I am Senior Lecturer in Politics at King's College London.
I was an undergraduate at Cambridge and did my PhD in Oxford. I’ve previously taught at Oxford, at Queen Mary University of London, and at Manchester.
I did my PhD in political science (elections), spent some time on political philosophy (democracy, Habermas and rationality), and now concentrate on history of political thought (Hobbes, and methods of interpretation).
Leo Strauss’s textual interpretations are epistemologically naive. Previous critics have not show... more Leo Strauss’s textual interpretations are epistemologically naive. Previous critics have not shown the full breadth
and depth of Strauss’s problems. The early, pre-esoteric Strauss makes some unduly certain claims on very slender
evidence. The mature, esoteric Strauss’s methodological principles rest on false dichotomies and logical errors. Most
problematic is Strauss’s one-sided approach: too often, he takes a single hypothesis, looks for and finds evidence
which fits it, and thinks that this constitutes proof; he states too many conclusions as if they are certain, without
adequately considering alternative explanations. Since we can see the same technique in his pre-esoteric writings,
this suggests that the problem is not esoteric interpretation itself, but Strauss’s particular version of esoteric
interpretation. In short, the problem is not Straussianism, but Strauss.
Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these clai... more Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these claims are right. Uncertainty is thus inevitable for intellectual historians. But accepting uncertainty is not enough: we should also act on it, by trying to reduce and report it. We can reduce uncertainty by amassing valid data from different sources to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations, rather than trying to “prove” an empirical claim by looking for evidence that fits it. Then we should report our degree of certainty in our claims. When we answer empirical questions in intellectual history, we are not telling our readers what happened: we are telling them how strong we think our evidence is — a crucial shift of emphasis. For intellectual historians, then, uncertainty is subjective, as discussed by Keynes and Collingwood; the paper thus explores three differences between subjective and objective uncertainty. Having outlined the theoretical basis of uncertainty, the paper then offers examples from actual research: Noel Malcolm’s work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about composition, and David Wootton’s work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about beliefs.
Corruption is a more important idea for Hobbes than has been recognized: a state of nature can re... more Corruption is a more important idea for Hobbes than has been recognized: a state of nature can result from corruption of the people, corruption of counsellors and corruption of legal processes. Hobbes often uses a ‘cognitive’ conception of corruption — the distortion of mental processes, by faulty reasoning or improper attitudes. Corruption means that citizens think they benefit from sedition, counsellors advise with self-interested rhetoric rather than impartial logic, witnesses lie and judges settle cases by bribes or pity. Although corruption is often thought to involve the pursuit of private gain, Hobbes only talks about corruption in terms of misjudged private gain, where an individual is motivated by his apparent, short-tem self-interest, rather than his real long-term self-interest. That is why corruption can lead to a state of nature.
John Dryzek’s justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationa... more John Dryzek’s justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationality and a defence of Habermas’s idea of communicative rationality. I question each stage of Dryzek’s theory. It defines instrumental rationality broadly but only criticises narrow applications of it. It conflates communicative rationality with Habermas’s idea of ‘discourse’ – the real motor of Dryzek’s democratic theory. Deliberative democracy can be better defended by avoiding overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality, by altering the emphasis on communicative rationality, and by focusing more on different models of politics than different models of rationality. Dryzek’s theory can thus present deliberative democracy as a better means to better ends – a more powerful and more positive position.
Abstract Different scholars countthe number of parties' in different ways, partly be... more Abstract Different scholars countthe number of parties' in different ways, partly because they examine different parts of the political process and for different reasons. Sartori's qualitative approach focused mainly on competition for government, but is now largely supplanted by ...
Leo Strauss’s textual interpretations are epistemologically naive. Previous critics have not show... more Leo Strauss’s textual interpretations are epistemologically naive. Previous critics have not shown the full breadth
and depth of Strauss’s problems. The early, pre-esoteric Strauss makes some unduly certain claims on very slender
evidence. The mature, esoteric Strauss’s methodological principles rest on false dichotomies and logical errors. Most
problematic is Strauss’s one-sided approach: too often, he takes a single hypothesis, looks for and finds evidence
which fits it, and thinks that this constitutes proof; he states too many conclusions as if they are certain, without
adequately considering alternative explanations. Since we can see the same technique in his pre-esoteric writings,
this suggests that the problem is not esoteric interpretation itself, but Strauss’s particular version of esoteric
interpretation. In short, the problem is not Straussianism, but Strauss.
Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these clai... more Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these claims are right. Uncertainty is thus inevitable for intellectual historians. But accepting uncertainty is not enough: we should also act on it, by trying to reduce and report it. We can reduce uncertainty by amassing valid data from different sources to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations, rather than trying to “prove” an empirical claim by looking for evidence that fits it. Then we should report our degree of certainty in our claims. When we answer empirical questions in intellectual history, we are not telling our readers what happened: we are telling them how strong we think our evidence is — a crucial shift of emphasis. For intellectual historians, then, uncertainty is subjective, as discussed by Keynes and Collingwood; the paper thus explores three differences between subjective and objective uncertainty. Having outlined the theoretical basis of uncertainty, the paper then offers examples from actual research: Noel Malcolm’s work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about composition, and David Wootton’s work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about beliefs.
Corruption is a more important idea for Hobbes than has been recognized: a state of nature can re... more Corruption is a more important idea for Hobbes than has been recognized: a state of nature can result from corruption of the people, corruption of counsellors and corruption of legal processes. Hobbes often uses a ‘cognitive’ conception of corruption — the distortion of mental processes, by faulty reasoning or improper attitudes. Corruption means that citizens think they benefit from sedition, counsellors advise with self-interested rhetoric rather than impartial logic, witnesses lie and judges settle cases by bribes or pity. Although corruption is often thought to involve the pursuit of private gain, Hobbes only talks about corruption in terms of misjudged private gain, where an individual is motivated by his apparent, short-tem self-interest, rather than his real long-term self-interest. That is why corruption can lead to a state of nature.
John Dryzek’s justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationa... more John Dryzek’s justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationality and a defence of Habermas’s idea of communicative rationality. I question each stage of Dryzek’s theory. It defines instrumental rationality broadly but only criticises narrow applications of it. It conflates communicative rationality with Habermas’s idea of ‘discourse’ – the real motor of Dryzek’s democratic theory. Deliberative democracy can be better defended by avoiding overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality, by altering the emphasis on communicative rationality, and by focusing more on different models of politics than different models of rationality. Dryzek’s theory can thus present deliberative democracy as a better means to better ends – a more powerful and more positive position.
Abstract Different scholars countthe number of parties' in different ways, partly be... more Abstract Different scholars countthe number of parties' in different ways, partly because they examine different parts of the political process and for different reasons. Sartori's qualitative approach focused mainly on competition for government, but is now largely supplanted by ...
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and depth of Strauss’s problems. The early, pre-esoteric Strauss makes some unduly certain claims on very slender
evidence. The mature, esoteric Strauss’s methodological principles rest on false dichotomies and logical errors. Most
problematic is Strauss’s one-sided approach: too often, he takes a single hypothesis, looks for and finds evidence
which fits it, and thinks that this constitutes proof; he states too many conclusions as if they are certain, without
adequately considering alternative explanations. Since we can see the same technique in his pre-esoteric writings,
this suggests that the problem is not esoteric interpretation itself, but Strauss’s particular version of esoteric
interpretation. In short, the problem is not Straussianism, but Strauss.
and depth of Strauss’s problems. The early, pre-esoteric Strauss makes some unduly certain claims on very slender
evidence. The mature, esoteric Strauss’s methodological principles rest on false dichotomies and logical errors. Most
problematic is Strauss’s one-sided approach: too often, he takes a single hypothesis, looks for and finds evidence
which fits it, and thinks that this constitutes proof; he states too many conclusions as if they are certain, without
adequately considering alternative explanations. Since we can see the same technique in his pre-esoteric writings,
this suggests that the problem is not esoteric interpretation itself, but Strauss’s particular version of esoteric
interpretation. In short, the problem is not Straussianism, but Strauss.