Abstract
We improve the communication complexity in the Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) model, which is a minimal model of non-interactive information-theoretic multi-party computation. The state-of-the-art PSM protocols were recently constructed by Beimel, Kushilevitz and Nissim (EUROCRYPT 2018).
We present new constructions of k-party PSM protocols. The new protocols match the previous upper bounds when \(k=2\) or 3 and improve the upper bounds for larger k. We also construct 2-party PSM protocols with unbalanced communication complexity. More concretely,
-
For infinitely many k (including all \(k \le 20\)), we construct k-party PSM protocols for arbitrary functionality \(f:[N]^k\rightarrow \{0,1\}\), whose communication complexity is \(O_k(N^{\frac{k-1}{2}})\). This improves the former best known upper bounds of \(O_k(N^{\frac{k}{2}})\) for \(k\ge 6\), \(O(N^{7/3})\) for \(k=5\), and \(O(N^{5/3})\) for \(k=4\).
-
For all rational \(0<\eta <1\) whose denominator is \(\le 20\), we construct 2-party PSM protocols for arbitrary functionality \(f:[N]\times [N]\rightarrow \{0,1\}\), whose communication complexity is \(O(N^\eta )\) for one party, \(O(N^{1-\eta })\) for the other. Previously the only known unbalanced 2-party PSM has communication complexity \(O(\log (N)), O(N)\).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
A note on the randomness complexity: The final protocol uses \(\mathbf {R}_\varOmega \) only if \(|\varOmega | \le k-1\).
- 2.
We implicitly exchange the order of indices in tensor product. E.g. when \(k=2\), the masked tensor \(\bar{\mathbf {X}}_{\{1,4\}}\otimes \bar{\mathbf {X}}_{\{2,3\}}\) is defined by \((\bar{\mathbf {X}}_{\{1,4\}}\otimes \bar{\mathbf {X}}_{\{2,3\}})[j_1,j_2,j_3,j_4] = \bar{\mathbf {X}}_{\{1,4\}}[j_1,j_4] \cdot \bar{\mathbf {X}}_{\{2,3\}}[j_2,j_3]\).
- 3.
The source code can be downloaded from https://github.com/tianren/psm.
References
Applebaum, B., Arkis, B.: On the power of amortization in secret sharing: d-uniform secret sharing and CDS with constant information rate. In: Beimel, A., Dziembowski, S. (eds.) TCC 2018, Part I. LNCS, vol. 11239, pp. 317–344. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03807-6_12
Applebaum, B., Arkis, B., Raykov, P., Vasudevan, P.N.: Conditional disclosure of secrets: amplification, closure, amortization, lower-bounds, and separations. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 24, 38 (2017). https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2017/038
Applebaum, B., Beimel, A., Farràs, O., Nir, O., Peter, N.: Secret-sharing schemes for general and uniform access structures. In: Ishai, Y., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2019, Part III. LNCS, vol. 11478, pp. 441–471. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17659-4_15
Applebaum, B., Holenstein, T., Mishra, M., Shayevitz, O.: The communication complexity of private simultaneous messages, revisited. J. Cryptol. 33(3), 917–953 (2020)
Ball, M., Holmgren, J., Ishai, Y., Liu, T., Malkin, T.: On the complexity of decomposable randomized encodings, or: how friendly can a garbling-friendly PRF be? In: Vidick, T. (ed.) 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2020, Seattle, Washington, USA, 12–14 January 2020. LIPIcs, vol. 151, pp. 86:1–86:22. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020). https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.86
Beimel, A., Ishai, Y., Kumaresan, R., Kushilevitz, E.: On the cryptographic complexity of the worst functions. In: TCC, pp. 317–342 (2014)
Beimel, A., Ishai, Y., Kushilevitz, E.: Ad hoc PSM protocols: secure computation without coordination. In: Coron, J.-S., Nielsen, J.B. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2017, Part III. LNCS, vol. 10212, pp. 580–608. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56617-7_20
