Abstract
I suggest three promising avenues for mechanism design; (1) the further unification of the Arrowian approach with the one underlying Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, (2) the search for useful domain restrictions embracing large classes of environments, and (3) the identification of further fields of application.
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Acknowledgements
I am thankful to the editors, and to Dolors Berga, Gabriel Carroll, Marcus Pivato, Matthew Jackson, Antonio Miralles, Bernardo Moreno, and Flip Klijn for their critical remarks and constructive comments.
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Barberà, S. (2019). Theoretical Unification, Domain Restrictions and Further Applications: Some Comments on Future Research in Economic Design. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_4
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