Abstract
A multiparty protocol to compute a function f(x 1, ..., x n ) operates as follows: each of n processors holds an input x i , and jointly they must compute and reveal f(x 1, ..., x n ) without revealing any additional information about the inputs. The processors are connected by secure communication lines but some number of processors may be corrupted by a resource-unbounded adversary that may attempt to interfere with the protocol or to gain extra information. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård have given protocols tolerating faults in t<n/3 processors. We improve the bound to t<n/2; as long as a majority remains uncorrupted, general and secure computations are achievable. To address and prove the security of our results, we introduce concise definitions for security and fault-tolerance. In particular, our notion of relative resilience—a means to compare the security and fault-tolerance of one protocol with that of another in a formal manner—provides a key tool for understanding and proving protocol security.
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This research was supported in part under NSF Grant CCR-870-4513. This work was done while the author was a graduate student at Harvard University.
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Beaver, D. Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority. J. Cryptology 4, 75–122 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00196771
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00196771