne troops and special forces carried out the brunt ofthe fighting on the ground.7 Thus, one could argue that the land campaign in South Ossetia demonstrated that the contract infantry (kontraktniky) is far from battle ready. One Russian commentator compared the use of airborne troops and special forces in traditional infantry roles to hammering a nail with an expensive microscope rather than with a regular hammer. …
Ukraine has been an active participant in NATO partnership activities almost since the country be... more Ukraine has been an active participant in NATO partnership activities almost since the country became independent in 1991. The intensity of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO increased markedly throughout the 1990s, and even more after Ukraine’s announcement in June 2003 of its ambition for NATO membership. While the motives behind both the partnership and membership policies are numerous and complex, the main argument of this chapter is that Ukraine’s desire to build a strong European identity is the most important. Thus, in terms of the scholarly debate on the sources of states’ foreign policies, this study provides empirical evidence in support of the constructivist claim that states’ identities have significant explanatory power (on this claim, see for example Wendt, 1999, especially pp. 231–3; Katzenstein, 1996, chapters 2, 8, 9, 10 and 11; Ashizawa, 2008, pp. 571–98; Checkel, 1993, pp. 271–300).
ABSTRACT In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add ... more ABSTRACT In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add up, this article discusses whether Russian private military companies have become low-cost tools to restore Russian great power status. Our findings suggest that whenever these companies are used in a ‘power as outcome’ way, they appear less successful at adding great power status on the cheap and less useful at elite enrichment. In contrast, PMCs seem well suited to make power contributions, and for a low cost, in a ‘power as prestige’ way. In these settings they are also more suitable instruments for informal elite earnings.
... Therefore, the CES may not make any fundamental changes in this respect. Although big busines... more ... Therefore, the CES may not make any fundamental changes in this respect. Although big business in Ukraine was built on close relations with Moscow, some of Ukraine's established business magnates envision a different future. Accord-ing to Julia Mostovaia, ...
ABSTRACT Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country’s prominent role in instigating and ... more ABSTRACT Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country’s prominent role in instigating and supporting an anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, surprised the world. This study seeks to explain Russian behaviour in these two cases. Because of the recent nature of events, there is so far not an abundance of reliable sources. Thus, some of the findings in this study should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. It is argued that dominating Russian axioms about Russians and Ukrainian being one people; the West using popular uprisings as a means of war against unwanted regimes; and Western exploitation of Russian weakness for 20 years; all constitute necessary preconditions for the Russian behaviour. However, the explanation is not complete without considerations on the dominant position of people with background from the Federalnaia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti in the inner decision-making circle, and on Putin’s risk-taking, improvisation and emotions.
IN AUGUST 2009, Russia celebrated the one-year anniversary of its military campaign in Georgia. I... more IN AUGUST 2009, Russia celebrated the one-year anniversary of its military campaign in Georgia. In the Kremlin's view, the war was a demonstration ofthe Russian armed forces' renewed ability to fight conventional wars. Independent observers have also partly shared that point of view. The Russian president has promised that the lessons drawn from the conflict will lead to changed priorities in arms purchases. Inspired by the lessons ofthe war, the Defense Ministry promised additional funds for the Russian armed forces and proposed changing its structure from division- to brigade-sized units to improve the armed forces' ability to fight small wars, such as the one with Georgia.1 This article summarizes the domestic Russian debate and draws some preliminary conclusions about the Russian armed forces. The Ground Offensive in South Ossetia From the Russian military's point of view, the most successful part ofthe campaign in South Ossetia was the performance ofthe Russian ground forces in expelling Georgians from the area. The degree of success, however, is relative. How impressive the performance ofthe Russian ground troops looks depends on the size of Russian numerical superiority in the conflict. Early estimates suggest there were between 15,000 and 25,000 on the Georgian side and between 20,000 and 30,000 on the Russian side. About 3,000 South Ossetian troops and 9,000 Abkhazian troops are included in the Russian figures.2 If those figures are true, one could argue that the Russian numerical advantage was significant but not decisive. However, some claim that the number of troops on the Russian side has been severely underestimated. Andrei Illarionov, former economic adviser to Vladimir Putin and now a Russian opposition figure, claims that Russia might have had up to three times the number of troops Georgia had. According to Illarionov, most independent Russian experts now think there were at least 40,000 Russian, Abkhazian, and North Ossetian troops in theater, and that an additional 40,000 Russian troops were mobilized across the border in Russia.' If these higher estimates are true, the accomplishments of the Russian ground offensive look less impressive than they initially did. Russian equipment was either similar or inferior to Georgian equipment; Russia had the most equipment plus reserve stocks. In addition, the Russian forces' fighting ability was a decisive element. In particular, the coordination between artillery and infantry worked well.4 This must be an encouraging sign for Russian political and military leaders, and goes some way toward justifying Russian president Dmitry Medvedev's claim that the operations in Georgia demonstrated the renewed quality of the Russian military. Clearly, Russia's ability to conduct and execute large and complicated military operations has survived the difficult 1 990s. According to U.S. military personnel who trained the Georgians, one of the major reasons for the Russian victory was that the Georgian forces trained at the tactical level, but underwent only limited reorganization and training at the operational and strategic levels. The Georgian forces had few well-educated, trained officers at higher levels. ^ Accounts of Georgia's performance in the conflict describe declining professionalism in higher echelons. Reports from the battlefield tell of Georgian soldiers who fought well, but within an increasingly chaotic organization.6 The same was not the case for the Russian forces. However, one should not rush to conclude that the ongoing professionalization ofthe Russian army has become a success. Several sources claim that detachments from the airborne troops and special forces carried out the brunt ofthe fighting on the ground.7 Thus, one could argue that the land campaign in South Ossetia demonstrated that the contract infantry (kontraktniky) is far from battle ready. One Russian commentator compared the use of airborne troops and special forces in traditional infantry roles to hammering a nail with an expensive microscope rather than with a regular hammer. …
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