Abstract
Security researchers have been focusing on developing mitigation and protection mechanisms against code-injection and code-reuse attacks. Modern defences focus on protecting the legitimate control-flow of a program, nevertheless they cannot withstand a more subtle type of attack, non-control-data attacks, since they follow the legitimate control flow, and thus leave no trace. Data-Flow Integrity (DFI) is a defence mechanism which aims to protect programs against non-control-data attacks. DFI uses static analysis to compute the data-flow graph of a program, and then, enforce at runtime that the data-flow of the program follows the legitimate path; otherwise the execution is aborted.
In this paper, we review the state of the techniques to generate non-control-data attacks and present the state of DFI methods.
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Díez-Franco, I., Santos, I. (2017). Data Is Flowing in the Wind: A Review of Data-Flow Integrity Methods to Overcome Non-Control-Data Attacks. In: Graña, M., López-Guede, J.M., Etxaniz, O., Herrero, Á., Quintián, H., Corchado, E. (eds) International Joint Conference SOCO’16-CISIS’16-ICEUTE’16. SOCO CISIS ICEUTE 2016 2016 2016. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 527. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47364-2_52
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47364-2_52
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