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Security in Plain TXT

Observing the Use of DNS TXT Records in the Wild

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  • First Online:
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11543))

Abstract

The Domain Name System is a critical piece of infrastructure that has expanded into use cases beyond its original intent. DNS TXT records are intentionally very permissive in what information can be stored there, and as a result are often used in broad and undocumented ways to support Internet security and networked applications. In this paper, we identified and categorized the patterns in TXT record use from a representative collection of resource record sets. We obtained the records from a data set containing 1.4 billion TXT records collected over a 2 year period and used pattern matching to identify record use cases present across multiple domains. We found that 92% of these records generally fall into 3 categories; protocol enhancement, domain verification, and resource location. While some of these records are required to remain public, we discovered many examples that unnecessarily reveal domain information or present other security threats (e.g., amplification attacks) in conflict with best practices in security.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Villanova University, Villanova, USA

    Adam Portier & Henry Carter

  2. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA

    Charles Lever

Authors
  1. Adam Portier
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  2. Henry Carter
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  3. Charles Lever
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Adam Portier .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

    Roberto Perdisci

  2. University of Rennes, CNRS, IRISA, Rennes, France

    Clémentine Maurice

  3. University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy

    Giorgio Giacinto

  4. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Magnus Almgren

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Portier, A., Carter, H., Lever, C. (2019). Security in Plain TXT. In: Perdisci, R., Maurice, C., Giacinto, G., Almgren, M. (eds) Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11543. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_18

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-22037-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-22038-9

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