In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB... more In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB) website was changed from 'Our mission is to serve Europe's citizens' to 'Our mission is to serve the people of Europe'. This article situates this discursive shift within a broader change of the ECB's self-presentation in public discourses and explores its meaning in terms of political theory and public law. The article argues that the shift represents a response to the perceived necessity of reimagining the ECB's foundation of legitimate governmental authority following its exercise of emergency powers during the Euro crisis. The discourse emphasizes an organic link between the ECB and 'the people of Europe' as a political subject able to authorize previously unauthorized governmental practices such as the outright monetary transactions programme. It reflects, furthermore , a new governing philosophy that stresses flexibility and discretion rather than strict adherence to rules in the ECB's exercise of power.
This is the report of a hearing that took place on 27 November, 2015, at the LSE. Participants we... more This is the report of a hearing that took place on 27 November, 2015, at the LSE. Participants were invited for their expertise on financial regulation and European integration, not for any particular views they hold about Britain’s relationship to the European Union.1 We are extremely grateful for the constructive debate in which the participants of the hearing engaged as well as for the feedback we received on a first draft. These contributions were given on a personal basis and should not be attributed to the respective organisations. The report also benefited greatly from background information generously provided by Professor Niamh Moloney from the LSE Law department before and after the hearing. Marion Osborne provided excellent organisational support. David Spence helped us greatly with the final drafting. Any remaining errors are our responsibility.
Will central bank independence in the UK fall as a consequence of Brexit? As Hjalte Lokdam (LSE) ... more Will central bank independence in the UK fall as a consequence of Brexit? As Hjalte Lokdam (LSE) explains, Brexit represents a political shift that is likely to affect the structure of the British governmental apparatus. The role of the executive will undoubtedly be strengthened, and if the already considerable difficulties associated with exiting the EU are compounded by a recession, an either Conservative or Labour government may find it expedient to thwart the independence of the UK's central bank.
This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the Eur... more This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its management of the Euro Crisis. Based on a genealogical analysis, the thesis identifies the central normative commitments undergirding the insulation of monetary policy from ordinary democratic politics. It argues that central bank independence is an institutional response to the ‘problem of politics’ in relation to money: the problem that money is simultaneously founded on political authority and fundamentally threatened by the ordinary exercise of this authority. Central bank independence, then, constitutes a way of grounding the value of money politically while at the same time depoliticising its government. The form that central bank independence takes in practice, however, differs substantially, reflecting different ways of wedding the idea to broader constitutional imaginaries. Drawing comparisons to other major central banks, the thesis details the ...
At least since the French Revolution, the idea of constituent power has been used to indicate the... more At least since the French Revolution, the idea of constituent power has been used to indicate the power the people have to create legal-political orders. As such, the history of constituent power is deeply tied to the principle of popular power and, through it, to the history of democracy, to its theory and to its practice. Not only does constituent power point to the process through which a democratic polity is instituted via procedures of constitution-making. It also acts as a reminder that the source of constitutional normativity lies in the will of the people. As a result,
The European Central Bank was established 20 years ago today on 1 June 1998. To mark the annivers... more The European Central Bank was established 20 years ago today on 1 June 1998. To mark the anniversary, we asked five academics to give their views on the lessons learned from two decades of the ECB, and their predictions on what might lie in store for both the ECB and the euro over the next 20 years.
The original constitution of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rested on a neoliberal approach to... more The original constitution of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rested on a neoliberal approach to interstate federalism a la Hayek. This approach appealed to political elites at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, promising to overcome the so-called ‘crisis of governability’ of the 1970s and early 1980s by constraining the capacity of Member States to respond to democratic demands, without at the same time constructing a comprehensive governmental apparatus at the European level. The original EMU thus sought to delink democratic legitimation from governmental capacity and to constrain what capacity was left. The Eurozone Crisis, however, introduced a ‘crisis of ungovernability,’ revealing that the original constitutional framework had failed in several respects. In efforts to salvage it, European and domestic political elites and institutions sought to correct the capacity deficit but only while imposing, in an authoritarian fashion, neoliberal policies and reforms. While early signs...
This paper argues that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created at Maastricht conformed to t... more This paper argues that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created at Maastricht conformed to the neoliberal theory of interstate federalism in seeking to constitute structural conditions that circumscribed the effective exercise of activist public authority at both the Member State and European level. A response to a perceived ‘crisis of governability,’ it was designed to address the problem of excessive, and ineffective, governmental interventions in economic matters. By separating monetary and fiscal policy, the EMU ensured that no single public authority at the Member State or European level could control all the main levers of economic government. The Eurozone Crisis challenged this construct by emphasising the need for a coherent and effective exercise of public authority. The problem was thus no longer an excess of government but the absence of effective governmental authority for the EMU as a whole. Eurozone Crisis reforms introduced a greater scope for federal interventions in the domestic affairs of Member States and such reforms have elicited a new constitutional imaginary, expressed by European elites, that emphasises the need to generate ‘European sovereignty.’ This imaginary departs radically from the original EMU by foreseeing an omnicompetent European governmental apparatus that is able to intervene in, and control, economic developments across the Union in accordance with political objectives. The constitutional imaginary of the EMU can thus no longer meaningfully be called neoliberal. The early response to the Covid-19 Crisis, furthermore, highlights that the objectives pursued under the reformed EMU may depart from the set of policies traditionally associated with neoliberalism. What it should be called instead, however, remains unclear.
