Theories of justice in the spirit of Harsanyi and Rawls argue that fair-minded people should aspi... more Theories of justice in the spirit of Harsanyi and Rawls argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society — that is, for themselves and for others — as if in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social and economic positions in society. While the original position is a purely hypothetical situation, developed as a thought experiment, the main result of this paper is that (under certain assumptions) prefer-ences — hence choices — behind the veil of ignorance are determined by preferences in front of the veil of ignorance. This linkage between preferences behind and in front of the veil of ignorance has implica-tions for distributive theories of justice and for theories of choice. ∗We are grateful to Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale and Daniel Markovitz for helpful conversations, and to seminar audiences at Bocconi, Brown, Caltech, Columbia, EUI,
We study sequential votes on proposals in two-period environments. If the first proposal is rejec... more We study sequential votes on proposals in two-period environments. If the first proposal is rejected, a second proposal is made; if both proposals are rejected, the status quo prevails. We use a 2x2 design that distinguishes the environments. Voters can be näıve or sophisticated; the electorate in the second period can be the same as in the first period or different. A risk-neutral agenda Setter has incomplete information about Voter preferences. Voters have quadratic loss. We identify environments with policy adjustment (different proposals in the two periods) and environments with no policy adjustment (identical proposals in the two periods). We identify environments where the Setter learns from a rejection and uses the information to tailor the second period proposal. Importantly, sophistication often limits, or entirely obviates, the Setter’s ability to exploit the opportunity to make two proposals. Results complement the work of Romer and Rosenthal (1979) on näıve Voters.
This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on economic outcomes of individualism (ti... more This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on economic outcomes of individualism (time spent working alone) and collectivism (complementary time spent working with others) in different societies during the Malthusian/Agricultural Era (after the Neolithic Age and before the Industrial Revolution). The model is driven by three forces: a greater degree of collectivism provides a higher safety net for low quality workers, a greater degree of individualism allows high quality workers to leave larger bequests, a larger population creates more congestion and lowers productivity. Although these forces seem simple, they interact in a very complicated way. The predictions of the model suggest that a greater degree of individualism leads to greater per capita income and to greater income inequality. Some historical evidence is consistent with these predictions.
This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on the economic outcomes in different soc... more This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on the economic outcomes in different societies during the Malthusian Era of individualism (time spent working alone) and collectivism (complementary time spent working with others). The model is driven by opposing forces: a greater degree of collectivism provides a higher safety net for low quality workers but a greater degree of individualism allows high quality workers to leave larger bequests. The model suggests that more individualistic societies display smaller populations, greater per capita income and greater income inequality. Some (limited) historical evidence is consistent with these predictions.
Theories of justice in the spirit of Harsanyi and Rawls argue that fair-minded people should aspi... more Theories of justice in the spirit of Harsanyi and Rawls argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society — that is, for themselves and for others — as if in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social and economic positions in society. While the original position is a purely hypothetical situation, developed as a thought experiment, the main result of this paper is that (under certain assumptions) prefer-ences — hence choices — behind the veil of ignorance are determined by preferences in front of the veil of ignorance. This linkage between preferences behind and in front of the veil of ignorance has implica-tions for distributive theories of justice and for theories of choice. ∗We are grateful to Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale and Daniel Markovitz for helpful conversations, and to seminar audiences at Bocconi, Brown, Caltech, Columbia, EUI,
We study sequential votes on proposals in two-period environments. If the first proposal is rejec... more We study sequential votes on proposals in two-period environments. If the first proposal is rejected, a second proposal is made; if both proposals are rejected, the status quo prevails. We use a 2x2 design that distinguishes the environments. Voters can be näıve or sophisticated; the electorate in the second period can be the same as in the first period or different. A risk-neutral agenda Setter has incomplete information about Voter preferences. Voters have quadratic loss. We identify environments with policy adjustment (different proposals in the two periods) and environments with no policy adjustment (identical proposals in the two periods). We identify environments where the Setter learns from a rejection and uses the information to tailor the second period proposal. Importantly, sophistication often limits, or entirely obviates, the Setter’s ability to exploit the opportunity to make two proposals. Results complement the work of Romer and Rosenthal (1979) on näıve Voters.
This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on economic outcomes of individualism (ti... more This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on economic outcomes of individualism (time spent working alone) and collectivism (complementary time spent working with others) in different societies during the Malthusian/Agricultural Era (after the Neolithic Age and before the Industrial Revolution). The model is driven by three forces: a greater degree of collectivism provides a higher safety net for low quality workers, a greater degree of individualism allows high quality workers to leave larger bequests, a larger population creates more congestion and lowers productivity. Although these forces seem simple, they interact in a very complicated way. The predictions of the model suggest that a greater degree of individualism leads to greater per capita income and to greater income inequality. Some historical evidence is consistent with these predictions.
This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on the economic outcomes in different soc... more This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on the economic outcomes in different societies during the Malthusian Era of individualism (time spent working alone) and collectivism (complementary time spent working with others). The model is driven by opposing forces: a greater degree of collectivism provides a higher safety net for low quality workers but a greater degree of individualism allows high quality workers to leave larger bequests. The model suggests that more individualistic societies display smaller populations, greater per capita income and greater income inequality. Some (limited) historical evidence is consistent with these predictions.
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Papers by William Zame