Books by Tasia (Anastasia) P Scrutton
This will be a chapter in a book on Continuing Bonds Theory (ed. Dennis Klass and Edith Steffen).... more This will be a chapter in a book on Continuing Bonds Theory (ed. Dennis Klass and Edith Steffen). From the introduction:
Despite the importance of rituals in continuing bonds theory, rituals are under-theorised in continuing bonds literature. This chapter will explore some reasons why rituals are important and powerful, contributing to our understanding of therapeutic practices for responding to grief. In order to set the scene for this, I will outline the rituals of two very different communities - those of Shona people in Zimbabwe and of Pagans in the United Kingdom – pointing to ways in which these might be seen to respond to features of grief highlighted by continuing bonds theory. Truth claims (formal doctrines and informal statements about the nature of reality) are often taken to be the most important and powerful aspects of religion and related phenomena, but I am interested in the ways in which the ritual aspect of religions and of human life more generally are important and powerful in distinctive ways. In particular, as I will argue, rituals are distinctively important and powerful because they are diachronic and narratival. As a result, they provide experiential knowledge or understanding of the view of reality that truth claims (for example, about the continued existence of the deceased) express more thinly. Furthermore, rituals are typically narratives that are sensorily rich, and so they enable the imaginative conceptualisation of perceived realities. In addition, because they are bodily, rituals can provide people with a more embedded and recalcitrant form of cognition than the more superficial forms provided by propositional means. Experiential and bodily forms of cognition are relevant when considering grief, because bereaved people undergo significant changes in their views of reality and relationships to it. In grief, this can include gaining a sense of the intelligibility of the deceased person’s absence, and yet of their continued felt presence, and of a continuing but changing relationship with them. Ritual’s relational character also contributes to its power and importance, because it enables grief to be shared and makes it a qualitatively different experience. At the end of the paper, I will point to some of the implications of the account of ritual I have given for how we respond to grief in practice.
"This book examines some of the primary questions for the impassibility debate through the lens o... more "This book examines some of the primary questions for the impassibility debate through the lens of contemporary philosophy of emotion: is the property of being able to experience emotions a susceptibility and a weakness, or a capacity and a strength? What does it mean to experience emotions, and what sort of being is able to experience them? In examining these questions, it explores the relationship between emotions, body, will and intelligence, addressing questions concerning whether emotions are essentially physiological or cognitive, whether emotions detract from intelligence or may actually contribute towards it, and whether (and to what extent) emotions can be controlled and/or cultivated. The book moves away from some of the artificially extreme accounts of emotion towards a more subtle account that sees most emotions as on a spectrum between cognitive and physiological, voluntary and non-voluntary.
While this book will be of interest to those working within contemporary philosophy of emotion, its primary originality and value lies in applying these insights to the impassibility debate within theology and philosophy of religion. The book shows how opting for a more variegated account of emotion would provide alternative possibilities within theology for speaking of God’s emotional life beyond the polarities of passibilism and impassibilism. It responds to some perennial objections to divine emotion, relating the discussions of emotions and body, will and intelligence to ongoing debates on divine incorporeality, omnipotence and omniscience, and concludes by exploring three emotional experiences sometimes attributed to God: compassion, anger and jealousy."
For reviews, see:
(a) Creel, R.E. 2012. Faith and Philosophy 29.4, pp. 487 – 490
(b) McDermid, D. 2013. The Heythrop Journal 54.2, pp. 324 – 325
(c) Hampson, P. 2013. New Blackfriars 94.1051, pp. 378 – 379
Papers by Tasia (Anastasia) P Scrutton
Religion and spirituality are increasingly associated with mental health, yet spirit-related prac... more Religion and spirituality are increasingly associated with mental health, yet spirit-related practices, beliefs and experiences (SPBEs) are regarded with more suspicion. This suspicion is misplaced, and worryingly so, since, I argue, it shuts down a potentially therapeutic avenue in relation to anomalous experiences such as hearing voices and sensing the presence of the dead. A presupposition of this argument is that anomalous experiences are not inherently pathological but can become so as a result of the way they are interpreted and reacted to.
