Using the Internet medium in order to mobilize supporters, disseminate ideology and fundraise for... more Using the Internet medium in order to mobilize supporters, disseminate ideology and fundraise for political campaigns is very popular today. In this study we investigate the effect of the digital divide on web based political campaigns. Using US Census data we conclude that using ...
Supplemental Material for Contracting Outcomes with Communication and Learning by Priyodorshi Ban... more Supplemental Material for Contracting Outcomes with Communication and Learning by Priyodorshi Banerjee, P. Srikant and Sujoy Chakravarty in Studies in Microeconomics
ABSTRACT We find that dictator giving is higher in group environments, where the dictator and rec... more ABSTRACT We find that dictator giving is higher in group environments, where the dictator and recipient share a common group affiliation, and the funds are group-owned, than in the benchmark individual environment, where the dictator and recipient do not share a group affiliation, and the funds are owned by the dictator. A move to the group environment from the individual environment involves two distinct shifts: one, a shift in affiliation, where the dictator gives to a group member, rather than just a randomly matched partner out of his own fund, and, two, a shift in ownership, where the dictator gives out of group-owned rather than personal funds, in either case to a group member. We implemented these two shifts through linguistic framing of instructions. Our results show that,although simple group framing does lead to a somewhat higher give rate, group framing combined with joint psychological ownership of the endowment leads to significantly higher average offers in the dictator game.
We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a c... more We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In the treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game and thus the endowment of the recipient. Across treatment conditions, we alter the mechanism that determines the recipient’s endowment by replacing the first game dictator by a disinterested third party or a computer. We find that a negative relationship exists between the endowment of the recipient and giving of the second dictator only when a human with self-interest performs the allocation in the first game. Additionally, we find some evidence that dictators in the second game give less than first game dictators and no significant difference in average second game dictator giving across conditions.
ABSTRACT Are promises believed or kept in situations where consequentalist arguments suggest ther... more ABSTRACT Are promises believed or kept in situations where consequentalist arguments suggest there are strong reasons for them not to be? We study these questions in the laboratory using dictator and ultimatum games, augmented with competitive, pre-play promise-communication. In the presence of the veto threat in the ultimatum environment, we find that bigger promises are favored by receivers, and lead to larger action by favored senders, suggesting there are tendencies to believe promises as well as keep them. The absence of any restraint in the dictator environment leads receivers to favor intermediate promises over extreme ones. There is ambiguity as far as the keeping of promises is concerned: the relationship between promise and action may break down, or one could be manifested more strongly than in the presence of a restraint. There is also substantial heterogeneity amongst senders, especially in the dictator environment. For sub-groups with a high tendency to keep promises, adherence is considerably lower in the ultimatum environment.
Journal of behavioral and experimental economics, Dec 1, 2021
Deception often implicates cognitive resources, and emotions have rarely been used to account for... more Deception often implicates cognitive resources, and emotions have rarely been used to account for deception. Deception is examined using a two-person cheap talk game (N= 219) in three payoff groups (participant and partner payoff difference: none, small, large) where each participant has to make two deception choices and two dictator control choices presented in two decision frames (Gain Deception, Loss Deception, Gain Control, and Loss Control). Measures of emotion (i.e., dispositional reward-punishment sensitivity and affect mood) were used to account for the four choices. The results showed that unfair gain-sharing in the dictator control was frameindependent. Emotions accounted for loss frame choices in the payoff group that inflicted the largest partner loss. Interaction of reward and punishment sensitivity increased partner-deception in a loss frame, whereas the interaction reduced selfish choice in the dictator control, with negative mood and reward sensitivity as a deterrent of selfish choice in loss control. Thus, we find that including emotions to account for deception might improve our understanding of deception, especially in developing countries.
ABSTRACT The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed a... more ABSTRACT The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a rich history in Economics and indeed in other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Our research examines free riding in an environment slightly different from that used in experimental studies thus far. In the game we use, the benefit received from the public good is not linear in effort or contribution as in most Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) or Common Property Resource (CPR) games but varies stochastically with effort (Banerjee, 2007). We specifically examine the effect of a quality bound (for the public good provided) below which very negligible benefits are received by community members. Our theory predicts that the presence of such a “pass mark” on quality of the good ultimately provided may under certain conditions reduce the incidence of free-riding in these games. This result has very significant implications for the design of mechanisms and institutions that provide public goods and services. We obtain very mixed support for the hypothesis that the presence of a pass mark on quality significantly lowers the incidence of free riding in the laboratory. In most sessions, the presence of this pass mark may actually significantly increase the incidence of free-riding, even when the theory predicts the opposite. In general, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) prediction performs very poorly in the laboratory. A noisy theoretical model, the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is then used and is a better predictor of laboratory play than the MSNE. We then use the Roth-Erev (RE, Erev and Roth, 1995) reinforcement learning model in both its one-parameter as well as three-parameter forms which generate predictions that fit observed play in the laboratory much better than the earlier “steady state” theory predictions.