Beimel, A., Kushilevitz, E., Nissim, P.: The complexity of multiparty PSM protocols and related models. In: Nielsen, J.B., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2018, Part II. LNCS, vol. 10821, pp. 287–318. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78375-8_10
Ciampi, M., Goyal, V., Ostrovsky, R.: Threshold garbled circuits and ad hoc secure computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2021/308 (2021). https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/308
Feige, U., Kilian, J., Naor, M.: A minimal model for secure computation (extended abstract). In: Leighton, F.T., Goodrich, M.T. (eds.) Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 23–25 May 1994, Montréal, Québec, Canada, pp. 554–563. ACM (1994). https://doi.org/10.1145/195058.195408. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/195058.195408
Gay, R., Kerenidis, I., Wee, H.: Communication complexity of conditional disclosure of secrets and attribute-based encryption. In: Gennaro, R., Robshaw, M. (eds.) CRYPTO 2015. LNCS, vol. 9216, pp. 485–502. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_24
Ishai, Y., Kushilevitz, E.: Private simultaneous messages protocols with applications. In: Fifth Israel Symposium on Theory of Computing and Systems, ISTCS 1997, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 17–19 June 1997, Proceedings, pp. 174–184. IEEE Computer Society (1997). https://doi.org/10.1109/ISTCS.1997.595170
Ishai, Y., Kushilevitz, E.: Randomizing polynomials: a new representation with applications to round-efficient secure computation. In: 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2000, 12–14 November 2000, Redondo Beach, California, USA, pp. 294–304. IEEE Computer Society (2000). https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.2000.892118
Liu, T., Vaikuntanathan, V., Wee, H.: Conditional disclosure of secrets via non-linear reconstruction. In: Katz, J., Shacham, H. (eds.) CRYPTO 2017, Part I. LNCS, vol. 10401, pp. 758–790. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_25
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Hoeteck Wee, Vinod Vaikuntanathan amd Michel Abdalla for helpful discussions. TL was supported by NSF grants CNS-1528178, CNS-1929901, CNS-1936825 (CAREER), CNS-2026774, a JP Morgan AI research Award, and a Simons Foundation Collaboration Grant on Algorithmic Fairness. Part of this work was performed while TL was in MIT, during which he was supported in part by NSF Grants CNS-1350619, CNS-1414119 and CNS-1718161, an MIT-IBM grant and a DARPA Young Faculty Award. LA was supported by a doctoral grant from the French Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendices
A Proof of Eq. (9) and (10)
Proof
(Proof of Eq. (9)). By definition:
where \((*)\) denotes “for all unordered \(E = \{S_1, \ldots , S_t\}\) being a partition of [2k] such that \(\{|S_1|, \ldots ,|S_t|\} = P\)”. Thus,
where \(\beta (P,G)\) accounts for the redundancy: define \(\beta (P,G)\) as the number of unordered partitions E of [2k] such that \(G\subseteq E\) and P is the shape of E. It is equivalent to count the number of \(F \mathrel {:=}E \setminus G\). That is, \(\beta (P,G)\) also equals the number of unordered partitions F of such that Q is the shape of F. Thus by definition, \(\beta (P,G) = \alpha (Q)\). The proof is concluded by
\(\square \)
Proof
(Proof of Eq. (10)). Let \(n = {\text {sum}}(Q)\). By definition, \(\alpha (Q)\) is the number of unsorted partitions \(E = \{S_1,\dots ,S_t\}\) of [n] such that the multiset \(\{|S_1|,\dots ,|S_t|\}\) (i.e. the shape of E) equals Q.
To compute \(\alpha (Q)\), we count the number of ways to arranging \(1,\dots ,n\) into a sequence.
-
First, pick an unsorted partitions E of [n] s.t. the shape of E equals Q. The number of choices is \(\alpha (Q)\).
-
Then, sort the sets in the partion \(E = \{S_1,\dots ,S_t\}\). Sort them by their sizes, i.e. \(|S_1| \le |S_2| \le \dots \le |S_t|\). For any m, if several sets are of the size m, their order has to be specified, the number of such choices is .