Forthcoming in the Journal of Disability and Religion
Moralising accounts of depression include the idea that depression is a sin or the result of sin,... more Moralising accounts of depression include the idea that depression is a sin or the result of sin, and/or that it is the result of demonic possession which has occurred because of moral or spiritual failure. Increasingly some Christian communities, understandably concerned about the debilitating effects these views have on people with depression, have adopted secular folk psychiatry’s ‘medicalising’ campaign, emphasising that depression is an illness for which, like (so-called) physical illnesses, experients should not be held responsible. This paper argues that both moralising and medicalising models of depression are intellectually and practically (pastorally and therapeutically) problematic, gesturing towards more promising emphases.
Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, an... more Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy of religion, arguing that practical and contextual as well as alethic considerations are properly central to the discipline.
A recent paper in Journal of Religion and Health argues that some cases of schizophrenia should b... more A recent paper in Journal of Religion and Health argues that some cases of schizophrenia should be seen as cases of demon possession and treated by faith healers. A reply, published in
the same journal, responds by raising concerns about the intellectual credibility and
potentially harmful practical implications of demon possession beliefs. My paper
contributes to the discussion, arguing that a critique of demon possession beliefs in the
context of schizophrenia is needed, but suggesting an alternative basis for it. It also
reflects on important differences between demonic and other forms of spirit
possession, and considers the implications of this for mental health care providers.
What would you think if someone told you they heard voices when no one was there, or could sense ... more What would you think if someone told you they heard voices when no one was there, or could sense the presence of the dead? In some historical periods and in some societies today these experiences are made sense of positively in religious or spiritual terms, but in modern western societies they tend to be regarded as symptomatic of mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. I argue that interpreting these experiences in terms of illness can negatively affect them, turning them into something pathological when they needn’t necessarily be so. I also discuss wider issues regarding illness, medicine, authority, interpretation and meaning.
Among the more notable Christian understandings of depression is the idea that depression is a si... more Among the more notable Christian understandings of depression is the idea that depression is a sin or the result of sin. While this idea is dismissed by many Christians and non-Christians, it is difficult to pinpoint what exactly is wrong with it. This paper seeks to address this problem, focusing on a common premise of the ‘depression is a sin’ claim: that it is within a person’s power to recover, such that remaining depressed is a choice. This claim is held not only by Christians who believe depression to be a sin, but also by other religious and non-religious voluntarists, who believe depression to be under the control of the will. I will object to this idea by pointing to accounts that indicate that one widespread feature of depression is an experience of diminished free will, and will argue that this means that asserting the possibility of making choices that are relevant to recovery in the context of all depression is misplaced. I will then turn from the question of whether ‘depression is a choice’ claims are true, to whether they are helpful, and will argue that they can be helpful, but only in non-extreme forms of depression. Finally, I will reflect on the pastoral and clinical implications of the discussion.
Some recent considerations of religion and psychiatry have drawn a distinction between pathologic... more Some recent considerations of religion and psychiatry have drawn a distinction between pathological and spiritual/mystical experiences of mental phenomena typically regarded as within the realm of psychiatry (e.g. depression, hearing voices, seeing visions/hallucinations). Such a distinction has clinical implications, particularly in relation to whether some religious people who suffer from depression, hear voices, or see visions should be biomedically treated.
Approaching this question from a philosophical perspective, I draw a distinction between (what I call) ‘spiritual health’ (SH) and ‘potentially transformative’ (PT) theologies, arguing that a PT model is therapeutically and philosophically more sound than a SH one. I then apply this to the clinical debate in critical dialogue with Dein and Durà-Vilà’s 2009 article, ‘The Dark Night of the Soul: spiritual distress and psychiatric implications’. My primary focus is on depression, though the discussion is also relevant to debates about psychosis and schizophrenia.
