Abstract
Differential games of common resources that are governed by linear accumulation constraints have several applications. Examples include political rent-seeking groups expropriating public infrastructure, oligopolies expropriating common resources, industries using specific common infrastructure or equipment, capital flight problems, pollution, etc. Most of the theoretical literature employs specific parametric examples of utility functions. For symmetric differential games with linear constraints and a general time-separable utility function depending only on the player’s control variable, we provide an exact formula for interior symmetric Markovian strategies. This exact solution (a) serves as a guide for obtaining some new closed-form solutions and for characterizing multiple equilibria and (b) implies that if the utility function is an analytic function, then the Markovian strategies are analytic functions, too. This analyticity property facilitates the numerical computation of interior solutions of such games using polynomial projection methods and gives potential for computing modified game versions with corner solutions by employing a homotopy approach.
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Notes
An earlier survey paper in differential games is Clemhout and Wan [8]. A recent paper by Kunieda and Nishimura [22] extends the Tornell and Velasco [34] model by introducing uncertainty and financial constraints. This study examines how commons problems are affected by imperfect financial markets and how the possibility for sustainable growth is affected by these commons problems. Although our model is deterministic, it can contribute to extending such analyses by using more general utility functions.
An early application of Markovian differential games to pollution is Dockner and Long [10].
Typically, Markovian differential game models require metric space or other functional analysis methods in order to prove that solutions exist, that they are well behaved, or that they possess certain desirable functional properties. Such approaches are necessitated by the complexity of dynamic programming problems, especially if their constraints are nonlinear. Regarding the approximation theory difficulties posed by dynamic programming problems and an exposition of metric space methods, see, for example, Chow and Tsitsiklis [6]. Theoretical foundations of differential games are provided by Basar and Olsder [2] and Dockner et al. [12].
Notice that we exclude \(A=0\), which is games with non-renewable resources. We focus on games with potentially sustainable resource outcomes.
For example, unlike in many papers, such as in Dockner and Sorger [11, p. 213], an upper bound is imposed on the consumption level, c, and the resource reproduction function is also bounded in their study. Here, in some cases of sustainable growth, c can grow to infinity. In examples that we present in a later section, we identify the cases where an upper bound must be placed on c and cases in which such a bound does not apply.
See Clairaut [7].
See, for example, Lang [24, Theorem 4.2, p. 60], proving that the composition of continuous functions gives a continuous function.
This property of continuity of strategies differs from Dockner and Sorger [11, Theorem 1, p. 2015], where the strategies can be discontinuous functions.
The next section, where we present several closed-form solutions, gives “hands-on” examples of how the choice of parameters affects whether a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium solution is interior or not.
Most of our examples, except the slightly more generalized case with “Gorman preferences” and the case of constant absolute risk aversion preferences, which we present below, have been thoroughly studied by Gaudet and Lohoues [16], who go beyond the use of linear resource reproduction functions, specifying the types of resource reproduction functions that allow for linear strategies. We thank Hassan Benchekroun for pointing this paper to us.
In Tasneem, Engle-Warnick and Benchekroun [31], there is experimental evidence that players may choose both linear and nonlinear strategies. The theoretical model employed in Tasneem, Engle-Warnick and Benchekroun [31] allows for multiple equilibria, providing a clear distinction between linear and nonlinear equilibria. The evidence that nonlinear strategies may be chosen by players supports the usefulness of our new example. We are indebted to Hassan Benchekroun for making this point to us.
A study explaining that nonlinear strategies can also exist is Tsutsui and Mino [35]. Nevertheless, focusing on interior solutions is important on whether such nonlinear strategies can exist or not in linear quadratic games.
Fish reproduction is the application in Sorger [29], who also uses a linear, constant reproduction rate, Ak. Alternative interpretations would include exogenously supplied infrastructure by governments to users, such as public roads, assuming that users have an upper capacity of usage, \({\bar{c}}\).
For the derivation of \(\phi \left( \lambda \right) \), see “Appendix.”
For a proof of this result, see “Appendix.”
See “Appendix” for details on this point.
