Abstract
This note demonstrates how certain collective decision methods ensure the selection of alternatives which are the closest to win unanimously. By using four different functions for measuring the distance between preference profiles, we obtain the equivalence between the closeness to unanimity procedure (CUP) and the Borda method, the plurality rule, the probabilistic Borda rule and the L-procedure respectively.
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Nitzan, S. Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications. Theor Decis 13, 129–138 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134214
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134214