We revisit two fundamental motivations of dishonesty: financial incentives and probability of det... more We revisit two fundamental motivations of dishonesty: financial incentives and probability of detection. We use an ability-based real effort task in which participants who are college students in India can cheat by over reporting the number of puzzles they could solve in a given period of time. The puzzles are all unsolvable and this fact is unknown to participants. This design feature allows us to obtain the distribution of cheating outcomes at the individual level. Controlling for participant attributes, we find that introducing piece-rate financial incentives lowers both the likelihood and magnitude of cheating only for individuals with a positive probability of detection. On the other hand, a decrease in the probability of detection to zero increases magnitude of cheating only for individuals receiving piece-rate incentives. Moreover, we observe that participants cheat significantly even in the absence of piece-rate incentives indicating that affective benefits may determine cheating. Finally, an increase in own perceived wealth status vis-à-vis one’s peers is associated with a higher likelihood of cheating while feeling more satisfied with one’s current economic state is associated with a lower magnitude of cheating.
Using the Internet medium in order to mobilize supporters, disseminate ideology and fundraise for... more Using the Internet medium in order to mobilize supporters, disseminate ideology and fundraise for political campaigns is very popular today. In this study we investigate the effect of the digital divide on web based political campaigns. Using US Census data we conclude that using ...
Supplemental Material for Contracting Outcomes with Communication and Learning by Priyodorshi Ban... more Supplemental Material for Contracting Outcomes with Communication and Learning by Priyodorshi Banerjee, P. Srikant and Sujoy Chakravarty in Studies in Microeconomics
ABSTRACT We find that dictator giving is higher in group environments, where the dictator and rec... more ABSTRACT We find that dictator giving is higher in group environments, where the dictator and recipient share a common group affiliation, and the funds are group-owned, than in the benchmark individual environment, where the dictator and recipient do not share a group affiliation, and the funds are owned by the dictator. A move to the group environment from the individual environment involves two distinct shifts: one, a shift in affiliation, where the dictator gives to a group member, rather than just a randomly matched partner out of his own fund, and, two, a shift in ownership, where the dictator gives out of group-owned rather than personal funds, in either case to a group member. We implemented these two shifts through linguistic framing of instructions. Our results show that,although simple group framing does lead to a somewhat higher give rate, group framing combined with joint psychological ownership of the endowment leads to significantly higher average offers in the dictator game.
We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a c... more We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In the treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game and thus the endowment of the recipient. Across treatment conditions, we alter the mechanism that determines the recipient’s endowment by replacing the first game dictator by a disinterested third party or a computer. We find that a negative relationship exists between the endowment of the recipient and giving of the second dictator only when a human with self-interest performs the allocation in the first game. Additionally, we find some evidence that dictators in the second game give less than first game dictators and no significant difference in average second game dictator giving across conditions.
ABSTRACT Are promises believed or kept in situations where consequentalist arguments suggest ther... more ABSTRACT Are promises believed or kept in situations where consequentalist arguments suggest there are strong reasons for them not to be? We study these questions in the laboratory using dictator and ultimatum games, augmented with competitive, pre-play promise-communication. In the presence of the veto threat in the ultimatum environment, we find that bigger promises are favored by receivers, and lead to larger action by favored senders, suggesting there are tendencies to believe promises as well as keep them. The absence of any restraint in the dictator environment leads receivers to favor intermediate promises over extreme ones. There is ambiguity as far as the keeping of promises is concerned: the relationship between promise and action may break down, or one could be manifested more strongly than in the presence of a restraint. There is also substantial heterogeneity amongst senders, especially in the dictator environment. For sub-groups with a high tendency to keep promises, adherence is considerably lower in the ultimatum environment.
Journal of behavioral and experimental economics, Dec 1, 2021
Deception often implicates cognitive resources, and emotions have rarely been used to account for... more Deception often implicates cognitive resources, and emotions have rarely been used to account for deception. Deception is examined using a two-person cheap talk game (N= 219) in three payoff groups (participant and partner payoff difference: none, small, large) where each participant has to make two deception choices and two dictator control choices presented in two decision frames (Gain Deception, Loss Deception, Gain Control, and Loss Control). Measures of emotion (i.e., dispositional reward-punishment sensitivity and affect mood) were used to account for the four choices. The results showed that unfair gain-sharing in the dictator control was frameindependent. Emotions accounted for loss frame choices in the payoff group that inflicted the largest partner loss. Interaction of reward and punishment sensitivity increased partner-deception in a loss frame, whereas the interaction reduced selfish choice in the dictator control, with negative mood and reward sensitivity as a deterrent of selfish choice in loss control. Thus, we find that including emotions to account for deception might improve our understanding of deception, especially in developing countries.
