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Dynamic attribute based vehicle authentication

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Abstract

Modern vehicles are proficient in establishing a spontaneous connection over a wireless radio channel, synchronizing actions and information. Security infrastructure is most important in such a sensitive scope of vehicle communication for coordinating actions and avoiding accidents on the road. One of the first security issues that need to be established is authentication via IEEE 1609.2 security infrastructure. According to our preliminary work, vehicle owners are bound to preprocess a certificate from the certificate authority. The certificate carries vehicle static attributes (e.g., licence number, brand and color) certified together with the vehicle public key in a monolithic manner. Nevertheless, a malicious vehicle might clone the static attributes to impersonate a specific vehicle. Therefore, in this paper we consider a resource expensive attack scenario involving multiple malicious vehicles with identical visual static attributes. Apparently, dynamic attributes (e.g., location and direction) can uniquely define a vehicle and can be utilized to resolve the true identity of the vehicle. However, unlike static attributes, dynamic attributes cannot be signed by a trusted authority beforehand. We propose an approach to verify the coupling between non-certified dynamic attributes and certified static attributes on an auxiliary communication channel, for example, a modulated laser beam. Furthermore, we illustrate that the proposed approach can be used to facilitate the usage of existing authentication protocols such as NAXOS, in the new scope of ad-hoc vehicle networks. We use BAN logic to verify the security claims of the protocol against the passive and active interception.

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Acknowledgments

The work of the first author is partially supported by Orange Labs under external research Contract No. 0050012310-C04021, the Rita Altura Trust Chair in Computer Sciences, Lynne and William Frankel Center for Computer Sciences, and Israel Science Foundation (Grant No. 428/11). The work of the second author is partially supported by fundings from Polish National Science Center (Decision No. DEC-2013/08/M/ST6/00928) project HARMONIA. The work of the last author is partially supported by General Motors.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 504 Building 37 Department of Computer Science, Beer-Sheva, 84105, NA, Israel

    Shlomi Dolev & Nisha Panwar

  2. Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Łukasz Krzywiecki

  3. Department of Communication Systems Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 504 Building 37 Department of Computer Science, Beer-Sheva, 84105, NA, Israel

    Michael Segal

Authors
  1. Shlomi Dolev
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  2. Łukasz Krzywiecki
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  3. Nisha Panwar
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  4. Michael Segal
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nisha Panwar.

Additional information

A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in proceedings of the 13th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (IEEE NCA) 2014 [38].

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Dolev, S., Krzywiecki, Ł., Panwar, N. et al. Dynamic attribute based vehicle authentication. Wireless Netw 23, 1045–1062 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11276-016-1203-5

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