Abstract
We compute a decomposition for the space of cooperative TU-games under the action of the symmetric group S n . In particular we identify all irreducible subspaces that are relevant to the study of symmetric linear solutions – namely those that are isomorphic to the irreducible summands of \(\mathbb{R}^n\). We then use such decomposition to derive, in a very economical way, some old and some new results for linear symmetric solutions.
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Hernández-Lamoneda, L., Juárez, R. & Sánchez-Sánchez, F. Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques. Int J Game Theory 35, 395–426 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0036-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0036-3