I primarily work in moral psychology, post-Kantian European philosophy, and social & political philosophy, and I am especially interested in questions at their intersection.
You can visit my personal website for my latest projects and updates: https://www.vasfiozen.com/
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023
I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner
awareness and wor... more I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner
awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken
on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they
have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate
cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–
as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-aswill
to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or
metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, inner awareness
reveals a genuine philosophical truth. Some scholars also suggest that it is
only via analogical transference that one can interpret the world as having
the same inner nature as oneself. I disagree and point out the downside of
this suggestion. I use both textual evidence and general philosophical
considerations to demonstrate that inner awareness, for Schopenhauer, has a
representational dimension. Overlooking this point has led scholars to
misconstrue how inner awareness relates to world-understanding. I provide
an alternative interpretation against figurative and analogical readings. I
propose that, for Schopenhauer, we cognize partially a priori that all things
are merely different expressions of the same activity that we are acquainted
with in inner awareness.
Nietzsche-Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung, 2021
Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly rendered as ‘compassion’... more Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly rendered as ‘compassion’). He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compassion” and contrasts it with “your compassion” (Beyond Good and Evil § 225). Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest that Nietzsche’s discussion on different forms of compassion have significant implications for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, for Nietzsche, ‘our compassion’, however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into ‘co-suffering’ with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. I also argue that although Nietzsche objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist theorists might now call ‘anticipatory empathy’. Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his understanding of a non-compassionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather overlooked and should receive more attention.
Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia o... more Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.
The Review of Metaphysics: A Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at... more The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term ‘thing-in-itself’ from Immanuel Kant, who uses it to refer to a reality that is distinct from what appears to us, and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation that I offer here distinguishes between three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. I argue that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer’s position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023
I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner
awareness and wor... more I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner
awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken
on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they
have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate
cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–
as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-aswill
to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or
metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, inner awareness
reveals a genuine philosophical truth. Some scholars also suggest that it is
only via analogical transference that one can interpret the world as having
the same inner nature as oneself. I disagree and point out the downside of
this suggestion. I use both textual evidence and general philosophical
considerations to demonstrate that inner awareness, for Schopenhauer, has a
representational dimension. Overlooking this point has led scholars to
misconstrue how inner awareness relates to world-understanding. I provide
an alternative interpretation against figurative and analogical readings. I
propose that, for Schopenhauer, we cognize partially a priori that all things
are merely different expressions of the same activity that we are acquainted
with in inner awareness.
Nietzsche-Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung, 2021
Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly rendered as ‘compassion’... more Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly rendered as ‘compassion’). He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compassion” and contrasts it with “your compassion” (Beyond Good and Evil § 225). Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest that Nietzsche’s discussion on different forms of compassion have significant implications for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, for Nietzsche, ‘our compassion’, however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into ‘co-suffering’ with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. I also argue that although Nietzsche objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist theorists might now call ‘anticipatory empathy’. Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his understanding of a non-compassionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather overlooked and should receive more attention.
Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia o... more Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.
The Review of Metaphysics: A Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at... more The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term ‘thing-in-itself’ from Immanuel Kant, who uses it to refer to a reality that is distinct from what appears to us, and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation that I offer here distinguishes between three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. I argue that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer’s position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer.
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awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken
on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they
have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate
cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–
as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-aswill
to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or
metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, inner awareness
reveals a genuine philosophical truth. Some scholars also suggest that it is
only via analogical transference that one can interpret the world as having
the same inner nature as oneself. I disagree and point out the downside of
this suggestion. I use both textual evidence and general philosophical
considerations to demonstrate that inner awareness, for Schopenhauer, has a
representational dimension. Overlooking this point has led scholars to
misconstrue how inner awareness relates to world-understanding. I provide
an alternative interpretation against figurative and analogical readings. I
propose that, for Schopenhauer, we cognize partially a priori that all things
are merely different expressions of the same activity that we are acquainted
with in inner awareness.
awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken
on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they
have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate
cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–
as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-aswill
to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or
metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, inner awareness
reveals a genuine philosophical truth. Some scholars also suggest that it is
only via analogical transference that one can interpret the world as having
the same inner nature as oneself. I disagree and point out the downside of
this suggestion. I use both textual evidence and general philosophical
considerations to demonstrate that inner awareness, for Schopenhauer, has a
representational dimension. Overlooking this point has led scholars to
misconstrue how inner awareness relates to world-understanding. I provide
an alternative interpretation against figurative and analogical readings. I
propose that, for Schopenhauer, we cognize partially a priori that all things
are merely different expressions of the same activity that we are acquainted
with in inner awareness.