The idea of the transformative nature of mental distress and, more particularly, of the wounded h... more The idea of the transformative nature of mental distress and, more particularly, of the wounded healer is geographically and temporally widespread, being attributed variously to classical Greece, biblical Judaism, Siberian Shamanism, the Jungian analytical psychology tradition, Alcoholics Anonymous, and self-help movements. It is also a commonplace in modern and contemporary Christian theology and spirituality. This paper will explore the idea as it is found in the writings of Henri Nouwen, focusing on his experience of depression as an occasion for spiritual growth. It will then critically evaluate a potentially transformative view, drawing on Nouwen and other sources, and suggesting some important emphases a transformative view needs to adopt if it is to avoid philosophical and pastoral pitfalls.
While the impassibility debate has traditionally been construed in terms of whether God suffers... more While the impassibility debate has traditionally been construed in terms of whether God suffers, recent philosophy of religion has interpreted it in terms of whether God has emotions more generally. This article surveys the philosophical literature on divine im/passibility over the last 25years, outlining major arguments for and against the idea that God has emotions. It argues that questions about the nature
and value of emotions are at the heart of the im/passibility debate. More specifically, it suggests that presuppositions about the dichotomy between emotions and reason (or the
‘heart and the head’) have negatively impacted the debate. It contends that the debate can only move forward in response to serious reflection on our affects as we experience them, aided by historical and anthropological as well as contemporary philosophical perspectives
In the past, emotions have had a bad press from philosophers and theologians. This is often becau... more In the past, emotions have had a bad press from philosophers and theologians. This is often because they have been regarded as deceptive, misleading and irrational. In modern culture, there has been a backlash against this, with some people saying that we should make decisions using our ‘heart’ (our emotions) as well as our ‘head’ (our intellect). However, in both cases, intellect and emotions are seen as being two separate things, and, moreover, as being two separate things that are often at war with one another.
In this paper, I question this separation between the intellect and the emotions, focusing on our experience of compassion. I begin by arguing that compassion and other emotions make us more intelligent. Furthermore, I argue that emotions provide a unique or non-substitutable form of intelligence – that is, a form of intelligence that cannot be gained by other, non-emotional, means. I then argue that the separation between the head/intellect and the heart/emotions is incorrect. Finally, I argue that emotions should be regarded not only as a source of knowledge, but also (like non-emotional beliefs) as a potential form of knowledge in their own right.
The conclusions of this paper have implications for our understanding of human nature, and for our ethics, particularly in relation to how we make (and how we should make) decisions. For those of us who are Muslims, Christians, or Jews, the conclusions of this paper also has implications for our view of God.
Human responses to suffering include the view that suffering is, or can be, transformative – that... more Human responses to suffering include the view that suffering is, or can be, transformative – that is, contribute to personal (or moral, or spiritual) growth. A transformative view of suffering can be divided into aetiological and non-aetiological forms. Aetiological forms use a transformative view of suffering as an explanation for why evil exists (for example, in John Hick’s theodicy, it is used to explain why God allows evil). Non-aetiological forms use a transformative view of suffering not as an explanation for suffering, but simply as a practical tool for interpreting painful experiences and responding positively to them. In non-aetiological forms, a transformative view of suffering is found in many of the world’s major faiths, indigenous spiritualities, and much secular thought, such as therapy culture.
In this paper I provide a philosophical and pastoral critique of a transformative view of suffering that will be of equal relevance to both aetiological and non-aetiological forms. I consider whether a transformative view is tenable or helpful, focusing on some of the experiences involved in mental illness, particularly depression. I argue that we need to qualify a transformative view by shifting the transformative potential of the experience away from the suffering itself and towards the subject’s response. However, I also argue that this view contains problems of its own in connection with free will, and discuss some possible solutions relating to diachronicity and eschatology.
