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Rationing in the presence of baselines

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Abstract

We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this general model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care sector, water distribution in drought periods). We introduce (and characterize) a natural class of allocation methods for this model. Any method within the class is associated with a rule in the standard rationing model, and we show that if the latter obeys some focal properties, the former obeys them too.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Rolighedsvej 25, 1958, Frederiksberg C, Denmark

    Jens Leth Hougaard

  2. Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, Spain

    Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

  3. CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

  4. Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Lars Peter Østerdal

Authors
  1. Jens Leth Hougaard
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  2. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
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  3. Lars Peter Østerdal
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Correspondence to Jens Leth Hougaard.

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Hougaard, J.L., Moreno-Ternero, J.D. & Østerdal, L.P. Rationing in the presence of baselines. Soc Choice Welf 40, 1047–1066 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0664-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0664-4

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