-
Finally, arrange the elements in each \(S_i\) into a sub-sequence, the number of possible sequences is \(|S_i|!\). Concatenate these sub-sequences in order.
\(\square \)
B Auxiliary PSM Protocols for \(\langle \mathbf {x}_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathbf {x}_k, \mathbf {Y} \rangle + s\)
1.1 B.1 The Multi-party Variant
In this section, we present an auxiliary PSM protocol that is used as a subroutine by our multi-party PSM in Sect. 3.
The functionality is \(\langle \mathbf {x}_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathbf {x}_k, \mathbf {Y} \rangle + s\). It is a \((k+1)\)-party functionality where the i-th party has as input \(\mathbf {x}_i\in \mathbb F^N\) for \(i\in [k]\), and the \((k+1)\)-th party has as inputs \(\mathbf {Y}\in \mathbb F^{\smash {\underset{k \text { times}}{N \times \dots \times N}}}\) and \(s\in \mathbb F\). We will present a PSM protocol for this functionality with a communication complexity of \(O(\mathop {{\text {poly}}}(k) \cdot N^k)\) field elements. This protocol is implicitly used in [8].
First, we consider the special case when \(k=1\). That is, there are only two parties. Say we call them Alice and Bob. Alice has \(\mathbf {x}\in \mathbb F^N\), Bob has \(\mathbf {y}\in \mathbb F^N, s\in \mathbb F\). The functionality output is \(\langle \mathbf {x},\mathbf {y} \rangle + s\). The PSM protocol works as follows:
-
Random \(\mathbf {a}, \mathbf {b}\in \mathbb F^{N}, c\in \mathbb F\) are sampled from the common random string, which is known by both Alice and Bob.
-
Alice sends to the referee.
-
Bob sends to the referee.
-
The referee outputs .
For the case \(k \ge 2\), the first k parties need to jointly emulate Alice. The protocol works as follows:
-
Random \(\mathbf {A}, \mathbf {B},\mathbf {C}\in \mathbb F^{N \times \dots \times N}\) are sampled from the common random string. Define \(c\in \mathbb F\) as the sum of entries in \(\mathbf {C}\).
-
The \((k+1)\)-th party sends to the referee.
-
The first k parties jointly reveal , \(w \mathrel {:=}c - \langle \mathbf {B},\mathbf {x}_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathbf {x}_k \rangle \) to the referee. Since every coordinate of \(\bar{\mathbf {X}}\) can be computed by an arithmetic formula of size O(k), each of these coordinates can be computed by the referee by using a PSM protocol with communication complexity of \(O(\mathop {{\text {poly}}}(k))\) field elements [13]. The referee learns \(\bar{\mathbf {X}}\) after receiving \(O(\mathop {{\text {poly}}}(k) \cdot N^k)\) field elements. The term \(w \mathrel {:=}c - \langle \mathbf {B},\mathbf {x}_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathbf {x}_k \rangle \) equals the sum of all entries in \(\mathbf {W}\mathrel {:=}\mathbf {C}- \mathbf {B}\circ _\text {p.w.} (\mathbf {x}_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathbf {x}_k)\), where \(\circ _\text {p.w.}\) denotes the point-wise product. In other words, we defines \(\mathbf {W}\in \mathbb F^{N\times \dots \times N}\) as
$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf {W}[i_1,\dots ,i_k] = \mathbf {C}[i_1,\dots ,i_k] - \mathbf {B}[i_1,\dots ,i_k] \mathbf {x}_1[i_1] \dots \mathbf {x}_k[i_k]. \end{aligned}$$Due to the randomness of \(\mathbf {C}\), we know \(\mathbf {W}\) is a randomized encoding of w. Thus, it is equivalent for the first k parties to jointly reveal \(\mathbf {W}\) to the referee. Since every coordinate of \(\mathbf {W}\) can be computed by an arithmetic formula of size O(k), each of them can be revealed by using the Ishai-Kushilevitz PSM protocol [13], which has a communication complexity of \(O(\mathop {{\text {poly}}}(k))\) field elements. The referee learns w after receiving \(O(\mathop {{\text {poly}}}(k) \cdot N^k)\) field elements.