Drafts by Tasia (Anastasia) P Scrutton
Passibilism – understood here as the idea that God suffers in Godself – is sometimes motivated by... more Passibilism – understood here as the idea that God suffers in Godself – is sometimes motivated by the idea that a fellow-sufferer provides consolation and so is religiously helpful. Yet people's intuitions about whether a divine fellow-sufferer is indeed religiously helpful are radically different: for some, 'only a suffering God can help', while for others it is precisely by not suffering that God offers consolation. I will explore people's differing intuitions, before arguing that consolation is not a good argument for passibilism. Rather, consolation may contribute to the rationality of belief in a passible God, if it is indeed religiously helpful. And whether it is religiously helpful will depend on factors including what other figures within the religious tradition are able to provide consolation through fellow-suffering. As examples of non-divine fellow-sufferer consolers, I will explore saints in late medieval Western Europe, and bodhisattvas in Japanese Buddhism today. In so doing, I will suggest an account of why passiblism arose out of Protestant Christianity, and attempt to do philosophy of religion in a way that takes context seriously and probes beyond formal arguments into people's practical and psychological motivations for believing what they believe. Finally, I will consider some of the implications of my argument for some other aspects of debates about divine passibility.
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Books by Tasia (Anastasia) P Scrutton
Despite the importance of rituals in continuing bonds theory, rituals are under-theorised in continuing bonds literature. This chapter will explore some reasons why rituals are important and powerful, contributing to our understanding of therapeutic practices for responding to grief. In order to set the scene for this, I will outline the rituals of two very different communities - those of Shona people in Zimbabwe and of Pagans in the United Kingdom – pointing to ways in which these might be seen to respond to features of grief highlighted by continuing bonds theory. Truth claims (formal doctrines and informal statements about the nature of reality) are often taken to be the most important and powerful aspects of religion and related phenomena, but I am interested in the ways in which the ritual aspect of religions and of human life more generally are important and powerful in distinctive ways. In particular, as I will argue, rituals are distinctively important and powerful because they are diachronic and narratival. As a result, they provide experiential knowledge or understanding of the view of reality that truth claims (for example, about the continued existence of the deceased) express more thinly. Furthermore, rituals are typically narratives that are sensorily rich, and so they enable the imaginative conceptualisation of perceived realities. In addition, because they are bodily, rituals can provide people with a more embedded and recalcitrant form of cognition than the more superficial forms provided by propositional means. Experiential and bodily forms of cognition are relevant when considering grief, because bereaved people undergo significant changes in their views of reality and relationships to it. In grief, this can include gaining a sense of the intelligibility of the deceased person’s absence, and yet of their continued felt presence, and of a continuing but changing relationship with them. Ritual’s relational character also contributes to its power and importance, because it enables grief to be shared and makes it a qualitatively different experience. At the end of the paper, I will point to some of the implications of the account of ritual I have given for how we respond to grief in practice.
While this book will be of interest to those working within contemporary philosophy of emotion, its primary originality and value lies in applying these insights to the impassibility debate within theology and philosophy of religion. The book shows how opting for a more variegated account of emotion would provide alternative possibilities within theology for speaking of God’s emotional life beyond the polarities of passibilism and impassibilism. It responds to some perennial objections to divine emotion, relating the discussions of emotions and body, will and intelligence to ongoing debates on divine incorporeality, omnipotence and omniscience, and concludes by exploring three emotional experiences sometimes attributed to God: compassion, anger and jealousy."
For reviews, see:
(a) Creel, R.E. 2012. Faith and Philosophy 29.4, pp. 487 – 490
(b) McDermid, D. 2013. The Heythrop Journal 54.2, pp. 324 – 325
(c) Hampson, P. 2013. New Blackfriars 94.1051, pp. 378 – 379
Papers by Tasia (Anastasia) P Scrutton
the same journal, responds by raising concerns about the intellectual credibility and
potentially harmful practical implications of demon possession beliefs. My paper
contributes to the discussion, arguing that a critique of demon possession beliefs in the
context of schizophrenia is needed, but suggesting an alternative basis for it. It also
reflects on important differences between demonic and other forms of spirit
possession, and considers the implications of this for mental health care providers.