To see why (75) implies \(A>\left( 5N-2\right) \rho /\left[ 2\left( 3N-1\right) \right] \) for all \(N\ge 1\), define \(H\left( N\right) =\left( 5N-2\right) \rho /\left[ 2\left( 3N-1\right) \right] \). Notice that \(H\left( 1\right) =3\rho /4\), with \(H^{\prime }\left( N\right) =\rho /\left[ 2\left( 3N-1\right) ^{2}\right] >0\) and with \(\lim _{N\rightarrow \infty }H\left( N\right) =5\rho /6\).
See “Appendix” for a proof of this statement.
Think, for example, of a railroad that is provided exogenously by a government, with railway companies utilizing this railroad infrastructure in a rivalrous and non-excludable manner, at no cost. This infrastructure, k , can depreciate with utilization, i.e., by the number of passengers of each company, \(q_{i}\), according to an endogenous depreciation function that is linear in \(q_{i}\), say, \(\delta \left( q_{i}\right) =\psi k_{i}\), and parameter A in the law of motion of k is normalized so as to set \(\psi =1 \). A discrete-time version of this setup is given, for example, in Koulovatianos and Mirman [19, p. 203].
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this interpretation to us.
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We thank Anastasia Antsygina, Hassan Benchekroun, Luca Colombo, Konstantin Sonin and Gerhard Sorger for very useful comments and suggestions. We also thank three anonymous referees, an anonymous Associate Editor of this Journal and the Journal Editor, Georges Zaccour, for comments and revisions that helped us in greatly improving the original draft. Koulovatianos thanks the Research Office of U Luxembourg for financial support (Grant Number F2R-CRE-PDE-13KOUL) and HSE for its resources and collaboration.
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Derivation of Function \(\phi \left( \lambda \right) \) in Eq. (59)
Substituting (58) into (19) leads to
To calculate the integral in (97) we expand the quadratic form, namely
which leads to
Combining (98) with (97) gives
where
Collecting terms in (99) leads to
or
where
Substituting the expressions for \(\alpha \), \(\beta \) and \(\zeta \) given by (100) and (102) into (101) gives Eq. (59), together with the expressions given by (60), (61) and (62). \(\square \)
1.2 Proof of Inequality (66)
Fix any value of \(\rho \) and observe that
where
and
Notice that, according to (65), \(A>2/3\rho >1/2\rho \), and therefore, \(F\left( A\right) >0\). Moreover,
and
Combining (107) with (106) gives
Similarly, notice that
while
Therefore, (103), (109) and (110) imply
Combining (103), (109) and (111) proves inequality (66). \(\square \)
1.3 Why the Case of \(\lambda -\theta \ge 0\) in Eq. (63) is not Admissible
Substituting \(\lambda -\theta \ge 0\) into (63) gives
Recall that \(\lambda =J^{\prime }\left( k\right) \). Differentiating the right-hand side of (112), we can see that \(J^{\prime \prime }\left( k\right) =1/\left( 2\eta ^{1/2}\right) \left( k-\psi \right) ^{-1/2}>0\) for all \(k\ge \max \left\{ 0,\psi \right\} \). Yet, \(J^{\prime \prime }\left( k\right) >0\) is not a property of the value function that complies with the transversality condition. To see this, consider the first-order condition given by (5), which implies
Differentiating both sides of (113) implies
Because \(u^{\prime \prime }\left( c\right) <0\) for all \(c\ \)complying with (57),
Yet, remember that the budget constraint given by (1) implies
Combining (116) with \(C^{\prime }\left( k\right) <0\) means that the right-hand side of Eq. (116) is upward sloping in \(k\left( t\right) \). Based on (21), we can combine (112) with (58) to obtain the explicit formula for \(C\left( k\right) \), namely
Using (117), we derive the first and second derivatives of the strategies \(C\left( k\right) \), i.e.,
Notice that (118) combined with (115) implies that
In addition, (118) implies
All properties of \(C\left( k\right) \) described by (57), (117), (118), (119) and (120) are depicted in Fig. 3, where the shaded areas indicate value regions where the strategies \(C\left( k\right) \) are not defined. Without loss of generality, Fig. 3 depicts a case where \(\psi >0\). The case of \(\psi \le 0\) would simply depict a picture with \(C\left( k\right) \) exhibiting the same properties for \(k\in \left[ 0,\psi +\eta \left( 1-\theta \right) ^{2}\right] \).
