Abstract
The so-called \(\omega \)-encoding, introduced by Goudarzi, Joux and Rivain (Asiacrypt 2018), generalizes the commonly used arithmetic encoding. By using the additionnal structure of this encoding, they proposed a masked multiplication gadget (GJR) with quasilinear (randomness and operations) complexity. A follow-up contribution by Goudarzi, Prest, Rivain and Vergnaud in this line of research appeared in TCHES 2021. The authors revisited the aforementioned multiplication gadget (GPRV), and brought the IOS security notion for refresh gadgets to allow secure composition between probing secure gadgets.
In this paper, we propose a follow up on GPRV, that is, a region-probing secure arithmetic circuit masked compiler. Our contribution stems from a single Lemma, linking algebra and probing security for a wide class of circuits, further taking advantage of the algebraic structure of \(\omega \)-encoding, and the extension field structure of the underlying field
that was so far left unexploited. On the theoretical side, we propose a security notion for \(\boldsymbol{\omega }_d\)-masked circuits which we call Reducible-To-Independent-K-linear (RTIK). When the number of shares d is less than or equal to the degree k of
, RTIK circuits achieve region-probing security. Moreover, RTIK circuits may be composed naively and remain RTIK. We also propose a weaker version of IOS, which we call KIOS, for refresh gadgets. This notion allows to compose RTIK circuits with a randomness/security tradeoff compared to the naive composition.
To substantiate our new definitions, we also provide examples of competitively efficient gadgets verifying the latter weaker security notions. Explicitly, we give 1) two refresh gadgets that use \(d-1\) random field elements to refresh a length d encoding, both of which are KIOS but not IOS, and 2) a multiplication gadget with bilinear multiplication complexity \(d^{\log 3}\) and uses d fresh random elements per run. Our compiler outperforms ISW asymptotically, but for our security proofs to hold, we do require that the number of shares d is less than or equal to the degree of
as an extension, so that there is sufficient structure to exploit.
Part of this work was done during an internship at PQShield in collaboration and under the supervision of Thomas Prest.
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Notes
- 1.
We also add a coefficient \(\alpha \) to its definition, which upper bounds the ratio of K-linear probes on \({\textbf {x}}\), \({\textbf {y}}\) after the reduction and the count of initial probes in the KIOS gadget.
- 2.
Please note that while we discuss about the asymptotic behaviour of the performances of our multiplication gadgets, their security only falls into our framework for bounded order of masking d, for a fixed
. - 3.
This multiplication gadget actually behaves as a KIOS refresh with regards to region-probing secure composition. It introduces d random elements to increment the number of regions when composed with other circuits.
- 4.
We assume that the folding matrix exists i.e
. If this condition is not verified, one can still use the \(\textsf{NaiveFold}\) at the cost of roughly halving the tolerated probing ratio.
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Plançon, M. (2023). Exploiting Algebraic Structures in Probing Security. In: Guo, J., Steinfeld, R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2023. ASIACRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14441. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8730-6_8
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