Abstract
The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism. A relationship between this solution concept and the sequential Nash equilibrium for an associated extended game is established. This correspondence result, which can be related to previous results obtained by Başar and Haurie (1984), is then used for studying the existence of such solutions in a class of sequential games. For the zero-sum case, the sequential Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a sequential maxmin equilibrium. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of this particular case of equilibrium.
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Communicated by G. Leitmann
This research was supported by SSHRC Grant No. 410-83-1012, NSERC Grant No. A4952, and FCAR Grants Nos. 86-CE-130 and EQ-0428.
The authors thank T. R. Bielecki and J. A. Filar, who pointed out some mistakes and helped improving the paper.
At the time of this research, this author was with GERMA, Ecole Mohammedia d'Ingénieurs, Rabat, Morocco.
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Breton, M., Alj, A. & Haurie, A. Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games. J Optim Theory Appl 59, 71–97 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00939867
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00939867