Introducing strategies \(C\left( k\right) \) into (1), we obtain
Differentiating (121) with respect to k, we obtain
Equation (122) is a consequence of Eq. (119). Eq. (122) implies unstable dynamics of k. These unstable dynamics of k further imply a violation of the feature that the solution is interior. In the absence of an interior solution, Proposition 1 does not apply, and therefore, the closed-form solution of the strategies, \(C\left( k\right) \), given by (117), is invalid.
Figures 4 and 5 depict (121) and the dynamics of k, based on all parametric cases. Specifically, we distinguish cases of parametric values of A such that \(\psi >0\) and otherwise. Based on Eq. (60), after some algebra, and making use of the parametric constraint given by (65), we can show that
and
A common feature between Figs. 4 and 5 is that when \(k=\psi +\eta \left( 1-\theta \right) ^{2}\), which is the upper bound of k for which \( C\left( k\right) \) is admissible in this case of \(\lambda -\theta \ge 0\), \( {\dot{k}}>0\). To see this, insert \(k=\psi +\eta \left( 1-\theta \right) ^{2}\) into (121) to obtain
Inequality (126) justifies why in both Figs. 4 and 5 the curve depicting the law of motion for k is above the 0 line.
To understand why there are two curves depicting (121) in Fig. 4, which focuses on parameter values implying \(\psi >0\), consider the equivalence given by (123) and focus on the specific value of k, \( k=\psi \). By inserting \(k=\psi ~\)into (121),
In the trivial case of \(N=1\), \(\left. {\dot{k}}\right| _{k=\psi }=0\). Yet, this does not correspond to an interior solution with free initial conditions. We therefore focus on cases with \(N\ge 2\). When \(N\ge 2\), the equivalence given by (127) implies that
Given that
the two curves depicting (121) in Fig. 4 are justified. The equivalence implied by (123) implies that, in the case where \(A\in \left( 2/3\rho ~,~\left( 3N-2\right) /\left( 4N-3\right) \rho \right) \), there is a value \(k^{ss}\) for which \(\left. {\dot{k}}\right| _{k=k^{ss}}=0\) . Yet, this unstable zero growth value does not correspond to an interior solution with free initial conditions for the problem.
Figure 5 focuses on the case implied by (125). Because of (128), in Fig. 5 we have once more a value \(k^{ss}\) for which \(\left. {\dot{k}}\right| _{k=k^{ss}}=0\). Again, this unstable zero growth value does not correspond to an interior solution with free initial conditions for the problem. The same problem arises for the two specific values of A given by (124), for which \(\psi =0\).
In summary, the case of \(\lambda -\theta \ge 0\) does not correspond to an interior solution and it should, therefore, be discarded. \(\square \)
1.4 Proof of Equivalence (85)
To prove that \(\theta > reqqless 1\Leftrightarrow A > reqqless \rho N\), use (61) to obtain
Based on the parametric constraint given by (75), numerators and denominators in the fractions appearing in (129) are strictly positive. This feature leads to verifying that
which confirms the first part of (85) that \(\theta > reqqless 1\Leftrightarrow A > reqqless \rho N\).
For proving the second part of (85) that \({\bar{k}} > reqqless \eta \Leftrightarrow A > reqqless \rho N\), observe that (62) and (73) imply
Using the parametric constraint given by (75), which also implies \( \eta >0\), together we can show that
which proves the second part of (85) that \({\bar{k}} > reqqless \eta \Leftrightarrow A > reqqless \rho N\).
Finally, for proving that \({\bar{k}}\left( 2-\theta \right) -\eta \theta > reqqless 0\Leftrightarrow A > reqqless \rho N\), use (61) and (62) to see that
confirming that \({\bar{k}}\left( 2-\theta \right) -\eta \theta > reqqless 0\Leftrightarrow A > reqqless \rho N\) for all \(N\ge 2\). \(\square \)
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Hakobyan, Z., Koulovatianos, C. Symmetric Markovian Games of Commons with Potentially Sustainable Endogenous Growth. Dyn Games Appl 11, 54–83 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00349-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00349-w
Keywords
- Differential games
- Endogenous growth
- Tragedy of the commons
- Lagrange–d’Alembert equation
- Analytic functions