I am a Ph.D Candidate in Political Science at Korea University. I specialize in legislative politics with particular focus on the South Korean National Assembly. My works have appreared in peer-reviewed journals incl. Government
The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural ru... more The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.
The purpose of this article is to explore the trend of party polarization and analyze its politic... more The purpose of this article is to explore the trend of party polarization and analyze its political consequences in South Korea. Party polarization refers to the diminishing of the center and surge of extreme political positions among political parties. In order to explore the trend of party polarization, we analyze the roll-call votes data in the 16-18th South Korean National Assembly by exploiting the NOMINATE method. The main findings from empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, the level of party polarization in the Korean National Assembly increased substantially during the last decade or so. Second, we find that the emergence of the Uri Party in 2003 is the watershed of party polarization in South Korea. Finally, party polarization in South Korea is ‘asymmetrical’ where the emergence of liberal parties (Uri Party and Democratic Labor Party) significantly expanded the ideological dimension to the liberal-side while the Grand National Party’s move towards the conservative-side is subtle. In the final section, we also discuss the political consequences of party polarization. We argue that despite some of the positive effects of party polarization, party polarization has more negative effects in the South Korean context. We argue that hostile confrontation between ruling party and opposition party, frequent political gridlock, low political productivity, and the increasing political distrust are the consequences of party polarization. We suggest that institutional reforms and the revitalization of consensus politics are crucial to alleviate the negative effects of party polarization.
This article explores legislative voting behaviour in the regional party system where electoral c... more This article explores legislative voting behaviour in the regional party system where electoral competition is based primarily on geographic divisions instead of national public policies. An analysis of roll-call votes in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea from 2000 to 2008 reveals that in the regionalized context, legislative voting unity is high because legislators are disciplined to receive endorsement from their regional champion party. Those legislators are far more disciplined when voting on pork legislation. Nonetheless, as the socioeconomic status of constituents rises and the constituents thus care more about policy than pork, then opposition legislators tend to vote against their parties more often. Conversely, governing-party members are more disciplined to pass bills where voters often desire policy over pork. This study suggests a powerful interaction between party affiliations and voter demands as a dominant electoral strategic tool in the regional party system.
Social Science Research Review 31(1): 393-410, Feb 28, 2015
The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of the incumbent advantage in South Korea by d... more The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of the incumbent advantage in South Korea by decomposing the officeholder effect (advertisement, credit claiming, and position taking) and quality effect (attractiveness and political skill). We test the two contending theories using the data of the 18th and 19th National Assembly election results in South Korea. We find that officeholder effect increases the probability of the incumbent's probability of reelection and decreases electoral competition. On the other hand, quality effect increases the incumbent's probability of reelection but does not have a significant impact on electoral competition. We also find that credit claiming or “pork-barreling” bolsters the incumbent’s reelection prospects while deterring electoral competition in the district. The results of our analysis implies that incumbents in the South Korean National Assembly are held accountable for their performance on constituency service.
The Korean Journal of International Studies 12(2): 451-472, Dec 31, 2014
Why do different countries experience varying levels of budget deficits? Common pool resource the... more Why do different countries experience varying levels of budget deficits? Common pool resource theorists argue that budget deficits tend to be low if the executive, who considers total tax burdens, suppresses the narrow incentives of individual legislators, who only consider partial tax burdens. Policy inertia theorists argue that a decrease in the number of veto players is associated with a low level of budget deficit. In this article, we combine the two approaches and offer a conditional common pool resource theory that predicts budget deficits to decrease as the executive strength vis-à-vis the legislature increases
under parliamentarism because of the lack of legislative veto power. Under presidentialism, however, this effect is not likely to be significant because of the presence of legislative veto power. We support the argument through an analysis of cross-national data on budget deficits of 49 countries from 1995 to 2011.
The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural ru... more The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.
The purpose of this article is to explore the trend of party polarization and analyze its politic... more The purpose of this article is to explore the trend of party polarization and analyze its political consequences in South Korea. Party polarization refers to the diminishing of the center and surge of extreme political positions among political parties. In order to explore the trend of party polarization, we analyze the roll-call votes data in the 16-18th South Korean National Assembly by exploiting the NOMINATE method. The main findings from empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, the level of party polarization in the Korean National Assembly increased substantially during the last decade or so. Second, we find that the emergence of the Uri Party in 2003 is the watershed of party polarization in South Korea. Finally, party polarization in South Korea is ‘asymmetrical’ where the emergence of liberal parties (Uri Party and Democratic Labor Party) significantly expanded the ideological dimension to the liberal-side while the Grand National Party’s move towards the conservative-side is subtle. In the final section, we also discuss the political consequences of party polarization. We argue that despite some of the positive effects of party polarization, party polarization has more negative effects in the South Korean context. We argue that hostile confrontation between ruling party and opposition party, frequent political gridlock, low political productivity, and the increasing political distrust are the consequences of party polarization. We suggest that institutional reforms and the revitalization of consensus politics are crucial to alleviate the negative effects of party polarization.