ABSTRACT The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed a... more ABSTRACT The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a rich history in Economics and indeed in other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Our research examines free riding in an environment slightly different from that used in experimental studies thus far. In the game we use, the benefit received from the public good is not linear in effort or contribution as in most Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) or Common Property Resource (CPR) games but varies stochastically with effort (Banerjee, 2007). We specifically examine the effect of a quality bound (for the public good provided) below which very negligible benefits are received by community members. Our theory predicts that the presence of such a “pass mark” on quality of the good ultimately provided may under certain conditions reduce the incidence of free-riding in these games. This result has very significant implications for the design of mechanisms and institutions that provide public goods and services. We obtain very mixed support for the hypothesis that the presence of a pass mark on quality significantly lowers the incidence of free riding in the laboratory. In most sessions, the presence of this pass mark may actually significantly increase the incidence of free-riding, even when the theory predicts the opposite. In general, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) prediction performs very poorly in the laboratory. A noisy theoretical model, the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is then used and is a better predictor of laboratory play than the MSNE. We then use the Roth-Erev (RE, Erev and Roth, 1995) reinforcement learning model in both its one-parameter as well as three-parameter forms which generate predictions that fit observed play in the laboratory much better than the earlier “steady state” theory predictions.
We revisit two fundamental motivations of dishonesty: financial incentives and probability of det... more We revisit two fundamental motivations of dishonesty: financial incentives and probability of detection. We use an ability-based real effort task in which participants who are college students in India can cheat by over reporting the number of puzzles they could solve in a given period of time. The puzzles are all unsolvable and this fact is unknown to participants. This design feature allows us to obtain the distribution of cheating outcomes at the individual level. Controlling for participant attributes, we find that introducing piece-rate financial incentives lowers both the likelihood and magnitude of cheating only for individuals with a positive probability of detection. On the other hand, a decrease in the probability of detection to zero increases magnitude of cheating only for individuals receiving piece-rate incentives. Moreover, we observe that participants cheat significantly even in the absence of piece-rate incentives indicating that affective benefits may determine cheating. Finally, an increase in own perceived wealth status vis-à-vis one’s peers is associated with a higher likelihood of cheating while feeling more satisfied with one’s current economic state is associated with a lower magnitude of cheating.
With a country-wide comprehensive Internet survey performed in India, we attempt to determine the... more With a country-wide comprehensive Internet survey performed in India, we attempt to determine the factors that drive hesitancy towards getting vaccinated for COVID-19, and also quantify and compare their levels of influence. The perceived reliability and effectiveness of available vaccines appear to be important drivers in lowering vaccine hesitancy. Additionally, higher hesitancy is associated with being of a younger age or having lower education. Furthermore, comparing vaccine attitudes from observations before a major COVID-19 wave with those from after, we find that the latter are almost 8 percent less hesitant about getting the vaccine. Finally, We find that it is not only knowledge and awareness campaigns, but also local level peer influences that are important factors that increase or lower vaccine hesitancy. To further explore vaccine hesitancy, statistically significant estimates from logistic regression on our survey data are used in a synthetic heterogeneous complex network-based society, to extrapolate scenarios that may arise from the dynamic interactions between our variables of interest. We use outcomes from this simulated society to suggest strategic interventions that may lower vaccine hesitancy.
Evaluation of pre-task quiz performance in our artefactual field experiment with an adolescent su... more Evaluation of pre-task quiz performance in our artefactual field experiment with an adolescent subject pool in India finds that females have a lower degree of confusion in comprehending task instructions as compared to males. Furthermore, economic status is negatively associated with completion of incentivized experimental tasks. Academic ability is negatively associated with subject confusion and positively associated with task completion. Finally, pre-task quiz performance is positively associated with completion of incentivized tasks. This suggests that unincentivized pre-task quiz scores that signal subject comprehension of task instructions may be used to study irregularities in incentivized experimental data.
Evaluation of pre-task quiz performance in our artefactual field experiment with an adolescent su... more Evaluation of pre-task quiz performance in our artefactual field experiment with an adolescent subject pool in India finds that females have a lower degree of confusion in comprehending task instructions as compared to males. Furthermore, economic status is negatively associated with completion of incentivized experimental tasks. Academic ability is negatively associated with subject confusion and positively associated with task completion. Finally, pre-task quiz performance is positively associated with completion of incentivized tasks. This suggests that unincentivized pre-task quiz scores that signal subject comprehension of task instructions may be used to study irregularities in incentivized experimental data.
Evaluation of pre-task quiz performance in our artefactual field experiment with an adolescent su... more Evaluation of pre-task quiz performance in our artefactual field experiment with an adolescent subject pool in India finds that females have a lower degree of confusion in comprehending task instructions as compared to males. Furthermore, economic status is negatively associated with completion of incentivized experimental tasks. Academic ability is negatively associated with subject confusion and positively associated with task completion. Finally, pre-task quiz performance is positively associated with completion of incentivized tasks. This suggests that unincentivized pre-task quiz scores that signal subject comprehension of task instructions may be used to study irregularities in incentivized experimental data.
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