Approaching this question from a philosophical perspective, I draw a distinction between (what I call) ‘spiritual health’ (SH) and ‘potentially transformative’ (PT) theologies, arguing that a PT model is therapeutically and philosophically more sound than a SH one. I then apply this to the clinical debate in critical dialogue with Dein and Durà-Vilà’s 2009 article, ‘The Dark Night of the Soul: spiritual distress and psychiatric implications’. My primary focus is on depression, though the discussion is also relevant to debates about psychosis and schizophrenia.
and value of emotions are at the heart of the im/passibility debate. More specifically, it suggests that presuppositions about the dichotomy between emotions and reason (or the
‘heart and the head’) have negatively impacted the debate. It contends that the debate can only move forward in response to serious reflection on our affects as we experience them, aided by historical and anthropological as well as contemporary philosophical perspectives
In this paper, I question this separation between the intellect and the emotions, focusing on our experience of compassion. I begin by arguing that compassion and other emotions make us more intelligent. Furthermore, I argue that emotions provide a unique or non-substitutable form of intelligence – that is, a form of intelligence that cannot be gained by other, non-emotional, means. I then argue that the separation between the head/intellect and the heart/emotions is incorrect. Finally, I argue that emotions should be regarded not only as a source of knowledge, but also (like non-emotional beliefs) as a potential form of knowledge in their own right.
The conclusions of this paper have implications for our understanding of human nature, and for our ethics, particularly in relation to how we make (and how we should make) decisions. For those of us who are Muslims, Christians, or Jews, the conclusions of this paper also has implications for our view of God.
In this paper I provide a philosophical and pastoral critique of a transformative view of suffering that will be of equal relevance to both aetiological and non-aetiological forms. I consider whether a transformative view is tenable or helpful, focusing on some of the experiences involved in mental illness, particularly depression. I argue that we need to qualify a transformative view by shifting the transformative potential of the experience away from the suffering itself and towards the subject’s response. However, I also argue that this view contains problems of its own in connection with free will, and discuss some possible solutions relating to diachronicity and eschatology.
Drafts by Tasia (Anastasia) P Scrutton
Despite the importance of rituals in continuing bonds theory, rituals are under-theorised in continuing bonds literature. This chapter will explore some reasons why rituals are important and powerful, contributing to our understanding of therapeutic practices for responding to grief. In order to set the scene for this, I will outline the rituals of two very different communities - those of Shona people in Zimbabwe and of Pagans in the United Kingdom – pointing to ways in which these might be seen to respond to features of grief highlighted by continuing bonds theory. Truth claims (formal doctrines and informal statements about the nature of reality) are often taken to be the most important and powerful aspects of religion and related phenomena, but I am interested in the ways in which the ritual aspect of religions and of human life more generally are important and powerful in distinctive ways. In particular, as I will argue, rituals are distinctively important and powerful because they are diachronic and narratival. As a result, they provide experiential knowledge or understanding of the view of reality that truth claims (for example, about the continued existence of the deceased) express more thinly. Furthermore, rituals are typically narratives that are sensorily rich, and so they enable the imaginative conceptualisation of perceived realities. In addition, because they are bodily, rituals can provide people with a more embedded and recalcitrant form of cognition than the more superficial forms provided by propositional means. Experiential and bodily forms of cognition are relevant when considering grief, because bereaved people undergo significant changes in their views of reality and relationships to it. In grief, this can include gaining a sense of the intelligibility of the deceased person’s absence, and yet of their continued felt presence, and of a continuing but changing relationship with them. Ritual’s relational character also contributes to its power and importance, because it enables grief to be shared and makes it a qualitatively different experience. At the end of the paper, I will point to some of the implications of the account of ritual I have given for how we respond to grief in practice.