In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB) websit... more In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB) website was changed from 'Our mission is to serve Europe's citizens' to 'Our mission is to serve the people of Europe'. This article situates this discursive shift within a broader change of the ECB's self-presentation in public discourses and explores its meaning in terms of political theory and public law. The article argues that the shift represents a response to the perceived necessity of reimagining the ECB's foundation of legitimate governmental authority following its exercise of emergency powers during the Euro crisis. The discourse emphasizes an organic link between the ECB and 'the people of Europe' as a political subject able to authorize previously unauthorized governmental practices such as the outright monetary transactions programme. It reflects, furthermore , a new governing philosophy that stresses flexibility and discretion rather than strict adherence to rules in the ECB's exercise of power.
In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB... more In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB) website was changed from 'Our mission is to serve Europe's citizens' to 'Our mission is to serve the people of Europe'. This article situates this discursive shift within a broader change of the ECB's self-presentation in public discourses and explores its meaning in terms of political theory and public law. The article argues that the shift represents a response to the perceived necessity of reimagining the ECB's foundation of legitimate governmental authority following its exercise of emergency powers during the Euro crisis. The discourse emphasizes an organic link between the ECB and 'the people of Europe' as a political subject able to authorize previously unauthorized governmental practices such as the outright monetary transactions programme. It reflects, furthermore , a new governing philosophy that stresses flexibility and discretion rather than strict adherence to rules in the ECB's exercise of power.
This is the report of a hearing that took place on 27 November, 2015, at the LSE. Participants we... more This is the report of a hearing that took place on 27 November, 2015, at the LSE. Participants were invited for their expertise on financial regulation and European integration, not for any particular views they hold about Britain’s relationship to the European Union.1 We are extremely grateful for the constructive debate in which the participants of the hearing engaged as well as for the feedback we received on a first draft. These contributions were given on a personal basis and should not be attributed to the respective organisations. The report also benefited greatly from background information generously provided by Professor Niamh Moloney from the LSE Law department before and after the hearing. Marion Osborne provided excellent organisational support. David Spence helped us greatly with the final drafting. Any remaining errors are our responsibility.
Will central bank independence in the UK fall as a consequence of Brexit? As Hjalte Lokdam (LSE) ... more Will central bank independence in the UK fall as a consequence of Brexit? As Hjalte Lokdam (LSE) explains, Brexit represents a political shift that is likely to affect the structure of the British governmental apparatus. The role of the executive will undoubtedly be strengthened, and if the already considerable difficulties associated with exiting the EU are compounded by a recession, an either Conservative or Labour government may find it expedient to thwart the independence of the UK's central bank.
This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the Eur... more This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its management of the Euro Crisis. Based on a genealogical analysis, the thesis identifies the central normative commitments undergirding the insulation of monetary policy from ordinary democratic politics. It argues that central bank independence is an institutional response to the ‘problem of politics’ in relation to money: the problem that money is simultaneously founded on political authority and fundamentally threatened by the ordinary exercise of this authority. Central bank independence, then, constitutes a way of grounding the value of money politically while at the same time depoliticising its government. The form that central bank independence takes in practice, however, differs substantially, reflecting different ways of wedding the idea to broader constitutional imaginaries. Drawing comparisons to other major central banks, the thesis details the ...
At least since the French Revolution, the idea of constituent power has been used to indicate the... more At least since the French Revolution, the idea of constituent power has been used to indicate the power the people have to create legal-political orders. As such, the history of constituent power is deeply tied to the principle of popular power and, through it, to the history of democracy, to its theory and to its practice. Not only does constituent power point to the process through which a democratic polity is instituted via procedures of constitution-making. It also acts as a reminder that the source of constitutional normativity lies in the will of the people. As a result,
The European Central Bank was established 20 years ago today on 1 June 1998. To mark the annivers... more The European Central Bank was established 20 years ago today on 1 June 1998. To mark the anniversary, we asked five academics to give their views on the lessons learned from two decades of the ECB, and their predictions on what might lie in store for both the ECB and the euro over the next 20 years.
The original constitution of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rested on a neoliberal approach to... more The original constitution of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rested on a neoliberal approach to interstate federalism a la Hayek. This approach appealed to political elites at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, promising to overcome the so-called ‘crisis of governability’ of the 1970s and early 1980s by constraining the capacity of Member States to respond to democratic demands, without at the same time constructing a comprehensive governmental apparatus at the European level. The original EMU thus sought to delink democratic legitimation from governmental capacity and to constrain what capacity was left. The Eurozone Crisis, however, introduced a ‘crisis of ungovernability,’ revealing that the original constitutional framework had failed in several respects. In efforts to salvage it, European and domestic political elites and institutions sought to correct the capacity deficit but only while imposing, in an authoritarian fashion, neoliberal policies and reforms. While early signs...
