I studied for an undergraduate degree in Philosophy at City University (London) and then for a DPhil at Oxford. My research interests are mainly in the Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics. I’m interested in the nature of consciousness and its relationship with the rest of the universe, and have a particular fascination with the unity of consciousness – and its temporal features in particular. Another of my main research-areas is the nature of the self, and its relationship with consciousness. I’m also interested in the various metaphysical implications associated with time and space, as well as the philosophical implications of advances in science and technology.
I’ve published four books so far: Stream of Consciousness (Routledge 2000, 2nd edition 2008), Time and Space (Acumen 2001, 2nd edition Routledge 2010), The Phenomenal Self (Oxford University Press, 2008), and Self (Penguin, 2014). I’ve also co-edited (with Howard Robinson) The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy (Bloomsbury 2014) Phone: +44(0)794 2792 Address: Department of Philosophy, Mulberry Court, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 7ZY
Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and sc... more Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and scholars from affiliated disciplines, this collection of essays offers important and timely insights into the pasts, presents, and, above all, possible futures of Artificial Intelligence. This book covers topics such as ethics and morality, identity and selfhood, and broader issues about AI, addressing questions about the individual, social, and existential impacts of such technologies. Through the works of science fiction authors such as Isaac Asimov, Stanislaw Lem, Ann Leckie, Iain M. Banks, and Martha Wells, alongside key visual productions such as Ex Machina, Westworld, and Her, contributions illustrate how science fiction might inform potential futures as well as acting as a springboard to bring disciplinary knowledge to bear on significant developments of Artificial Intelligence. Addressing a broad, interdisciplinary audience, both expert and non-expert readers gain an in-depth understanding of the wide range of pressing issues to which Artificial Intelligence gives rise, and the ways in which science fiction narratives have been used to represent them. Using science fiction in this manner enables readers to see how even fictional worlds and imagined futures have very real impacts on how we understand these technologies. As such, readers are introduced to theoretical positions on Artificial Intelligence through fictional works as well as encouraged to reflect on the diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence through its many philosophical, social, legal, scientific, and cultural ramifications
The Hitchhiker’s Guide series contains a wealth of brilliant and arresting inventions, many of wh... more The Hitchhiker’s Guide series contains a wealth of brilliant and arresting inventions, many of which are philosophically intriguing. The argument from the Babel fish to the non-existence of God might be thought comparable with many in the theological literature.1 Then there is the Hooloovoo, a ‘super-intelligent shade of blue’ (Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, chapter 4). Since intelligence is a remarkable and sophisticated phenomenon one might suppose that to possess intelligence a thing needs to possess inherent complexity — which a shade of blue manifestly lacks. But this reasoning is contestable. According to one venerable and still influential tradition, our own minds are housed in immaterial souls: things which lack internal complexity but not (presumably) intelligence.2
Henri Bergson (1859–1941) introduced his concept of durée or “duration” (also durée pure, or duré... more Henri Bergson (1859–1941) introduced his concept of durée or “duration” (also durée pure, or durée réelle) in his first book, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (English translation Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness) in 1889. As a first approximation, durée just is experienced change and succession as we find it in our immediate experience – though (as we shall see) it has other distinctive features as well. The concept of durée remained at the centre of Bergson’s philosophy, as this was elaborated in subsequent major works: Matière et Mémoire (1896) (Matter and Memory), L’Évolution Créatrice (1907) (Creative Evolution), Durée et Simultanéité (1922) (Duration and Simultaneity) and La Pensée et le Mouvant (1934) (The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics).
Although many find it hard to believe that every physical thing—no matter how simple or small—inv... more Although many find it hard to believe that every physical thing—no matter how simple or small—involves some form of consciousness, panpsychists offer the reassurance that their claims are perfectly compatible with everything physics has to say about the physical world. This is because although physics has a lot to say about causal and structural properties it has nothing to say about the intrinsic natures of physical things, and if physics is silent in this regard it is perfectly possible that everything physical has an experiential intrinsic nature. Following in Thomas Nagel’s footsteps, panpsychists have also argued that by revealing that everything is composed of the same fundamental ingredients, physics provides grounds for holding that if any physical things (e.g. our neural processes) have an experiential intrinsic nature then all must. My main contention in this paper is that the relationship between physics and panpsychism is considerably more complex than panpsychists have tended to assume. Nagel’s reasoning may be sound in the context of simplistic atomic theories which posit just one kind of fundamental particle. However, it begins to look distinctly dubious in the context of the diverse range of primitive entities that are to be found in the Standard Model of particle physics. Galen Strawson has suggested that mass-energy interconvertibility should be regarded as evidence that everything physical has the same intrinsic nature. I suggest Strawson’s claim relies on a dubious construal of the nature of energy. Special relativity is another of the cornerstones of contemporary physics, and it too makes life difficult for panpsychists, a fact which emerges when we consider what it would like to be a ray of light. However in this case I suggest that there is an interesting—if radical—move open to the panpsychist: they can simply deny that light exists. To conclude I briefly consider whether what QCD has revealed about the nature of mass poses a problem for panpsychism.
Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and sc... more Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and scholars from affiliated disciplines, this collection of essays offers important and timely insights into the pasts, presents, and, above all, possible futures of Artificial Intelligence. This book covers topics such as ethics and morality, identity and selfhood, and broader issues about AI, addressing questions about the individual, social, and existential impacts of such technologies. Through the works of science fiction authors such as Isaac Asimov, Stanislaw Lem, Ann Leckie, Iain M. Banks, and Martha Wells, alongside key visual productions such as Ex Machina, Westworld, and Her, contributions illustrate how science fiction might inform potential futures as well as acting as a springboard to bring disciplinary knowledge to bear on significant developments of Artificial Intelligence. Addressing a broad, interdisciplinary audience, both expert and non-expert readers gain an in-depth understanding of the wide range of pressing issues to which Artificial Intelligence gives rise, and the ways in which science fiction narratives have been used to represent them. Using science fiction in this manner enables readers to see how even fictional worlds and imagined futures have very real impacts on how we understand these technologies. As such, readers are introduced to theoretical positions on Artificial Intelligence through fictional works as well as encouraged to reflect on the diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence through its many philosophical, social, legal, scientific, and cultural ramifications
The Hitchhiker’s Guide series contains a wealth of brilliant and arresting inventions, many of wh... more The Hitchhiker’s Guide series contains a wealth of brilliant and arresting inventions, many of which are philosophically intriguing. The argument from the Babel fish to the non-existence of God might be thought comparable with many in the theological literature.1 Then there is the Hooloovoo, a ‘super-intelligent shade of blue’ (Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, chapter 4). Since intelligence is a remarkable and sophisticated phenomenon one might suppose that to possess intelligence a thing needs to possess inherent complexity — which a shade of blue manifestly lacks. But this reasoning is contestable. According to one venerable and still influential tradition, our own minds are housed in immaterial souls: things which lack internal complexity but not (presumably) intelligence.2
Henri Bergson (1859–1941) introduced his concept of durée or “duration” (also durée pure, or duré... more Henri Bergson (1859–1941) introduced his concept of durée or “duration” (also durée pure, or durée réelle) in his first book, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (English translation Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness) in 1889. As a first approximation, durée just is experienced change and succession as we find it in our immediate experience – though (as we shall see) it has other distinctive features as well. The concept of durée remained at the centre of Bergson’s philosophy, as this was elaborated in subsequent major works: Matière et Mémoire (1896) (Matter and Memory), L’Évolution Créatrice (1907) (Creative Evolution), Durée et Simultanéité (1922) (Duration and Simultaneity) and La Pensée et le Mouvant (1934) (The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics).
Although many find it hard to believe that every physical thing—no matter how simple or small—inv... more Although many find it hard to believe that every physical thing—no matter how simple or small—involves some form of consciousness, panpsychists offer the reassurance that their claims are perfectly compatible with everything physics has to say about the physical world. This is because although physics has a lot to say about causal and structural properties it has nothing to say about the intrinsic natures of physical things, and if physics is silent in this regard it is perfectly possible that everything physical has an experiential intrinsic nature. Following in Thomas Nagel’s footsteps, panpsychists have also argued that by revealing that everything is composed of the same fundamental ingredients, physics provides grounds for holding that if any physical things (e.g. our neural processes) have an experiential intrinsic nature then all must. My main contention in this paper is that the relationship between physics and panpsychism is considerably more complex than panpsychists have tended to assume. Nagel’s reasoning may be sound in the context of simplistic atomic theories which posit just one kind of fundamental particle. However, it begins to look distinctly dubious in the context of the diverse range of primitive entities that are to be found in the Standard Model of particle physics. Galen Strawson has suggested that mass-energy interconvertibility should be regarded as evidence that everything physical has the same intrinsic nature. I suggest Strawson’s claim relies on a dubious construal of the nature of energy. Special relativity is another of the cornerstones of contemporary physics, and it too makes life difficult for panpsychists, a fact which emerges when we consider what it would like to be a ray of light. However in this case I suggest that there is an interesting—if radical—move open to the panpsychist: they can simply deny that light exists. To conclude I briefly consider whether what QCD has revealed about the nature of mass poses a problem for panpsychism.
Provided there is suitable illumination a mirror will more or less accurately reflect its environ... more Provided there is suitable illumination a mirror will more or less accurately reflect its environment: the light reflecting from its surface will represent its surroundings. In doing so, the mirror will-typically-not represent itself. However, under certain circumstances a mirror can do so: all you need do is hold another mirror in front of it. According to the account of subjects Christopher Peacocke elaborates over the course of his book, subjects are analogous. Their conscious states will normally represent their surroundings, but in doing so will often not represent themselves. However, some subjects do have the ability to represent themselves, and different subjects can do so in different ways. Peacocke's account of subjects is in many ways an appealing one (or at least I found it so), but also complex and multi-layered. In the most fundamental move made in the book, he takes subjects and their experiences to be ontologically basic, but also interdependent.
Leslie's new book supplies some bold answers to some big questions. The position he develops is a... more Leslie's new book supplies some bold answers to some big questions. The position he develops is an interesting one; although there is much that is speculative, the speculation is not groundless, but is invariably supported by argument, even if not all of the arguments are as polished or as precise as one might like. Leslie is well aware that his cosmology will strike many contemporary readers as bizarre, but this does not mean that it is wrong, or should be ignored. Even if it is wrong, it might well be wrong for interesting reasons, and in locating these reasons, we will be learning something about what the ultimate options might be.
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