While this book will be of interest to those working within contemporary philosophy of emotion, its primary originality and value lies in applying these insights to the impassibility debate within theology and philosophy of religion. The book shows how opting for a more variegated account of emotion would provide alternative possibilities within theology for speaking of God’s emotional life beyond the polarities of passibilism and impassibilism. It responds to some perennial objections to divine emotion, relating the discussions of emotions and body, will and intelligence to ongoing debates on divine incorporeality, omnipotence and omniscience, and concludes by exploring three emotional experiences sometimes attributed to God: compassion, anger and jealousy."
For reviews, see:
(a) Creel, R.E. 2012. Faith and Philosophy 29.4, pp. 487 – 490
(b) McDermid, D. 2013. The Heythrop Journal 54.2, pp. 324 – 325
(c) Hampson, P. 2013. New Blackfriars 94.1051, pp. 378 – 379
the same journal, responds by raising concerns about the intellectual credibility and
potentially harmful practical implications of demon possession beliefs. My paper
contributes to the discussion, arguing that a critique of demon possession beliefs in the
context of schizophrenia is needed, but suggesting an alternative basis for it. It also
reflects on important differences between demonic and other forms of spirit
possession, and considers the implications of this for mental health care providers.
Approaching this question from a philosophical perspective, I draw a distinction between (what I call) ‘spiritual health’ (SH) and ‘potentially transformative’ (PT) theologies, arguing that a PT model is therapeutically and philosophically more sound than a SH one. I then apply this to the clinical debate in critical dialogue with Dein and Durà-Vilà’s 2009 article, ‘The Dark Night of the Soul: spiritual distress and psychiatric implications’. My primary focus is on depression, though the discussion is also relevant to debates about psychosis and schizophrenia.
and value of emotions are at the heart of the im/passibility debate. More specifically, it suggests that presuppositions about the dichotomy between emotions and reason (or the
‘heart and the head’) have negatively impacted the debate. It contends that the debate can only move forward in response to serious reflection on our affects as we experience them, aided by historical and anthropological as well as contemporary philosophical perspectives
In this paper, I question this separation between the intellect and the emotions, focusing on our experience of compassion. I begin by arguing that compassion and other emotions make us more intelligent. Furthermore, I argue that emotions provide a unique or non-substitutable form of intelligence – that is, a form of intelligence that cannot be gained by other, non-emotional, means. I then argue that the separation between the head/intellect and the heart/emotions is incorrect. Finally, I argue that emotions should be regarded not only as a source of knowledge, but also (like non-emotional beliefs) as a potential form of knowledge in their own right.
The conclusions of this paper have implications for our understanding of human nature, and for our ethics, particularly in relation to how we make (and how we should make) decisions. For those of us who are Muslims, Christians, or Jews, the conclusions of this paper also has implications for our view of God.
In this paper I provide a philosophical and pastoral critique of a transformative view of suffering that will be of equal relevance to both aetiological and non-aetiological forms. I consider whether a transformative view is tenable or helpful, focusing on some of the experiences involved in mental illness, particularly depression. I argue that we need to qualify a transformative view by shifting the transformative potential of the experience away from the suffering itself and towards the subject’s response. However, I also argue that this view contains problems of its own in connection with free will, and discuss some possible solutions relating to diachronicity and eschatology.
Having considered ways in which religion and spirituality have been thought both to conflict with and to complement mental health, I will turn to ways in which religions and spirituality have been re-imagined for emotional healing, initially in 'alternative' but increasingly in mainstream popular and medical cultures. I will argue that at the heart of the re-imagining of spiritual resources by western consumers are not only practical, therapeutic concerns but also some important philosophical concerns to do with the mind and emotion: the relationship between the body and the mind, between the human person and the larger world (or the nature of consciousness), the nature of human wellbeing and its relationship to experiences of suffering, and the nature, value, importance and role of emotion. While therefore in some ways sympathetic to these re-imaginings, however, I will point to some important concerns raised by religious practitioners and by religious studies scholars about the appropriation of religious and spiritual traditions for therapeutic ends, focusing on issues of misrepresentation. As with the religion and mental health literature discussed earlier in the paper, I will argue that increased attention to the religious traditions in question is needed, and that this should be combined with a more respectful attitude towards them.