-
The referee outputs \(\langle \bar{\mathbf {X}}, \bar{\mathbf {Y}} \rangle + z + w\).
The correctness of the protocol can be verified in the following equation:
The privacy is guaranteed by the following simulator:
-
Simulate \(\bar{\mathbf {X}}, \bar{\mathbf {Y}}, \mathbf {W}\) as uniform random, since they are one-time-padded by \(\mathbf {A},\mathbf {B},\mathbf {C}\).
-
Given \(\bar{\mathbf {X}}, \bar{\mathbf {Y}}, \mathbf {W}\) and the function output, w, z are uniquely determined since \(w=\sum (\mathbf {W})\) and \(\langle \bar{\mathbf {X}}, \bar{\mathbf {Y}} \rangle + z + w = \text {output}\).
-
Simulate the transcripts of the inner Ishai-Kushilevitz PSM protocols using its own simulator, which takes \(\bar{\mathbf {X}},\mathbf {W}\) as input.
1.2 B.2 The 2-party Variant
In this section, we present an auxiliary PSM protocol that is used as a subroutine by our unbalanced 2-party PSM in Sect. 4.
The functionality is \(\langle \mathbf {x}_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathbf {x}_k, \mathbf {Y} \rangle + s\). It is a 2-party functionality where the first party, namely Alice, has as inputs \(\mathbf {x}_1,\ldots ,\mathbf {x}_k\in \mathbb F^N\) and the second party, namely Bob, has as inputs \(\mathbf {Y}\in \mathbb F^{\smash {\underset{k \text { times}}{N \times \dots \times N}}}\) and \(s\in \mathbb F\). We will present a PSM protocol for this functionality with unbalanced communication complexity, where Alice sends O(kN) field elements and Bob sends \((N+1)^k\) field elements.
As the first step, we consider a harder problem instead. Bob’s input is replaced by a multi-affine function \(f:\mathbb F^N \times \dots \times \mathbb F^N \rightarrow \mathbb F\). Corresponding, the functionality is replaced by \(f(\mathbf {x}_1,\ldots ,\mathbf {x}_k)\). Every multi-affine function f can be uniquely represented by its coefficient tensor \(\mathbf {F}\in \mathbb F^{(N+1)\times \dots \times (N+1)}\) such that for any \(\mathbf {z}_1,\ldots ,\mathbf {z}_k\in \mathbb F^N\),
Here \(\mathbf {z}_i \Vert 1\) denotes the concatenation of \(\mathbf {z}_i\) and 1, which is a dimension-\((N+1)\) vector. Notice that, if we let the “first” \(N \times \dots \times N\) subtensor of \(\mathbf {F}\) equal \(\mathbf {Y}\), let its “last” entry \(\mathbf {F}[N+1,\dots ,N+1] = s\), and let all other entries in \(\mathbf {F}\) be 0, we have
The protocol works as follows:
-
Random \(\mathbf {r}_1, \dots , \mathbf {r}_k\in \mathbb F^N\) and a random multi-affine function g are sampled from the common random string.
-
Alice sends to the referee, for all \(i\in [k]\).
-
Bob computes the multi-affine function g, such that
$$ g(\mathbf {z}_1, \dots , \mathbf {z}_k) \mathrel {:=}f(\mathbf {z}_1 - \mathbf {r}_1, \dots , \mathbf {z}_k - \mathbf {r}_k). $$Bob sends \(\bar{g} = g + h\) to the referee.
-
Alice additionally sends to the referee.
-
The referee outputs .
The correctness follows directly from the following equation:
The privacy is guaranteed by the following simulator:
-
Simulate as uniform random, since they are one-time padded by \(\mathbf {r}_1, \dots , \mathbf {r}_k, h\).
-
Given and the function output, simulate s by computing s from the equation .
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 International Association for Cryptologic Research
About this paper
Cite this paper
Assouline, L., Liu, T. (2021). Multi-party PSM, Revisited:. In: Nissim, K., Waters, B. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13043. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-90452-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-90453-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)