Papers by alberto emiliani
This was an invited paper at a conference in Cambridge, called "von Wright and Wittgenstein in Cambridge". I never published it. I tried once with the Philosophical Review but they rejected it and I didn't bother to try others. Yet, since it was received fairly well by the people at the conferenc..., 2017
If a patient affected by a retinal disease complains about a feeling of uneasiness at the centre ... more If a patient affected by a retinal disease complains about a feeling of uneasiness at the centre of her visual field, she might be blamed for a conceptual mistake, on the grounds that feelings and visual contents belong to sharply distinct categories. However, such a sharp distinction is closely related to the thesis that visual contents are to be regarded as peculiar objects within a subject's consciousness - which should be viewed critically. A compelling line of thought originating in Wittgenstein's investigations leads to a non-pictorial approach to visual contents, based on the collapse of a notion of an inner observational space. In this light, the patient's claim turns out to be reasonable and even illuminating. A deep connection between our inner life and our environment comes into focus: a deep form of involvement that is itself no object for neutral observation but only emerges in the course of the inquiry.
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Fred Stoutland (ed.), Philosophical Probings, Automatic Press, 2009
Norm and Action marks a turning point in the development of von Wright's conception of the nature... more Norm and Action marks a turning point in the development of von Wright's conception of the nature and aims of deontic logic: two very different approaches coexist in it, one of which subsequently defeated and superseded the other. My aim is to examine the conflict between these approaches as well as the problems from which they arise. As an Appendix, I reproduce a letter from von Wright about a previous version of this paper.
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Niiniluoto and Wallgren (eds.), On the Human Condition, Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 93, 2017
I discuss the distinction between personal and impersonal aspects. What is described by focussing... more I discuss the distinction between personal and impersonal aspects. What is described by focussing on a personal aspect — someone being in pain, one raising one's arm — can be impersonally described in terms of physical processes. However a personal aspect, which is as real as any physical one, only becomes visible if we perform a turn from the position of an observer of processes to the position of a participant that is actively engaged with our natural and cultural environment. Such a turn does not detract from the cognitive value of a description of personal aspects; it is instead epistemically and logically fundamental.
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Aho and Pietarinen (eds.), Truth and Games, Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 78, 2006
The topic of the present paper is Wittgenstein's conception of logical form in his Tractatus Logi... more The topic of the present paper is Wittgenstein's conception of logical form in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). My main contention is that logical form is there regarded as the possibility of a meaningful nexus of symbols, which intrinsically shows the possibility of a state of affairs. The reading I am putting forth is neither 'traditional' nor 'resolutist' but it embodies central insights of both. This study includes revised parts from a previous work of mine which have been rewritten in accordance with the development of my views.
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Wittgenstein Today, Il Poligrafo, 2004
According to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the sense of a proposition is in its "connection" with pos... more According to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the sense of a proposition is in its "connection" with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. This paper focus on semantic agreement as a basic notion, on the way the insights concerning it are amplified in Wittgenstein's representational conception of sense and on the rejection of a reductionist approach to thought and sense.
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Philosophical Essays In Memoriam Georg Henrik von Wright, Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 77, 2005
The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the main lines of thought in von Wright's last book... more The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the main lines of thought in von Wright's last book, In the Shadow of Descartes. The conceptual dualism of Explanation and Understanding is developed, its main difficulties are tackled with.
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This paper is not devoted to analyzing Wittgenstein´s claims about machine-thought but to clarify... more This paper is not devoted to analyzing Wittgenstein´s claims about machine-thought but to clarifying and expanding an argument of Wittgenstein´s about the non-mechanicity of thought. According to my reading of Zettel 608, such a feature of thought should not be merely accounted to the contrary, it should be argued for by showing that an analysis of our brains does not provide any account of what thought consists in (a conceptual case). The point is quite radical: a neural structure does not define a concept, but a concept defines what neural (or otherwise physical) structures would answer to it. Concepts are therefore not mere "emergent properties" of neural frameworks-unless by "emergent property" we mean a property which does not proceed from its underlying substratum. On these grounds, there is no need for thought to be mechanicall at all, for the order ot thought has not to answer to a physical (or even to micro-logical) order which is mechanical in nature. T...
