Abstract
We present two efficient constructions aimed at making public key systems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. The first one applies to any deterministic public key system and modifies it into a system that is provably as hard to break under a passive attack as the original one, but has the potential of making a chosen ciphertext attack useless to an enemy. The second construction applies to the El Gamal/Diffie-Hellman public key system. Again, the modified system is provably as hard to break under a passive attack as the original one, and under an additional cryptographic assumption, a chosen ciphertext attack is provably useless to an enemy. We also point out a connection between such public-key systems and efficient identification schemes.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
M. Blum and S. Goldwasser: An Efficient Probabilistic Public-Key Encryption Scheme which Hides all Partial Information, Proc. of Crypto 84, Springer Verlag.
B. den Boer: Diffie-Hellman is as Strong as Discrete Log for Certain Primes, Proc. of Crypto 84, Springer Verlag.
T. El Gamal: A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms, IEEE Trans. on Inf. Theory, vol.IT-31, 1985.
U. Feige, A. Fiat and A. Shamir: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity, J.Crypt, vol. 1, 1988, Springer Verlag.
O. Goldreich and H. Krawczyk: On the Composition of Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems, Proc. of ICALP 90.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and R. Rivest: A “Paradoxical” Solution to the Signature Problem, proc. of FOCS 84.
M. Naor and M. Yung: Public-Key Cryptosystems Provably Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks, Proc. of FOCS 90.
M.O. Rabin: Digital Signatures and Public Key Encryption as Intractable as Factorization, Tech. report, MIT/LCS/TR-212. M.I.T., 1978.
C. Rackoff and D. Simon: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks, these proceedings.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Damgård, I. (1992). Towards Practical Public Key Systems Secure Against Chosen Ciphertext attacks. In: Feigenbaum, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’91. CRYPTO 1991. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_36
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_36
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-55188-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46766-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive