Abstract
The handling of insider attacks is a significant technical challenge as little assurance theory and design practice exists to guide the design of effective, credible countermeasures for large systems and applications. Much of the relevant theory has focused on insider attacks on individual security protocols and smallscale applications. In this position paper, we suggest that confidence in a system’s resilience to insider attacks can emerge by the application of well-accepted survivability principles and design methods. We caution, however, that different tradeoffs emerge in applying these principles to practical designs, thereby requiring a careful balance among the costs of countering insider attacks, recovery from attack, and attack deterrence, and between the fine granularity of access permissions and ability to administer these permissions is a safe manner. In view of the dearth of practical solutions for surviving insider attacks in any significant-size system, we suggest that experiments in applying well-accepted principles and design methods to critical subsystems (e.g., user authentication, DNS) are necessary to provide effective and quantifiable assurances.
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Gligor, V.D., Chandersekaran, C.S. (2008). Surviving Insider Attacks: A Call for System Experiments. In: Stolfo, S.J., Bellovin, S.M., Keromytis, A.D., Hershkop, S., Smith, S.W., Sinclair, S. (eds) Insider Attack and Cyber Security. Advances in Information Security, vol 39. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77322-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77322-3_9
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