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Philosophical Investigations, Jul 1, 2003
My comparison of a traditional approach to TLP with a New Wittgensteinian approach leads to the f... more My comparison of a traditional approach to TLP with a New Wittgensteinian approach leads to the following conclusion.
The aim of TLP is not to show its own absurdity, but to be recognized as an attempt to say something which can only be shown. It is true that any formulation of Wittgenstein's basic insights eventually betrays them. But to grasp the nonsensical nature of the propositions of TLP is to take the final step; it is a step on them, over them. We recognize that a sentence trying to describe the possibility that symbols combine into a meaningful whole is indeed nonsensical, because it treats a possibility and a meaningful nexus as elements of a representation, and so, as mythological objects. It is a merely negative nonsense (in the sense that is a mere lack of sense, not a sort of expressive nonsense). Yet, there is a positive aspect in such a recognition, because it shows us the ineffable nature of the meaningful connection into a sinnvoller Satz, and so, logical form.
A mythological object disappears when form shows itself, and form shows itself when the mythological object disappears. This is an important way in which a proposition may illuminate by being recognized as nonsensical.
For, it is only as makers of sense, not as hypothetical describers, that we can see what shows itself in language.
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Normativita Fatti Valori, 2003
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The Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy / Die Aufgaben der Philosophie in der Gegenwart, 1986
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Books by alberto emiliani
Helsingin Ylipiston Filosofian Laitoksen Julkaisuja, 1999
Wittgenstein's Tractatus is pervaded by the insight that a meaningful proposition is internally r... more Wittgenstein's Tractatus is pervaded by the insight that a meaningful proposition is internally related to a state of affairs. I try to elucidate this insight, to shed light on its roots and to point out its importance in the compact network of the Tractatus, especially as regards the notions of sense, possibility and logical form. I also try to show how crucial aspects of the insight survive the later Wittgenstein's radical criticisms of the Tractatus
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Papers by alberto emiliani
The aim of TLP is not to show its own absurdity, but to be recognized as an attempt to say something which can only be shown. It is true that any formulation of Wittgenstein's basic insights eventually betrays them. But to grasp the nonsensical nature of the propositions of TLP is to take the final step; it is a step on them, over them. We recognize that a sentence trying to describe the possibility that symbols combine into a meaningful whole is indeed nonsensical, because it treats a possibility and a meaningful nexus as elements of a representation, and so, as mythological objects. It is a merely negative nonsense (in the sense that is a mere lack of sense, not a sort of expressive nonsense). Yet, there is a positive aspect in such a recognition, because it shows us the ineffable nature of the meaningful connection into a sinnvoller Satz, and so, logical form.
A mythological object disappears when form shows itself, and form shows itself when the mythological object disappears. This is an important way in which a proposition may illuminate by being recognized as nonsensical.
For, it is only as makers of sense, not as hypothetical describers, that we can see what shows itself in language.
Books by alberto emiliani
The aim of TLP is not to show its own absurdity, but to be recognized as an attempt to say something which can only be shown. It is true that any formulation of Wittgenstein's basic insights eventually betrays them. But to grasp the nonsensical nature of the propositions of TLP is to take the final step; it is a step on them, over them. We recognize that a sentence trying to describe the possibility that symbols combine into a meaningful whole is indeed nonsensical, because it treats a possibility and a meaningful nexus as elements of a representation, and so, as mythological objects. It is a merely negative nonsense (in the sense that is a mere lack of sense, not a sort of expressive nonsense). Yet, there is a positive aspect in such a recognition, because it shows us the ineffable nature of the meaningful connection into a sinnvoller Satz, and so, logical form.
A mythological object disappears when form shows itself, and form shows itself when the mythological object disappears. This is an important way in which a proposition may illuminate by being recognized as nonsensical.
For, it is only as makers of sense, not as hypothetical describers, that we can see what shows itself in language.