This article explores legislative voting behaviour in the regional party system where electoral c... more This article explores legislative voting behaviour in the regional party system where electoral competition is based primarily on geographic divisions instead of national public policies. An analysis of roll-call votes in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea from 2000 to 2008 reveals that in the regionalized context, legislative voting unity is high because legislators are disciplined to receive endorsement from their regional champion party. Those legislators are far more disciplined when voting on pork legislation. Nonetheless, as the socioeconomic status of constituents rises and the constituents thus care more about policy than pork, then opposition legislators tend to vote against their parties more often. Conversely, governing-party members are more disciplined to pass bills where voters often desire policy over pork. This study suggests a powerful interaction between party affiliations and voter demands as a dominant electoral strategic tool in the regional party system.
Social Science Research Review 31(1): 393-410, Feb 28, 2015
The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of the incumbent advantage in South Korea by d... more The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of the incumbent advantage in South Korea by decomposing the officeholder effect (advertisement, credit claiming, and position taking) and quality effect (attractiveness and political skill). We test the two contending theories using the data of the 18th and 19th National Assembly election results in South Korea. We find that officeholder effect increases the probability of the incumbent's probability of reelection and decreases electoral competition. On the other hand, quality effect increases the incumbent's probability of reelection but does not have a significant impact on electoral competition. We also find that credit claiming or “pork-barreling” bolsters the incumbent’s reelection prospects while deterring electoral competition in the district. The results of our analysis implies that incumbents in the South Korean National Assembly are held accountable for their performance on constituency service.
The Korean Journal of International Studies 12(2): 451-472, Dec 31, 2014
Why do different countries experience varying levels of budget deficits? Common pool resource the... more Why do different countries experience varying levels of budget deficits? Common pool resource theorists argue that budget deficits tend to be low if the executive, who considers total tax burdens, suppresses the narrow incentives of individual legislators, who only consider partial tax burdens. Policy inertia theorists argue that a decrease in the number of veto players is associated with a low level of budget deficit. In this article, we combine the two approaches and offer a conditional common pool resource theory that predicts budget deficits to decrease as the executive strength vis-à-vis the legislature increases
under parliamentarism because of the lack of legislative veto power. Under presidentialism, however, this effect is not likely to be significant because of the presence of legislative veto power. We support the argument through an analysis of cross-national data on budget deficits of 49 countries from 1995 to 2011.
Uploads
Publications by Hojun Lee
Assembly by exploiting the NOMINATE method. The main findings from empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, the level of party polarization in the Korean National Assembly increased substantially during the last decade or so. Second, we find that the emergence of the Uri Party in 2003 is the watershed of party polarization in South Korea. Finally, party polarization in South Korea is ‘asymmetrical’ where the emergence of liberal parties (Uri Party and Democratic Labor Party) significantly expanded the ideological dimension to the liberal-side while the Grand National Party’s move towards the conservative-side is subtle. In the final section, we also discuss the political consequences of party polarization. We argue that despite some of the positive effects of party polarization, party polarization has more negative effects in the South Korean context. We argue that hostile confrontation between ruling party and opposition party, frequent political gridlock, low political productivity, and the increasing political distrust are the
consequences of party polarization. We suggest that institutional reforms and the revitalization of consensus politics are crucial to alleviate the negative effects of party polarization.
(with Nae Young Lee)
(with Sang Un Park) (In Korean)
under parliamentarism because of the lack of legislative veto power. Under presidentialism, however, this effect is not likely to be significant because of the presence of legislative veto power. We support the argument through an analysis of cross-national data on budget deficits of 49 countries from 1995 to 2011.
(with Jae Hyeok Shin)
Assembly by exploiting the NOMINATE method. The main findings from empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, the level of party polarization in the Korean National Assembly increased substantially during the last decade or so. Second, we find that the emergence of the Uri Party in 2003 is the watershed of party polarization in South Korea. Finally, party polarization in South Korea is ‘asymmetrical’ where the emergence of liberal parties (Uri Party and Democratic Labor Party) significantly expanded the ideological dimension to the liberal-side while the Grand National Party’s move towards the conservative-side is subtle. In the final section, we also discuss the political consequences of party polarization. We argue that despite some of the positive effects of party polarization, party polarization has more negative effects in the South Korean context. We argue that hostile confrontation between ruling party and opposition party, frequent political gridlock, low political productivity, and the increasing political distrust are the
consequences of party polarization. We suggest that institutional reforms and the revitalization of consensus politics are crucial to alleviate the negative effects of party polarization.
(with Nae Young Lee)
(with Sang Un Park) (In Korean)
under parliamentarism because of the lack of legislative veto power. Under presidentialism, however, this effect is not likely to be significant because of the presence of legislative veto power. We support the argument through an analysis of cross-national data on budget deficits of 49 countries from 1995 to 2011.
(with Jae Hyeok Shin)