This paper argues that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created at Maastricht conformed to t... more This paper argues that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created at Maastricht conformed to the neoliberal theory of interstate federalism in seeking to constitute structural conditions that circumscribed the effective exercise of activist public authority at both the Member State and European level. A response to a perceived ‘crisis of governability,’ it was designed to address the problem of excessive, and ineffective, governmental interventions in economic matters. By separating monetary and fiscal policy, the EMU ensured that no single public authority at the Member State or European level could control all the main levers of economic government. The Eurozone Crisis challenged this construct by emphasising the need for a coherent and effective exercise of public authority. The problem was thus no longer an excess of government but the absence of effective governmental authority for the EMU as a whole. Eurozone Crisis reforms introduced a greater scope for federal interventions in the domestic affairs of Member States and such reforms have elicited a new constitutional imaginary, expressed by European elites, that emphasises the need to generate ‘European sovereignty.’ This imaginary departs radically from the original EMU by foreseeing an omnicompetent European governmental apparatus that is able to intervene in, and control, economic developments across the Union in accordance with political objectives. The constitutional imaginary of the EMU can thus no longer meaningfully be called neoliberal. The early response to the Covid-19 Crisis, furthermore, highlights that the objectives pursued under the reformed EMU may depart from the set of policies traditionally associated with neoliberalism. What it should be called instead, however, remains unclear.
In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB) websit... more In the wake of the Euro crisis, the mission statement on the European Central Bank's (ECB) website was changed from 'Our mission is to serve Europe's citizens' to 'Our mission is to serve the people of Europe'. This article situates this discursive shift within a broader change of the ECB's self-presentation in public discourses and explores its meaning in terms of political theory and public law. The article argues that the shift represents a response to the perceived necessity of reimagining the ECB's foundation of legitimate governmental authority following its exercise of emergency powers during the Euro crisis. The discourse emphasizes an organic link between the ECB and 'the people of Europe' as a political subject able to authorize previously unauthorized governmental practices such as the outright monetary transactions programme. It reflects, furthermore , a new governing philosophy that stresses flexibility and discretion rather than strict adherence to rules in the ECB's exercise of power.
This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the Eur... more This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its management of the Euro Crisis. Based on a genealogical analysis, the thesis identifies the central normative commitments undergirding the insulation of monetary policy from ordinary democratic politics. It argues that central bank independence is an institutional response to the ‘problem of politics’ in relation to money: the problem that money is simultaneously founded on political authority and fundamentally threatened by the ordinary exercise of this authority. Central bank independence, then, constitutes a way of grounding the value of money politically while at the same time depoliticising its government. The form that central bank independence takes in practice, however, differs substantially, reflecting different ways of wedding the idea to broader constitutional imaginaries. Drawing comparisons to other major central banks, the thesis details the ECB’s form of independence and argues that the creation of the ECB not as a government agency (as the Fed) or a societal power on a par with the government (as the Bundesbank), but as a sovereign representative on a par with the Member States altered the constitutional make-up of the Eurozone. As the existential crisis of the euro shows, general tensions within central bank independence become irresolvable contradictions in this constitutional construct. Without institutional mechanisms for resolving them through ordinary politics, the emergency politics of the Euro Crisis placed the ECB centre-stage, engaged in the ‘higher lawmaking’ of changing the Eurozone’s constitution in order to save it. In doing so, however, the ECB redefined the meaning of its independence and reignited ‘the problem of politics’ by undermining its underlying social contract.
Uploads
Papers by Hjalte Lokdam
such reforms have elicited a new constitutional imaginary, expressed by European elites, that emphasises the need to generate ‘European sovereignty.’ This imaginary departs radically from the original EMU by foreseeing an omnicompetent European governmental apparatus that is able to intervene in, and control, economic developments across the Union in accordance with political objectives. The constitutional imaginary of the EMU can thus no longer meaningfully be called neoliberal. The early response to the Covid-19 Crisis, furthermore, highlights that the objectives pursued under the reformed EMU may depart from the set of policies traditionally associated with neoliberalism. What it should be called instead, however, remains unclear.
such reforms have elicited a new constitutional imaginary, expressed by European elites, that emphasises the need to generate ‘European sovereignty.’ This imaginary departs radically from the original EMU by foreseeing an omnicompetent European governmental apparatus that is able to intervene in, and control, economic developments across the Union in accordance with political objectives. The constitutional imaginary of the EMU can thus no longer meaningfully be called neoliberal. The early response to the Covid-19 Crisis, furthermore, highlights that the objectives pursued under the reformed EMU may depart from the set of policies traditionally associated with neoliberalism. What it should be called instead, however, remains unclear.