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Round-Efficient Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model

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Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12020))

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Abstract

Anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (APAKE) protocols allow for authenticating legitimate users via low-entropy passwords while keeping their actual identities private. They are important cryptographic primitives for privacy protection, which have attracted much attention recently and have been standardized in the international standard ISO/IEC 20009-4. However, most of the existing APAKE schemes (especially including all the APAKE schemes in the storage-extra setting) are developed in the random oracle model. In this paper, we present the first storage-extra APAKE protocol in the standard model by combing the technique of algebraic MAC with oblivious designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (DVNIZK) proof. Toward our aim, we first give out a new construction of the oblivious DVNIZK proof system, which is compatible with a new class of algebraic MAC schemes. As a consequence, our APAKE protocol needs only 2 flows of messages in the authentication phase, which is very efficient in terms of rounds. Moreover, we show that this protocol enjoys stronger security guarantees while achieves considerably computational performance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As pointed out by Camenisch et al. [26], the auxiliary information \( \sigma _j \) are not required for the MAC verification, but they are useful to improve the efficiency of credential presentation, and additionally remove the requirement of extended unforgeability.

  2. 2.

    Beyond a single value of identity, here we consider a vector of attributes, which could handle more complex access policies such as expiration dates and access rights.

  3. 3.

    Together with the credential \(\varSigma \), the server perhaps, if needed, sends a zero-knowledge proof proving that this MAC tag is honestly generated. The ZK proof could be either a NIZK proof secure in the random oracle model, or a DVNIZK proof secure in the standard model where the proving key is sent to the server along with the attributes.

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Acknowledgments

Qihui Zhang and Wenfen Liu are supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61862011, 61872449), and Guangxi Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. 2018GXNSFAA138116) and the Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (Grant No. GCIS201704). Kang Yang is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2018YFB0804105), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61932019, 61802021).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. PLA SSF Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, 450001, China

    Qihui Zhang & Xuexian Hu

  2. Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, 541004, China

    Wenfen Liu

  3. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, 100878, China

    Kang Yang

  4. Automobile NCO School, Army Military Transportation University, Bengbu, 233000, China

    Ying Mei

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  1. Qihui Zhang
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Correspondence to Wenfen Liu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China

    Zhe Liu

  2. Computer Science Department, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

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Zhang, Q., Liu, W., Yang, K., Hu, X., Mei, Y. (2020). Round-Efficient Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model. In: Liu, Z., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12020. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42921-8_30

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